Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2012 January 14

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January 14

Mozilla

How does Mozilla make money? Kittybrewster ☎ 09:58, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Sources include donations (although their donation page was broken when I visited) and payments for directing people to Google's search engine[1]. See Mozilla Foundation and Mozilla Corporation. --Colapeninsula (talk) 12:06, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Looking for an article on responsibility and social involvement

There's a well known scenario where a person has a heart attack on the street and everyone walks by. It's commonly described as "Don't get involved". It's covered as a social phenomenon, in psychological/social research, and in decision-making. But I can't think if we have an article on it, if there's a formal term for it, or if so what it would be called. Any ideas? FT2 ^{(Talk | email)} 14:20, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Our article on the Murder of Kitty Genovese, a similar-ish case, points towards bystander effect and diffusion of responsibility - are either of these quite what you're looking for? Shimgray | talk | 14:24, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Yup, thanks! FT2 ^{(Talk | email)} 15:15, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

There's an important technique for when you need help. Don't say "Somebody call 911 !", because then everyone thinks somebody else will do it. Grab an individual, and get them to promise to personally call 911. If they leave to go to a phone, you might do the same with somebody else, so you have a backup caller. StuRat (talk) 16:24, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

This technique is in use outside of emergency response as well. For instance, if you're trying to get out the vote for a political candidate, it's more effective to ask how someone will get to the polls--will they drive or walk, go before or after work, etc etc. It gets the voter in the frame of mind of actually taking the action in question. Meelar (talk) 00:18, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Assassinations and international law

Is there anything in international law that prohibits assassination as a means of waging policy? --Mr.98 (talk) 14:53, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Not sure. Some of this is personal impressions so do your own research first. But even if there was, it's clear that a state of "war" can be unilaterally declared - for example if country X declared a "war on terror" or that some action was an act of war, then legally those aiding the declared opponents/enemy in that war would become legitimate targets of some kind. Whether bombing (as took place in numerous wars), sniping, classical warfare on the field, or any other route.

In practical terms it's the kind of term everyone argues over - a wide range of countries of many affiliations have at one time or another decided a particular individual or group of individuals should be killed by order of the state (directly) or by its authority (indirectly via chain of command). You might find our article on targeted killing helpful as this seems to be the current euphemism, though according to that article there is said to be a clear distinction between that and assassination. FT2 ^{(Talk | email)} 15:23, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Deliberately killing "protected persons" (i.e. civilians) in war is a war crime, I would presume. Targeting individuals within the enemy's military (either state-military or non-state actor / guerrilla) command or leadership is probably not. War is about killing your enemy (sorry, pacifists). One of the big issues, though, is, how do you pick your targets? It's not always clear who is in fact involved in guerrilla activities, and who is an innocent civilian who has nothing to do with it. And who has been coerced into helping the guerrillas against their will. Inevitably, some of those targeted will turn out to be innocent. Some will say "that's the nature of war", and point out that "targeted killings" are in fact overall probably less likely to kill civilians than other common military tactics, such as "carpet bombing".

As far as U.S. domestic law, see the judge's decision in the case brought by the father of Anwar al-Awlaki, challenging the "kill order" against his son. The judge did point out the unusual situation - to tap a phone, the government needs a warrant. But to set out to kill a U.S. citizen abroad, all that's needed is an executive decision. Someone want to provide a link to the court's judgement? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 58.111.163.209 (talk) 17:13, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

A link is provided in the article you linked to. [2]. --Tango (talk) 23:35, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

As to politically-motivated assassinations, there's no doubt that it's murder, but I'm not sure about international law regarding state-sponsored murder. How did the UN commission plan to try anyone for the (state-sponsored) murder of Rafic Hariri, for example? I'm not sure. Clearly, it was a murder, as Hariri was a purely political figure, and had no military involvement of any sort.

To quote the CIA assassination manual's "justification" section: Murder is not morally justifiable. Self-defense may be argued if the victim has knowledge which may destroy the resistance organization if divulged. Assassination of persons responsible for atrocities or reprisals may be regarded as just punishment. Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the cause of freedom may be held necessary. But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it." Of course, I would not consider this a legal opinion, merely the author's "moral" opinion. 58.111.163.209 (talk) 16:45, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

In the case of the recent assassination of the Iranian nuclear scientist, presumably by Israel, it doesn't seem to me that international law would have jurisdiction. The murder occurred within Iran, so Iranian law would apply. Iran could request extradition of anyone they suspect of planning it, but somehow I doubt that Israel will honor that request. If Iran catches them, though, I'd expect a show trial followed by an execution. StuRat (talk) 17:11, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Don't agree - Israeli government actions, both against states and individuals, are (in theory, at least) bound by international law. Iran could, in theory, bring a case to the international court of justice against Israel, couldn't it (if it could claim a violation of a specific international law)? However, Israel may well argue that its' actions were against a "military" target, inasmuch as they were targeting someone (allegedly) involved in Iran's nuclear weapons program (and were an attempt to hinder that program). The actions of the individual assasins, however, would indeed likely be a matter for domestic Iranian law (unless they are a War Crime of the sort where the International Criminal Court would sometimes have jurisdiction). 58.111.163.209 (talk) 17:18, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Also, I do indeed doubt that Israel would honour any extradition request. However, given past history, Iran might well try to get Israeli individuals (in the intelligence circles, or whatever) extradited whilst they are travelling abroad. They are unlikely to be successful (often there'd be an issue of Diplomatic Immunity, as well as political and fair-trial issues) but they can try. 58.111.163.209 (talk) 17:23, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

But is it a "government action" ? I seriously doubt that the Knesset voted on it, or even knew about it. I'd say Mossad planned it alone, possibly with the approval of the Prime Minister. So, how much of the government has to be involved for it to qualify as a government action ? StuRat (talk) 17:27, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Israel holds the Palestinian government responsible for missile attacks on Israel even when they're done by terrorists acting on their own initiative, so presumably the definition is quite loose. --Colapeninsula (talk) 17:58, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

I'd assume actions of a contry's executive or intelligence arms are still ones for which the country in question bears a sovereign liability, as long as they did not exceed the authority implicitly or explicitly granted to them by the country's legislature - a classical case of Vicarious liability? If it was a "rogue" action by Mossad which clearly exceeded that authority, it would indeed presumably not be subject to such responsibility. However, the failure on the part of the Israeli government to take any measures against those responsible might very well be considered evidence of tacit approval. For comparisons' sake, note how Israel reacted to the murders commited by Baruch Goldstein, which were clearly not a "government-sponsored" act. The same applies for missile attacks, if the palestinian authorities effectively give free-rein to terrorist groups engaging in such activities from their areas. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades clearly fall under the P.A.'s ability to effectively castrate, so to speak, should they choose to. And if arms or money did indeed flow from the P.A. to those engaging in such activities, it clearly would be their responsibility. If, however, the palestinian government does all it can to strip the groups responsible of every bullet, every rifle, every missile, and every dollar in their arsenals, they will have indeed done theirs. 58.111.163.209 (talk) 18:08, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Hi guys. So getting back to the question... is this sort of activity covered by international law, at all? Other than the general prohibition against the deliberate targeting of non-combatants. --Mr.98 (talk) 18:47, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Just to clarify, are you talking about Sovereignty law? Than yes, it would certainly be a serious breach of another country's sovereignty to carry out an assassination on their territory, or against their government officials. As to it "merely" being the murder of a human being... not sure. If it was part of "widespread and systemic practice" targeting political dissidents (for example), and not merely an "isolated act", it would likely be considered a Crime against humanity. Otherwise? I assume it would be a serious breach of Human Rights treaties, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for a government to assassinate someone for peaceful political activism. That doesn't mean that there would be any practical remedy against a country breaching this right. Does this help? International laws of this kind are notoriously hard to practically enforce. 58.111.163.209 (talk) 22:51, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

I don't know if I'm being helpful, or just saying what everyone (especially the OP) knows, but it seems to me, based on Geoffrey Robertson's Crimes Against Humanity, that it would come under jus cogens, which then requires that someone agree to it and enforce it. International law is all about various treaties and principles that people have made up, and it seems to exist in discourse as the union, in reality as the intersection, of all of these. In other words, it would probably depend on treaties between the various states involved (viz those of the perpetrator and victim, and perhaps the state where the crime occurred), and particular laws that may (even in violation of jus cogens) confer sovereign immunity. Robertson suggests Augusto Pinochet as an example of the process in action. But it's way outside my area, so just trying to advance the discussion. IBE (talk) 00:24, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I want to echo what IBE's said... I think the concept of "international law" is much more fluid than that of domestic law, and is much more about the whims of a country rather than principle... That said there are some widely-entered into treaties that form the basis of most international law and probably are where your answer is: namely the Geneva Convention, the Vienna Convention, Law of the Sea, United Nations Charter, among others. I'm sure I'm leaving out important ones in that list. I know, for instance, that the Geneva Convention has some strangely detailed regulations regarding killing in wartime, among other things. I'm sure there's similar principles for what you're asking about. Shadowjams (talk) 09:08, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Race and census

Why don't census forms allow for percentage answers? Like 25% black 75% white. 88.9.215.240 (talk) 15:44, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Its complicated... but for a start on the topic, see our article on Racial politics. Blueboar (talk) 16:02, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

In the two most recent censuses (assuming you're talking about the United States), people were allowed to specify themselves as multiracial, marking all racial-category boxes that may apply (but not to indicate percentages). Traditionally in the United States, the one-drop rule applied, theoretically making percentages somewhat irrelevant for black vs. white categorization, though some censuses included the categories "Mulatto", "Quadroon", and "Octoroon" (see Race and ethnicity in the United States Census)... AnonMoos (talk) 16:19, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

It is important to note that race is a social construct, it primarily manifests itself by how an individual interacts with their society and culture. In the U.S., exact percentages of "racial makeup" aren't all that important, what is most important is how an individual feels about their relationship with society; and historically, because of things like the "one drop rule" cited above, that level of detail was not socialogically important, so those distinctions aren't made. Also relevent to this discussion is Passing (racial identity), which is one way of how mixed race and minority people have dealt with things like the "one drop rule". --Jayron32 16:30, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Worst than just that, but percentage notation of the sort discussed here is just complete nonsense, scientifically and sociologically. Even if the notion of race does have some biological meaning — and you can come up with versions of it that are not as bad as others — the idea of being exactly 25% black and 75% white is totally bullocks. If anything it would look more like, "I share genes that are common in 58% of populations that were historically located in Europe," which is not the same thing at all (and would generally have almost no direct relation with superficial appearance). None of this would be useful as a form of self-representation, either, since most people likely have zero idea about their own genetic ancestry. --Mr.98 (talk) 21:02, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Bullocks? The above editors are onto it. It's as much racial self-identification as anything. Percentages are not really the point. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 01:25, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

If you have a mother who identifies as black and a father who identifies as white, then you could say "I'm half white, half black" (50%,50%), even if genetically that's not that easy and, depending on which society, you are classified as black or mulatto. 88.9.215.240 (talk) 02:24, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Or white, if that is the way you self identify. 02:29, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Or white, right. I've seen in Latin America that many people who wouldn't be white by American standards considered themselves white and even made jokes about blacks. Hilarious. 88.9.215.240 (talk) 02:32, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Agree with 88.9.215.240 -- it's not at all uncommon for people to say things like "I'm 50% German, 25% French, and 25% Norwegian" based on their grandparents' origins, without attempting to make any kind of claim about genetics... AnonMoos (talk) 13:36, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

As a small excourse: My personal experience - and it has to be stressed that it is just that - makes me think that for most people giving such numbers they have no bearing whatsoever on their actual cultural heritage. People who professed to a high degree of German ancestry regularly failed to even have a general sense of the location of said nation on a world map, its language, political structure (present - or with one unfortunate exception - past) or general history. It was rather embarrasing really. What I think people try to claim with such numbers is >prestige< connoted with certain countries of ancestry. No matter how genetically or even historically unsound such claims are. These claims are just another incident of social construction of ancestry really. --Abracus (talk) 16:43, 16 January 2012 (UTC)

In the Census in Australia respondents are asked to list their ancestry. They can tick multiple boxes, one of which is Other, with a write-in option. HiLo48 (talk) 02:34, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

That's still a different case, since you cannot specify things like being more white than black,like having 3 white grandparents and just one black. 88.9.215.240 (talk) 02:59, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

That response made me notice a particular slant of this discussion. It's about percentages and skin colour. My observation would be that Australians are a lot less concerned about those two characteristics than Americans. Australians tend to take pride in diversity among their ancestry (particularly if they can find some convict background) and generally don't give a damn about skin colour. So maybe that form of question works for Australians, while Americans may seek something different. HiLo48 (talk) 05:07, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I think you'd agree, nevertheless, that we're generally happier to acknowledge traces of all manner of European, Asian or African heritage than to acknowledge traces of our own indigenous heritage. Having one's children marry or get involved with Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders is still considered a cause for concern (or worse) in some quarters, whereas involvement with an African, say, would be cause for celebration of our multicultural maturity. -- Jack of Oz ^{[your turn]} 12:31, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Jack, your comment brings to mind the theory that the Cherokees are the only ethnic group made up entirely of women, since legions of (apparently white) Americans claim to have a Cherokee grandmother, but there's nary a Cherokee grandfather to be found. --- OtherDave (talk) 16:24, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I don't know about Cherokees specifically, but there is nothing new in indigenous women bearing the children of the invaders: see war rape. And from raptio, the abduction of women:

The practice is surmised to have been common since anthropological antiquity. In Neolithic Europe, excavation of the Linear Pottery culture site at Asparn-Schletz, Austria, the remains of numerous slain victims were found. Among them, young adult females and children were clearly under-represented, suggesting that the attackers had killed the men but abducted the nubile females. Abduction of women is a common practice in warfare among tribal societies, along with cattle raiding. In historical human migrations, the tendency of mobile groups of invading males to abduct indigenous females is reflected in the greater stability of Human mitochondrial DNA haplogroups compared to Human Y-chromosome DNA haplogroups. Case in point, "Mitochondrial Eve" is estimated to be about twice as old (140,000 years) as "Y-chromosomal Adam" (60,000 years).

As I noted at First white child, there were typically plenty of children of white men in any given newly explored or frontier area (e.g. Metis), long before the region was considered safe for white women. BrainyBabe (talk) 19:51, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Argument for existence of god

I found it in the page of some one in youtube, and I just don't know how the person reached necessity from probability...
P1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
P2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
P3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
P4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
P5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
P6) Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
C) Therefore God exists.

and what is a "maximally great being"?--Irrational number (talk) 16:41, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Hi there, Irrational Number :) this is called the Ontological argument for God's existence. P3 is the problem, and it isn't usually taken very seriously. It has a long history; indeed I studied it in undergrad philosophy under the mistaken impression it was invented by Descartes. Approach such dodgy nonsense with great caution. IBE (talk) 17:07, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

It's hardly "dodgy nonsense" when it's based on perfectly sound logic. The argument proves the existence of a maximally great being. I'm pretty sure a maximally great being wouldn't ban shellfish and football.222.248.6.168 (talk) 17:17, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

It's not based on "sound logic". First, with P1 it's unclear what a "maximally great being should be". This assumes that "greatness" has a unique maximum. Since we know that omnipotence is impossible (Consider the impossibly heavy stone... - perfectly sound logic there), how do you compare the being that can make stones it cannot lift with the being that can lift all stones it can make? Which one is "greater"? P2 assumes infinitely many possible worlds - why? P3 makes no logical sense at all. Compare "If there is a million bucks in one bank account, there is a million bucks in all bank accounts" ;-). P4 is sound and P5 is trivial. C, of course, is not, unless you first define God as "the maximally great being" (which, per my comment to P1, has its own problems). But if you get to define what God is, why not define a stone as God? Then the proof is even easier, and fully constructive. P1: This stone here is God. C: See, there is the stone. God exists... --Stephan Schulz (talk) 17:46, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

P3), like P1), hinges on the definition of "maximally great" (and the whole argument suffers from massive equivocation on the term "maximally great"). I believe the sub argument for P3) goes something like: "Something that is good and exists is better than something which would be good, but doesn't exist. Likewise, something good that exists in every possible world would be better than something good that exists in just one possible world. Something that is great that exists in only in one world isn't really at the *maximum* of greatness, so therefore, by contradiction, if a "maximally great" being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world (because otherwise it would not deserve the title "maximally great")." - The problem is not so much that argument per se, but the equivocation with the other definition of "maximally great" used in P1). Rarely is the "so maximally great that it exists in all possible worlds" characteristic considered when evaluating the validity of P1), and you can't just "boil the frog" by introducing it later. By the way, even if valid, P1-P6) doesn't actually say much ("there is some "maximally great" being which exists"). The rhetorical point of the argument is to bring in equivocation on going from P6) to C), where you're slid down the "maximally great being"="God"="Judeo-Christian God"="God as recognized and worshiped by my particular church" scale. Going from P6) to C) is really the weakest point in the whole scheme, even though it superficially looks like a simple rephrasing. -- 71.35.113.131 (talk) 18:42, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

P1) It is possible that a maximally great diamond is buried in my back yard.

P2-P6) ...

C) Profit! (Or should I say prophet?) -- ToE 11:13, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

(Edit conflict) A maximally great being is one that it is impossible to imagine anything greater than. As IBE says, the trick is P3 and P4 - the idea is that existence is a more perfect state than non-existence, so a perfect god exists. The standard objection - apparently first raised by Gaunilo of Marmoutiers - is that it doesn't just work for gods. You can posit an identical argument for a maximally great sandwich, for instance - to be maximally great, it should exist in reality (and be right in front of you, ready to eat), yet sadly the perfect sandwich proves elusive. The standard objections to this objection is that sandwiches can't be perfect, only gods can, or that divinity is a necessary part of perfection. Other philosophers have made deeper criticisms of the ontological argument, which are detailed on the page. Smurrayinchester 17:50, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Regarding a "maximally great being", Plantinga (the leading recent proponent of the ontological argument) equates maximal excellence with being omnipotent, omniscient AND morally perfect[3]. Wikipedia has a thorough article on omnipotence which considers if omnipotence as a concept makes sense - if an omnipotent being is impossible, then P2 is false. The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy has a good article on Ontological Arguments which covers various possible arguments. --Colapeninsula (talk) 18:08, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

(ec) I agree with Smurray, and if the OP is interested in a more general introduction, the topic is covered by many philosophy primers, such as Introducing Philosophy by Robert C. Solomon. It is also in Philosophy for Dummies by Tom Morris. I should just add that, re: the OP's specific presentation of the ontological argument (they all differ slightly), I said P3 was the real problem because it makes a crucial jump, based on equivocation over the word "possible". If by the "possible" we mean "that which could have happened in this universe", the argument might be correct, but based on P1 and P2, a rational person can only consent if the definition of "possible" is "as far as we can tell", or in other words "we can't prove it impossible, therefore I'll go along with this 'possible' thing of yours". There is no way P3 follows under such a definition. As for the suggested ref's on the article page, generally I find Alvin Plantinga highly readable. Colapeninsula's link to the Stanford Encyc looks good at a glance, although note that Stanford articles are often difficult for people looking for a layman's guide. IBE (talk) 18:20, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

In the end, the ontological argument always seemed to me to boil down to, "if the human mind can imagine it, or human language can express it, it must exist." This has always struck me, when put in this fashion, as utterly silly. Language can express many impossible things (would anybody care for a triangular square?) and the human mind is quite clever at imagining things which have no basis in reality. It's an argument that only appeals to people who want it to appeal to them. I think it is entirely incapable of convincing a non-believer. There are more compelling arguments for God out there than this (and I say this as a non-believer, but there is a spectrum of non-compellingness). That this argument has been considered important for so long only reflects, as far as I can tell, the entirely insular nature of its discussion or debate. This isn't the argument that you use to convince atheists, it's the argument that you use to try and convince other like-minded philosophers that you are terribly clever. --Mr.98 (talk) 18:41, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

I would question whether you can define "possible world", or say what is possible in every possible world. I find other arguments more persuasive, e.g., where did mathematics come from? I don't mean the invented ability to work sums, I mean the fact that there is such a thing as a number or that the sums you work can actually be consistent with one another from one attempt to the next, let alone from culture to culture. Wnt (talk) 19:24, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

There is no such thing as a number; it's just a human invention. Only until recent human history (by which I mean the past few thousand years) has there been any concept of a number. In many languages today, there is no way of saying anything like "twenty-five"; the speakers can only say none, one, some, or many, and can't even match 9 items to 9 other items. I also don't know what you mean by "the sums you work can actually be consistent with one another..." Clearly if you place 1 apple beside another, you get 2 apples. Some tribes can't express the idea of 2, or the idea of "apple", but that doesn't mean there aren't 2 apples. --140.180.15.97 (talk) 02:34, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Then there are no such things as computers, books, movies or Wikipedia either, because they're "just human inventions". -- Jack of Oz ^{[your turn]} 03:37, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I meant to say that there is no such thing as a number in "nature". Wnt seemed to believe that numbers were not invented whereas ways of working sums were. I beg to differ. --140.180.15.97 (talk) 04:15, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I seem to remember someone quipping once that: "Proof that God exists is only important to those who lack faith"; damned darned if I can remember who, though… --Ludwigs2 05:03, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

But completely true. I've made the point here a number of times that there would be need for faith if the question of the existence of God was settled scientifically. But science or logic can no more prove or disprove God than they can explain our likes and dislikes about music, food, art etc. -- Jack of Oz ^{[your turn]} 12:22, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

You could say the same thing about a maximally great diamond. It is not possible to either prove or disprove the existence of such a diamond somewhere in the universe, so therefore, you need faith to believe that it exists.

Also, I disagree with your assertion that science can't explain our likes or dislikes. Our likes and dislikes are a matter of brain chemistry, and are already being explored by brain imaging: http://www.neurosciencemarketing.com/blog/articles/infrared-brain-imaging.htm --140.180.15.97 (talk) 19:46, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Yes, there might be such a diamond out there. The difference is, nobody has ever claimed such a diamond created the universe and everything and everyone in it, and so we tend not to have any history of philosophical, cultural and religious focus on it. I personally disbelieve there is such a diamond, but others are free to believe what they like.

Maybe I should have said that science can't predict what an individual is going to like and dislike. Three sons from the same parents: one's into heavy metal; the second likes classical; the third is pretty indifferent to all music - how can science possibly predict that? -- Jack of Oz ^{[your turn]} 20:26, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I see no convincing reason why having a history of philosophical, cultural, and religious focus makes a belief any more valid. That seems like argumentum ad populum to me. Geocentrism, the flat Earth theory, the tooth fairy, and Santa Claus all have a long history; does that mean they're valid? Of course you might say that the first 2 explicitly contradict science, but the impossibility of traveling faster than light, of interacting with the world in any way other than the four fundamental forces, of observing a system without causing wavefunction collapse, and of predicting the future far in advance (prohibited by chaos theory and the probabilistic nature of wavefunction collapse) disprove most conceptions of God as well. They do not disprove my conception of a diamond.

Also, you're confusing what science can't predict now, with what science cannot ever predict. I don't see any reason why science can never predict the musical preferences of children, since the brain is governed by the same physical laws as all other matter. It would not surprise me at all if in 20 years, a scientist could sample an infant's DNA, image his brain, examine the environment he will grow up in, and predict exactly what kind of music he will like in 20 years. A scientist might well discover tomorrow that if part X of subregion Y of a person's brain has Z% of one enzyme and A% of another, and if that subregion is linked to another subregion by a certain number of dendrite and axon connections, and the culture he grew up in is conducive to heavy metal, he will certainly like heavy metal; otherwise, he will certainly not. --140.180.15.97 (talk) 22:08, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

You can take that to as many levels as you like. Science might be able one day to predict the musical and other tastes of people. But could it ever predict that a person will be a meat-eater all their life until, for a few months during their 29th year, they'll chose to avoid meat? Or that they'll be a smoker for 20 years, then give up for 10 years, then relapse for a few months before finally giving up permanently? Or that they'll emigrate to Brazil when they're 52? Or that in a certain election they'll vote for the Vorticist-Nihilist Party? -- Jack of Oz ^{[your turn]} 22:22, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I'll make it simple for you. Science cannot predict whether a certain radioactive atom will decay in the next nanosecond or the next 3 billion years. But science also explicitly forbids the possibility of anyone knowing when that atom will decay, so any God that can predict the future in this way clearly and unambiguously violates the laws of physics. Similarly, whether a person born today will emigrate to Brazil when they're 52 depends sensitively on truly probabilistic quantum events, which precludes any God that obeys the laws of physics from knowing the answer. --140.180.15.97 (talk) 08:31, 16 January 2012 (UTC)

Well, the simpleton that I apparently am seems to think you've arrived at the crux of the whole question: Does God "obey" the laws of physics, or do they obey him? IF there is such a being that not only exists but has always existed, even before there was time, and will always exist, even after time ceases; a being that can create the entire Universe and is thus simultaneously in the Universe and beyond it (whatever that means); a being that knows everything that has ever happened or will ever happen throughout the Universe - IF such a being exists, then the laws of physics would be a trifling, if fairly pervasive, matter. You say that science "forbids" certain possibilities, which inevitably leads to certain conclusions about any hypothetical God. I say that such a God will not be dictated to as to what he can or cannot do. This is the meaning of "omnipotence": an omnipotent being can do literally anything, including things that are WAY beyond the feeble comprehension of the likes of you and me, and things that appear to break all the rules and then some. There really is no such thing as a qualified omnipotence. -- Jack of Oz ^{[your turn]} 09:31, 16 January 2012 (UTC)

I think this is a pretty good proof that there is no all-powerful benevolent God in any alternate world, as if they were all-powerful they could be present in our world (despite the fact that it is 'alternate') and if they were benevolent, they would want to do good here. The suffering, starvation, wars, famine, etc, here proves that there is no all-powerful benevolent being in any alternate Universe. 80.98.112.4 (talk) 17:03, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

That argument or question is often raised by those who expect God to be some sort of benign dictator, and then shot down by those who believe that God gave us free will. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 19:10, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

But there's a lot of misery in the world that doesn't have free will as its cause. Natural disasters, for example. Either God would like to control these in a less misery-inducing way and he can't, or he can control them but he won't. You're left to fall back on the "well, we can't understand his ways," which is not a logical argument, it's just an admission that it doesn't seem to follow any obvious system. The argument from evil only works though if you try to infer these sorts of absolute properties about a deity — all good, all powerful, all knowing, etc. — which I think is a little arbitrary. (For me, the most compelling part about the argument from evil is this: the world looks more or less identical to how you would expect it to look if there wasn't anyone running the show whatsoever. I find that significant, personally, though the idea of an apathetic or unattendant God is not incompatible with this.) --Mr.98 (talk) 18:39, 19 January 2012 (UTC)

"There’s no point in believing in things that exist." (Terry Pratchett, Small Gods) Blueboar (talk) 20:22, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Policies and positions of US presidential candidates

Where can I find a neutral summary of the policies and positions of the various US presidential candidates? --Tango (talk) 18:06, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Hehe, that's supposed to be Wikipedia. "Journalism" is supposed to be that way, for that matter. Unfortunately Ballotpedia does not appear to be covering the presidential candidates - surprising to me, since that greatly limits their audience. The League of Women Voters traditionally has been a useful source of information, but if there's anything about these on http://vote411.org/ or http://smartvoter.org I haven't found it. Wnt (talk) 19:19, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Are potlatch customs a function of languistic difficulty?

I've often heard of potlatch and related customs (see See Also on that page) described as a matter of altruism versus selfishness, or primitivism versus capitalism, etc. I was wondering, though - might such customs also, even primarily, be a response to the situation in which tribes of people meet who are simply unable to communicate? After all, even the Europeans started off by handing out beads and "trinkets" (whatever those are). I'm thinking maybe it's just not very practical for two groups of people who don't know each others' languages to indicate that they want this for that, indicate the number of items, ask about the quality and so on. But pushing something forward as a gift should often be a pretty unambiguous gesture. As an aside, it seems possible, for such reasons, that if Earth were to be contacted by some alien influence, that any trading might likewise start out as a potlatch economy; of course, whether it remains that way or follows that European precedent is another matter. I imagine someone must have explored such ideas? Wnt (talk) 18:50, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Unlikely theory. Without verbal communication, all actions are ambiguous (i.e. is that offering of food a gesture of friendship among equals or a tribute given in submission to a superior force). for the potlach custom to develop the groups involved had to share a common worldview (and most likely had to do extensive preparation), all of which requires communication.

Add that in the stone-age world, the likelihood of two tribes being near each other without sharing common language roots is remote. hunter/gatherers might travel long distances seasonally following game, but their neighboring tribes would be following the same patterns. Only natural disasters would be likely to drive a tribe so far from its stomping grounds that it runs into a language barrier (as with the Jews in Egypt, for instance), but drives driven out of their lands are rarely welcomed as equals in that potlach sort of way. --Ludwigs2 22:47, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

On the other hand, the indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest Coast, where the potlatch was practised, are linguistically rather complex, with dozens of different languages, some of which are completely unrelated to the others. I don't know if there were ever potlatches between different linguistic groups though. Adam Bishop (talk) 23:03, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

There is a theory and apparently some evidence that the Chinook Jargon originated before European contact—that there was, as our page puts it, a "Chinookan-Nuu-chah-nulth interlingua. Pfly (talk) 03:05, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Just realized interlingua is the wrong term—changed to lingua franca. Pfly (talk) 03:40, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Ludwigs2 -- In the New Guinea Highlands (which was stone age, but agricultural), it was apparently rather common for speakers of mutually-incomprehensible languages to live close together... AnonMoos (talk) 00:03, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Some would connect it with Thorsten Veblen's classic theories of "conspicuous consumption". One practice which is in fact a function of linguistic difficulty is silent barter... AnonMoos (talk) 00:03, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Why don't news stories have background music anymore?

Newsreel news stories had plenty of music as seen in this example. I actually like the idea of music playing behind the news better than how the news is made today.

You see, if the old newsreel habits were preserved in this century, in the breaking footage of the attacks, you would hear this suspenseful theme song. (To play both videos concurrently, wait until 0:07 to start playing said background music. This sets the mood.)

So why won't modern news formats have background music like in the good old days? Wouldn't most of us prefer to have music playing while the news is being broadcast? Thanks. --70.179.174.101 (talk) 21:24, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

I think most people (or should that be some of us) would find music inappropriate as a background to serious news (but perhaps that is just a matter of taste). The newsreels were regarded as entertainment as well as providing information. Dbfirs 21:42, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

It is distracting. Just like laugh tracks in American TV shows. I like to be left to choose my own emotional feelings, thanks. HiLo48 (talk) 21:55, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

If you'll allow me to make a completely unreferenced wild guess, I'll bet that it's mostly historical. Much of our TV news "tradition" still comes from the very earliest days of TV news. In those days mixing in mood music would have been more technological hassle than news studios were willing to deal with. It wouldn't have taken long for their studio technology to advance to the point where it was easy to do, but by then adding mood music would have remind people of the old newsreels and seemed old-fashioned.

It's slowly coming back in the form of topic-specific "bumpers" before different news items. Those usually have a little bit of music to get you in the mood for the next story. APL (talk) 22:23, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Documentaries often have it, or so I remember from the days when I used to watch them. I've seen occasional feature stories on news broadcasts that did, although I have no idea how common it is/was. I just remember an electrifying feature story that used some classic riff, possibly by Dire Straits, played over footage of Vladimir Putin walking somewhere, possibly in slow-mo, just to set him up as the dark, powerful, arch-bad dude. It's rare, but I have seen it. These things are basically hard to get right, I feel - established conventions and audience expectations play a huge role, so if you were going to start this, you would have to do it well, or people would really notice the new format, and complain. IBE (talk) 00:57, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

This or a similar question was asked some months back. News is news, and putting music to it would seem trite, at the very least. Newsreels and documentaries are basically movies, i.e. entertainment, as noted above. American news programs do have their theme songs, though - intended to set kind of a dramatic tone to the coming broadcast. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 01:22, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Early newsreels were often filmed with no sound. I imagine it was better, for audiences used to silent movies with a musical accompaniment, to add music than leave gaps in the newsreader's commentary as silence. Indeed, the second paragraph of Pathé News#History specifically mentions the silent film and later says sound was introduced in 1928. With the introduction synchronised live sound, the need for music to fill in the silence gradually vanished. Astronaut (talk) 10:04, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

There's also the question of those hard of hearing. Background music will make it harder to hear what is said, and if you consider factual information in news to be important, you want to get that information across as efficiently as possible.Sjö (talk) 14:57, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Sound newsreels came on the scene by 1931, especially for subjects like someone making a speech. But Even WW2 newsreels were often filmed without sound, because sound recording equipment even in the 1940's was bulky and heavy. A hand-held windup camera could show events nicely. Sound on film or synchronized film with a disc recorder would have been unfeasible for many newsreel subjects. Sound effects (marching troops, gunfire, shells exploding) were commonly added in the studio editing room, along with stock music. One clue of the Foley artist at work is when there is a distant (a mile away) explosion seen, and the sound is heard simultaneously, rather than several seconds later. Edison (talk) 23:27, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Hostility towards Christianity today vs early America

How would the "hostility" towards Christianity or religion in general, whether real or not, compare to the hostility towards religion in America's first two or three decades (i.e., anti-clericalism, Thomas Jefferson's writings, etc.)? Would the individuals who proclaim the "persecution" of Christianity be shell-shocked if they were to visit the time of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin? --Melab±1 ☎ 22:21, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

There were many Deists, and fairly widespread suspicion of entangling religion with government/politics, but not a great amount of overt public hostility towards Christianity as such. Thomas Paine conspicuously fell out of public favor in the U.S. when it was felt that he had crossed a line... AnonMoos (talk) 23:54, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

What did Thomas Paine do to make himself fall out of favor? And how can one believe in a god but not religion? I understand that it might be possible, I just can't comprehend it. --Melab±1 ☎ 02:02, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

In the eyes of many, he went far beyond abstract philosophical speculations (which would not have greatly perturbed too many) into sneering and jeering direct attacks on what was commonly regarded as the foundations of morality and ordered social life. AnonMoos (talk) 03:48, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

The characterisation of Deism above is a bit incomplete. The deism of the Enlightenment believed in a prime mover who "set the heavens and earth into motion", i.e. who created the universe and determined natural laws, but who did not interfere in the running of the universe after creation at all. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 09:51, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

(ec)It's important to distinguish between deism, the belief in god but not religion, and atheism, the disbelief in both god and religion. Deism was the predominant religious belief during the Enlightenment, but atheism was still considered too extreme to be acceptable. Today, atheism is viewed much more favorably, but belief in organized religion has also surged. American Christian fundamentalism, for example, arose in the late 19th and early 20th century. It's a modern phenomenon that Enlightenment thinkers, like the founders of the U.S., would have considered disgusting.

This may sound stupid given that seems to be in the definition of Deism, but how is a belief in a god and not a religion characterized? --Melab±1 ☎ 17:48, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

I meant to say that he believed God existed, but didn't believe God controlled the universe in its day-to-day affairs, and didn't believe in any organized religion like Christianity. --140.180.15.97 (talk) 19:40, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

That said, it's interesting to contemplate how skeptical the U.S. founders were to organized religion, especially Christianity. Jefferson took a razor to his New Testament and cut out everything he considered supernatural--his divine birth, his miracles, his resurrection, everything--and left only non-supernatural descriptions of his life that he considered to be Jesus' true life story. See Jefferson Bible. Thomas Paine was even more radical; he publicly and vehemently attacked organized religion. The Age of Reason, intended for a mass audience, indicted priests for greed and corruption and the Church for opposing scientific investigation. He saw the history of Christianity as one of oppression, and considered the Bible to be just as worthless as any other ancient text in divine matters. The book brought deism to the middle and lower classes, so its views are an accurate representation of what people at the time found acceptable. --140.180.15.97 (talk) 00:15, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Did Jefferson have a Bible with words on only one side of each page? Otherwise, when cutting out the supernatural bits, he would have lost what was on the back too. HiLo48 (talk) 01:33, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Unless he had two copies! --Jayron32 03:34, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

He actually cut the verses he wanted to keep out of a bible, and pasted them into a blank book. I'm not sure what he did when he wanted verses that were on opposite sides of the same page - maybe he did have two bibles. Buddy431 (talk) 05:06, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Actually, he provided parallel version in Greek, Latin, French and English, so I suspect he condensed several bibles into one. And it tell us something both about his capabilities and his dedication to the task... --Stephan Schulz (talk) 09:44, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

He owned several copies of Holbachs System of Nature, so I would think it very possible that he also owned several copies of the much more readily available bible. --Saddhiyama (talk) 10:22, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

It's a shame that Jefferson had a very narrow and corrupted view of Christianity. From his point of view Chistianity was just a overly complicated mess with strange nonsensical traditions. You know, that is the same thing that happened in France leading up to the Revolution. Centuries of corrupted, and oppresive Catholic doctrines have rotted the original form of Christianity down to the core. People just got tired of dealing with the Catholic faith and all its shackles, and said enough is enough, no longer will we be burdened with this, enter the Age of Enlightenment. The Age of Enlightenment was sealed with the French Revolution. It is not surprising that some protestants were also entranced by the Age, after all, all original forms of protestantism derived from Catholisism and would have unknowingly or willingly retained a few corrupt doctrines. Plasmic Physics (talk) 10:30, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Well, Jefferson did not believe in divine intervention, did not believe in miracles, and in particular neither believed that Jesus was the son of god, or that he was resurrected. He did believe that Jesus was one of the greatest moral teachers of all time, on a level with Socrates. I think this is, on the one hand, incompatible with every version of Christianity (certainly with all versions of Nicean Christianity), but on the other hand is not evidence that he was turned from Christianity itself by any form of perceived "corruption". --Stephan Schulz (talk) 10:43, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

To describe Jefferson's view as narrow and corrupted does not seem very Christian. In fact, I'd say it matches the real views of many people in my country today. HiLo48 (talk) 10:54, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

It's not un-Christian to speak the truth as you believe it to be, HiLo. In fact, it's a requirement. I don't know if this was what you're getting at, but the maxim of "If you can't say anything nice about someone, don't say anything at all", while probably a good general principle, has nothing to do with Christianity. -- Jack of Oz ^{[your turn]} 12:11, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Well, the Nicene Creed was not, shall we say, the outcome of an immaculate conception! In the actual scriptures Jesus is called the Son of Man, a more beautiful but elusive concept which, I suspect, might have more in common with Nietschze's concept of the Overman (by imitation, that is) than the typical, almost scatological interpretation of the Virgin Birth. The concept of a Son of God was prone to less materialistically oriented interpretations in many other contexts. Certainly there is much room for varying notions of what the religion is about, and Jefferson, as a man of science, should be expected to resist a more medieval conception of miracles that expects them regularly to interfere with any attempt to understand the universe. As for Jefferson's work, it is not so dissimilar from efforts like a portion of Ain't Nobody's Business If You Do or one of the Christianity Usenet FAQs floating around, where people also tried to develop texts describing just what Jesus actually preached, free of distraction. The most basic requirements of Christianity, to love your enemy, to love God with all your heart, these are indeed difficult tasks on their own. The theory of Christian scripture is based on the idea of the Holy Spirit, but the decision about who has been guided in this way during the writing of any given text appears open to substantial differences of opinion. Wnt (talk) 04:57, 16 January 2012 (UTC)

Plasma Physics: Your summary of the history of religious views in the Age of Enlightenment is not very accurate. Rationalistic and secularistic ideas regarding Christianity appeared in both the protestant and the catholic spheres in Europe, and they manifested themselves in both moderate and radical versions and you did not have to be against Christianity to subsrcibe to them, far from it in fact, most actually called themselves Christians. The radical rejection of Christianity was only ever held by a very small (albeit very vocal and influential) minority in Europe at the time.--Saddhiyama (talk) 10:55, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Maybe it was my wording, but I did not mean to be so specific as to exclude your argument. Jefferson's views were most likely a consequence or reason for him being a 33° mason. Plasmic Physics (talk) 11:34, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Except that there is no evidence to show that Jefferson ever joined a Masonic lodge, much less became a 33°. Blueboar (talk) 22:56, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Reading some of the articles on Deism lead me down the road to wonder how the Enlightenment dealt with other religions. Is there a name for any kind of belief that holds that the gods of all religions are just different forms one God? You might say religious pluralism but that doesn't quite cover it. --Melab±1 ☎ 18:26, 16 January 2012 (UTC)

Perhaps Omnism or Omnitheism. (The latter currently redirects to Omnism, but these two older revision might be of interest). You might also be interested in our Pandeism. -- ToE 19:24, 16 January 2012 (UTC)