User talk:EdwardLovette

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Your sig

I'm not sure if your sig is appearing exactly how you intend. Do you intend two date stamps to appear? Do you want to call yourself Lovette or EdwardLovette? If you like, I can help you design something. --ROGER DAVIES ^talk 05:57, 21 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

January 2008

Hi, the recent edit you made to Origins of World War I has been reverted, as it appears to be unconstructive. Use the sandbox for testing; if you believe the edit was constructive, ensure that you provide an informative edit summary. You may also wish to read the introduction to editing. Thanks. - ✰ALLSTAR✰ ^echo 07:15, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

International Law and the Outbreak of World War I

I don't want to clutter up the "Origins of World War I" talk page with our chatter regarding International Law, but I would like to give you a more complete response than I did on that talk page.

The Hague Convention of 1907, "Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" is the most applicable international treaty under which one could consider the legality of the steps leading up to the war (leaving aside for the moment the Belgian Neutrality Treaty). The Convention has two main components: 1. Mediation, and 2. Commissions of Inquiry.

Mediation: The various types of mediation permitted under the convention contain the phrase "as far as circumstances allow". This phrase is a legal escape hatch allowing states to avoid mediation if mediation is against their perceived interests. With Russia's slow mobilization of its gigantic army time worked against Austria-Hungary and so mediation with Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary underway and without the prior occupation of Belgrade could be rejected by Austria-Hungary on a sound legal basis. In real world application, mediation was purely voluntary, not compelled. The Signatory Powers Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania and the Ottoman Empire (and by extension Greece) engaged in two wars in 1911-1912, with the Signatory Power Montenegro attacking the Ottoman Empire without warning to start the first Balkans war, and Bulgaria similarly attacking Greece and Serbia (who were plotting to attack the Bulgarians but just had not gotten around to it yet) to start the Second Balkans War. The Second Balkans War had a special cirumstance, Russia had already been nominated by a secret treaty signed before the first Balkans War to be the arbiter of any territorial dispute that should arise over the spoils of the war, but nevertheless the Balkan states went to war rather than waiting for a peaceful settlement. No legal action was brought against these states.

Commissions of Inquiry: These commissions are only for determining facts and not for dealing with matters of honor or vital interests. The dispute between Serbia and Austria-Hungary involved both honor and vital interests and so fell outside the purview of these commissions.

Mobilization: The only mention of mobilization in the convention is that during mediation mobilization may proceed unless otherwise agreed.

Central Powers Peaceful Efforts: It should be noted, as mentioned in the article "Origins of World War I", that Austria-Hungary and Germany did during the days immediately following June 28 seek a peaceful solution with Serbia, but these efforts were summarily rebuffed by Serbia and Russia. There was no talk of mediation until after Russian pre-mobilization and Serbia mobilization had begun (while Austria-Hungary and Germany had not taken such steps yet) and mediation under these circumstances would be disadvantageous to Austria-Hungary.

Serbian Act of War?: There are three bases on which Austria-Hungary could argue that Serbia in fact had started the war. First, members of the Serbian Military had sponsored, trained, armed, etc. men armed with bombs and guns to kill and who did kill 2 and wound 20 Austro-Hungarians. By itself, judgements might vary as to whether this was an act of war, but surrounding facts make a clear case that this was an act of covert war. These facts include that the assassination was ordered by the Chief of Military Intelligence, that while the operation was underway the Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence was the most powerful political figure in the country and was in the process of organizing a new government, that the Prime Minister monitored the plot but did not prevent it, that Serbia publicly refused to investigate and failed to discipline its officers involved, and finally that the military and civilian Government of Serbia was keenly aware that the assassination might bring about war with Austria-Hungary that would bring in Russia and possibly other powers. Second, Serbia had renigged on its international commitment of March 1909 to change the direction of its policy and live henceforth on a good neighborly basis with Austria-Hungary. Unilaterally and repeatedly violating this commitment, which in effect was a peace treaty, was a violation of international law touching on honor and vital interests and as such a casus belli. Finally, Serbia's mobilization while Austria-Hungary had taken no similar measure followed by the border violation at Temis-Kubin by Serbia reservists constitutes another technical act of war. These three acts together demonstrate that Serbia caused the hostilities and that Russia's unconditional backing for Serbia was aiding and abetting.

Belgian Neutrality: Clearly Belgium suffered terribly at the hands of Germany and Germany owes compensation to Belgium as a civil matter, and Germany admitted and committed to it in advance, so no defense of Germany on civil grounds is appropriate. As a criminal matter, things are more murky. There are three possible defenses as I see it:

First, Belgium was not maintaining a completely balanced neutrality. It had secret military cooperation discussions and agreements with Britain that it did not have with Germany. Likewise, Belgium's fortification and military concentrations were definitely tilted against Germany. Taken together with statements by British Statesmen such as Lloyd George that Belgium could not remain neutral during a general European War (there would be no way to properly blockade Germany if Belgium remained neutral), a case could be made that Belgium was no longer neutral.

Second, Serbia had abrogated its March 1909 commitment to Austria-Hungary and the Great Powers without any complaints from the Entente. Russia unilaterally ripped up its 1905 friendship treaty with Germany almost before the ink on Nicholas II's signature was dry. In escence, "so what?" Sovereign nations abrogate treaties all the time. The penalty, in rare instances is war. Well, not invading Belgium was not going to stop the war anyway, so "so what?".

Third, "Necessity": This is probably the soundest argument. Its basis is common law. Take the analogy that a French arsonist is planning to burn down a German's house and has taken out a gas can and some matches. The German with a baseball bat in his hand who owns the home sees the Frenchman from a distance and asks him what he is planning. The French says "I intend to act according to my own interests." With that the German has decided to attack the Frenchmen to stop him from burning down his house, but a Belgian is standing in the way and if he goes round him, the German knows he will be too late. The German shouts to the Belgian to stand aside, but the Belgian says, "I am standing on my own property and will not move." The German then runs toward the Frenchman, knocks over and badly injures the Belgian and then starts fighting the Frenchman. The German's house burns down anyway. The German would have a proper necessity defense against assault and trespassing in common law.

None of these defenses are fully sound, but in a jury trial with a "beyond a reasonable doubt" threshold, I bet there would be a few jurors holding out for the defense. In a civil case though Germany had best just pay compensation as I said.

Finally, if we discuss more broadly war guilt and if there was to be a trial for war guilt, I think you should keep in mind that the prosecution is expected to have clean hands. Instead, the Entente's hand are very dirty with all kinds of lies that were told to the public, each other, and other countries the net effect of which was to make the war more likely, wider or more resistant to settlement. The trial would become a big embarrassment to everyone which may be one of the reasons William II was never tried at the Hague or anywhere else.Werchovsky (talk) 19:29, 13 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

In response to your comments on my talk page:

1. No way to properly blockage Belgium: Holland and Scandinavia were blockaded extensively through sea mines. This was not possible in the case of Belgium it being too close to French-British shipping lanes. Long ago I have read quotes from Lloyd George and other British cabinet members that Belgium could not remain neutral.

2. With regards to duress in 1909, you were the one who cited the Venezuelan debt collection matter that went before the Hague. As I said before, the Hague ruled that duress is irrelevant in such international agreements. What difference does it make that duress is a cause to declare a contract in America unconscionable when there is clear international law precidence on point?

3. Shoplifting is of course a poor analogy. Russia and France were intent on dismembering Germany, as they did. There are no international police. Arson seemed to me a good analogy as once the damage was done it could not be undone. The escence of the common law defense of necessity is the effort to prevent a serious crime.Werchovsky (talk) 15:30, 14 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

With regards to your comments on John Kenney, he and I shared the view that your focus on international law amongst other things was not helpful to the article (although, of course, I share an interest with you in this topic). He is pressed for time as he is trying to complete his dissertation. (In my first encounter with him we had quite a sharp exchange but eventually found an accomodation and since then have gotten along well.) So, let's keep off the "Origins" page in these peripheral discussions as much as possible.

I would like to be frank with you. After you accused the article as a crime against humanity and evoked Hitler and revisionism in the same breath, I found myself questioning your sanity. You haven't repeated that kind of hyperbole so my guess now is you were just in a strange mood when you wrote that.

The "Origins of World War I" is an extremely vast and complex subject. I think I am only expert on Sarajevo. I searched the internet for experts on Sarajevo, found a librarian who taught a course on the topic, and he recommended a series of books including his highest recommendation for Albertini, but also Dedijer, Owens and a few others (including one really bad Russian article written in Stalinist style). These then had footnotes to primary sources, which I then looked into. I think this is more productive than starting out with the memoirs of the participants or observers. Albertini of course includes interviews with the participants, but as a highly skilled journalist he is much more likely to get at the truth than you or I reading Bethmann's memoirs on our own. Memoirs, of course, have their place, but we need to be a bit skeptical. Generally, if the memoirs touched on a critical issue to war guilt, there will be a Kriegschuldfrage article on it and perhaps something in the Entente press as well. So, for example, when Burzinski wrote that War Minister Werchovsky had told him directly of the Russian Military Attache's role in Sarajevo Outrage, one should not be satisfied with just that information. But then if you discover that the Kriegschuldfrage attempted to get Werchovsky, who was then a general in the Red Army, to confirm or deny the authenticity of that statement and he declined to say anything and since there is other coroberating evidence, Burzinski's statement can be accepted as probably true. You may want to initially narrow your focus and follow this kind of approach. The article definitely needs a section on Agadir Crisis for example, and the Agadir article itself is quite weak. But this is just an example and may not interest you. Werchovsky (talk) 17:55, 14 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Bright Line

When I wrote "bright line", I didn't intend to say anything about the law, it was just a legal term that seemed to describe diplomatically exactly what Britain needed to do if war was to be avoided or at least contained. If Britain had said "We will remain neutral so long as Germany does not invade France (or if France invades Germany, not advance into France further than 10KM), attack French ports, shipping, or the French Navy (outside the North Sea), and Germany does not invade Belgium and Holland, and Germany refrains from invading Russia (or if Russia invades Germany, not advance further than 30km into Russia) and Germany does not invade Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro. Germany may send troops to Austria-Hungary to defend Austria-Hungary against attack without affecting Britain's neutral status. If Germany takes any of these prohibited actions Britain will join the war against Germany with all the force at its disposal. We amend our proposal on 4-party talks to include a freeze on military mobilization as well as military action. If Germany accepts our proposal for 4-party talks, we guarantee we will support trial of all implicated parties in the conspiracy to assassinate Franz-Ferdinand before a specially created International Court to be located in the Hague. The court shall have the powers to issue arrest warrants and compell the appearance and testimony of witnesses regardless of what country they may reside in. The trials shall be open to the public." If a demarche of that nature was delivered, then perhaps Germany would have dropped the Schlieffen Plan, or even decided to go ahead with the conference. But Britain instead sat and did nothing for a month after the murders, then started sending somewhat cryptic signals, and then far too late began making its position clear. It was not what was required from the world's preeminent power if peace was to be maintained.Werchovsky (talk) 01:00, 14 August 2008 (UTC)[reply]

In response to what you wrote on my talk page: Britain knew how to conduct private diplomacy (Grey never even told the cabient the extent to which he had over the years committed Britain to defend France and Russia). Grey could make the statement directly to Germany without informing Russia and France so as not to embolden them. The "beware of foreign entanglements" argument does not seem to fit the British case as Britain was already quite thoroughly entangled. There are I think four explanations for why Britain did little or nothing for so long: 1) The cabinet and parliament were divided. 2) Britain had many issues occupying its foreign policy and a little dust-up in the Balkans was not really such a bad thing, Italy would demand territorial compensation for whatever Austria-Hungary took from Serbia, Austria-Hungary wouldn't give it, and this would drive Italy toward alliance with Britain and slightly weaken Britain's old and perhaps future enemy Russia. 3) War fighting alongside Russia and France against Germany looked like it would inflict little pain on Britain, while taking a heavy toll on Britain's continental rivals. Since its more pain for them, let them solve it. 4) The speed of events from the close of the Franco-Russian summit to the outbreak of war surprised Britain.Werchovsky (talk) 01:58, 14 August 2008 (UTC)[reply]