Jump to content

User:Y-S.Ko/Wikipedia course2/Philosophy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Metaphysics

[edit]
  • Introduction
    • Overview
    • The Nature of Metaphysics—Some Historical Reflections
    • Metaphysics as Category Theory
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 1 The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism
    • Overview
    • Realism and Nominalism
    • The Ontology of Metaphysical Realism
    • Realism and Predication
    • Realism and Abstract Reference
    • Restrictions on Realism—Exemplification
    • Further Restrictions—Defined and Undefined Predicates
    • Are There Any Unexemplified Attributes?
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 2 The Problem of Universals II: Nominalism
    • Overview
    • The Motivation for Nominalism
    • Austere Nominalism
    • Metalinguistic Nominalism
    • Trope Theory
    • Fictionalism
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 3 Concrete Particulars I: Substrata, Bundles, and Substances
    • Overview
    • Substratum and Bundle Theories
    • An Objection to the Bundle Theory—Subject-Predicate Discourse
    • Another Objection to the Bundle Theory—the Identity of Indiscernibles
    • An Argument for the Substratum Theory
    • Problems for the Substratum Theory
    • Aristotelian Substances
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 4 Propositions and Their Neighbors
    • Overview
    • The Traditional Theory of Propositions
    • Nominalism about Propositions
    • Facts, States of Affairs, and Events
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 5 The Necessary and the Possible
    • Overview
    • Problems about Modality
    • Possible Worlds
    • Possible Worlds Nominalism
    • The Metaphysics of Possible Worlds Nominalism—David Lewis
    • Actualism and Possible Worlds—Alvin Plantinga
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 6 Causation
    • Overview
    • Hume’s Account of Causation
    • The Response to Hume
    • Neo-Humean Approaches
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 7 The Nature of Time
    • Overview
    • McTaggart’s Argument
    • The B-Theory
    • The A-Theory
    • The New B-Theory
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 8 Concrete Particulars II: Persistence through Time
    • Overview
    • Two Theories of Persistence—Endurantism and Perdurantism
    • Persistence and the Nature of Time
    • The Ontology of Perdurantism
    • An Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Properties
    • A Second Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Parts
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 9 Concrete Particulars III: Parts and Wholes
    • Overview
    • The Problem of the Many
    • Mereological Nihilism
    • Mereological Moderatism
    • Mereological Universalism
    • Constitution Metaphysics
    • Partism
    • Relative Identity
    • Simple Universalism
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 10 Metaphysical Indeterminacy
    • Overview
    • What Is Metaphysical Indeterminacy?
    • Epistemic Indeterminacy
    • Examples of Metaphysical Indeterminacy?
    • Composition and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
    • Future Contingents and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
    • Quantum Physics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
    • Linguistic and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
    • Moral Indeterminacy and Metaphysical Indeterminacy
    • Evans’s Argument Against Vague Identity
    • Notes
    • Further Reading
  • 11 The Challenge of Anti-Realism
    • Overview
    • Two Views about the Nature of Reality
    • Dummett’s Anti-Realist
    • The Inscrutability of Reference
    • Putnam’s Anti-Realism
    • Realism or Anti-Realism?
    • Notes
    • Further Reading

Philosophy of Mind

[edit]
  • 1 Introduction
    • 1.1 Experience and Reality
    • 1.2 The Unavoidability of the Philosophy of Mind
    • 1.3 Science and Metaphysics
    • 1.4 Metaphysics and Cognitive Science
    • 1.5 A Look Ahead
    • Suggested Reading
  • 2 Cartesian Dualism
    • 2.1 Science and Philosophy
    • 2.2 Descartes’s Dualism
    • 2.3 Substances, Attributes, Modes
    • 2.4 The Metaphysics of Cartesian Dualism
    • 2.5 Mind–Body Interaction
    • 2.6 A Causally Closed Universe
    • Suggested Reading
  • 3 Descartes’s Legacy
    • 3.1 Dualism without Interaction: Parallelism
    • 3.2 Occasionalism
    • 3.3 Causation and Occasionalism
    • 3.4 Idealism
    • 3.5 Mind and Meaning
    • 3.6 Epiphenomenalism
    • Suggested Reading
  • 4 Behaviorism
    • 4.1 Moving Away from Dualism
    • 4.2 Historical and Philosophical Background
    • 4.3 Other Minds
    • 4.4 The Beetle in the Box
    • 4.5 Philosophical Behaviorism
    • 4.6 Dispositions
    • 4.7 Behavioral Analysis
    • 4.8 Sensation
    • 4.9 The Legacy of Philosophical Behaviorism
    • 4.10 Intrinsic Characteristics
    • 4.11 ‘Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion’
    • 4.12 Psychological Behaviorism
    • 4.13 The Demise of Behaviorism
    • 4.14 Behavior
    • Suggested Reading
  • 5 The Identity Theory
    • 5.1 From Correlation to Identification
    • 5.2 Parsimony
    • 5.3 Self-Conscious Thought
    • 5.4 Locating Mental Qualities
    • 5.5 Substances, Properties, States, and Events
    • 5.6 Predicates and Properties
    • 5.7 Strict Identity
    • 5.8 Leibniz’s Law
    • 5.9 The $64 Question
    • 5.10 The Phenomenological Fallacy
    • 5.11 Epistemological Loose Ends
    • 5.12 Taking Stock
    • Suggested Reading
  • 6 Functionalism
    • 6.1 The Rise of Functionalism
    • 6.2 The Functionalist Picture
    • 6.3 Abstraction as Partial Consideration
    • 6.4 Minds as Programs
    • 6.5 Functional Explanation
    • 6.6 Functionalist Metaphysics
    • 6.7 Functionalism and Materialism
    • 6.8 Functional Properties
    • 6.9 Mental Properties as Functional Properties
    • 6.10 Functionalism and Behaviorism
    • 6.11 Characterizing Functional States
    • 6.12 Functional Systems Generally
    • 6.13 Moving Beyond Analogy
    • Suggested Reading
  • 7 The Representational Theory of Mind
    • 7.1 Mental Representation
    • 7.2 Semantic Engines
    • 7.3 Minds as Semantic Engines
    • 7.4 The Turing Test
    • 7.5 The Chinese Room
    • 7.6 From Syntax to Semantics
    • 7.7 Thinking as Computing
    • 7.8 Levels of Description
    • 7.9 From Taxonomy to Ontology
    • 7.10 Layers of Reality
    • Suggested Reading
  • 8 The Intentional Stance
    • 8.1 Minds as Constructs
    • 8.2 Taking a Stance
    • 8.3 From Intentional Stance to Design Stance
    • 8.4 From Design Stance to Physical Stance
    • 8.5 The Emerging Picture
    • 8.6 Thought and Language
    • 8.7 Kinds of Mind
    • 8.8 Consciousness
    • 8.9 Searle’s Objection
    • Suggested Reading
  • 9 Eliminativism
    • 9.1 From Instrumentalism to Eliminativism
    • 9.2 Ontological Commitment
    • 9.3 Theories and Theory Reduction
    • 9.4 Stich’s Argument
    • 9.5 Prospects for Reduction or Elimination
    • 9.6 Is Eliminativism Self-Refuting?
    • Suggested Reading
  • 10 Consciousness
    • 10.1 The Status of ‘Raw Feels’
    • 10.2 The Mystery of Consciousness
    • 10.3 Qualities of Conscious Experiences
    • 10.4 Zombies
    • 10.5 Biting the Bullet
    • 10.6 Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary
    • 10.7 Emergence and Panpsychism
    • 10.8 Representationalism
    • 10.9 Consciousness as Higher-Order Representation
    • 10.10 Explaining Consciousness
    • Suggested Reading
  • 11 Non-Reductive Physicalism
    • 11.1 From Substances to Properties
    • 11.2 Substance Monism, Property Dualism
    • 11.3 Mental Causation: Background Issues
    • 11.4 Mental–Physical Supervenience
    • 11.5 Causal Relevance
    • 11.6 The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties
    • 11.7 The Challenge of Causal Relevance
    • 11.8 Jettisoning Higher-Level Properties
    • 11.9 The Upshot
    • Suggested Reading
  • 12 Metaphysics and Mind
    • 12.1 The Status of Philosophies of Mind
    • 12.2 Metaphysical Preliminaries
    • 12.3 Substances and Properties
    • 12.4 Universals
    • 12.5 Properties as Particularized Ways
    • 12.6 Powerful Qualities
    • 12.7 Manifestations of Dispositions
    • 12.8 Causality and Dispositionality
    • 12.9 Complex Objects
    • 12.10 Emergence
    • 12.11 Levels of Being
    • 12.12 Predicates and Properties
    • 12.13 Properties, Realism, and Anti-Realism
    • Suggested Reading
  • 13 The Mind’s Place in Nature
    • 13.1 Applied Metaphysics
    • 13.2 Multiple Realizability
    • 13.3 An Alternative Approach
    • 13.4 Higher-Level Properties
    • 13.5 Causality and Ceteris Paribus Laws
    • 13.6 Levels of Reality vs. Levels of Description
    • 13.7 Zombies (Again)
    • 13.8 Qualities of Conscious Experience
    • 13.9 Neutral Monism
    • 13.10 ‘Privileged Access’
    • 13.11 Imagery and Intentionality
    • 13.12 Putting Imagery to Work
    • 13.13 Twin-Earth
    • 13.14 Intentionality Delivered
    • 13.15 Functionalism Adieu
    • 13.16 Dénouement
    • 13.17 Concluding Note
    • Suggested Reading

Epistemology

[edit]
  • Introduction: a sketch of the sources and nature of belief, justification, and knowledge
    • Perception, belief, and justification
    • Justification as process, as status, and as property
    • Knowledge and justification
    • Memory, introspection, and self-consciousness
    • Reason and rational reflection
    • Testimony
    • Basic sources of belief, justification, and knowledge
    • Three kinds of grounds of belief
    • Fallibility and skepticism
    • Overview

Sources of justification, knowledge, and truth

[edit]
  • 1 Perception: sensing, believing, and knowing
    • The elements and basic kinds of perception
    • Seeing and believing
    • Perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge
    • Notes
  • 2 Theories of perception: sense experience,appearances, and reality
    • Some commonsense views of perception
    • The theory of appearing
    • Sense-datum theories of perception
    • Adverbial theories of perception
    • Adverbial and sense-datum theories of sensory experience
    • Phenomenalism
    • Perception and the senses
    • Notes
  • 3 Memory: the preservation and reconstruction ofthe past
    • Memory and the past
    • The causal basis of memory beliefs
    • Theories of memory
    • Remembering, recalling, and imaging
    • Remembering, imaging, and recognition
    • The epistemological centrality of memory
    • Notes
  • 4 Consciousness: the life of the mind
    • Two basic kinds of mental properties
    • Introspection and inward vision
    • Some theories of introspective consciousness
    • Consciousness and privileged access
    • Introspective consciousness as a source of justification and knowledge
    • Notes
  • 5 Reason I: understanding, insight, and intellectualpower
    • Self-evident truths of reason
    • The classical view of the truths of reason
    • The empiricist view of the truths of reason
    • Notes
  • 6 Reason II: meaning, necessity, and provability
    • The conventionalist view of the truths of reason
    • Some difficulties and strengths of the classical view
    • Reason, experience, and a priori justification
    • Notes
  • 7 Testimony: the social foundation of knowledge
    • The nature of testimony: formal and informal
    • The psychology of testimony
    • The epistemology of testimony
    • The indispensability of testimonial grounds
    • Notes

The structure and growth of justification and knowledge

[edit]
  • 8 Inference and the extension of knowledge
    • The process, content, and structure of inference
    • Inference and the growth of knowledge
    • Source conditions and transmission conditions for inferential knowledge and justification
    • Memorial preservation of inferential justification and inferential knowledge
    • Notes
  • 9 The architecture of knowledge
    • Inferential chains and the structure of belief
    • The epistemic regress problem
    • The epistemic regress argument
    • Foundationalism and coherentism
    • Holistic coherentism
    • The nature of coherence
    • Coherence and second-order justification
    • Moderate foundationalism
    • Notes

The nature and scope of justification and knowledge

[edit]
  • 10 The analysis of knowledge: justification, certainty, and reliability
    • Knowledge and justified true belief
    • Knowledge conceived as the right kind of justified true belief
    • Naturalistic accounts of the concept of knowledge
    • Problems for reliability theories
    • Notes
  • 11 Knowledge, justification, and truth: internalism, externalism, and intellectual virtue
    • Knowledge and justification
    • Internalism and externalism in epistemology
    • Internalist and externalist versions of virtue epistemology
    • Justification, knowledge, and truth
    • The value problem
    • Theories of truth
    • Concluding proposals
    • Notes
  • 12 Scientific, moral, and religious knowledge
    • Scientific knowledge
    • Moral knowledge
    • Religious knowledge
    • Notes
  • 13 Skepticism I: the quest for certainty
    • The possibility of pervasive error
    • Skepticism generalized
    • The egocentric predicament
    • Fallibility
    • Uncertainty
    • Notes
  • 14 Skepticism II: the defense of common sense in theface of fallibility
    • Negative versus positive defenses of common sense
    • Deducibility, evidential transmission, and induction
    • The authority of knowledge and the cogency of its grounds
    • Refutation and rebuttal
    • Prospects for a positive defense of common sense
    • The challenge of rational disagreement
    • Skepticism and common sense
    • Notes
  • 15 Conclusion

Logic

[edit]
  • Chapter 1 Introduction
    • 1.1 Logic
    • 1.2 Valid arguments
    • 1.3 Sound arguments
    • 1.4 The plan of this book

Part 1 Syllogistic, Informal, and Inductive Logic

[edit]
  • Chapter 2 Syllogistic Logic
    • 2.1 Easier translations
    • 2.2 The star test
    • 2.4 English arguments
    • 2.4 Harder translations
    • 2.5 Deriving conclusions
    • 2.6 Venn diagrams
    • 2.7 Idiomatic arguments
    • 2.8 The Aristotelian view
  • Chapter 3 Meaning and Definitatinos
    • 3.1 Uses of language
    • 3.2 Lexical definitions
    • 3.3 Stipulative definitions
    • 3.4 Explaining meaning
    • 3.5 Making distinctions
    • 3.6 Analytic and synthetic
    • 3.7 A priori and a posteriori
  • Chapter 4 Fallacies and Argumentation
    • 4.1 Good arguments
    • 4.2 Informal fallacies
    • 4.3 Inconsistency
    • 4.4 Constructing arguments
    • 4.5 Analyzing arguments
  • Chapter 5 Inductive Reasoning
    • 5.1 The statistical syllogism
    • 5.2 Probability calculations
    • 5.3 Philosophical questions
    • 5.4 Reasoning from a sample
    • 5.5 Analogical reasoning
    • 5.6 Analogy and other minds
    • 5.7 Mill's methods
    • 5.8 Scientific laws
    • 5.9 Best-explanation reasoning
    • 5.10 Problems with induction

Part 2 Classical Symbolic Logic

[edit]
  • Chapter 6 Basic Proppositional Logic
    • 6.1 Easier translations
    • 6.2 Basic truth tables
    • 6.3 Truth evaluations
    • 6.4 Unknown evaluations
    • 6.5 Complex truth tables
    • 6.6 The truth-table test
    • 6.7 The truth-assignment test
    • 6.8 Harder translations
    • 6.9 Idiomatic arguments
    • 6.10 S-rules
    • 6.11 I-rules
    • 6.12 Mixing S- and I-rules
    • 6.13 Extended inferences
    • 6.14 Logic and computers
  • Chapter 7 Propositional Proofs
    • 7.1 Easier proofs
    • 7.2 Easier refutations
    • 7.3 Harder proofs
    • 7.4 Harder refutations
    • 7.5 Copi proofs
    • 7.6 Truth trees
  • Chapter 8 Basic Quantificational Logic
    • 8.1 Easier translations
    • 8.2 Easier proofs
    • 8.3 Easier refutations
    • 8.4 Harder translations
    • 8.5 Harder proofs
    • 8.6 Copi proofs
  • Chapter 9 Relations and Identity
    • 9.1 Identity translations
    • 9.2 Identity proofs
    • 9.3 Easier relations
    • 9.4 Harder relations
    • 9.5 Relational proofs
    • 9.6 Definite descriptions
    • 9.7 Copi proofs

Part 3 Advanced Symbolic Systems

[edit]
  • Chapter 10 Basic Modal Logic
    • 10.1 Translations
    • 10.2 Proofs
    • 10.3 Refutations
  • Chapter 11 Further Modal Systems
    • 11.1 Galactic travel
    • 11.2 Quantified translations
    • 11.3 Quantified proofs
    • 11.4 A sophisticated system
  • Chapter 12 Deontic and Imperative Logic
    • 12.1 Imperative translations
    • 12.2 Imperative proofs
    • 12.3 Deontic translations
    • 12.4 Deontic proofs
  • Chapter 13 Belief Logic
    • 13.1 Belief translations
    • 13.2 Belief proofs
    • 13.3 Believing and willing
    • 13.4 Willing proofs
    • 13.5 Rationality translations
    • 13.6 Rationality proofs
    • 13.7 A sophisticated system
  • Chapter 14 A Formalized Ethical Theory
    • 14.1 Practical reason
    • 14.2 Consistency
    • 14.3 The golden rule
    • 14.4 Starting the GR proof
    • 14.5 GR logical machinery
    • 14.6 The symbolic GR proof

Part 4 Further Vistas

[edit]
  • Chapter 15 Metalogic
    • 15.1 Metalogical questions
    • 15.2 Symbols
    • 15.3 Soundness
    • 15.4 Completeness
    • 15.5 An axiomatic system
    • 15.6 Gödel's theorem
  • Chapter 16 History of Logic
    • 16.1 Ancient logic
    • 16.2 Medieval logic
    • 16.3 Enlightenment logic
    • 16.4 Frege and Russell
    • 16.5 After Principia
  • Chapter 17 Deviant Logics
    • 17.1 Many-valued logic
    • 17.2 Paraconsistent logic
    • 17.3 Intuitionist logic
    • 17.4 Relevance logic
  • Chapter 18 Philosophy of Logic
    • 18.1 Abstract entities
    • 18.1 Metaphysical structures
    • 18.2 The basis for logical laws
    • 18.4 Truth and paradoxes
    • 18.5 Logic's scope

Ethics

[edit]
  • Preface
  • About the Tenth Edition
  • 1. WHAT IS MORALITY?
    • 1.1 The Problem of Definition
    • 1.2 First Example: Baby Theresa
    • 1.3 Second Example: Jodie and Mary
    • 1.4 Third Example: Tracy Latimer
    • 1.5 Reason and Impartiality
    • 1.6 The Minimum Conception of Morality
    • Notes on Sources
  • 2. THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM
    • 2.1 Different Cultures Have Different Moral Codes
    • 2.2 Cultural Relativism
    • 2.3 The Cultural Differences Argument
    • 2.4 What Follows from Cultural Relativism
    • 2.5 Why There Is Less Disagreement Than There Seems to Be
    • 2.6 Some Values Are Shared by All Cultures
    • 2.7 Judging a Cultural Practice to Be Undesirable
    • 2.8 Back to the Five Claims
    • 2.9 What We Can Learn from Cultural Relativism
    • Notes on Sources
  • 3. SUBJECTIVISM IN ETHICS
    • 3.1 The Basic Idea of Ethical Subjectivism
    • 3.2 The Linguistic Turn
    • 3.3 The Rejection of Value
    • 3.4 Ethics and Science
    • 3.5 Same-Sex Relations
    • Notes on Sources
  • 4. DOES MORALITY DEPEND ON RELIGION?
    • 4.1 The Presumed Connection between Morality and Religion
    • 4.2 The Divine Command Theory 52
    • 4.3 The Theory of Natural Law
    • 4.4 Religion and Particular Moral Issues
    • Notes on Sources
  • 5. ETHICAL EGOISM
    • 5.1 Is There a Duty to Help the Starving?
    • 5.2 Psychological Egoism
    • 5.3 Three Arguments for Ethical Egoism
    • 5.4 Two Arguments against Ethical Egoism
    • Notes on Sources
  • 6. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
    • 6.1 Hobbes’s Argument
    • 6.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
    • 6.3 Some Advantages of the Social Contract Theory
    • 6.4 The Problem of Civil Disobedience
    • 6.5 Difficulties for the Theory
    • Notes on Sources
  • 7. THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH
    • 7.1 The Revolution in Ethics
    • 7.2 First Example: Euthanasia
    • 7.3 Second Example: Marijuana
    • 7.4 Third Example: Nonhuman Animals
    • Notes on Sources
  • 8. THE DEBATE OVER UTILITARIANISM
    • 8.1 The Classical Version of the Theory
    • 8.2 Is Pleasure All That Matters?
    • 8.3 Are Consequences All That Matter?
    • 8.4 Should We Be Equally Concerned for Everyone?
    • 8.5 The Defense of Utilitarianism
    • 8.6 Concluding Thoughts
    • Notes on Sources
  • 9. ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES?
    • 9.1 Harry Truman and Elizabeth Anscombe
    • 9.2 The Categorical Imperative
    • 9.3 Kant’s Arguments on Lying
    • 9.4 Conflicts between Rules
    • 9.5 Kant’s Insight
    • Notes on Sources
  • 10. KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS
    • 10.1 Kant’s Core Ideas
    • 10.2 Retribution and Utility in the Theory of Punishment
    • 10.3 Kant’s Retributivism
    • Notes on Sources
  • 11. FEMINISM AND THE ETHICS OF CARE
    • 11.1 Do Women and Men Think Differently about Ethics?
    • 11.2 Implications for Moral Judgment
    • 11.3 Implications for Ethical Theory
    • Notes on Sources
  • 12. VIRTUE ETHICS
    • 12.1 The Ethics of Virtue and the Ethics of Right Action
    • 12.2 The Virtues
    • 12.3 Two Advantages of Virtue Ethics
    • 12.4 Virtue and Conduct
    • 12.5 The Problem of Incompleteness
    • 12.6 Conclusion
    • Notes on Sources
  • 13. WHAT WOULD A SATISFACTORY MORAL THEORY BE LIKE?
    • 13.1 Morality without Hubris
    • 13.2 Treating People as They Deserve
    • 13.3 A Variety of Motives
    • 13.4 Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism
    • 13.5 The Moral Community
    • 13.6 Justice and Fairness
    • 13.7 Conclusion
    • Notes on Sources
  • Index

Metaethics

[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Y-S.Ko/Wikipedia_course2/Philosophy&oldid=1170731920"