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Talk:2020–2021 China–India skirmishes

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Former good article nominee2020–2021 China–India skirmishes was a Warfare good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There may be suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake.
Article milestones
DateProcessResult
July 24, 2020Good article nomineeNot listed
In the newsA news item involving this article was featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the "In the news" column on June 16, 2020.

Some sources

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  • Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via Questia
  • Garver, John W. (2006), "China's Decision for War with India in 1962", in Robert S. Ross (ed.), New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, ISBN 978-0-8047-5363-0, archived from the original (PDF) on 28 August 2017
  • Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990), India and the China Crisis, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6
  • Lamb, Alastair (1964), The China-India border, Oxford University Press
  • Lintner, Bertil (2018), China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-909163-8
  • Maxwell, Neville (1970), India's China War, Pantheon Books, ISBN 978-0-394-47051-1
  • Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
  • Woodman, Dorothy (1969), Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries, Praeger – via archive.org

Territorial changes source

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This article reports that "A summer of fighting saw India lose control over about 300 square kilometers of land along the disputed mountainous terrain". It has amazing 3D maps of the territorial changes.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-11-01/china-gained-ground-on-india-during-bloody-summer-in-himalayas

Disengaged complete

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https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-complete-border-disengagement-depsang-demchok-ladakh-9646221/ N0riooo (talk) 11:24, 31 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]


https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/patrolling-starts-indo-china-border-disengagement-completes-line-of-actual-control-lac-ladakh-2626011-2024-10-31


https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/India/patrolling-starts-at-indo-china-border-as-disengagement-complete-sources/ar-AA1tfLdF — Preceding unsigned comment added by N0riooo (talk • contribs) 11:28, 31 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Effect of the October 2024 agreement on territorial changes

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Under the October 2024 agreement between India and China, disengagement has been agreed only in Depsang and Demchok, Ladakh.

This is only with respect to the last two remaining friction points — Depsang and Demchok — and there is no change in status at the other friction points where buffer zones were set up since the disengagement from 2020-2022.
Former diplomats and military officers also advised caution on the continued presence of buffer zones which are in the Indian territory.

— The Hindu, 27 Oct 2024

The buffer zones set up in Indian territory after the skirmishes of 2020 still remain inaccessible for India.

The two armies had established no-patrol buffer zones ranging from 3 km to 10 km, primarily on the Indian side of the LAC.
While there is now an agreement on patrolling rights in the Depsang Plains and Demchok, sources indicate that the situation at other friction points—such as those in the Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso, where troop disengagement occurred two years ago alongside the establishment of buffer zones – will remain unchanged.

— Bharat Shakti, 22 Oct 2024

While there was agreement on patrolling rights in Depsang Plains and Demchok, sources said the situation at the other friction points — in Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso — where disengagement of troops was achieved two years ago with creation of buffer zones would remain the same.

— Indian Express, 22 Oct 2024

Those buffer zones at Galwan, north bank of Pangong Tso, the Kailash Range and the larger Gogra-Hot Springs area, varying from 3-km to 10-km, are largely on what India considers to be its own territory.

— Times of India, 26 Oct 2024

The frictions between the two sides in the Depsang Plains and Demchok region have long been regarded as "legacy issues" predating the Chinese incursions of 2020.

— Business Standard, 22 Oct 2024

The assertion that the pre-2020 status has been reached along the entire border is false.

The pact does not include the buffer zones that were earlier created by altering the status quo at multiple transgression points, including the Galwan Valley where Chinese troops had killed 20 Indian soldiers in 2020.
It is very clear that the minister and the government are trying to keep the domestic audience in good humour by making such unsubstantiated claims. India had ceded further territory to the Chinese under the earlier agreements by creating buffer zones within India-claimed lines instead of insisting on a return to the pre-transgression status quo of April 2020.

— The Telegraph, 26 Oct 2024

Based on the above, the description in the infobox that speaks about the the territorial changes that have happened since 2020 should not be reomved from the article. The Discoverer (talk) 08:05, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

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