User talk:Brews ohare/Dilemma

Discussion invited

This draft is intended as a vehicle for discussion.

Its definition of the dilemma itself is as the dilemma of morality one faces when one's notions of causality conflict with the intuitive notion that one has free choice over at least some of one's actions. The dilemma is a moral quandary posed by a belief that events are determined by outside agency, placing human decisions outside moral responsibility.

The 'horns of a dilemma' section explains that there is no dilemma related to choosing determined events over random events - any dilemma of that sort is an empirical matter that is settled by looking at particular theories of how events are connected.

The actual dilemma as discussed by William James and by John Martin Fischer is the dilemma of reconciling moral responsibility with either of these choices (determined or random), or (for that matter) any scientific theory connecting events that is considered to be a model governing all possible events, including decisions about one's choice of actions. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 18 October 2013 (UTC)

I've stated my view of James' definition of the 'dilemma' as a dilemma over the scope of morality compared to 'laws of nature', and not as a dilemma posed by the choice between the determinism/chance 'horns' of the dilemma, a view that I believe is very clear already from the paragraph quoted from his talk titled The Dilemma of Determinism. In further support of this view, I'd point out Rick Armstrong (2011). "Chapter 8: "First principles of morals": evolutionary morality and American naturalism". In Keith Newlin, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of American Literary Naturalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 141–142. ISBN 0195368932. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help). Among other things he says:

"Moreover, in 'The Dilemma of Determinism' (1884) William James ...defined the dilemma as consisting not merely in the insignificance of human action but more importantly in the irrelevancy of human judgment because a determinist passively accepts all that happens ...James argues that the world should not be viewed as a determinist machine but rather 'as a contrivance for deepening the theoretic consciousness of what goodness and evil in their intrinsic nature are'. James believes that individuals are compelled to exercise their abilities to make ethical decisions, connecting the individual will to a more ethical world and asserting that determinism left a void of moral passivity." —Rick Armstrong: “First principles of morals”: Evolutionary morality and American naturalism, pp. 141-142

Brews ohare (talk) 14:21, 20 October 2013 (UTC)

We also have this "William James: Introduction by John J McDermott". Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: Essential readings and interpretive essays. Oxford University Press. 1999. ISBN 0195118308.

"[In the "Dilemma of Determinism"] the upshot of his position is that ...if all were to be determined from here on, there is doubt that we could live under such a rubric" —John J McDermott: Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy, p. 148

and from William James (1896). "The Dilemma of Determinism". The Will to Believe. Longmans, Green & Co. p. 166.

"The dilemma of this determinism is one whose left horn is pessimism and whose right horn is subjectivism. In other words, if determinism is to escape pessimism, it must leave off looking at the goods and ills of life in a simple objective way, and regard them as materials, indifferent in themselves, for the production of consciousness, scientific and ethical, in us" —William James: The Dilemma of Determinism, p. 166

and from the same talk:

"The refuge from the quandary lies, as I said, not far off. ... The world must not be regarded as a machine whose final purpose is the making real of any outward good, but rather as a contrivance for deepening the theoretic consciousness of what goodness and evil in their intrinsic natures are... We have thus clearly revealed to our view what may be called the dilemma of determinism, so far as determinism pretends to think things out at all. ...[A merely mechanical determinism] is very sure that the universe must satisfy its postulate of a physical continuity and coherence, but it smiles at any one who comes forward with a postulate of moral coherence as well." —William James: The Dilemma of Determinism, pp. 164,166

Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 21 October 2013 (UTC)

In his discussion of Kant, this dilemma has been elevated beyond the issue of moral responsibility to a broader issue by Jacob Needleman (2003). "One self: two worlds". The heart of philosophy (Penguin reprint of Alfred A Knopf 1982 ed.). p. 172. ISBN 1585422517.:

"What to do? How to think about this impossible dilemma? The laws of the universe are certain, they are not capricious, they are not temporary conveniences; there is an implacable order of nature. Yet there is no direct experience of this order. I know, with utter certainty, that every effect must have a cause, although I have never seen or experienced causal power! Is the mind of man doomed forever to speak of things it cannot be sure of when it seeks to ascertain the deepest truths about reality? ... Kant's answer to this dilemma could be likened, as he himself likened it, to the revolution brought about by Copernicus — only this Copernican revolution concerned not the movements of the planets and the stars, but the very relationship of the human mind to nature itself. Until now, Kant says, man has completely misunderstood this relationship. Until now, he has believed that true knowledge, true ideas, involve a sort of mental mirroring of the order of nature — the mind forming concepts that accurately reflect external reality. At the deepest level, Kant says this cannot be true. On the contrary, the opposite is true: The order of nature conforms to the structure of the mind! And not my mind, or your mine, but the structure of mind, reason itself. Reason legislates to nature — it does not simply obey it! At the deepest level of natural order, it si reason that is the active principle and nature that is the passive principle. Just as Copernicus had shown that the motions of the heavens are determined by the motions of the Earth, so Kant demonstrated that the laws of nature are put into nature by the mind, not merely discovered there as something existing independently of the mind." —Jacob Needleman: The Heart of Philosophy, p. 172

Brews ohare (talk) 13:42, 23 October 2013 (UTC)

Fischer

Let's compare the formulation presented in this article with that of Fischer. The argument presented here is:

The concept of determinism contradicts that of free will — the deterministic horn,

The concept of indeterminism also contradicts free will — the indeterministic horn,

and one claim of putative fact:

Some occurrences are governed by determinism, and all the rest by indeterminism — a putative claim of fact,

which statements in combination lead to the conclusion:

In the universe as we know it, free will does not govern any occurrences — the conclusion.

The formulation of Fischer is:

Casual determinism means I have to act as I do, and thus am not responsible for my actions — the deterministic horn,

The only meaningful alternative to causal determinism is that how I act is a matter of luck, and thus I am not responsible for my actions — the indeterministic horn,

and one claim, possibly of putative fact, or possibly merely a tautological proposition:

Either casual determinism is true, or it is false — maybe a putative claim of fact, maybe a statement of logical consistency

which statements in combination lead to the conclusion, which again may be a claim of fact, or a claim of logical consequence:

Therefore, I am not responsible for my actions — the conclusion.

If we look at Fisher's formulation it has the unfortunate features of (i) making a particular definition of determinism and responsibility (which prejudices the first premise by combining it with particular positions), (ii) defining indeterminism in two different ways in the second premise: as the opposite of determinism and as luck, and introducing a particular view of responsibility (again prejudicing the premise with what should be separate debates over the interpretation of indeterminism and responsibility) and (iii) possibly using the words 'true' and 'false' in two different senses: a logical sense (a matter of consistency in usage) in the first two statements, and either in an empirical sense in the third claim and in the conclusion (which is a matter of applying assertions to the universe), or possibly in a logical sense here as well, in which case no empirical claim is made at all, and the entire formulation is a syllogism (that is, a purely theoretical logical construction without implication for the real world). In summary, any discussion of any of the premises or the conclusion introduces multiple issues, and any argument over the structure of the argument becomes entangled simultaneously in multiple interpretations, instead of teasing out the various threads of the argument. To know how Fischer himself interprets this unsatisfactorily vague formulation of the argument, we are forced to read his lengthy discussion in detail, often going between the lines.

Although Fischer frames the matter in terms of our sense of moral responsibility (which has the merit of an extensive legal codification that removes its subjective nature from all debate), I'd suggest that the intuitive concept of 'free will' underpins this sense of moral responsibility, so Fischer's arguments apply equally to free will. Brews ohare (talk) 17:31, 8 November 2013 (UTC)

William James

In a talk titled The dilemma of determinism, William James explains the 'dilemma' involved as being the conflict between his definition of 'determinism' and the need for moral responsibility. James' idea of determinism is based upon the 'principle of causality', which he characterizes as simply a need for the sequence of events to 'manifest a deeper kind of belonging of one thing with another than a mere arbitrary juxtaposition' a goal driven by our instinctive demand for logical rationality. Likewise, moral responsibility is an instinctive demand which appears at odds with determinism because it contradicts the notion of choice.

James' purpose in this talk is to suggest that 'chance' be introduced into the discussion. He feels himself in an environment where the idea of chance is strongly opposed, and some labor is needed to defend its occurrence. "In every outwardly verifiable and practical respect, a world in which the alternatives that now actually distract your choice were decided by pure chance would be by me absolutely indistinguished from the world in which I now live." With this remark, in effect, James introduces the subject-object problem and the problem of other minds. James continues: "To yourselves, it is true, these very acts of choice, which to me are so blind, opaque and external, are the opposites of this, for you are within them and effect them. To you they appear as decisions...they appeal to no outside moment to put its stamp upon them or make them continuous with the rest of nature. Themselves it is [that is, acts of choice] rather who seem to make nature continuous; and in their strange and intense function of granting consent to to one possibility and withholding it from another, to transform an equivocal and double future [that is, a future that allows choice] into an unalterable and simple past." (p. 8).

Thus, James describes the intuitive notions behind the controversy. From a metaphysical standpoint he argues that "No part of the world, however big, can claim to control absolutely the destinies of the whole." He argues that chance does play a role, although "from any strictly theoretical point of view, the question {of whether the world is ruled by chance] is insoluble", and states the most that he can accomplish is to "deepen our theoretic sense of the difference between a world with chances in it and a deterministic world".

His conclusion is "It is entirely immaterial, in this scheme, whether the creator leave the absolute chance-possibilities to be decided by himself, each when its proper moment arrives, or whether, on the contrary, he alienates this power from himself and leaves the decision out and out to such finite creatures as we men are. The great point is that the possibilities are really here. Whether it be we who solve them or he working through us...is of small account, so long as we admit that the issue is decided nowhere else than here and now [that is, not determined by a past sequence of events]. That is what gives the palpitating reality to our moral life and makes it tingle..."

Russell

Russell's discussion of Hume contains the figure below:

(A) Chance         (B) Humean necessity    (C) Metaphysical necessity

 No regular succession   Regular succession    "Compelling" powers in objects

   ↑           ↑            ↑

             Moral Realm?

      Humean necessity and the dilemma of determinism

Russell says: "Hume is arguing that a middle path may be traveled between, on the one hand, a confused and unintelligible conception of necessity and, on the other, an erroneous belief in the existence of chance." "In the light of the above diagram, it appears evident that Hume's strategy is to reveal that the dilemma of determinism, presented as an alternative between horns A and C, is a false dilemma. What has encouraged philosophers to misconstrue the problem in this way has been their confusion about the nature of necessity as we discover it in the natural realm. According to Hume, our experience of both the natural and the moral realms makes it plain that the only genuine alternative is the middle path of Humean necessity; therefore, in this respect, our actions and our willings are on the same footing as the operations of bodies....The distinction that is crucial ... concerns the type of cause (i.e. the nature of the object that produced the action), rather than the nature of the causal relation..." Speaking for himself, Russell says: "it remains open to the libertarian to simply maintain that what is caused need not be necessitated."

One can approach Russell's own views in this matter, or his interpretation of Hume's views, as both are pertinent to a discussion of the 'dilemma of determinism'. According to Russell, Hume attacks the topic of determinism as mentioned in the 'dilemma' by analyzing 'cause' and its connection with 'compulsion', the idea being that there is a mistake in not distinguishing 'causation' from 'compulsion' , and that freedom of choice is consistent with 'causation' because that does not imply 'compulsion'. Russell says he is not in agreement with Hume's arguments supporting this view, but he seems to accept the conclusion nonetheless.