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Budapest Memorandum

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Budapest Memorandum
on Security Assurances
Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with the Republic of Belarus'/Republic of Kazakhstan's/Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
U.S. President Clinton, Russian President Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President Kravchuk after signing the Trilateral Statement in Moscow on 14 January 1994
Signed5 December 1994 (1994-12-05)
LocationBudapest, Hungary
Original
signatories
Languages
Full text at Wikisource

The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances comprises three substantially identical political agreements signed at the OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary, on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories relating to the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The three memoranda were originally signed by three nuclear powers: Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom.[1] China and France gave somewhat weaker individual assurances in separate documents.[2]

The memoranda, signed in Patria Hall at the Budapest Convention Center with US Ambassador Donald M. Blinken amongst others in attendance,[3] prohibited Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, "except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." As a result of other agreements and the memorandum, between 1993 and 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons.[4][5]

Content

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According to the three memoranda,[6] Russia, the US and the UK confirmed their recognition of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine becoming parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and effectively removing all Soviet nuclear weapons from their soil, and that they agreed to the following:

  1. Respect the signatory's independence and sovereignty in the existing borders (in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act).[7]
  2. Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the signatories to the memorandum, and undertake that none of their weapons will ever be used against these countries, except in cases of self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
  3. Refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus and Kazakhstan of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
  4. Seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to the signatory if they "should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used".
  5. Not to use nuclear weapons against any non - nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.[8][9][10]
  6. Consult with one another if questions arise regarding those commitments.[11][12]

History

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When Ukraine became an independent state in December 1991, President Kravchuk signed agreements in Minsk and Almaty giving operational control over the nuclear forces on its territory to the new Commonwealth of Independent States based in Moscow.[4][13][14][importance?][non-primary source needed] Until Ukraine transferred the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, it held the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile,[15][16] of which Ukraine had physical but no effective operational control. Russia controlled the codes needed to operate the nuclear weapons through electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system, although this could not be a complete guarantee against Ukrainian access as the weapons could feasibly be manually accessed so Ukraine could eventually gain operational control over them.[17][18][14][importance?][non-primary source needed] Belarus only had mobile missile launchers, and Kazakhstan had chosen to quickly give up its nuclear warheads and missiles to Russia. Ukraine went through a period of internal debate on their approach.[4][19]

Preliminaries

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On 23 May 1992, Russia, the U.S., Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol to the START I treaty, ahead of ratifying the treaty later. The protocol committed Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states as soon as possible. However, the terms for the transfer of the nuclear warheads were not agreed, and some Ukrainian officials and parliamentarians started to discuss the possibility of retaining some of the modern Ukrainian built RT-23 (SS-24) missiles and Soviet built warheads.[19][20]

In 1993, two regiments of UR-100N (SS-19) missiles in Ukraine were withdrawn to storage because warhead components were past their operational life, and Ukraine's political leadership realised that Ukraine could not become a credible nuclear military force as they could not maintain the warheads and ensure long term nuclear safety. Later in 1993, the Ukrainian and Russian governments signed a series of bilateral agreements giving up Ukrainian claims to the nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet, in return for $2.5 billion of gas and oil debt cancellation and future supplies of fuel for its nuclear power reactors. Ukraine agreed to ratify the START I and NPT treaties promptly. This caused severe public criticism leading to the resignation of Ukrainian Defence Minister Morozov.[4] On 18 November 1993, the Rada passed a motion agreeing to START I but renouncing the Lisbon Protocol, suggesting Ukraine would only decommission 36% of missile launchers and 42% of the warheads on its territory, and demanded financial compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons removed in 1992. This caused U.S. diplomatic consternation, and the following day Ukrainian President Kravchuk said "we must get rid of [these nuclear weapons]. This is my viewpoint from which I have not and will not deviate." He then brought a new proposal to the Rada.[19][20]

Yeltsin and Clinton news conference, 14 January 1994

On 15 December 1993, U.S. Vice President Al Gore visited Moscow for a meeting. Following side discussions, a U.S and Russian delegation, including U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, flew to Ukraine to agree to the outlines of a trilateral agreement including U.S. assistance in dismantling the nuclear systems in Ukraine and compensation for the uranium in nuclear warheads. Participants were invited to Washington on 3–4 January to finalise the agreement. A Trilateral Statement with a detailed annex was agreed, based on the previously agreed terms but with detailed financial arrangements and a firm commitment to an early start to the transfer of at least 200 warheads to Russia and the production in Russia of nuclear reactor fuel for Ukraine. Warheads would be removed from all RT-23s (SS-24) within 10 months. However Ukraine did not want a commitment to transfer all warheads by 1 June 1996 to be made public for domestic political reasons, and Russia did not want the financial compensation for uranium made public because they were concerned that Belarus and Kazakhstan would also demand this. It was decided to exclude these two matters from the published agreement, but cover them in private letters between the countries' presidents.

Another key point was that U.S. State Department lawyers made a distinction between "security guarantee" and "security assurance", referring to the security guarantees that were desired by Ukraine in exchange for non-proliferation. "Security guarantee" would have implied the use of military force in assisting its non-nuclear parties attacked by an aggressor (such as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for NATO members) while "security assurance" would simply specify the non-violation of these parties' territorial integrity. In the end, a statement was read into the negotiation record that the (according to the U.S. lawyers) lesser sense of the English word "assurance" would be the sole implied translation for all appearances of both terms in all three language versions of the statement.[19]

President Clinton made a courtesy stop at Kyiv on his way to Moscow for the Trilateral Statement signing, only to discover Ukraine was having second thoughts about signing. Clinton told Kravchuk not signing would risk major damage to U.S.-Ukraine relations. After some minor rewording, the Trilateral Statement was signed by the three presidents in Moscow in front of the media on 14 January 1994.[19][21]

The Budapest Memoranda

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On 5 December 1994 to sign the three documents the leaders of the seven nations gathered at the Budapest Congress Center, shown here in a photograph dated October 2015

The "Budapest Memorandum" is actually three documents signed individually on 5 December 1994 by the three leaders of the ex-Soviet nations, together with the guarantor nations: United States, United Kingdom and Russia. So the UNTERM portal notes for one: "To distinguish this from the other two Budapest Memorandums of the same date, this one could be referred to as the 'Budapest Memorandum regarding Kazakhstan'".[22]

Sequels

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Wikisource has original text related to this article:

After this was agreed, the U.S. used its Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programme to provide financial assistance over $300 million (equivalent to $617 million in 2023), and technical assistance in decommissioning the nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which took to 2008 to fully complete.[4] The U.S. also doubled other economic aid to Ukraine to $310 million (equivalent to $637 million in 2023) for 1994.[23]

In 2009, Russia and the United States released a joint statement that the memorandum's security assurances would still be respected after the expiration of the START Treaty.[24]

2013 Belarus sanctions

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In 2013, the government of Belarus complained that American sanctions against it were in breach of Article 3 of the Memorandum. The US government responded that its sanctions were targeted at combating human rights violations and other illicit activities of the government of Belarus and not the population of Belarus.[25]

2014 Russian annexation of Crimea

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Further information: Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation

In February 2014, Russian forces seized or blockaded various airports and other strategic sites throughout Crimea.[26] The troops were attached to the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea,[27] which placed Russia in violation of the Budapest Memorandum. The Russian Foreign Ministry had initially denied the movement of armoured units attached to the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea which led to the troops being labelled "little green men",[28] however after taking full military control over Crimea Russia finally did admit their involvement but asserted that they were acting within the scope of the various agreements between the two countries. Russia responded by staging a so-called "illegal referendum" on whether the Crimea should join it, where the option to remain part of Ukraine and keep the same rights and laws of 2014, as before, was not present. Prior to the referendum Russian military blocked all the opposition TV and media as well as radically put down the rallies for support of Ukraine. There are cases where residents of Crimea were forced to vote under a gunpoint. As a result, the Crimean parliament announced a referendum on Crimea's future in accordance with the law "On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea". On 16 March the referendum was held, on 17 March Crimea declared independence and on 21 March it was incorporated into the Russian Federation. Ukraine vigorously protested the action as a violation of Article 1 of the Budapest Memorandum.

After the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, Canada,[29] France, Germany, Italy, Japan,[30] the UK,[31] and the US[32][33] stated that Russian involvement was a breach of its Budapest Memorandum obligations to Ukraine and in violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. On 1 March the Address of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the Guarantor States in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was published.[34][35]

On 4 March, Russian president Vladimir Putin replied to a question on the violation of the Budapest Memorandum, describing the current Ukrainian situation as a revolution: "a new state arises, but with this state and in respect to this state, we have not signed any obligatory documents."[36] Russia stated that it had never been under obligation to "force any part of Ukraine's civilian population to stay in Ukraine against its will." Russia suggested that the US was in violation of the Budapest Memorandum and described the Euromaidan as a US-instigated coup.[37]

US Secretary of State John Kerry speaks with British Foreign Secretary William Hague and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Deshchytsia after hosting the Budapest Memorandum Ministerial on the Ukraine crisis in Paris, France, on 5 March 2014.

On 24 March, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper led the G7 partners in an ad hoc meeting during the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit for a partial suspension of Russian membership from the G8 due to Russia's breach of the Budapest Memorandum. He said that Ukraine had given up its nuclear weapons "on the basis of an explicit Russian assurance of its territorial integrity. By breaching that assurance, President Putin has provided a rationale for those elsewhere who needed little more than that already furnished by pride or grievance to arm themselves to the teeth." Harper also indicated support for Ukraine by saying he would work with the new Ukrainian government towards a free trade agreement.[38]

In February 2016, Sergey Lavrov claimed, "Russia never violated Budapest memorandum. It contained only one obligation, not to attack Ukraine with nukes."[39] However, Canadian journalist Michael Colborne pointed out that "there are actually six obligations in the Budapest Memorandum, and the first of them is 'to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine'". Colborne also pointed out that a broadcast of Lavrov's claim on the Twitter account of Russia's embassy in the United Kingdom actually "provided a link to the text of the Budapest Memorandum itself with all six obligations, including the ones Russia has clearly violated – right there for everyone to see." Steven Pifer, an American diplomat who was involved in drafting the Budapest Memorandum, later commented on "the mendacity of Russian diplomacy and its contempt for international opinion when the foreign minister says something that can be proven wrong with less than 30 seconds of Google fact-checking?"[40] Russia argued that the United States broke the third point of the agreement by introducing and threatening further sanctions against the Yanukovych government[citation needed].

On 20 April 2016, Ukraine established the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories[41] to manage the occupied parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea regions, which are affected by Russian military intervention of 2014.

Kerch Strait incident

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Main article: Kerch Strait incident

On 25 November 2018, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels after they attempted to transit from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol.[42][43] On 27 November 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine appealed to the signatory states of the Budapest Memorandum to hold urgent consultations to ensure full compliance with the memorandum's commitments and the immediate cessation of Russian aggression against Ukraine.[44][45][46]

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

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Main articles: Russian invasion of Ukraine and Legality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

In 2008 and 2011, Putin expressed the opinion that neither the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine nor the Budapest Memorandum signed by Yeltsin were binding for Russia. In 2014, Putin claimed the Maidan movement and government change radically changed Ukraine into a new entity, toward which Russia has no engagement, allowing the 2014 invasion of Donbass.[47]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has publicly commented on the Budapest Memorandum by arguing that it provides no true guarantee of safety due to Russia's coercive power. On 19 February 2022, at the Munich Security Conference, Zelenskyy said "Since 2014, Ukraine has tried three times to convene consultations with the guarantor states of the Budapest Memorandum [i.e. United States and United Kingdom]. Three times without success. Today Ukraine will do it for the fourth time. ... If they do not happen again or their results do not guarantee security for our country, Ukraine will have every right to believe that the Budapest Memorandum is not working and all the package decisions of 1994 are in doubt."[48] Putin used Zelenskyy's comments as part of his claims that Ukraine could develop nuclear weapons. Critics have disputed Putin's claims.[49] The treaty has since been violated by Russia with its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[50][1] In March 2022, The Conversation argued: "Russia’s invasion of Ukraine today is an even more serious violation and effectively buries Russia’s assurances in the Budapest Memorandum."[51]

Analysis

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Under the agreement the Russian Federation provided security assurances to Ukraine in the form of promising neither to attack nor to threaten to attack them. The other signatories (the United States, United Kingdom and France) pledged non-military support to Ukraine in exchange for its adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The memorandum bundled together a set of assurances that Ukraine had already held from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act, the United Nations Charter and the Non-Proliferation Treaty[2] but the Ukrainian government found it valuable to have these assurances in a Ukraine-specific document.[52][53]

The Budapest Memorandum was negotiated at political level, but it is not entirely clear whether the instrument is devoid entirely of legal provisions. It refers to assurances, but unlike guarantees, it does not impose a legal obligation of military assistance on its parties.[2][53] According to Stephen MacFarlane, a professor of international relations, "It gives signatories justification if they take action, but it does not force anyone to act in Ukraine."[52] In the US, neither the George H. W. Bush administration nor the Clinton administration was prepared to give a military commitment to Ukraine, and they did not believe the US Senate would ratify an international treaty and so the memorandum was adopted in more limited terms.[53] The memorandum has a requirement of consultation among the parties "in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning the ... commitments" set out in the memorandum.[54] Whether or not the memorandum sets out legal obligations, the difficulties that Ukraine has encountered since early 2014 may cast doubt on the credibility of future security assurances that are offered in exchange for nonproliferation commitments.[55] Regardless, the United States publicly maintains that "the Memorandum is not legally binding", calling it a "political commitment".[25]

Ukrainian international law scholars such as Olexander Zadorozhny maintain that the Memorandum is an international treaty because it satisfies the criteria for one, as fixed by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and is "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law".[56]

China and France gave security assurances for Ukraine in separate documents. China's governmental statement of 4 December 1994 did not call for mandatory consultations if questions arose but only for "fair consultations". France's declaration of 5 December 1994 did not mention consultations.[2]

For 20 years, until the 2014 Russian military occupation of regions of Ukraine,[57] the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament was an exemplary case of nuclear non-proliferation. Since the invasions of Ukraine by Russia the wisdom of Ukraine relinquishing its nuclear weapons has been questioned,[1] even by former president Bill Clinton, one of its signatories.[58]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b c Paull, John (2023). War in Ukraine: Treaty to Treachery Archived 10 March 2023 at the Wayback Machine,   in Proceedings of Russia-Ukraine War: Consequences for the World, 3rd International Scientific and Practical Internet Conference, March 2-3, 2023. WayScience, Dnipro, Ukraine (pp. 18-20)
  2. ^ a b c d Vasylenko, Volodymyr (15 December 2009). "On assurances without guarantees in a 'shelved document'". The Day. Archived from the original on 21 August 2021. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  3. ^ "1994 Public Papers 2146 - Remarks at the Denuclearization Agreements Signing Ceremony in Budapest". Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1994, Book II). 5 December 1994. Archived from the original on 19 August 2022. Retrieved 19 August 2022.
  4. ^ a b c d e Harahan, Joseph P. (2014). "With Courage and Persistence: Eliminating and Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs" (PDF). DTRA History Series. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. pp. 101–134, 186. ASIN B01LYEJ56H. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  5. ^ "Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". treaties.un.org. 5 December 1994. Archived from the original on 2 April 2022. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
  6. ^ "Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994 - Council on Foreign Relations". Cfr.org. 5 December 1994. Archived from the original on 12 March 2017. Retrieved 7 March 2017.
  7. ^ "Joint Declaration of the Leaders of Ukraine, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, as well as a Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994". undocs.org. United Nations. 21 December 1994. CD/1285. Archived from the original on 19 March 2017. Retrieved 19 March 2017.
  8. ^ Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by [Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations],[Nations Unies New York], page 169-171
  9. ^ [Memorandum of Security Assurances in connection with Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Russian]
  10. ^ Memorandum of Security Assurances in connection with Accession of the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by [Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations],[Nations Unies New York], page 18-21
  11. ^ "Letter dated 94/12/07 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General" (PDF). United Nations. 19 December 1994. hdl:11176/44537. A/49/765; S/1994/1399. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
  12. ^ Philipp Bleek (29 April 2014). "Why Ukraine wasn't a nuclear power in the early 1990s and the West has no legal obligation to come to its aid now". Arms Control Wonk. Archived from the original on 19 August 2014. Retrieved 16 August 2014.
  13. ^ Hanley, Jeremy (22 June 1993). "Nuclear Weapons". Hansard. UK Parliament. Column 154. Archived from the original on 9 September 2018. Retrieved 9 September 2018. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jeremy Hanley): ... Some weapons are also possessed by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, but these are controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States.
  14. ^ a b Lewis, Jeffrey; Stein, Aaron (24 February 2022). Deterrence in Ukraine. Arms Control Wonk. Event occurs at 3m13s-, 11m37s-. Archived from the original on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022. Jeffrey Lewis: Ukraine did not possess nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They were not the third largest nuclear power. They did not give up those weapons because they did not possess them. ... The Rocket Forces pushed back and instead of taking the Ukrainian oath were able to arrange to take an oath to the Commonwealth of Independent States.
  15. ^ Kuzio, Taras (November 2010). "The Crimea: Europe's Next Flashpoint" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 March 2014.
  16. ^ "Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994". Council on Foreign Relations. 5 December 1994. Archived from the original on 17 March 2014. Retrieved 2 March 2014.
  17. ^ Martel, William C. (1998). "Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons: non-proliferation incentives and disincentives". In Barry R. Schneider; William L. Dowdy (eds.). Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats. Psychology Press. pp. 88–104. ISBN 9780714648569. Archived from the original on 16 January 2023. Retrieved 6 August 2014. There are some reports that Ukraine had established effective custody, but not operational control, of the cruise missiles and gravity bombs. ... By early 1994 the only barrier to Ukraine's ability to exercise full operational control over the nuclear weapons on missiles and bombers deployed on its soil was its inability to circumvent Russian permissive action links (PALs).
  18. ^ Pikayev, Alexander A. (Spring–Summer 1994). "Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?" (PDF). The Nonproliferation Review. 1 (3): 31, 40–45. doi:10.1080/10736709408436550. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 May 2014. Retrieved 6 August 2014. Ukrainian officials always underline that they provide purely administrative control over the strategic weapons, while the Russians provide 'operational' control. ... technical features themselves could not be considered a sufficient guarantee against Ukraine gaining unauthorized access to weapons.
  19. ^ a b c d e Pifer, Steven (May 2011). "The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons" (PDF). Brookings Institution. pp. 5, 7, 10–13, 21–24. Arms Control Series Paper 6. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 1 March 2022.
  20. ^ a b Reif, Kingston (December 2020). "The Lisbon Protocol At a Glance". Arms Control Association. Archived from the original on 6 December 2017. Retrieved 1 March 2022.
  21. ^ "Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, Ukraine". Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 20: 313–316. 1996. JSTOR 41036699. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 1 March 2022.
  22. ^ "Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with the Republic of Kazakhstan's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". UNTERM portal. Archived from the original on 19 August 2022. Retrieved 19 August 2022.
  23. ^ Nelson, Jack (11 January 1994). "Ukraine Agrees to Give Up Its Nuclear Arsenal, Clinton Says: Summit: President hails the accord as a breakthrough, but it faces parliamentary opposition. NATO endorses the U.S. 'Partnership for Peace' plan to broaden alliance". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 1 March 2022.
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  27. ^ Booth, William; DeYoung, Karen (28 February 2014). "Reports of Russian military activity in Crimea prompts stern warning from Obama". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 1 March 2014. Retrieved 1 March 2014.
  28. ^ Schreck, Carl (26 February 2019). "From 'Not Us' To 'Why Hide It?': How Russia Denied Its Crimea Invasion, Then Admitted It". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 22 February 2024.
  29. ^ That, Corinne Ton; Commisso, Christina (22 March 2014). "In Kyiv, Harper calls for 'complete reversal' of Crimea annexation". CTV News. Archived from the original on 16 September 2018. Retrieved 26 March 2014.
  30. ^ Fisher, Matthew (24 March 2014). "Russia suspended from G8 over annexation of Crimea, Group of Seven nations says". National Post. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
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  32. ^ "Readout of President Obama's Call with President Putin". whitehouse.gov (Press release). 1 March 2014. Archived from the original on 11 February 2017. Retrieved 26 March 2014 – via National Archives.
  33. ^ "Condemnation isn't enough for Russian actions in Crimea". The Washington Post. 28 February 2014. Archived from the original on 27 November 2018. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
  34. ^ "Address of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the Guarantor States in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. 1 March 2014. Archived from the original on 30 September 2022. Retrieved 19 August 2022.
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  37. ^ Медведев: Россия не гарантирует целостность Украины [Medvedev: Russia does not guarantee the integrity of Ukraine] (in Russian). bbc.com. 20 May 2014. Archived from the original on 8 April 2017. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
  38. ^ Chase, Steven; MacKinnon, Mark (24 March 2014). "Harper leads charge to expel Russia from G8, ramp up sanctions". The Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on 3 April 2017. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
  39. ^ "Lavrov: Russia never violated Budapest memorandum". Russian Embassy in United Kingdom. 27 January 2016. Archived from the original on 18 September 2022. Retrieved 27 January 2016.
  40. ^ Colborne, Michael (4 February 2016). "Russia's bald-faced lies". National Post.
  41. ^ "У Гройсмана створили нове міністерство" [Groisman created a new ministry]. Ukrayinska Pravda (in Ukrainian). 20 April 2016. Archived from the original on 28 March 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2017.
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  44. ^ "Україна скликає зустріч ядерних держав" [Ukraine convenes a meeting of nuclear states]. uprom.info. 5 December 2018. Archived from the original on 5 December 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
  45. ^ "Україна скликає зустріч ядерних держав за механізмом Будапештського меморандуму" [Ukraine convenes a meeting of nuclear states under the mechanism of the Budapest Memorandum]. www.eurointegration.com.ua. Ukrayinska Pravda. 5 December 2018. Archived from the original on 6 December 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
  46. ^ "Заява МЗС України у зв'язку зі скликанням консультацій відповідно до Будапештського меморандуму" [Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in connection with the convening of consultations in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum]. mfa.gov.ua. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. 5 December 2018. Archived from the original on 6 December 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
  47. ^ Borger, Julian (5 May 2023). "We knew in 2011 Putin would attack Ukraine, says Bill Clinton". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 6 May 2023. Retrieved 6 May 2023.
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  49. ^ Sanger, David (23 February 2022). "Putin Spins a Conspiracy Theory That Ukraine Is on a Path to Nuclear Weapons". The New York Times. New York. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 23 February 2022.
  50. ^ What is the Budapest Memorandum and how does it impact the current crisis in Ukraine? Archived 30 August 2022 at the Wayback Machine, CTV News (3 March 2022)
  51. ^ "Ukraine war: What is the Budapest Memorandum and why has Russia's invasion torn it up?". 2 March 2022.
  52. ^ a b "Are the US and the UK bound to intervene in Ukraine?" Archived 19 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine, france24, 3 March 2014
  53. ^ a b c Steven Pifer (4 March 2014). "Ukraine crisis' impact on nuclear weapons". CNN. Archived from the original on 8 March 2014. Retrieved 6 March 2014.
  54. ^ Budapest Memorandum, paragraph 6.
  55. ^ "The Budapest Memorandum and Beyond: Have the Western Parties Breached a Legal Obligation?". EJIL: Talk!. 18 February 2015. Archived from the original on 17 April 2019. Retrieved 17 April 2019.
  56. ^ Zadorozhny, Olexander (2015). "Russian Aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum". European Political and Law Discourse.
  57. ^ Shymanska, Alina (1 March 2018). "The 'Double Standard' of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program". International Journal of Nuclear Security. Archived from the original on 31 August 2020. Retrieved 20 August 2020.
  58. ^ O'Callaghan, Ciriam (4 April 2023). "Clinton regrets persuading Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons". Raidió Teilifís Éireann. Retrieved 14 November 2024.
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