User talk:Dapi89/SandboxAdolf Galland list of victories

glantz

u own kursk ? if not i will give his numbers friday ( if the book arrived )

Yes, I have Glantz and House Titans Clash, I also have Glantz' The Battle of Kursk. Dapi89 (talk) 17:52, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

maps

what is with my map [[1]] is it ok? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Blablaaa (talk • contribs) 14:04, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Not bad at all. Good work. Dapi89 (talk) 17:51, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

neutral

glantz wrotes russian POV and frieser german POV, both should be included. your rumanyantcev for example is only dealing with russian decessions —Preceding unsigned comment added by Blablaaa (talk • contribs) 14:05, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

One doesn't need to include an author of a particular nationality to indicate neutrality or bias. But both should be included, yes. Neither though, should be given undue weight over the other. Dapi89 (talk) 17:50, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

my bias ?!?

i would please see an example of me pushing german bias. if there is non please admit that i did NOT pushing german bias Blablaaa (talk) 14:06, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Well, lets not get into this again. Sufficed to say losses are a contentious issue and who had, possibly unintentionally, misquoted the important totals for the Kharkov region. Glantz and House say 400 odd thousand were casualties, but this covers the period March - 23 August 1943 period. This would also include Third Kharkov. As long as all the sources are included, then there is no bias from either perspective (as pointed out by Parsecboy). Dapi89 (talk) 17:48, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

so there is no german bias of me? i dont think that this casualites include the third battle of kharkov. frieser quotes krivo and takes exactly this casualties for rumanyantcev. krivo always gives casualties for russian operations, and rumanyantcev is one. so i guess the 4xx.xxx are exactly for rumanytcev. i will check when the book is here. dont misunderstand me i want to clear that i never pushed german bias here . Blablaaa (talk) 18:14, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Its okay. All that has to be done is to write what the various authors say, not matter how we, as individuals, feel about it. Dapi89 (talk) 18:36, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

dump quote here

“ Although often thought of as a tank battle, Kursk as a whole arguably demonstrated the triumph of artillery, infantry and engineers over armour. The Soviet plan was to soak up the German assault in a colossal web of defensive positions and only then launch their armoured counter-attack. It was also an important air battle, in which the balance shifted in favour of the Soviets. ” — John Keegan

State of the Red Air Force

The Red Air Force (VVS) had lost over 36,900 aircraft in 1941-1942. However the Soviet aircraft industry had replaced losses in machines and had now rearmed and dispensed with obsolete types such as the I-16, MiG-3 and the LaGG-3. The most widely used Soviet fighters in the Kursk battle were the Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5. The La 5FN was considered to be a match for both the Bf 109 and Fw 190. Pilot training was short and lacked thoroughness. The 13,383 Soviet pilots who were trained in 1942 received 13–15 flight hours before combat. Sturmovik and bomber pilots received just 18 and 15 hours respectively. Of the Soviet bomber and ground attack units, just seven percent of its pilots had seen action prior to Kursk. Most Soviet pilots were forced to train on the type they would fly in combat. As a result the Soviets lost 10,600 aircraft to accidents up until the summer of 1943. At senior command, the Soviets possessed highly skilled leaders, such as Colonel General Aleksandr Novikov, Commander-in-Chief of the VVS in the Kursk region. A lack of experience at lower levels led to costly losses. In the aftermath of Kursk, Soviet aviation rapidly improved its coordination with the ground forces. Its pilots also received a rapidly improving training program. As a result, the Soviets were able to build the Red Banner units of highly skilled fighter pilots. Just six months after Kursk, the ratio of Soviet to German aircraft losses had fallen from 4:1 to 3:2.

where is the problem ? Blablaaa (talk) 18:17, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Prelim' ground

It took four months before Hitler allowed Manstein to attack, by which time the Germans had added 90 Ferdinand Panzerjägers, all 79 flyable Henschel Hs 129 ground attack aircraft, as well as 270 Tigers, late model Panzer Mark-IVs and even a number of captured T-34s. In total, they assembled some 3,000 tanks and assault guns, 2,110 aircraft and 900,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy.

By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on German military strength. Although actions in North Africa hardly constituted the Red Army's longed-for second front, the operation there did begin to tell on the Germans, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of Luftwaffe losses occurred in the battles over Malta and Tunisia. German air superiority was no longer guaranteed. The Soviet Air Force outnumbered the Luftwaffe, and were gaining in technological quality as well. Both air forces possessed very effective ground-attack aircraft types capable of decimating armour: the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the German Junkers Ju 87G (Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added Bordkanone 37 mm gunpods).

The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on 1 July, the orders were issued to attack on 5 July. The following day, Marshal Vasilyevskiy warned the Front commanders (N. F. Vatutin, K. K. Rokossovskiy and I. S. Konev) that the long-awaited German offensive would begin sometime between 3 and 6 July. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from their Red Orchestra (German: Rote Kapelle, and the "Lucy Group") espionage organization, whose sources allegedly included officers in Hermann Göring’s aviation ministry and other parts of the Nazi administration.

Preliminary fighting started on 4 July 1943 in the south, as 4th Panzer Army had elected to try to take Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on 5 July. Thus they deliberately sacrificed tactical surprise. Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin, having received reports that the German offensive was imminent, ordered Voronezh Front to bombard German positions on the night of 4 July.

In the afternoon, Stuka dive bombers blew a two-mile-wide gap in the Soviet front lines on the north in a period of 10 minutes, and then turned for home while the German artillery opened up to continue the pounding. Hoth's armored spearhead, the III Panzer Corps, then advanced on the Soviet positions around Zavidovka. At the same time, the Großdeutschland Division attacked Butovo in torrential rain, and the 11th Panzer Division took the high ground around Butovo. To the west of Butovo, the going proved tougher for Großdeutschland and the 3rd Panzer Division, which met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. The II SS Panzer Corps launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts, and again met with strong resistance, until assault troops equipped with flamethrowers cleared the bunkers and outposts.

At 2:30, the Red Army hit back with an artillery bombardment in the north and south. This barrage by over 3,000 guns and mortars expended about half of the artillery ammunition for the entire operation. The goal was to delay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly against German artillery positions and managed to suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they attacked, resulting in much weaker German artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. This bombardment disrupted German units and caused them to attack at different times on 5 July. In the south, the Red Army chose to fire largely against the German infantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially successful in delaying the German attack, but caused few casualties.

my source says the artillery attack was a complete failure, nearly nothing happend. he backs up his opinion with war diaries Blablaaa (talk) 18:18, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Premlim' Aviation

The Soviet Air Arm played a significant role in hampering the German preparations. On 17 April 1943, a raid on the German airfield at Orsha-South destroyed five Ju 88 reconnaissance aircraft from 1.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 100 and 4.(F)/121, and then three Do 17s/Do 217s of 2. Nachtaufklärungsstaffel. Three days later, another ten high-level reconnaissance aircraft were destroyed on the ground. As a result, the only operational strategic reconnaissance Staffel was 4.(F)/14.

The Luftwaffe was also busy before the main operation. The tank factory at Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ) was subjected to a series of heavy attacks throughout June 1943. On the night of 4/5 June, He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 1 (KG 1), KG 3, KG 4, KG 55 and KG 100 dropped 179 tons of bombs, causing massive destruction to buildings and production lines. All of GAZ No. 1 plant's 50 buildings, 9,000 metres (30,000 ft) of conveyers, 5,900 pieces of equipment and 8,000 tank engines were destroyed. However, the Germans made an error in target selection. The GAZ plant No. 1 produced only the T-70 light tank. Factory No. 112, the second-biggest producer of the more formidable T-34, continued production undisturbed. Soviet production facilities were repaired or rebuilt within six weeks. In 1943, Factory No. 112 produced 2,851 T-34s, 3,619 in 1944, and 3,255 in 1945. The Luftwaffe had also failed to hit the Gorkiy Artillery Factory (No. 92) or the aircraft plant where the Lavochkin La-5 and La 5FN were made. The Luftwaffe failed to disrupt the Soviet preparation for the coming battle.

in general i cant provide informations regarding the airbattles Blablaaa (talk) 18:19, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Reasons for the failure of "Zitadelle"

According to the German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser there are five main reasons for the failure of Operation Zitadelle:

• Soviet numerical superiority. Frieser points out that the biggest problem of the OKW were the shortage of infantry. The OKH had no operational reserve while the Red Army could field an entire front (Steppe Front) as reserve. That the Red Army had more tanks than the Wehrmacht had less influence on the outcome according to Frieser.

• Delays: The repeated delays by Hitler gave the Red Army enough time to fortify the bulge around Kursk to an enormous fortress. High officers like Manstein and Zeitzler pushed for a fast attack to catch the Red Army unprepared and low on morale after the third battle of Kharkov. The allied Operation Husky made Hitler's date for the attack the "most adverse possible termin"

Frieser's finding's are disputed by American military historian and Soviet military expert David Glantz:

• Glantz asserts the German defeat at Kursk did not come about by the "Often-exaggerated numerical superiority" of the Soviet armed forces. The principal cause of Kursk was the revolution in Soviet command, staff, operational and tactical techniques. The General Staff had learned from the lessons of previous battles and disseminated "war experience" based on "exhaustive" anaylsis of battles, operations and campaigns. These lessons were added to Soviet doctrine (Soviet deep battle), producing new procedures. Glantz and House have asserted the tank strength was even, between 1:1 and 1.5:1 in the Soviets favour.

• Glantz contends the Soviet introduced new operational and tactical techniques. They worked out many of the difficulties of integrating arms and services into "a true combined arms operation". Glantz emphasises "sophisticated understanding of intelligence, deception, and anti-tank defence". Similar improvements were made in the combined use of artillery, tanks, engineers, infantry to break German defences on a narrow front. At Prokhorovka and in the Kutzov operations, the Red Army gained experience with mobile armoured formations and mechanized corps that became the hallmark of Soviet deep operations. These formations demonstrated their ability to match the best efforts of the German panzer force. Operations still needed to be perfected to reduce huge casualties. Nevertheless, the German command recognised that at Kursk they faced an entirely new and more competent Red Army.

• Glantz points out the defensive tactics had also improved. Skillful use of anti-tank artillery in strong points and the use of separate tank brigades, tank regiments and self-propelled gun unitsto support them offered mobile defence support. These units participated in wearing down tactical attacks against enemy spearheads. The transitional year of 1943 was decisive for the Soviet war effort. By the years end Soviet doctrine had perfected its force structure. Operational and tactical techniques tested and smoothed out in 1943 would be refined further and perfected in 1944 and 1945. "The elementary education the Red Army received in 1941-42 gave way to the secondary education of 1943. In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets would accomplish university-level and graduate study in the conduct of war".

Steven Zaloga also refutes Frieser's opinions about the Red Army at Kursk:

• Zaloga contends the popular perception of Soviet victory 'by numbers' as a myth created by German Generals and the memoirs in the 1950s. Zaloga rejects the caricature of the Red Army relying on mass rather than tactical skill. Zaloga accepts at the very small tactical end ("platoon" and "company" level), the Red Army was not particularly impressive and received significantly poorer training. Zaloga points out that there was still many tactical lessons to be learned, however by 1943 the gap between Soviet and German tanker training "narrowed greatly", and was at a comparable level with the Soviets.

• Zaloga asserts that the Soviets, in terms of operational art, were adept at using mobile tank formations. Zaloga asserts that Soviet operational methods were superior, allowing Soviet field commanders to bluff, baffle and overwhelm their opponents.

Richard Overy:

• Points out that the quality of the two air forces were even. The Soviets had introduced air-to-ground communications, radar, a proper maintenance system and depots for forward fuel reserves. This allowed aircraft to fly twenty missions in the heat of the battle (while the Luftwaffe suffered shortages).

• The Soviets were not, as commonly interpreted, inferior in the quality of their tanks. The T-34 model, only a few were equipped with 76mm tubes), was out-ranged by German Tiger and Panther tanks but was faster and more manoeuvrable. Instead, at the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Soviets used their tanks in "hand-to-hand" combat role. Crews were ordered to close the range so that it would not become an issue. According to Glantz and House the Soviet tanks pressed home their initial attacks despite two significant German advantages; the range of the German tanks' 88mm gun, German air superiority and attacking a well dug-in enemy while covering flat rolling terrain. Even so, the loss ratio was less then 2:1, 320 German and 400 Soviet AFV.

Accounts of this battle remain shrouded in controversy and dispute. The original Soviet account of brave but reckless if ultimately successful mass Red Army assault on heavy German armour is now generally discounted; the most recent revisionist accounts suggest a complete Soviet debacle, with the Soviet charge on German armour being disrupted not by German tanks but fundamentally because so many T-34s fell down a Soviet anti-tank ditch.

What is generally not disputed though is that the Red Army did enough, at very high cost, to stop any German breakthrough here. In that sense this remains a crucial turning point of the battle and indeed of the Great Patriotic War: here the blitzkrieg was ground to a halt, albeit at a huge cost.

Memorial on Prokhorovka Field

On the morning of 12 July, Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough, scraped together the available reserves of the 4th Panzer Army and advanced on Prokhorovka at the same time that the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive scheduled for 12 July and in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives.

In stifling heat, an eight-hour battle began. The German units had 494 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces in the attack, with 90% operational. The men of the 5th Guards Tank Army had not yet been committed to battle, so they were fresh. The German force found itself heavily outnumbered. After the battle was over, the Soviets held the area, and were able to recover their disabled tanks and wounded crews.

The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss, but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day.

The air battle was also intense: von Manstein had intended it to be the decisive blow against the Red Army forces, preventing a breakthrough to Oboyan and Kursk. The 5th Guards Tank Army had moved mainly at night, bringing 593 tanks and 37 self-propelled artillery pieces into position at Staryy Oskol. Sturmoviks from 291 ShAD attacked the II. SS Panzer Division throughout the day, causing significant damage to German armoured formations. Simultaneously, waves of Hs 129s and Ju 87s caused losses to the 69th Army and 5th Guards Army. Although Soviet tank losses are unknown, a report from the 29th Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery". It also mentioned losses were so heavy that the advance had to be halted, and a switch to the defensive ordered. The Luftwaffe had complete air superiority over Prokhorovka, due to the VVS being concentrated over the flanks of the 4.Panzerarmee. However the Soviet 31 Guard Tank Corps, and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the II SS Totenkopf to a standstill, employing the tactic of getting in close to German armour and attacking the vulnerable sides of the Tigers. The II SS was soon forced onto the defensive. Although the German formation held, it lost 50 percent of its armour in a prolonged engagement. By the night of 11–12 July, the only success the Germans had to show for their losses was a captured bridgehead over the Donets river at Rzavets. The LSSAH had been stopped by the Soviet 18 Tank Corps; III Panzerkorps and Das Reich were checked by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and two more Soviet reserve corps.

Tank losses have been a contentious subject ever since. Red Army losses have been stated to be as low as 200 or as high as 822 tanks, but the loss records now show about 300 complete losses, with a similar number damaged. Likewise, German losses have been reported to be as low as 80 and as high as several hundred. This number is impossible to establish because of the German way of counting lost tanks. 60 to 70 German tanks are thought to have been total losses.

German strategy

Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had just successfully pursued at Kharkov, when he had cut off an overextended Red Army offensive. He suggested tricking the Red Army into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, leading them into the Donets Basin in the eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the Donets river towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov.

Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) did not approve of Manstein's plan and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Two Red Army Fronts, the Voronezh and Central Fronts, occupied the ground in and around the salient and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line and recapture the strategically useful railway city of Kursk, located on the main north-south railway line from Rostov to Moscow.

In March, the plans crystallized. Walter Model's 9th Army would attack southwards from Orel while Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk but if the offensive went well, they would have permission to continue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to re-establish a new line at the Don River, several weeks' march to the east.

Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the OKH considerable control over the planning of the operation. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping the German line of practically anything remotely useful for deployment in the operation. They first set the attack for 4 May but delayed in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new Tiger and Panther tanks. Hitler postponed the offensive several more times. On 5 May, the launch date became 12 June. Due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy, and delays in armour deliveries Hitler set the launch date to 20 June. On 17 June, he further postponed it until 3 July, and then later to 5 July. The concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and for the Germans usually successful) double-envelopment, or Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a Cannae-style method and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics even more effective. Blitzkrieg depended on mass, shock and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a pitched battle.

Such breakthroughs were easier to achieve by attacking in unexpected locations, as the Germans had done in the Ardennes in 1940, Kiev in 1941 and towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated the principle of surprise: anyone with the most basic grasp of military strategy could deduce that the Kursk salient was the most obvious target for any German attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian, who asked Hitler:

"Was it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east that year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?"
Perhaps more surprisingly, Hitler replied:
"I know. The thought of it turns my stomach."

The German force numbered fifty divisions, including 17 Panzer and Panzergrenadiere, among them the elite Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Division as well as Waffen-SS divisions 1st SS PzGrenDiv Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS PzGrenDiv Das Reich and 3rd SS PzGrenDiv Totenkopf grouped into the II SS Panzer Corps. The High Command concentrated all their armor, the Tiger and new Panther tanks and the new Ferdinand tank destroyer, being used as assault guns. They also massed a high proportion of their available air units and artillery and despite the problems of the German plan it was a formidable concentration of armor.

The German deception plan included defensive-sounding names for major formations. For example, the 9.Armee was given the name "Festungsstab II", Fortress Staff II. Model ordered that recordings were to be made of massed German tanks' engines. This noise was to be played on loudspeakers to confuse the Soviets as to the whereabouts of German armour concentrations. Many German AFVs were painted with new divisional insignia used only for this campaign. These deception measures were generally unsuccessful.

Soviet strategy

The Red Army had also begun planning for their summer offensives, and had settled on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkov would flatten the line and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes. Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans.

The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Red Army by surprise but in this case, Kursk seemed the obvious target. Moscow received warning of the German plans through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. This was almost unnecessary, since Marshal Zhukov had already predicted the site of the German attack as early as 8 April, when he wrote his initial report to Stavka (the Red Army General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the Red Army.

The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success. Blitzkrieg had worked against all opponents, including the Red Army. On the other hand, Soviet results during both winters had shown that their own offensives were now effective. Stalin and some Stavka officers wanted to strike first. However, the overwhelming majority of Stavka, most notably Zhukov, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves first. Zhukov wrote in a letter to Stalin on 8 April 1943:

I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to the offensive in the very first days of the campaign in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force.

The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Red Army four months in which to prepare and with every day, they turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended areas on Earth. Two Fronts, the Central and Voronezh, manned the defensive lines and the Steppe Front was available as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million land mines and dug about 5000 km (3000 mi) of trenches, to a depth of 175 km (95 mi). They massed a huge army of their own, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft. This amounted to 26% of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26% of its mortars and artillery, 35% of its aircraft and 46% of its tanks. Due to the disparity in populations, industrial capability and continual German delays in tank production, the Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month they pulled further ahead in men and matériel. The Germans also received reports of rapid and powerful Soviet concentrations in the Kursk area and delayed the offensive to allow for more Panther tanks to reach the front line.

Many of the forces assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the Battle of Stalingrad but the Red Army also added over one million new men in the first half of 1943. Thus, the Red Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive gave the new units an unusually long time to train.

The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from howitzers would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from 45mm (1.7"), 57mm (2.24"), and 85 mm (3.3") towed anti-tank guns and 76.2mm (3") divisional field guns would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German 9th Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometre of defended front. In the 6th and 7th Guards Army sectors in the south the density was lower, about 10 guns per kilometre.

Red Army machinegun crew in action.

The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometre of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometre and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometre. Red Army engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid barbed wire, built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Soviet deception plans, like the German were most elaborate; unlike the German plans, the Soviet deceptions were generally successful. Dummy positions were constructed and dummy aircraft were placed on false airfields and false radio traffic sent to confuse German intelligence. Camouflaging of actual positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units had of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns was their own vehicles exploding.

prokhorovka

do we have consense about prokhorovka ? that there is a true version and a math created by rotmistrov who was afraid of superiors? Blablaaa (talk) 18:20, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Well, we will just have to mention that is contoversial and cite that it may have been distorted out of context. What we cannot do is call it a myth, unless of course the mjority of sources agree it was. Dapi89 (talk) 18:23, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

kannst du deutsch ? Blablaaa (talk) 18:25, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

thy myth: everything happend on 12 july. german were launching an assault. the 5th GTA was launching an assault too. clash between them. only german units and 5th GTA. heavy tank fight with high losses for both sides. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Blablaaa (talk • contribs) 18:28, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

the 12 july was an absolute tactical desaster for rotmistro. primary source: one day after 12 july the II SS corps reported more 4 tanks more operational than before the battle. zetterling for example is giving 70-80 tanks losses, that is for 9-15 july and for all participating units. for the 12 july german tanks losses were minimal. rotmistrov claimed 350 destroyed german tanks this day... . i think the men casualties tell the same story of tactical desaster. SS lost about 500 rotmistrovs army alone lost up too 7000. i must admit that i think frieser is making a big mistake, he give 3 total losses for 12 july, but i think there must be many more damaged so the 3 against 300 look very strange. so we can give zetterling but he is giving only losses for 6 day time frame and more units. Blablaaa (talk) 18:35, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

The Soviets suceeded in preventing the Germans from breaking through their tactical zones and into the strategic depth of their front. The Soviets may have lost heavily, but they succeeded in holding onto Prokhorovka. Battlefield destruction is used as a result only when there is no clear result. Defensively it was a Soviet victory, operationally, a draw, strategically, the Soviets crippled German offensive abilities thereafter - as they could afford the losses. Dapi89 (talk) 18:53, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

lack of german point of view, after the landing on sicily hitler started thinking the advance should be stoped after this german units shifted west to start operation roland , after the 12 july prokhorovka was no major objective any longer. manstein asked for the operational tank reservers ( wiking for example ) to destroy the remaining russian units. hitler refused and after this prokhorvka lost its importance. the northern sector failed . i think here we have a perfect example of different POV for u ( glantz) germans were stoped here and depleted for me (frieser) german destroyed so much armor that the use of 2 new panzerdivision would have wrecked havoc. and i think it cant be a defensiv vicotry because german were not advancing onto proko german primary sources show this clear. it was a russian attack which had the primary goal of destroying the SS corps and he failed heavy. no offense but iam not sure how up too date your sources about prokho are. are u able to read german i can give u a long article published for the austrian army regarding this battle with newest research done by german military study ministery. i think if we have different sources we can stop discussing because this will led to stress. my sources show a clear soviet disaster , a planned attack which totally failed. manstein is cited with saying "outstanding victory" ... "now we can destroy them". nobody who was stopped sounds like this ^^ . but i suggest we wait for the book. maybe glantz has updated his opinion about this battle. we should discuss other easier points first Blablaaa (talk) 18:55, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Am I to assume you understand the concept of Soviet deep battle? The Soviet intention was not offensive but defensive. The object of defensive deep battle was to wear down enemy spearheads, then hit them on the counter when they were exhausted. At Prokhorovka, much to Soviet surpise, the SS Corps did breach the Soviet defensive web. However, defensive deep battle dictates that the Soviets hold a operational reserve for defensive purposes in the event an enemy does break through the defensive web and threatens to break into the operational rear of their lines. The Soviets engaged the SS at Prokhorovka, not as part of a general offensive, but to seal the breach. Dapi89 (talk) 19:04, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

yes and they lost so much tanks that the german reservers were easily able to penetrated into strategic deep ? regardless of the outcome of zitadelle. if hitler had gave the permission of using his reserve corps wich was und führervorbehalt then this corps plus SS corps had no problem to breaching the soviet lines. romistrovs throw his army away. that german didnt advance further can be contributed to hitler and the general situation . i know many dont like the hitler arguement but this particulary corps was not under mansteins orders. after the 12 july hitler was convinced the battle was over and decided to give no more units to support the attack ---> german units shift west to start operation roland. i dont see the soviet victory here. i see a very very complicated situation which led to complicated orders. when the ultimate goal of red army was defending proko with all costs, than the achieved their target, but we not even know if the german would have advanced there after 12 july. and i dont want to sound to germanpovig but if german had commited their reservers ( russian commited entire tank armies as reservers) numbering more than 200 tanks they had punched through the line easily. after the use of 5th GTA the soviet looked worse than before. ( i dont doubt they had won anyway) and i think this is called phyriffic? frieser is even so bold to call at a strategic failure and he sounds cogent. the 5th GTA was planned to take part in the summer offensive and now was thrown away for nearly nothing, stopping a german advanced which was canceled by hitler ( yes the hilter argument ). to cite Stalin: " what have u done with your fine army" . another problem , even if russian defensiv doctrines says the battle was correct then this doesnt mean is was a victory regarding what we see as victory. i guess nearly no army of today will call this a victory so why wiki should do ? iam not sure how we handle this, do we look the objectives of an offensive and judge then if it is a victory? PS: the russian weakend themself with such moves. .... Blablaaa (talk) 19:20, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

I understand your points about losses and the German command system. Yes, it is complicated and the points here are vaild.

It is of course conjecture to suggest another two divisions might have broken the Soviets. As you rightly point out, the Soviets had significant reserves to intervene.

I also agree the 5GA took a beating, but so did the SS, (relative to their numbers of course). The objective of the Soviets was to prevent a breakout by German forces at all costs. This meant keeping P'. Losing it would lead to the Germans capturing Prokhorovka and then being in a position to begin their operational manoeuvre towards the east of Kursk.

I think you mean Pyrrhic victory.

The Soviet movement and concentrations were not an accident. Nothing the Soviets did from Kursk onward happened by chance. This was the way the Soviets planned to fight. To stop the Germans and inflict losses that would win them the initiative for the rest of the war, accepting heavy casualties in return for the prize.

The outcome, strategically was a victory for the Soviets as the held the initative for the rest of the war. I think Frieser is in the minority on citing this battle as a Soviet strategic failure. There is a wealth of sources that cites it as a turning point in the war and a German disaster. Dapi89 (talk) 19:33, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

frieser points out that regarding the fact the germans stoped their advance anyway the usage of the 5th GTA and the way it was used were a big failure, the soviet summer offensive would have much more punch with 600 tanks more.

• "The Soviet movement and concentrations were not an accident"

thats the advantage when u dominate your opponnent

• " To stop the Germans and inflict losses that would win them the initiative for the rest of the war, accepting heavy casualties in return for the prize. "

thats: using superior numbers.

• "The outcome, strategically was a victory for the Soviets as the held the initative for the rest of the war"

here frieser has a different opinion. and regarding the fact i think i have a smiliar opinion. the soviets could do what they want; that they waited for the wehrmacht doesnt mean this was the last chance of wehrmacht that only meant german launched an offensive which failed before it started. they did the same in the ardennen in hungary in belarus and so on. the only difference between Kursk is that kursk was more impressive.... .

• "Nothing the Soviets did from Kursk onward happened by chance"

are your sources covering the onslaught on vitebesk 43/44 and the kurland battles ?Blablaaa (talk) 19:51, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

The Germans halted owing to their inability to push the Soviets back. The Soviets never dominated the Wehrmacht by numbers alone, they outfought them in 43-45 using Soviet deep battle and Maskirovka. They planned carefully for every single operation. The German were constantly caught off balance. The Germans still won some defensive victories, but they did not have the brain power or the strategic reserves in material or manpower to turn the tide. Dapi89 (talk) 20:03, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

i dont dispute this , to be honest i know nothing about soviet plannings. and i dont know which factores were how important. but iam pretty sure and i would bet money on it. doesnt madder when , give the wehrmacht the same ressources like soviet . relly everything, than 6 months later the war in the east is over. the planning of soviets was maybe clever like u say but this doesnt help when u lose more ressources against an equal enemy. some people are overexagrate the impact of hitler but what i know for a fact, people like glantz do the extreme opposite. iam very sure, and again no offence, that your books dont cover battles like vitebesk and kurland and much more.

dumping the rest of the article here

Background

In the winter of 1942–43, the Red Army had conclusively won the Battle of Stalingrad. The German Sixth Army had been destroyed, along with about 800,000 German and other Axis troops, seriously depleting Axis strength in the east.

In 1917, the Germans had built the famous Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, shortening their lines and thereby strengthening their defense. They planned on repeating this strategy in the USSR and started construction of a massive series of defensive works known as the Panther-Wotan line. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated.

In February and March 1943, German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had won the Third Battle of Kharkov, leaving the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. In the middle lay a large 200 km (120 mi) wide and 150 km (90 mi) deep Soviet-held salient (bulge) in the lines between German forward positions near Orel in the north, and Kharkov in the south.

Most of the German front commanders agreed a defensive stance should be the priority, to contain Soviet offensives and deliver counter blows. Hitler accepted this advice. Erich von Manstein insisted first strike was still an option and an offensive to pinch out the Soviet bulge at Kursk would be achieveable before moving further south to recover more lost territory. Manstein wanted to attack in May but owing to the poor tank strength of the German Army, Hitler delayed it until July when newer tanks minimized the risk of defeat. The High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)) hoped to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front.

Opposing Forces

Battle of Kursk

See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle

Main operations — the northern face

German attack

The 9th Army attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on 5 July. The attack sector had been correctly anticipated by the Red Army Central Front. Attacking on a 45-kilometre-wide front, the Germans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive minefields, and needed engineering units to come up and clear them under artillery fire. Although a few Goliath and Borgward remote-controlled engineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields, they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles cleared mines, they had no on-board marking system to show following tanks where the cleared lanes were. Red Army units covered the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delaying German engineers clearing manually; German losses were high.

For example, the German 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion began the attack with 49 Ferdinand self-propelled guns; 37 of them were lost in the minefields before 17:00 on 5 July. Although most of the lost vehicles were mobility kills rather than permanent losses, they were out of action until they could be repaired. They were also easier for Red Army artillery to knock out permanently. However, since the Germans were advancing, any repairable vehicles could be recovered, repaired, and put back into action. After the first day of attack, the German units penetrated 8 km deep into the Russian lines for the loss of 1,287 KIA & MIA and 5,921 WIA.

The Germans also noted a fundamental flaw in their armoured vehicles, particularly the Ferdinand. Although excellent against any Soviet tank at long to medium range, they lacked secondary armament and were vulnerable to attacks from Soviet slit trenches once separated from the heavy machine gun protection of the lighter tanks, vehicles and infantry. Guderian noted in his diary:

Once they had broken through into the enemy's infantry zone they literally had to go quail-shooting with cannons. They did not manage to neutralise, let alone destroy, the enemy's rifle and machine guns, so that our own infantry was unable to follow up behind them. By the time they reached the Soviet artillery they were on their own

At the second day the Central-Front under Rokossovskiy started a counter-attack against the German 9th Army especially the XLVI Tank Corps. The Red Army attacked with the 2nd Tank Army and the XIX Tank Corps. But this operational counter-attack was launched too early. Soviet tanks saw the first time combat with the Tiger tanks of the s.Pz.Abt 505 and sustained heavy losses. The 107th and 164th Tank Brigade lost 69 tanks and the Soviet attack was stopped.. After the encounter with German Tiger's Rokossovskiy decided to dig in most of his tanks and use them as static anti-tank guns..

The next two days of the attack brought heavy fighting around the strong point of Ponyri ( Ponyri lay on the Orel-Kursk railway), which was one of the most fortified positions in the northern sector. Both sides saw this area as a vital point and so the a very intense battle took place. The German tanks were awaited by 70 antitank guns per km. On 7 July the 86th and 292nd German Infantry Divisions attacked Ponyri and captured the town after intense house to house fighting. The Soviets counter-attacked and forced the German troops to withdraw temporarily, many counter-attacks by both sides followed and the town changed hands many times. Not before the evening of 8 July the German units captured most of the town. The heavy Ferdinands were called into action to take the hill 253,3 and succeed at the 9th. It developed into a battle of attrition with heavy casualties for both sides, John called Ponyri "the new Douaumont". German units were exhausted while Russian reserves were committed.

Model decided to pause the attack to rearrange his units. On 10 July he renewed his attack with additional air support but his gains were minor. Fresh Soviet formations repelled German attacks and only limited penetrations were achieved, the diary of 9th Army describes the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attritionbattle". Model cancels the new attack.

The cancellation of the attack changed the German plans; Model accepted that his forces had not enough power to advance directly through the Soviet strongpoints. He decided to bypass the heights of Ol'chovatka and shift the schwerpunkt to XXXXVI Panzercorps. He also decided to use the uncommitted 12th Pz.Div. For the first time in the northern sector, a heavy concentration of tanks was planned. Model's hesitation to use the concept of concentration, which is described as the decisive element of an armoured attack, lead to an slow advance of the 9th army. Because of the limited action of the tank units, only 63 tanks and assault guns were written off by 12 July.

Soviet formations, including the 3rd Tank Army and the 11th Guards Army, attacked the German 2nd Panzer Army, which were positioned in the rear of 9th Army. The outnumbered 2nd Panzer Army had trouble with the Soviet attack. Soviet formations made a deep penetration and threatened German supply routes. With their advance on Orel the encirclement of the 9th army was possible.

The end of "Zitadelle" in the north

The 9th Army had to withdraw, and did so through the window of opportunity created for them by the Luftwaffe. Their part in the offensive was over. Because the German armor was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the South, the German armor losses were comparatively light – 143 armored vehicles were total losses between 5 and 14 July. Central Front losses were 526 tanks. However, this failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and matériel for the Red Army. Few Red Army guns were captured, and those Red Army units that did retreat did so on orders. The German attack had nearly broken through the main Soviet defence zones, but stalled. The Soviet counter-offensive compelled Model to withdraw or risk the destruction of both German Armies.

Northern analysis

There are a number of factors that explain the 9th Army’s lack of progress, mainly the combination of Soviet defensive planning and German lack of concentration of force. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength, and often without sufficient infantry support. Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovskiy had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had fortified those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The 13th Army, which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and anti-tank guns than the other Central Front units, and indeed held the strongest defensive positions in the entire salient.

A Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and the German 9th Army also committed major units piecemeal because Model was afraid of the Bryansk Front, which stood ready for counterattack in the north of his army. Model decided to place his most powerfull corpsgroup, Korpsgruppe Esbeck (2 Pz.Div and 1 Pz.Gren.Div), far behind the frontline to use it as "firebrigade" against a possible onslaught of Bryansk Front. Model's refusal to use his Panzerdivisions as a concentrated force, can be seen as the most significant reason for the poor penetration of the northern pincer. Finally, the 9th Army led with reinforced infantry divisions that were already in the line facing the Red Army, rather than attacking with uncommitted units.

Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration shows clearly that the Red Army defensive tactics were succeeding. Beginning with a 45-kilometre-wide attack frontage on 5 July, the next day, the German 9th Army attacked on a 40-kilometre front. This dropped to 15 kilometres wide by 7 July, and only 2 kilometres on 8–9 July. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: 5 kilometres on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each succeeding day. By 10 July, the 9th Army had been stopped in its tracks.

A great deal of the Soviet defensive success was down to its method of fire control, known to the Germans as Pakfront. This relied upon a group of 10 or more anti-tank guns under a single commander, which would fire at a single target at a time. These positions were protected with heavy concentrations of mortar and machine-gun nests, which were ordered to fire on German infantry only.

Main operations — the southern face

German attack

A Waffen-SS Tiger I engages enemy armor. The Tiger's advanced optics and accurate main gun allowed it to effectively hit targets at extended ranges.

The crew of a Pz.Kpfw. III tank assigned to the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich rest after heavy fighting near Belgorod.

Von Manstein's troops in the south were better equipped than Models in the north. The 4th Tank Army and Armygroup Kempf had 1,377 tanks while the 9th Army possessed "only" 988 tanks. The 1,377 tanks included 102 Panzer VI and 200 Panzer V.

The 4th Tank Army ( Hoth ) attacked into two directions with the XLVIII Panzer Corps and the II SS Panzer Corps. The flanks of the spearheads were protected by the LII Corps on the left and by the Armygroup Kempf on the right. The XXXXVIII Tank Corps should be the lead spearhead so it got the 200 Panthers attached. Their opponent was the Voronezh Front

At 4.00 am the attack began and nearly all units advanced with good speed despite well prepared defensive positions and minefields. From the beginning were Mansteins tanks much more successful than their northern counterparts. Reason for this is particulary the better usage of tanks by Manstein, who used his tanks as concentrated spearheads. Moreover in the south, the Red Army had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses more evenly. For example, three of the four armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometre of front; this contrasts sharply with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which was twice as heavy in the active sectors. Also, the Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tactical zone much more thinly, leaving a much higher proportion of units in deeper positions compared to the Central Front. Finally, the Voronezh Front was weaker than the Central Front, yet it faced much stronger German forces.

Many eyes were focused on the newly arrived Panther tanks, which failed to comply the expectations. The Panthers had to fight with reliability problems. When the new tanks moved into their assembly areas 45 out of 200 were broke down and had to be repaired. When the remaining Panthers launched their attack they got immediately stuck in a minefield and lost many tanks as mobility-kills.

In the first two days the II SS Tank Corps penetrated 25 km deep into the Russian lines and took Jakovlevo. The XXXXVIII Tank Corps to the left had a bit more trouble, many of their 200 Panthers spent more time in the workshops than fighting the enemy. Armygroup Kempf, which task was to assist the II SS Tank Corps, was overchallenged and had problems with crossing the Donec.

The steady progress of the German units forced the Russian leaders to commit some of their strategic reserves after nearly all operational reserves were already in action. The Steppe Front had been formed in the months prior to the operation as a central reserve for such an eventuality As early as 6 July STAVKA decided to send the II, X Tank corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army to the southern sector, one day later other big formations got their marching orders. Vatutin planned a big operational counterstrike against the German units but decided to cancel after he got news about the complete failure of the northern counter-attack. Instead of seeking open battle against the German tanks Vatutin let his tanks dig in as Rokossovskiy did in the north. Zhukov protested against this use of the tanks but it was Vatutins decision.

German officers reported that they were slowed down buy the so called "Schweigepanzer"( Silent tank ), because it costed much time to take out this camouflaged "bases".. Despite the order to dig in many of their available tanks, enough tanks remained to launch little counterattacks. On the 8 july a remarkable battle happened when a single german tank, commanded by SS Unterscharführer Franz Staudegger met a group of ~50 T-34. In the following battle Staudegger knocked out 22 T-34, he was awarded the first Knights Cross for a tigercommander.

The german tanks were slowed but moved steady. On the 9 july the first german units reached the Pselriver. The next day first infantry units crossed the Psel. Until the 10 july german units in the south lost 166 tanks. Despite the deep defensivsystem and big minefields the german tank losses were remarkable low. The 11 july became a good day for german units, particulary Armygroup Kempf achieved a breakthrough, the III Panzercorps penetrated deep into russian lines. The next night the 6th Pz.Div took a bridge over the Donec with a coup de main. The russian 69th Army was almost trapped between the III Panzercorps and II SS Panzercorps, when Kempfs units advanced to prokhorovka from the south and the II SS Panzercorps from the west. At this moment Manstein thougt he had achieved the final breakthrough and could now operate freely and destroy the russian reserves. . Meanwhile the Red Army planned a huge counterattack to destroy the spearheads of Heeresgruppe Süd.

Prokhorovka

Main article: Battle of Prokhorovka

Memorial on Prokhorovka Field

The end of "Zitadelle" in the south

While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 July, in the south the overall situation still hung in the balance, even after 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, had nevertheless breached the first two defensive belts and believed (wrongly) that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts (and some of them did not have troops deployed). Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves.

On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely depleted, the Germans then had to face Operation Rumyantsev, an offensive launched to smash the German forces in the Belgorod-Kharkov area on 3 August. Belgorod fell on 5 August, and on 23 August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resistance from German forces. With the capture of Kharkov, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk over.

Southern analysis

The German forces made steady progress, but, as in the north, attack frontages (width) and penetration depth tended to drop as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. Beginning with a 30-kilometre-wide attack frontage on 5 July, this dropped to 20-kilometres wide by 7 July and 15 km by 9 July. Likewise, the depth of the penetration dropped from 9 km on 5 July to 5 km on 8 July and 2–3 km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled.

Red Army minefields and artillery were again successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans was vital to allow their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, again indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.

German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Division, which began the operation with 118 tanks. On 10 July, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on 5 July.

Hitler cancels the operation

On the night of 9–10 July, the Western Allies mounted an amphibious invasion of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned von Kluge and von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory: "on no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves which he had committed were decisively beaten". In an unusual reversal of their roles, Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 17 July, he ordered a withdrawal and cancelled the operation. He then ordered the entire SS Panzer Korps to be transferred to Italy.

Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs, and also by some historians For example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Korps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.

In any event only one German division, 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, departed for Italy, and without their equipment. The others remained behind to try to stem the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.

Soviet strategic counter offensives

In the north: Operation Kutuzov

Main article: Operation Kutuzov

Operation Kutuzov, was launched on the 12 July against the southern wing of Army Group Centre. The counterattack was launched before the Germans had stopped their attack, so Operation Kutuzov had a bigger effect to the outcome of Zitadelle compared to the southern counter, which was launched after the cancellation of Zitadelle.

The Briansk front (Popov) and parts of the Western front (Sokolovskij) attacked the largely undefended German north falnk of the 2nd Panzer Army on 12 July. The 2nd Panzer Army was weakened as many tanks were given to other armies before Zitadelle. On 12 July the attacking forces numbered 487,111 men (combat troops only) supported by 1,401 tanks and 15,109 guns. Three days later the second phase of Kutuzov started and several Russian armies attacked the German 9th Army. The combined troops deployed for Kutuzov now numbered 1,286,049 men supported by 2,409 tanks and 26,379 guns.

The Operations of the Briansk front marked the beginning of the Russian summer-offensive. The artillery barrage was described as very heavy and the first German lines were overran. German defensive lines were deeper than expected and many Russian spearheads were slowed under heavy casualties, but in some areas the Russian units achieved deep penetrations, The Germans lacked reserves to block these penetrations, so the situation became very dangerous for the 2nd Panzer Army. On 13 July Army Group Centre gave the command of the 2nd panzer Army to Model, who had already commanded the German 9th army. Model now was in control of all German units in the Orel area.

The situation for the Germans worsened and Russian breakthroughs threatened the entire 9th Army. Model sent nearly all of his Panzer units to aid the 2nd Panzer Army whose northern front was about to collapse, while the 4th Army in the north sent the 253rd Infantry Division. German units achieved a temporary stabilization of the front but meanwhile the 9th Army started to withdraw from the captured ground. Initially, the Russian Central Front followed hesitantly, but then started their attack with heavy air support. On 18 July the 9th Army was at the same position as on 5 July, before Zitadelle.

Eventually the Russian tank formations failed to achieve a operational breakthrough despite the numerical superiority. Red Army Tank Armies repeated their attacks against the same positions with the same methods and suffered heavy casualties in men and tanks. For example the 4th Tank Army lost 84% of their T-34 and 46% of their light tanks, within few days. After two weeks of fighting the 3rd Guards Tank Army had lost half of their 800 tanks.

The German armies conducted a fighting withdrawal to Hagen-Stellung. German movements were consistent hampered by partisans, who numbered about 100,000. Partisans tried to disrupt German supply routes especially railway lines. On 3 August partisans launched a large operation against the German rear, the so called "Railway-war". Organized by the Red Army, the partisan activities supported the Russian operation.

By shortening their line the Wehrmacht freed 19 divisions, which could be used elsewhere or as reserve. Nevertheless, the Soviets achieved a complete breakthrough. The Soviets massed a high density concentration of artillery and tanks on small narrow fronts and used sophisticated artillery techniques to defeat German fortified positions despite tenacious German defences. Operation Kutzov "was a perfect example of the newly sophisticated Soviet way of war". On 5 August the 3rd Guards Tank Army entered Orel and by 18 August, the Briansk Front had reached the city Briansk and "completely eliminating the German salient in the region".

The battle in the Orel-sweep, which is the German name for this battle, was the bloodiest of the three major operations during the Battle of Kursk. German losses were 86,064 men, the Red Army lost lost 112,529 killed and 317,361 wounded. The Red Army losses were paritculary high for tanks and assault guns, 2,586 of them were written off during Kutuzov. German tank losses are not available for this battle, but Heeresgruppe Mitte lost 343 during Zitadelle and Kutuzov.

Some of the Soviet command were displeased, complaining that an even greater victory might have been won. Marshall Rokossovskij says, "Instead of encircling the enemy, we only pushed them out of the bulge... The operation would have been different if we had used our force for two heavy punches which met at Brijansk". Zhukov held a similar opinion. Stalin instead thought encirclement should be used against a weakened Wehrmacht, the primary task of the Red Army was to push the German from Russian soil: "It is our task to push them from our territory we can trap them when they are weaker".

In the south: Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

Main article: Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

To the south, the Red Army needed more time to re-group after the losses sustained in July, and could not launch its offensive again until 3 August when Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced. STAVKA planned Operation Rumyantsev as the major thrust of the their summer offensive. The aim was to destroy Mansteins 4th Army and Army Group Kempf and later the southern wing of Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South). The German 1st Tank Army and newly formed 6th Army were to be trapped by an advance to the Black Sea. The Russian Southern Front and the Southwest Front attacked as early as 17th July.

The Voronez Front and the Stepe Front deployed about 1,144,000 men supported by 2,418 tanks and 13,633 guns and rocket launchers for their attack. At the start of "Rumyantsev" the Germans fielded only 237 tanks and assault guns. The reasons for a lack of German armour were twofold; Manstein believed that the Soviets were incapable of launching an offensive in the southern sector, and dispatched his reserves (II SS Panzerkorps, XXIV Korps and XXXXVIII Panzerkorps) southward to deal with Soviet offensives across the Dnieper and Mius Rivers. The Soviet operations in those regions were actually carefully planned diversion operations. The Soviet plan worked, and removed German reserves from the critical Kharkov axis (conforming to Maskirovka) The tactical-operations across the Mius were unsuccessful, but achieved their primary aim of diverting German forces further away from Kharkov, although by Soviet accounts, the STAVKA had wished for more.

For the Kharkov offensive the Red Army focused enormous firepower on a 30 kilometre front. The 5th and 6th Guards Army, two elements that had borne the brunt of the German offensive, and the Soviet 53rd Army. The artillery concentration was neccessary to puncture the first five German defence lines between Kursk and Kharkov. The 1st Tank Army and 5th Guards Army, supported by two additional mobile Corps', would act as a mobile-operational unit to encircle Kharkov from the north and west. To the west, four separate tank corps' would support the 27th and 40th Armies would make supporting attacks. To the east and south-east, the 69th and 7th Guards Armies, followed by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, would also support the attack.

On 3 August the intial attack demonstrated the growing sophistication of Soviet tactical art. Heavy and long-range artillery bombarded German positions, supported by anti-tank shock-groups, ready to repell counter attacks. The German defence was tenacious, and two tank armies had to enter the battle to secure a penetration. By the 5th August the Soviets had broken deep into the German rear and captured Belgorod, advancing some 60 kilometres into German lines. Each combined-arms army pressed the German defences from the north and east.

German reserves were rushed from the Orel sector and north from the Donbas regions (where Soviet Maskirovka operations had diverted them) and tried to break up Soviet attacks. The only success was achieved by the Grossdeutschland Division, which suceeded in delaying the 40th Army on 6-7 August. Four infantry divisions and seven panzer and motorised divisions were assembled under the III Panzerkorps. Manstein tried to repeat the success of Third Battle of Kharkov. However, this time the Soviets were alert to the danger, and it was the German forces rather than the Soviets that were worn down and overextended. On 11 August, the 1st Tank Army engaged Waffen SS units near Bogodukhov, 30 kilometres northwest of Kharkov. Initially the Germans stopped the advance, "mauling" three brigades of the 1st Tank Army. The 5th Guards Army sent reinforcements, and between 13 and 17 August the Germans were fought to a stalemate. For the first time a major German counter offensive had failed to destroy a Soviet exploitation force. Kharkov fell on 28 August. The battle is usually referred to as the Fouth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation by the Soviets.

Soviet casualties are uncertain. Between 1 March and 23 August 1943, 71,611 Soviet soldiers were killed and 183,955 wounded in the Belgorod-Kharkov sector. A further 1,864 tanks were lost in this sector during this time, while a further 423 artillery guns were also lost.

Results

The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armor than in previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth defenses of the Red Army, and were surprised by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This was an outcome that few had predicted, and it changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front. The victory had not been cheap however; the Red Army, although preventing the Germans from achieving the goals of Citadel, lost considerably more men and matériel than the Wehrmacht .

Heinz Guderian wrote in his diary:

With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front... Needless to say the Russians exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.

Casualties

German casualties listed in German sources during the operation proper (as opposed to the following Red Army counter-offensives north and south of the salient) in the period 5 to 20 July 1943 were between 50,000 and 57,000. German tank write-offs were between 278 and 323. Yet the numbers of destroyed tanks alone does not tell the entire story. For example, Zetterling and Frankson list only 33 tanks destroyed for the three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps as of 17 July, but the number of operational tanks on 17 July as of 19:15 had dropped by 139, leading one to assume that 106 tanks were damaged and not able to take part in the battle, at least temporarily.

Red Army casualties were 177,847 as listed in Krivosheev. However, Restayn and Moller point out that Krivosheev's figures for Central Front strength show a decline in strength during the period 5 to 11 July 1943 of approximately 92,700, of which 33,897 are accounted for as dead or wounded with no explanation given for the further 58,893 losses. Restayn and Moller consider that the missing 58,893 should be accounted for as casualties, in which case total Red Army casualties in this period would be approximately 235,000 (ie 177,847 plus 58,893). Red Army armor losses, again according to Krivosheev, were 1,614 tanks and assault guns destroyed.

From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed to the Red Army, while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting to their moves. A new front had opened in Italy, diverting some of Germany's resources and attention. Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive in the East.

Moreover, the loss further convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his General Staff. He continued his interference in military matters progressively, so that by the end of the war he was involved in tactical decisions. However, the opposite was true for Stalin. After seeing Stavka's planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more, and stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions.

Predictable results ensued for both sides: the German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted personally to micromanage the day-to-day operations of what soon became a three-front war, while the Red Army gained more freedom and became more and more fluid as the war continued.

german casualties: Zitadelle : 54,182: 11,023 KIA/MIA Kutozov : 86,064 25.515 KIA/MIA Rumyantcev: 30,000 10.000 KIA/MIA Blablaaa (talk) 19:03, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Tanks 252 for zitadelle and estimated 720 for alltogetherBlablaaa (talk) 19:04, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Another source on Kursk casualties

Hope you don't mind me chipping in :) I've just finished "Absolute War" by Chris Bellamy (a highly credible source, I hope you'll agree!). He looks at Kursk from the perspective of the Soviet "learning curve" by examining casualty ratios. He writes:

• "Although Russian losses were, again, greater than German, the German casualties were horrific, and they could afford them less."
• Looking at the German performance, he states that of about 70 German divisions operating in the Kursk area, 30 were destroyed; the Germans' own figures give "more than half a million killed, seriously wounded, prisoners or missing in fifty days", so about 10,000 per day.
• "Russian figures show a remarkable shift from inordinate numbers of dead or missing to a more normal ratio of killed to wounded."
  • Defensive phase: 70,000 'irrecoverable losses' vs 107,517 sick & wounded
  • Operation Rumyantsev: 71,611 'irrecoverable losses' vs 184,000 sick & wounded
  • Op Kutuzov: 112,529 vs 317,361
• He concludes that, compared to earlier battles, the ratio of 'irrecoverable losses' to sick & wounded were 1 to 3, which he states is the "norm" for combat; this he credits partly to improved Russian casualty treatment and evacuation and partly to the "growing confidence of the government, Stavka, and the Red Army."
• Looking at casualty ratios between the Germans and Russians, he concludes that during Kursk the ratio was 1 German casualty to 1.5 Russian, and this would be the norm for the remainder of the war.
• Unrelated to casualties, he states "most German officers" on the Eastern Front from Keitel downwards believed Kursk to be the point "after which Germany was bound to lose the war".

All info from Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. London: Pan Books. ISBN 978-0-330-48808-2. pp. 594-595. Hope this is useful, EyeSerene^talk 21:01, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

how he gets the 1:1.5? this would mean 550,000 german casualties which would mean the destruction of the german forces. note: the Killed/Wounded ratio depends on retreat or advance! but iam sure soviet improved their medical system. after kursk german were in retreat ---> higher missed in action Blablaaa (talk) 21:16, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

is he giving his sources or time frame? the loss of a half million men would mean the collapse of german front. Blablaaa (talk) 21:17, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

The 1:1.5 comes from averaging the German figures as 10,000 per day across the whole of the 50 days (note that he claims the Germans had >500,000 losses by their own figures), and the Russian figures as 9,360 per day during the defensive phase and then 23,483 per day for the two counteroffensives. He footnotes his analysis to Koltunov, p. 1390; Krivosheyev, pp. 132-4; Fritz Stoeckli, pp. 645-651, and quotes Stoeckli for the 1:1.5 norm: "On average the Germans were more efficient than their Soviet counterparts in killing or wounding their opponents by a factor of approximately 1.5." (p. 650).

That doesn't really matter though - we can't be in the business of critiquing the sources of the sources we use; we just report what they say. I thought Bellamy's analysis was interesting because it approaches the casualty issue from a slightly different direction. EyeSerene^talk 21:31, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

ok but where are his numbers for germans from, the german suffered no 500,000. when we include him we can include sukov for russian casualites than we have 1,600.000 soviet casualties. only interessed if he lists his sources. Blablaaa (talk) 21:35, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

I wasn't clear enough. German casualties, Koltunov, p. 1390. Russian casualties, Krivosheyev, pp. 132-4. Ratios, Stoeckl. EyeSerene^talk 21:39, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

ok i never heard koltunov for german casualties, only for soviet casualties. regarding the fact that kultunov had access to russian archives and did no research in german ones, his numbers are high likly russian estimations of german casualties. i looked absolute war on amazon. iam wondering that he uses such number for his conclusions. Blablaaa (talk) 21:47, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

i have done bit research finding, that soviet sources claimed up to 100,000 losses inflicted for zitadelle, that is about 2:1 of the real losses. so bellamy is citing soviet claims.... ( i know my opinion is irrelevant ) using soviet claims to make conclusions about the effectiveness of both armies. how can he get good findings?^^ Blablaaa (talk) 21:57, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

Re Koltunov, I've no idea, Bellamy doesn't go into that sort of detail. You may be right that he relies on Russian sources; his area of expertise is Russia rather than Germany. I'll look at the rest of the chapter at some point and see if he breaks down the numbers further. His book is well regarded though and has won awards, so scholars don't seem to have objected too much to his research. EyeSerene^talk 22:02, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

i think his book is seen as very good book about the military and political descission of soviet union during the war. and iam sure it is a good book but if we cite him for german casualties ( while using russian archives ) than we have a problem because than germany lost 30 million men at the eastern front. the same would happen if we cite okw sources for russian casualties. thats why i think there is consense about using krivosheev and other russians for soviet casualties.... . do u like the book? Blablaaa (talk) 22:14, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

is bellamy saying something about german tank losses? Blablaaa (talk) 22:15, 18 February 2010 (UTC)

glantz tank losses^^

first, i dont dispute that we use his findings for the article. SOOOO :-) when we take heinricis ratios and the strenghtnumbers of frieser/okw than we get ~246 tanks lost, what is actually frieser number for tank losses. so we saw glantz simply has to high number of participating tanks. he uses the correct ratios but heinrici took his ratios from the correct strenght numbers ^^ this is funny use your calculator u will see :-) Blablaaa (talk) 12:06, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

I see what you mean. If you have any further sources which put this into greater persepctive, let us know what they are and what they say. I think the sources agree on the correct ratio (60 percent) but differ on the numbers of tanks involved and thus their respective losses. Dapi89 (talk) 16:05, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

frieser is not using this ratios he is citing OKW sources. so OKW reported losses ----> heinrici took tank strenghtes and losses and made ratios----> frieser uses "correct" tank strenght ----> so friesers number fit perfect. glantz takes to high strenght numbers but heinricis ratio ----> he gets higher losses than the OKW reported. but the discrepancy is to low for moaning about it. glantz gives 3xx and okw/frieser 2xx so i think both should be mentioned. but its interesting that glantz uses okw sources for the men losses but uses "strange" numbers to create the tank losses... Blablaaa (talk) 16:24, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

That is worth mentioning. If Frieser is getting access to better primary sources there is no reason why it can't be in the article. It doesn't matter if there is only one tank difference. What does Friser say? What page? and waht is the exact name of the primary document he uses? Dapi89 (talk) 17:59, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

in generall frieser has access to complete german archiv in Freiburg, he was working for this guys. for losses he is always using the primary OKW documents, i can give the numbers. thats why he is critizing many authors who used russian archives, for not using german ones(update : for not using both. Blablaaa (talk) 20:31, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

infoboxes

multipl infboxes possible ? small ones for the counter attacks only time frame / strenght

• i think the problem is that the infobox only covers zitadelle ( brjansk and western front are missing, glantz even excludes steppe front ) zitadelle : 4th tank army, 9th army, Armydetachment Kempf vs voronez front, central front Steppe front. Whole battle: germans plus 2nd tank army soviet plus briansk front and western front Blablaaa (talk) 20:28, 19 February 2010 (UTC)

proko

hm i think we have a big problem here, first of all no offense. we only can know what we read. frieser disputes heavily that the leibstandarte launched an attack he is citing many people which fought there and the diaries of the units, no unit had orders to attack proko this morning. they waited for totenkopf to capture a hill. tank-ramming: frieser disputes this an claims romistrov created this myth

• "The opposing forces, without knowing it, advanced head on toward each other and collided near Prokhorovka"

heavily disputed...

• "German sources from the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler described heavy fighting and hand-to-hand combat for a three hour period"

they also described it as incredible "target practice"

• "The Soviet defence was fanatical."

after the soviet attack gained ground 252,2 was recaptured by german units

• "When Soviet crews ran out of ammunition they rammed enemy tanks"

frieser calls this the climax of the myth when major Skripkin moved back to his burning tank let the engine and drove towards a tiger tank ramming and destroying them. frieser cites rotmistrov i think overy does the same. frieser calls this nonsense . then, to support that this thesis is nonsense, he cited georg lötsch the tiger commander. indeed a burning t-34 was rolling slowly to his tiger but missed and everything was cool. this was the attack of the XVIII Tankcorps

• "frustrated the German thrust"

hmmmmmmmm

• "the German forces were too exhausted to continue a drive for a decisive breakthrough"

if the author really thinks the german losses given by soviet are correct then maybe he would be correct. but his data is wrong so his findings are too. frieser disputes, this giving strenght listed and that orders changed after 12 july and so on.

i read to much rotmistrov here , sorry..... Blablaaa (talk) 14:18, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

the russian launched an attack nearly everywhere and gained absolutly NO ground. even if we write they achieved "limited sucess" there cant be nice words for this actions. only for the soldiers but not for the attacks.... . they used more than hundred tanks in some areas and gained no ground, how can this happen? u advance with 300-600 tanks and achieve nothing. this action must be described as desaster and one of the most worse options. serious so much tanks for an attack. in wehrmacht all officers would have been fired after such desaster.14:48, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

You're getting lost in the minute detail. The capture of a hill is not important. I keep saying; the purpose of the Soviet advance at P' was not to seize ground but prevent a German breakthrough by maintaining the line. If Frieser is implying the Soviet formations intended to do anything other than conduct defensive operations and keep the Germans in the main tactical defence zones he is being misleading. Losses can be stated, sure. But losses are irrelevant to the outcome. The outcome is decided on whether or not the Germans achieved their mission (after all it was their operation).

The Soviets may have taken heavy losses, but their mission was not to avoid casualties, but prevent a breakthrough at all costs. It was not a disaster, the Soviets achieved their mission, albeit at high cost. The battle did not effect Soviet fighting capacity, it did effect the Germans. Dapi89 (talk) 15:35, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

frieser has the german primary data, german were not attacking.----> glantz failed.... he failed, hes wrong glantz didnt understood the battle. glantz failed he used bad data, glantz is not always correct. Blablaaa (talk) 15:39, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

why u not addressing my point that glantz uses faked primary data? dapi we didnt wrote the books we have our own opinions, there is no need to defend opinions of others. glantz is wrong here not u... Blablaaa (talk) 15:41, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

It is not up to us to evaluate other proffessional historians about how they interpret data. Frieser might just as well be wrong. German sources were notorious (in Waffen SS units) of minimising and underreporting losses. The fragmented archival sources are not water tight. Dapi89 (talk) 17:14, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

this is the perfect example for glantz bias. the russian used theit strategic reserve to destroy the german forces and protect proko. they lost so much tanks that german could breakthrough easily when they had get the orders to do. glantz wants to see russian victories everywhereBlablaaa (talk) 15:43, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

he explaines russian superiority with victories, when russian get the order to destroy a enemy force and fail, than its a victory because the german had problems with advancing because so much burning tanks lay in there way. its the same in the normandy articles, when allied troops attack german troops and suffer heavy casualties then its a victory because the german troops had to fight there.^^ how can glantz say numercial superiority doesnt madder after battles like proko.... Blablaaa (talk) 15:47, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

glantz says losses doesnt madder but in the same moment he says numercical superiority wasnt significant. lol ? brain ? :-) Blablaaa (talk) 15:49, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

You have misunderstood. The Soviets were willing to pay a high price for containing the German spearhead. Operational reserves were indeed depleted. Strategic reserves would have been committed if need be. But they were not because they were not needed. The attrition of breaking through several defensive lines had taken its toll on the Wehrmacht - it was incapable of breaking through during or after the battle. At no time did the Germans have significant numbers to do so. The Soviets had out thought the Germans; wear them down, then hit them while their are worn down. It worked.. Dapi89 (talk) 17:14, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

russian units had the objectiv of destroying the german forces to defend proko. they defended proko ( glantz here simply forgets that the orders changed ) and failed heaily to destroy german forces, instead german forces nearly destroyed the soviets. and your word "may" is strange they suffered heavy casualties, u proctet the soviet or u discuss neutral ? Blablaaa (talk) 15:57, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

The first objective of the Soviets was to defend P' and prevent a breakthrough. Their secondary goal was to achieve the destruction of the spearhead. The first case is indisuptable: they achieved a defensive victory. Secondary goal: was a failure, coupled with the failure of the German operation = operational stalemate. Dapi89 (talk) 17:14, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

no , u are not addressing my points. its hard to get consense with u. u are ignoring everything what u dont like. the german were not advancing at proko, why u ignore this, because glantz told u ? Blablaaa (talk) 17:35, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

to be honest u are simply blind bias here. u call this a soviet defensiv victory while german were not attacking lol ? the russian were totally devasted by the german which were in defense. what is theis for germans? its a defensiv victory for the germans than lol, u not seeing that u missing totally the situation because your sources lack german archives? the germand defended themself and were victorios. u cant attack a any army losing all your tanks and crying defensive victory ?? if the russian objective was defending moscow then they susceeded too. they defended everything because german DID NOT ADVANCE Blablaaa (talk) 17:39, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

u created an opinion about this battle after u read books , i think u simply copied the opinion of glantz. then after u got presented new facts that your sources did mistake u are not changing your opinion :-) Blablaaa (talk) 17:41, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

u are citing your historian even when he cites rotmistrov, which this ramming bullshit, this is typical sovietproganda shit. Blablaaa (talk) 17:43, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Mind your language and your tone. I keep telling you to respect the source and other editors. Thats the kind of behaviour that got you blocked. Only agenda driven editors want one source to dominate another. Dapi89 (talk) 13:20, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

to be honest u have only one source because all your sources are affected by the same stuff. iam sure u realized already... and yes i want that german archives dominate soviet wartime propaganda . thats why i dont use solokov for russian casualties. but u want soviet claims for german casualties and orders. german sources for german orders and casualties/strenght and russian for soviet...Blablaaa (talk) 13:45, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

proko casualties

frieser brings undisputable arguments which give the range for possible Waffen SS losses

• the workshops of leibstandarte and das reich had 41 tanks
• for the 12 july the quartiermeiste of SS corps gives NO total losses
• but 3 tanks which not marked as total losses could not be recovered from the battlefield, because they were to near to russian lines
• evening 11 july leibstandarte and das reich announce 186 tanks combat ready ( 2 panzer II excluded ) quartiermeister
• evening 12 july ( after battle ) leibstandarte and das reich announce 190 tanks combat ready ( +4) quartiermeister
• for the entire operation zitadelle the both SS divisions reported 21 tank write offs!!!! including 2 tigers.

conclusion: more than 21 tanks destroyed not possible ( frieser gives 3 write offs while he says this 3 were not destroyed they could not be recovered ) more than 41 tanks destroyed + damaged not possible ( the damaged tanks in the workshops are mostly from the prior battles )

looking the primary data ( danger ! my german POV ) it looks like nothing else then outstanding combat performance of Waffen SS. supported by the fact that the russian casualties are 10:1 ( i know numbers are not everything )

when we really present this battle in the context rotmistrov and konev created then this would be a big disgrace for wiki and for russian soldiers which were again slaughtered by stupid descisions of the tactical level.

Blablaaa (talk) 15:25, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

looking russian data we get 300 destroyed + 300 damaged tanks. for a total of 600 only for 5th Guards Tank Army. if we take 20 damaged/destroyed for the german than we have +30:1 in tank losses and +10:1 in men. on the next morning the german units had more combatpower than the day before ( when we look tanks) .

all this data fits perfect with german accounts of the battle which calls it tanker:"incredible practice targeting" manstein:"outstanding victory"

frieser calls this "the absolute example of how : Not to use a tank unit" a frontal attack against heavy armed elite troops of the enemy,

overy glantz and all oter historians using rotmistrov were punkted. and should not be used for this battle . do we have consense dapi ?

but its nice to see how experts like glantz, even this events, can transform to examples of russian growing skill. Blablaaa (talk) 15:35, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

I not going to respond to this. As I posted on your article: respect the sources! There is no such thing as "one source rules all". Dapi89 (talk) 13:17, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

yeah ok but i show perfectly how your sources work and what they do wrong. here we can discuss sources. i showed how glantz faked the overall tank losses, i showed that bergström only copied his numbers without using brain. where is the problem ? u can bring arguments or ignore my comments, but dont say iam not correct without arguments.... . and again i will not respect your sources in 10 years u will look back and shame because u used this sources^^ i have no reason to respect sources when its so obivous that they failed. and again i think its a disgrace for wiki when your sources will make the background of this section. at the moment i think i have to order töppels book about the prokhorovka myth to kill the myth. i see even that the most modern research with primary data of both sides dont affect your opinion. and your influence on this article is bigger than mine, thats dangerous for "truth". again i ask u if it is better to finish the undisputed sections first? Blablaaa (talk) 13:52, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

page dump

Red Army	Central Front	Voronezh Front	Steppe Front	Total
Combat Troops	510,983	466,236	449,133	1,426,352
Tanks	1,607	1,699	1,632	4,938
Aircraft	....	....	....	....
Guns	12,453	9,751	9,211	31,415
Wehrmacht	9th Army	4th Pz. Army	Kempf	Total
Combat Troops	223,000	149,271	66,000	518,271
Tanks	988	1,377	listed in 4th Army	2,465
Aircraft	....	.....	.....
Guns	3,630	1,774	1,073	7,417

For the attack, the Wehrmacht used three armies and a big propotion of their tanks on the eastern front. The 9th Army in the north had 335,000 men ( 223,000 combat troops) , the 4th Panzer Army had 223,907 men ( 149,271 combat troops ) and Armydetachment Kempf had 100,000 men ( 66,000 combat troops) for a grand total of 778,907 men ( 518,271 combat troops )

The red army used 2 Fronts ( Armygroups ) for the defence and one Front as reserve. The Central and Vornonez Front fielded 12 armies. Central front had 711,575 men (510,983 combat troops ), Voronez front had 625,591 men (446,236 combat troops ) and the Steppe front had 573,195 men (449,133 combat troops )

i u think red doesnt look good then will i change look the prior version to look how a normal box looks

tables

hm maybe this is controversial but i think tables look good and reader can take a fast look. for strenghtes for example is it better i think? in books u have tables too... . for strenght a table ? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Blablaaa (talk • contribs) 00:34, 24 February 2010 (UTC)