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Valence populism

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Valence populism is a form of populism linked to political parties or politicians whose positions cannot be placed on the left–right political spectrum and mainly promote valence issues that are widely approved by voters. Such popular valence issues include anti-corruption, government transparency, democratic reform, and moral integrity. Valence populism is associated with anti-establishment sentiment and lacks a consistent ideology, unlike left-wing or right-wing populism. Techno-populism is a variant of valence populism.

The concept of valence populism was largely built by political scientist Mattia Zulianello. It has usually been found in parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite this, the best known example is the Italian Five Star Movement. Other parties that have been described as valence populist include the Czech ANO 2011, Bulgarian GERB, Croatian Human Shield, Slovak OĽaNO, and Slovenian List of Marjan Šarec. As of 2024, valence parties achieved their best result in the 2019 European Parliament election.

Definition

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Populism is often defined as an idea within the framework of a liberal democracy that defines two core groups—"the people" and "the elite".[1] Political scientist Cas Mudde defined the core populist concepts with "the people" being presented as a morally good force, while "the elite" are often portrayed as corrupt and self-serving.[2][3] There are several definitions of "the people", meaning that the group can be based on ethnic, national, or class lines.[4] According to Mudde's framework, populism is often combined with ideologies such as nationalism, socialism, or neoliberalism.[5]

Political scientist Mattia Zulianello defines valence populism as a variant of populism that is attributed to parties that have an unclear positioning on the left–right political spectrum and that promote valence issues that are widely approved by voters,[6] such as anti-corruption ideas, increased government transparency, democratic reform and integrity.[7][8] Such parties place more importance on these issues than left-wing, right-wing, or centrist populists.[9] Technocratic populism is a variant of valence populism.[8][10][11] It promotes apolitical experts who seek to directly connect with "the people".[8][10][12] Despite the concentration on valence issues, some valence populists may adopt stances on a limited range of ideological issues.[12]

Valence populist parties are neither left-wing, right-wing, nor centrist;[8][13][14] they cannot be positioned on the political spectrum.[7] They also purposely avoid showing clear positions regarding socio-cultural and economic issues and are often anti-establishment.[7][15][16] "Their policy stances are primarily informed by an unadulterated conception of populism … and are therefore flexible, free-floating and, often, inconsistent", Zulianello has said.[8] Together with political scientist Petra Guasti, Zulianello said that valence populists lack a "thick ideology" such as nativism or socialism, which is not the case for ideological populism.[10] Valence populism also "rejects consistent ideologies".[17][18] Because of this, the ideology of valence populists is solely populism.[6] This has led valence populism to being described as a "purer form of populism".[19]

Zulianello has argued for the adoption of the term valence populism, considering that centrist populism "directly or indirectly refers to the ideological or geometric centre of the party system".[20] He has also said that while issues such as anti-corruption are typically affiliated with centrist populism, he considers it misleading because valence issues lack a clear positioning and thus cannot be located in the political centre.[21] Zulianello built off the definition from political scientist Kenneth M. Roberts, who said in 2018 that "some [populist] parties offer little more than … valence considerations" and thus cannot be defined as either left-wing or right-wing.[22] Political scientist Eliška Drápalová has argued that valence populism is "well suited" for local politics due to local politics being "more direct, personalised, and unmediated".[23] Political scientists Vladimír Naxera, Ondřej Stulík, and Vojtěch Kaše criticised the creation of new subdivisions of populism, including valence populism, due to the categories creating ambiguity in academic literature.[24]

History

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In political science, variants of populism, such as left-wing and right-wing populism and even centrist populism since the 2000s, have been discussed and distinguished.[7] In regard to Europe, Zulianello noted that other political scientists viewed that populist parties "primarily engage in positional competition" on the economic and socio-cultural axes.[8] Zulianello disagreed with the approach that all populist parties can be positioned on the political spectrum.[25] Parties that cannot be identified as either left or right were sometimes attributed as centrist populist or were placed in the "residual category".[8] Zulianello and another political scientist, Erik Gahner Larsen, have discussed the exception to positioning populist parties.[8] He has said that their approach has been largely theoretical.[8] Valence populism has usually been found in political parties in Central and Eastern Europe.[21]

In French, political scientists Chloé Alexandre and Gilles Ivaldi have called valence populism "consensual populism" (French: populisme consensuel), while in Italian, political scientist Matteo Giardiello called it "hybrid populism" (Italian: populismo ibrido) due to not being clearly identified with either the left or right sides of the political spectrum.[26][27] Social psychologist Valerio Pellegrini described valence populism as an "innovative category".[28] Researcher Frederik Henriksen has identified anti-systemic populism, a form of populism that combines anti-elitism with conspiracy theories and vaccine hesitancy, as being similar to valence populism.[29] Political scientist Dani Filc listed Peronism, an ideology built around Argentinian leader Juan Perón,[30] as a variant of populism that cannot be classified as either left-wing or right-wing.[31]

Considering that valence populism is more prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, whose countries were not members of the European Union until the 1990s, valence populism was not present in the European Parliament until then.[32] The first valence populist parties entered the European Parliament in the 2004 election.[33] These were the Austrian Hans-Peter Martin's List, which won 1 seat, and the Lithuanian Labour Party, which won 5 seats.[33] The 2009 election also saw the Bulgarian GERB, another valence populist party, join the European Parliament.[33] By 2014, valence populist parties had 28 seats in the European Parliament.[34] Valence populist parties achieved their best result yet in the 2019 election, when six parties gained representation.[35] During this period, valence populism also spread to Western Europe, particularly Italy and France, where the Five Star Movement (M5S) and La République En Marche ! (LREM) achieved success.[15][21] Outside of Europe, Imran Khan, the former prime minister of Pakistan, has also been viewed as a valence populist due to his focus on issues such as corruption, transparency, governance reform, integrity, and social justice.[36]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, valence populist parties held varied positions regarding vaccination. In Europe, Slavi Trifonov of Bulgarian There is Such a People and Ivan Pernar, formerly affiliated with Croatian Human Shield (ŽZ), promoted conspiracy theories and opposed vaccination. On the other hand, in Australia, Jacqui Lambie of the Jacqui Lambie Network was supportive of the COVID-19 vaccination.[37]

Political parties

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Logo of the Five Star Movement
The Italian Five Star Movement is a common example of a valence populist party

Zulianello and Larsen have compiled a list of valence populist parties using their dataset of varieties of populism from 1979 to 2019 and the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on political parties.[9] Out of all listed political parties, the ŽZ had the highest rate of blurry positions on socio-cultural and economic issues in 2019.[38] Regarding the reduction of political corruption as a priority, Slovak OĽaNO is listed as the party that holds the highest priority on the issue, followed by the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S), and ŽZ. GERB is listed on the bottom with regard to valence populist parties.[39] Zulianello and Larsen have also both argued that the term valence populism fits better than centrist populism for OĽaNO, M5S, and Czech ANO 2011.[40] In a 2023 article, Zulianello and Guasti listed ANO 2011, M5S, and OĽaNO as examples of valence populist parties.[10] In a separate article, they named Jacqui Lambie Network as a valence populist party.[37]

Regarding M5S, Zulianello has described it as "perhaps the best example" of valence populism; M5S cannot be positioned on the left–right political spectrum and is very ideologically flexible and eclectic.[21] Pellegrini also said that M5S is valence populist due to their focus on non-ideological issues.[41] Academic Gilda Sensales noted in 2024 that while M5S has been also described as left-wing populist, the research of Pellegrini and political scientists Núria Font, Paolo Garziano, and Myrto Tsakatika had M5S "in the middle of ... the classic left-right continuum of political orientation", and thus Sensales categorised M5S as a valence populist party instead.[42]

Zulianello has also said that while GERB is a member of the European People's Party and defines itself as a centre-right and Christian-democratic party, it is still a valence populist party due to not following a particular ideology.[43] On the other hand, ANO 2011 has presented itself as a technocratic party.[43] Naxera, Stulík, and Kaše said that ANO 2011's leader Andrej Babiš showcased technocratic populist and valence populist tendencies.[44] Together with author Kostiantyn Yanchenko, Zulianello also analysed the Ukrainian Servant of the People of Volodymyr Zelenskyy and concluded that SN is a valence populist party due to its focus on valence issues and blurry socio-cultural and economic issues.[45] Sociologists and researchers Michel Perottino and Petra Guasti also identified Emmanuel Macron's LREM as valence populist due to focusing on technocratic issues and rejecting being positioned on either the left, right, or centre of the political spectrum.[15] Political scientist Dragoș Dragoman described the Save Romania Union as a valence populist party.[46]

Huber, Jankowski, and Juen noted that the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) also began as a valence populist party, having only campaigned on anti-tax and anti-elitist issues.[18] FrP later began focusing on issues related to immigration and switched towards right-wing populism.[18] They argued the same for Alternative for Germany due to initially campaigning solely on an anti-Euro platform before turning towards right-wing populism.[18]

The following list includes political parties that have been labelled as valence populist.[47][48][49]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Trifonov is a politician, not a political party, though he formed his own political party, There is Such a People, in 2020. His previous project in 2019 was There Is no Such State, but was unregistered, thus Trifonov was listed instead in Zulianello's and Larsen's research.[9][50]

References

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Bibliography

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News articles

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Footnotes

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  1. ^ Mudde & Rovira 2017, pp. 1, 9.
  2. ^ Mudde & Rovira 2017, pp. 11, 99.
  3. ^ Mudde 2021, pp. 578–579.
  4. ^ Mudde 2021, p. 579.
  5. ^ Mudde & Rovira 2017, pp. 5, 6, 19.
  6. ^ a b Zulianello 2023, p. 62.
  7. ^ a b c d Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 190.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 191.
  9. ^ a b c Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 192.
  10. ^ a b c d Zulianello & Guasti 2023a.
  11. ^ Reiser & Hebenstreit 2020, p. 569.
  12. ^ a b Zulianello & Larsen 2021, p. 2.
  13. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 28.
  14. ^ Driscoll 2023, p. 148.
  15. ^ a b c Perottino & Guasti 2020, p. 547.
  16. ^ Bruno 2022, p. 117.
  17. ^ Gorbach 2024, p. 275.
  18. ^ a b c d Huber, Jankowski & Juen 2022, p. 1000.
  19. ^ Pellegrini 2023, p. 27.
  20. ^ Zulianello 2019, p. 329.
  21. ^ a b c d Manucci 2019.
  22. ^ de la Torre & Roberts 2018, p. 252.
  23. ^ Drápalová 2023.
  24. ^ Naxera, Kaše & Stulík 2023, p. 13.
  25. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 190-191.
  26. ^ Giardiello 2021, p. 346.
  27. ^ Alexandre & Ivaldi 2023, p. 8.
  28. ^ Pellegrini 2023, p. 4.
  29. ^ Henriksen 2024.
  30. ^ Turner 1983, p. 3.
  31. ^ Filc 2023.
  32. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 35.
  33. ^ a b c Manucci 2021, p. 30.
  34. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 31.
  35. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 37.
  36. ^ Khalid 2020, p. 11.
  37. ^ a b Zulianello & Guasti 2023b, p. 9.
  38. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 194.
  39. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 196.
  40. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 197.
  41. ^ Pellegrini 2023, p. 13, 16.
  42. ^ Sensales 2024, p. 140.
  43. ^ a b Zulianello 2023, p. 65.
  44. ^ Naxera, Kaše & Stulík 2023, p. 14.
  45. ^ Yanchenko & Zulianello 2023, p. 253.
  46. ^ Dragoman 2020, p. 305.
  47. ^ Zulianello 2019, p. 330-332.
  48. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 193.
  49. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2021, p. 10-12.
  50. ^ Spirova 2021, p. 55.

Further reading

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