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February 25

Who is De Gouy, a composer from Arban's Grand Method for Trumpet?

Who is De Gouy, the composer credited with four duets in Joseph Jean Baptiste Laurent Arban's "Grand Method for Trumpet," namely Romance, Bolero, and two Marches, numbers 19 and 39?Haiku1 (talk) 05:43, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Jacques de Gouy, a 17th century French baroque composer. See Grove Dictionary of Music & Musicians, for example. ---Sluzzelin talk 06:05, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Jewish missionaries

The alternate-history story I'm reading, set in the 6th century AD, made a passing mention of "Jewish missionaries". I don't recall the Jews as being very interested in converts; is this something that has changed over the years, or did the author make a mistake? --12.169.167.154 (talk) 06:06, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

It is hard to know what a alternate history might mean, without having read it myself, but it might refer to Christian missionaries, because Jesus was Jewish and Christianity was perceived at its beginning as a Jewish cult or sect. BrainyBabe (talk) 06:39, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Yep, as per Brainybabe, the first "Christian" missionaries were Jewish until there were more generations of Christians. The apostles were Jewish and Paul was on a mission to convert gentiles. Before that he worked to persecute members of the Christian faith who as it happened, were Jews or Jewish proselytes. Julia Rossi (talk) 08:17, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Jews discourage conversion to Judaism, although they're supposed to encourage people to general monotheism. --Dweller (talk) 11:05, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

That, however, wasn't always the case. Please see Yitzhak ha-Sangari for voluntary conversion of Khazars (presumably in 8th century AD), and Hasmonean#Hasmonean expansion and civil war for forced conversion of Idumeans to Judaism in 2nd century BC. --Dr Dima (talk) 12:43, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

In the former case, no sources survive that I'm aware of that adequately detail the amount of desire to convert that the Khazar king was required to demonstrate. In the latter case, see our article on John Hyrcanus; "He is credited with the forced conversion of the Idumeans to Judaism, which was unusual for a Jewish leader; Judaism was not typically spread by the sword." Hyrcanus was like many of the Hasmoneans, an interesting contrast. As both a religious and temporal leader, he was fearsome in defending religious tradition (see his actions against the Samaritans), yet in his own body encapsulated anti-traditional values, by adopting the role of King despite not descending from the Davidic line. Religious actions of the Hasmonean leaders do not necessarily reflect even the contemporary religious approach to Judaism, as they are always understandably strongly influenced by profound political or military self-interest/realpolitik, which is why traditional Judaism prior to the Hasmoneans had from the time of Moses separated the "Church and state" (sorry, no better phrase) leadership into two bodies, with the High Priest separate from the leader. --Dweller (talk) 13:18, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I agree that actions of Hyrcanus were considered controversial even in his lifetime; that was to be expected considering the perpetual state of factional war in Kingdom of Judea (sensu lato) between 2nd century BC and 1st century AD. Despite the Mosaic attempt of separation of Priest and Military Leader (later: King) authorities that you mention, religious differences within Judaism did play a very important role in the politics in the times of the Second Temple, especially towards the end. Positive attitude towards conversion to Judaism can be traced back to the Book of Ruth. The present-day orthodox restrictions on conversion to Judaism, OTOH, are far more pragmatic (and more modern) in their origin: as far as I know, they were originally meant to protect the Jewish communities in diaspora (that is, after the destruction of the Second Temple) from persecution, as nethier Christian nor Islamic rulers looked very favorably at their followers being converted to Judaism. It is still quite unclear what the situation in 6th century AD was. The Judaism became far more strictly formalized after the fall of the Second Temple than it was before. However, the difference between diaspora communities seems to have been quite substantial; see for example Karaite Judaism#History of Karaism. That said, I would still tend to agree that the deliberate "Jewish missionaries" activity in 6th century AD is quite an unlikely scenario. --Dr Dima (talk) 16:45, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Worth its weight

Has there ever been a unit of currency which has been worth its weight? Not necessarily in gold but in the materials that the currency is made of. A guy I work with claims that a U.S. nickel is worth its own weight. Although I don't believe this, it got me thinking about currencies in general. I would expect the answer would be yes considering currencies that are so devalued that it takes millions of dollars/francs/etc to buy even a loaf of bread. Dismas|^(talk) 06:36, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

At the rate that hyperinflation is going in Zimbabwe, soon the notes will be worth their weight in paper! BrainyBabe (talk) 06:44, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

To add to that, see the first illustration in hyperinflation, showing a German woman stoving her stove with bank notes because they burn longer than the firewood they can buy. Presumably, the German mark bought less paper than there was in the bank notes themselves. Also, the Royal Canadian Mint stopped producing pennies with nearly pure copper in 1996 because copper became more expensive then one cent per penny. --Bowlhover (talk) 07:10, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Historically, most un-debased coinage was, by definition, worth its weight in whatever metal it was made out of.

Inserting: Is that actually true? I suppose it must have been in the earliest days of coins, but I thought it was common for coins to have a face value worth slightly more than the value of the metal, i.e. seigniorage applied. --Anon, 08:40 UTC, February 25, 2008.

Modern fiat currency is almost invariably worth less

Inserting again: That is, this is intentionally so. --Anon, 08:40.

-- it's why the US penny was changed from pure copper to copper-clad zinc, for example. For the past few months, the metal making up a US nickel has been worth more than the face value of the coin, and the government is looking into changing the composition. It's not going to be easy: any new alloy will need to weigh the same as a current nickel and have similar magnetic and electrical properties so that vending machines will recognize it. --Carnildo (talk) 08:05, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

So in short, the situation can happen because metal prices rise. Similarly, in countries like the US and Canada, the old silver coinage is still valid money, but is worth more than its face value in silver... which is why cheaper coinage was substited and therefore you never see silver coins in circulation. --Anon, 08:40.

Since the aforementioned penny-change of 1985, the nickel has been the most expensive coin for the US to produce, when comparing the assigned worth of the coin to the worth of the metal it is made of. With inflation the way it is, it was only a matter of time... Wrad (talk) 19:45, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I've heard that the derivation of the word "pound" was that it began as the value of a pound, in weight, of stirling silver. (Not exactly what you were looking for, perhaps.) AndyJones (talk) 20:08, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

That's true. (It's spelled sterling, by the way.) It was a pound in the Tower weight system, equal to 27/35 of today's ordinary (avoirdupois) pound or 15/16 of a troy pound. See Pound (mass). --Anonymous, 22:44 UTC, February 25, 2008.

Hyperinflation

Edit:Ignore this question, it's unnecessary I worked out myself it was the article that was wrong and why Nil Einne (talk) 13:15, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I'm not sure whether to put this here or in the maths desk but I guess it has more to do with economics then maths, unless my maths is screwed. Anyway, I was reading this article and saw a talk page comment which got me thinking. The person was complaining that the price doubling doesn't make sense, but then nor do the percentages, unless I'm missing something. According to the article, inflation in Yugoslavia was 5 × 10¹⁵% a month in late 1993/early 1994. This seems like a lot. And according to Yugoslav dinar, the October dinar (YOU) lasted 3 months with the highest denomonition being 500 billion. Indeed it means that in one month, something that use to cost 1 YOU would now cost 50000000000001 YOU. That would mean by the end of October you would need 100 YOU notes of the largest denomonation for something that used to cost 1 YOU. By the end of November, it would be 2500000000000100000000000001 YOU for something that used to cost 1 dinar. I.E. You would need 5000000000000200 YOU notes of the largest denomonition notes. I.E. You could not buy anything by the end of November with October Yugoslav dinars. Either I'm missing something or have calculated wrong, or people had actually given up on using Yugoslav dinars long before it was revalued in January or the figure is wrong. I know inflation figures are averages but it still doesn't make sense to me. Nil Einne (talk) 12:59, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Note the article also mentions "1 novi dinar = 1 × 10²⁷~1.3 × 10²⁷ pre 1990 dinars". This sounds much more resonable but it is over a much longer period. And unless I'm missing something/calculated wrong, it means an inflation of 5 × 10¹⁵% per month for 3 months was impossible (unless you had a period of deflation as well) Nil Einne (talk) 13:09, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Ah I think I've found the problem. A much older version stated [1] the inflation rate was for this period (i.e. the nearly 4 month period given). Someone made the mistake at some stage of converting this to per month which resulted in the inaccurate figure which didn't make sense. I've changed this now [2] Nil Einne (talk) 13:15, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Ipatiev House and Ekaterinburg 217.43.8.161 (talk) 14:04, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

You have a little information on the history of the Ipatiev House after the murder of the Romanovs but I would be grateful for some more details plaese.

217.43, the Ipatiev House, as you will have noted from the article, was converted into a Museum of the Revolution in 1927. It then became an Agricultural School before taking on new life in 1938 as Anti-Religious Museum. During this period it was customary for party apparatchiks to arrive in large tour groups, posing before the bullet-damaged wall of the cellar in which the Tsar and his family had been murdered. In 1946 it was taken over by the local Communist Party. In 1974 it was formally listed as a Historical-Revolutionary Monument. But, to the embarrassment of the government, it was steadily becoming a place of pilgrimage for those who wished to honour the memory of the royal family.

In 1978, as the sixtieth anniversary of the crime approached, the Politburo decided to take action, declaring, amazingly enough, that the house was not of 'sufficient historical significance', and ordering its demolition. The task was passed to Boris Yeltsin, Chair of the local party, who had the house demolished in September 1977. He later wrote in his memoirs, published in 1990, that "sooner or later we will be ashamed of this piece of barbarism." But, despite this action, the pilgrims kept coming, often in secret and at night, leaving tokens of remembrance on the vacant site. After the fall of the Soviet state the Church of the Blood was built on the site, now a major place of pilgrimage. Clio the Muse (talk) 01:15, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I've expanded the article accordingly. Thanks! 06:38, 26 February 2008 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Sandstein (talk • contribs)

Clausewitz and Iraq

According to the Carl Clausewitz, the Prussian military stratagist, conflict, the decision to go to war, has to be based on clear political aims, on the rational and intelligent pursuit of national policy. How true is this in relation to George W Bush's decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003? Please note I am not asking for a debate on the rights and wrongs of the Iraq war, which is likely to prove endless and to no purpose. Rather, I would like answers to be tailored, if possible, to the central precepts of Clausewitz's On War. In essence this is a question about aims, means and consequences. It is for a study on the links between politics and strategy. I know this is an ambitious-perhaps too ambitious-request, but I hope it will not prove entirely impossible. Many, many thanks. Prince Yakamov (talk) 14:50, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Answers will necessarily be speculative, because the arguments among members of Bush's government are and will for some time remain secret. However, my guess as to the "clear political aims" were 1) to advance the interests of the Bush regime's core political base (the oil and armaments industries) by engaging in what was likely to be a costly war that aimed to secure U.S. control over a country with large oil reserves; 2) to give more reality to the claim that the United States was in a state of "war" (the "war on terror"), since the president's powers in a time of war are greater than those in a time of peace; 3) as a kind of corollary to point #1, to reward political supporters and clients (e.g. Halliburton) with lucrative contracts; 4) to generate what was intended to be a military victory to boost the chances of Bush and the Republicans in the 2004 elections. As for the "rational and intelligent pursuit of national policy", this presupposes rational and intelligent agents who are motivated to advance or protect national interests. I'm not sure that those presuppositions apply to members of the Bush regime. Their allegiances may have been to their personal and professional associates rather than to the nation as a whole. And their intelligence and rationality may be questionable. Putting those doubts aside, however, they might have felt that projecting United States power in the Middle East and gaining control over vast oil reserves were in the U.S. national interest. They may have overlooked ways in which such destabilizing and costly aggression was not in the U.S. interest. Marco polo (talk) 15:03, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Surely the aims (as given) were very clear - to get rid of saddam hussein and his ruling party and replace them with something else. Whether you think the decision was rational or in the best interests is something I'm not able to say. The 'dictators=bad' argument is compelling though - and I believe the action is based upon a 'stitch in time saves nine' theory.. If the stated reason is different from the true reason for this war is a question that many have asked - I won't bother to speculate about that. I confine my answer to the things you mentioned rather than the physical operation of the war and it's relationship to any theories in said book...

Apologies to those who may think this view point is naive. One alternative view has been covered by the previous reply83.100.158.211 (talk) 15:12, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I would like to point out that it's perfectly possible to rationally and intelligently pursue completely irrational goals. If the starting point was the belief that ‘democracy' is universally wanted, then no matter how sound the logical train that departed from there, the conclusion must have been questionable if not downright wrong. I do believe that there was a clear political aim and a more-or-less noble intent behind the Iraq war (at least for some of its instigators), but if you're aiming at mirages you won't be hitting much. Random Nonsense (talk) 22:45, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Prince Yakamov, perhaps you are familiar with the following passage from On War?-

No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses should do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

You see, what is important here, what Clausewitz understood and American strategic planners did not, is not so much the specific design, the aims and objectives as these are conceived in advance of an attack, but what unintended consequences may arise. War is then not a 'continuation of policy by other means.' Rather it can, and does, produce entirely new lines of policy that turn the original objectives inside out. For Washington the unintended consequences of the war in Iraq have, quite simply, been endless. The aims Marco has outlined above are perfectly plausible, but, as constituted, they have all been self-defeating.

So, what did the Bush administration not anticipate? For one thing they did not anticipate that America casualties would be greater after 'victory' than before. Above all, it did not anticipate being involved in a sectarian war of possibly indefinite duration. It was all so one dimensional: a deposed dictator, a grateful people a new democracy. In reality, the real consequences, the new departure in policy, has been a more unstable Middle East, an increased danger of terrorism, a growing threat to the civil liberties of the democratic nation, and a widespread distrust of the United States among the Islamic countries.

In response to a deteriorating strategic situation Donald Rumsfeld, the then US Secretary of Defense, said quite simply, in the crassest possible way, 'Stuff happens'. But you see, stuff should not happen if war is a rational pursuit of policy in the sense that Clausewitz conceived this. The advice that the great Prussian strategist would have given to Bush and Rumsfeld is to read the signs history for possible consequences, in an attempt to minimise the variables. But they did not read history; they did not read Clausewitz and they did not understand Iraq. The only certainty now is more chaos. Clio the Muse (talk) 02:40, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

A little truncation would help here Quote "Me on war" 'no one in his senses should do so'. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.100.138.74 (talk) 04:56, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

The Bush regime might have anticipated that the occupation of Iraq would be as peaceful as the occupation of Germany and Japan was after WW2. (Bush majored in history). After all, the U.S. did not have every military convoy attacked with roadside bombs 5 years after the end of WW2, and did not find it necessary by 1950 to drop 10 tons of bombs on enemy strongholds in German or Japanese cities, as has been done in Iraq 5 years after victory was proclaimed in Iraq. Unintended consequence can be a bitch. Edison (talk) 05:59, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Clausewitz is not THE authority on such matters, but merely a theorist. AllenHansen (talk) 11:47, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you for the considered responses. There are one or two real gems here. Clio the Muse, from your reading of Clausewitz, what would you say his view was on the precise relationship between the political and the military arms of the state? Would he accept that there are occasions in which a competent ruler would have to to give way to the judgements of the senior commanders? In other words, are their any conceivable situations, in Clausewitz's strategic view, where the military is superior to the civil? I appreciate your clear expertise. Prince Yakamov (talk) 17:28, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Hello again, Prince Yakamov. It would appear, on a superficial reading of Clausewitz, that the state and the military are interchangeable; that the will of one is the will of the other. After all, is war not simply the continuation of politics by other means? However, his philosophy of war is much more subtle than that statement would appear to suggest. For Clausewitz gives priority to the civilian authority over the military. In other words, the army is there to serve the state, not the state the army. What it comes down to is a question of perspectives. The soldier, of necessity, is a specialist. His horizons are limited to what is necessary to accomplish a given set of military tasks. The ruler, or the statesman, has to take account of all power relations, both military and political. If you like, the statesman, the commander-in-chief, is a kind of super-general, who takes final authority over the soldier in the field. After all, Napoleon is far more than a soldier! Clio the Muse (talk) 00:05, 27 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Purchasing power parity and geographical differences in cost of living within a country

I've just been offered a job in Belfast. As part of my negotiation, I'd like to be able to think through how much the salary offered is "equivalent" to in the currency I work in now. Exchange rates are part of the picture, but I think purchasing power parity might be a more important number. However, as someone who as lived in Vancouver, British Columbia, Cambridge, Massachusetts and Albuquerque, New Mexico, I understand well that currency isn't the whole story; the cost of living varies greatly within a country.

So, can someone help me with that? I know there are cost-of-living indices out there, at least for the U.S. (http://cgi.money.cnn.com/tools/costofliving/costofliving.html) , though I'm not sure where to find them for the UK, or where to find conversion rates for, say, the Geary-Khamis dollar. And once I have these indices, what would the specific mathematical formula be, for say, converting a pound in Belfast, NI, to a dollar in Boston, MA? moink (talk) 18:40, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

If you do a Google search on "international cost of living index" or the like, you will find that there are companies that charge $100 or more for this kind of comparison. No such thing seems to be available for free online. But you can kind of paste one together using a combination of sites. This site will let you compare the cost of living in Boston with the cost of living in New York. This site offers index numbers that let you compare the cost of living in New York with that in London. (This site will get you from Boston to London directly for a fee.) And this site will get you from London to Belfast for free. Using the last site, I found that a salary of £35,000 in London would be comparable to one of £21,570 in Belfast. A salary of £80,000 in London would be comparable to £53,193 in Belfast. Marco polo (talk) 20:58, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

That last site asks questions I don't have the answers to, in order to make the free report, though I should be able to interpolate from your data. Thanks. moink (talk) 22:30, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

"Within a country"? Has Vancouver seceded from Canada? Clarityfiend (talk) 22:05, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

No, but I wanted to point out that I've also lived in more than one country, thus pointing out that exchange rates also make a difference. Though I admit I originally wrote the sentence with just Albuquerque and Cambridge, and then edited later. I've also lived in Toronto, but I don't find the cost-of-living much different between Toronto and Vancouver, whereas Cambridge and Albuquerque are nearly the ends of the spectrum, at least if only cities are included. moink (talk) 22:24, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

The US Department of Defense maintains a very detailed policy for how much (both long term and, for short trips, per diem) it allows service personel (and I think civilian employees and contractors) can charge for living in various places. It's used by other US government departments and by other (often entirely unrelated, non-defense, non-aerospace) companies; my own direct experience is using the per diem part, which has always proved to be an adequate, but not excessive, amount for a reasonable business trip. I guess you can use these data (which are very granular for developed countries; Belfast is called out explicitly) as a basis from which to assess the pertaining multiplier. For example, comparing the rates for an O-1 between Albuquerque,NM and Cambridge, MA shows Cambridge to cost slightly more than double Albuquerque). The site is at http://perdiem.hqda.pentagon.mil/perdiem/rateinfo.html -- Finlay McWalter | Talk 14:12, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

War against japan

I have some questions about the allied war against japan.

1. Would it be true to say that William Slim was the best British general of the war fighting the most pointless campaign?

2. Has the reputation of Douglas MacArthur been inflated? How essentail was his campaign iin the Philippines?

3. Was there an alternative to the atomic attacks? How would the war, particular the air war, have proceeded without them? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jake Lake (talk • contribs) 19:04, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I find #1 quite confusing. Are you asking if Slim was the best general (in a pointless campaign), a (good) general in the most pointless campaign, specifically the best general in the most pointless campaign, or something else? The two superlatives make any sort of truth analysis tricky, and of course, the answer is predicated on your underlying assumptions and analyses.

Skipping ahead to #3, our article on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is an excellent starting point with many branches, and there is naturally no pat answer. Certainly alternatives existed; I personally find that the most interesting moral/ethical argument isn't over the nukes themselves (conventional firebombings had already established that the US was quite capable of causing widespread death and destruction) but over the demand for unconditional surrender that made such bombings an attractive option. As for the air war specifics, though, it's likely that little would have changed. At the time of the atomic bombings, the US had already firebombed 67 Japanese cities, specifically reserving a few as yet-unblemished nuclear targets. Nothing suggests that the campaign could not have been continued. — Lomn 21:57, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

You may be interested in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's conclusion to Racing the Enemy (2005) OCLC 57010369, where the author indulges in speculation as to the outcome of a number of 'what-if' scenarios concerning provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, soviet entry into the war, and use of the atomic bombs.—eric 00:46, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Re: #3: "Was there an alternative?" Of course, there are always alternatives. The question is which alternative was most compelling at the time. There are a variety of reasons that using the atomic bombs against civilian areas were more compelling than any of the many alternatives that they considered at the time (demonstrating the bomb, using the bomb against more purely military targets, not using the bomb at all, etc.). --98.217.18.109 (talk) 22:55, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

And note: not all of the reasons were necessarily the ones they publicly gave for it. One could make (and some people have) the argument that there were strong internal pressures to the Manhattan Project and the various committees that decided for its use to use it on civilian targets, ranging from the need to justify the expense of the project, to a desire to send a message to Russia, etc. The plausibility of these alternative, unstated motives varies. --98.217.18.109 (talk) 00:47, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Jake, I would answer your three questions as follows:

1. Yes, William Slim was a consummate soldier, in my estimation by far the best British commander of the Second World War, barring none. He fought the Burma Campaign with great professionalism and skill, inflicting on the Japanese at Kohima and Imphal the most serious defeats their army had ever faced. Kohima alone was so significant that it became widely known as the 'Stalingrad of the East'. Yet, at the same time, the recapture of Burma had far less to do with defeating Japan and far more to do with Churchill's determination to restore lost imperial prestige. In the end it served no purpose.

2 I've never really quite understood American reverence for Douglas MacArthur, a man who, it seems to me, was driven by more by deeply personal ambitions than by the duty he owed to his country. In military terms he was maverick. Obviously there had to be some kind of landing in the Philippines, to establish air and naval bases, and protect the southern flank of the navy for the continuing advance on Japan. But all that was needed was the partial or complete conquest of Luzon, which would have served this strategic purpose very well. MacArthur's plodding drive through island after island was pointless and wasteful, an ambition achieved at a huge and unnecessary cost in American lives.

3 No, as far as I am concerned, there was no alternative to the atomic bomb attacks; or rather there was at a momumental cost in lives, both American and Japanese. Unfortunately, the atom bombing has achieved, for understandable reasons, a unique grip on the popular imagination, as a singularly dreadful act. But, in their consequences, in terms of lost lives, the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, less dreadful than the firebombing of Tokyo. Remember, too, the effects of radioactive fall-out, which give the atomic attacks their particular horror, were largely unknown at the time. Without the atomic attacks the immediate option was to tighten the naval blockade of Japan, while the air force disrupted internal communications by attacking transport links. By August 1945 the Japans were already close to starvation. If the war had gone on much longer millions are likely to have died, even before it became necessary to implement Downfall. Clio the Muse (talk) 02:04, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

The book "American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964" by Manchester makes the point that MacArthur's Pacific war was extremely efficient in the ratio of Japanese killed to Allied soldiers killed, and in the retaking of strategic objectives in comparison the the war in Europe. MacArthur's knowlege of the Japanese and his strategies in prosecuting the war are generally well regarded. That said, it seems that the reconquest of the Phillipines may have been driven more by his "I shall return" boast and by what he described as the need for the U.S. to appear credible in the post-war world, than by it being the quickest way to defeat Japan. The Phillipines could have been isolated and bypassed. He was certainly a drama queen, whose underlings referred to him as "Sarah" referring to Sarah Bernhardt. Eisenhower, who was long his assistant in the prewar years, said he studied drama under him for several years, and recommended MacArthur be left to die on Corregidor. The 2 atom bombs avoided the need for house to house fighting on the home island, which would likely have been defended more tenaciouslyu that Iwo Jima, with a saving of hundreds of thousands of Allied and Japanese lives. MacArthur was not as revered by the soldiers who fought for him in WW2 as he was by the soldiers who fought for him in WW1. Edison (talk) 05:50, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

MacArthur was in the southern theater to keep him out of the Navy's hair. MacArthur was a visible figure, and he knew how to use public opinion. The public gets to choose their heroes, and they chose that distinguished-looking strong-willed man with the corncob pipe. In his day I'm sure more than one person had occasion to say "History will judge him." Well, here we are, and what is our decision? Many will say he was a vainglorious, pompous prima donna—a legend in his own mind. Others will say he was a great man and a great American who embodied the manly ideal of his day—a puissant visionary. I think we have to judge a general on results. He accomplished his mission in the Pacific. He managed the occupation of Japan wisely. Perhaps Inchon was pure luck, but good generals are lucky. He bucked the chain of command at the end, but he did it in aggression toward the enemy, and I want my generals to have a fighting spirit. I, personally, can't stand men like MacArthur, but he got the job done, and I'll judge him on that and hope he never quite fades away. --Milkbreath (talk) 12:45, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

MacArthur was a paradox. He could be "Dougout Doug," hated by GIs for hiding in Corregidor and only visiting Bataan once during the defense against the Japanese invasion, then leaving in a PT boat rather than surrendering ("leaving on the direct orders of the President," which order his friends may have solicited). In WW1 he had been a bold front-line general, in assaults across no-man's land. In later combat in WW2 and Korea he frequently went right to the front line to observe how effective enemy marksmanship was. He was very bold in entering Japan for the occupation, landing with a few MPs at a kamikazi base and driving to a hotel with only Japanese troops to provide security. His governing of Japan, his spurring of the remodeling of their society and the development of the constitution stands in vivid contrast to the year of occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. His evacuation to Bataan is said to be a masterpiece of maneuver, with well planned counterattacks, and bridges held until the last of his troops crossed then blown in the face of the Japanese advance. Yet he failed to store the available rice provisions and adequate ammunition on Bataan, hoping to fight the Japanese on the beaches. He squandered the largest fleet of bombers in the Pacific by allowing the Japanese to destroy them while they were parked inthe open on a well known airfiels, many hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, rather than dispersing and camouflaging them to allow attacks on Japanese ports in Tawan and on the invasion fleet. His rallying of the UN troops in Korea and the amphibious landing which routed the North Koreans stand up well in 2020 hindsight, compared to the Pentagon desire to hold and reinforce the toehold and gradually expand the Pusan perimeter, which would likely have caused more UN casualties in the manner of General U.S. Grant's American Civil War philosophy. He was an egotist, resenting press mention of the generals who led troops under him in WW2, unlike the practice in Europe. Edison (talk) 23:16, 26 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

He won. All the time. People, Americans and otherwise, like generals who win for them. So does history. That's why people like him in America. I personally like him. What many see as egotism, I see as his just being a good general, especially as regards Korea. Wrad (talk) 00:28, 27 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]