User:Xyl 54/Sandbox 7

Sandbox 7

Page History

Title	Written	Posted	Deleted	Notes
Bismarck (#Controvery section)	April 2014	–	–	(link to discussion)

Bismarck

The general view of Bismarck’s foreign policy was that he was responsible for peace in Europe in the years from 1871 onwards. Hobsbawm says “Bismarck, who remained undisputed world champion at the game of multilateral diplomatic chess for almost 20 years after 1871, devoted himself exclusively, and successfully, to maintaining peace between the powers” While Pflanze says “successfully strove for two decades to preserve the peace of Europe against great odds” AJP Taylor calls Bismarck "an honest broker for peace".

However, several biographers paint a more complex picture.

Steinberg says that Bismarck’s foreign policy was not aimed at keeping Europe at peace per se, but to preserve the Germany he had created. He points out Bismarck’s own actions had made this more difficult; whilst explicitly leaving the door open for a reconciliation with Austria in 1866, he equally explicitly rejected that approach with France in 1871, thus “blocking in advance sixteen of the sixty four squares on the chessboard”

AJP Taylor also states Bismarck’s foreign policy was not a well thought-out scheme to achieve peace but a series of opportunistic manoeuvres , saying of his relations with the other powers. "Metternich had perhaps planned a system of perpetual peace. Bismarck was content to avoid troubles of the moment".

Crankshaw is even more forthright, saying that the idea of Bismarck as “a paragon of peace” is simply a legend, asking whether we should a call Bismarck a man of peace "simply because he was satisfied with the Germany he had created, and found the best way to buttress and sustain it was to keep all Europe desperately guessing, and fearing". He goes on (quoting Russell) to describe Bismarck as a man "who preferred to foster instability when he might have stood on a rock"

Crankshaw goes on to explain: “It is easy enough to see how the legend took root. Statesmen and diplomats in all countries were so overwhelmed by the new German presence and the consummate skills of its creator that it was the most natural thing in the world to assume he must always know precisely what he was doing, and why, and that whatever he did must make sense” (p304) and “there was also the matter of relief when the worst fears aroused by the new military state in the heart of Europe proved unfounded” (Crankshaw p304) Steinberg points out that the editors of Bismarck's’s collected works in 1924 wished to “build a monument that Germany erects to the founder of the Reich” and omitted documents that showed him in unfavourable postures or acts; (p314) While Taylor says of the period from 1871 onwards “these forty years of stability became in retrospect Bismarck’s system, and he was credited with profound insight where there had been only a quick instinctive response to events". (p139)

Quotes

• Taylor p140-1: “It was the same with his (Bismarck’s) relations with the other powers. Metternich had perhaps planned a system of perpetual peace. Bismarck was content to avoid troubles of the moment."
  • He says of the period from 1871 onwards “these forty years of stability became in retrospect Bismarck’s system, and he was credited with profound insight where there had been only a quick instinctive response to events" (p139)
  • Of B’s alliance with Austria he says it “did not increase German security oin the least. On the contrary it brought her nearer to war….the alliance was a liability to Germany, not an asset, and B never explained why he thought it a necessary liability." (p189)
  • And "He often used his domestic policy to strengthen his position in foreign affairs; and, with less excuse, he sometimes played tricks in diplomacy in order t5o influence affairs at home." (p208)

• Crankshaw p303: "enter the elder statesman, paragon of peace and wisdom. Thus is the legend. It is true that he made no more wars: he didn’t need them. But peace? Does it make sense to call the later Bismarck a man of peace simply because he was satisfied with the Germany he had created, and found the best way to buttress and sustain it was to keep all Europe desperately guessing, and fearing…?”
  • and goes on “Had Bismarck been a great statesman he would have concentrated on securing perpetual amity with France, with Austria, with Russia and with England. He did not even consider this obvious and humane course”(p305).
  • He also says “Bismarck was not interested in Europe, only in Prussia, his Prussia; later in Germany, his Germany” (p324).
  • And “the legend of his infallibility has been so firmly implanted, not least by Bismarck himself, that it is the easiest thing in the world to overlook his tactical and strategic errors, or at least discount them. But his errors were many and sometimes grave." (p81)

• Steinberg p312: “in March 1871 he had become immortal, but now he faced a completely different challenge; to preserve his creation and make it work” and "Preservation of his great achievement meant constant watchfulness for threats from abroad as well as at home. The great powers had reason to fear the new Germany”
• Steinberg p313:“Bismarck had explained to Leopold von Gerlach that one could not play chess if sixteen of the sixty four squares were blocked in advance. Politics as the art of the possible required flexibility. Yet Bismarck’s own achievements made that flexibility harder to obtain”. And “Bismarck quite explicitly left the door open for an eventual reconciliation with the Habsburg Monarchy. He equally explicitly, as we have seen, rejected a soft peace with France”
  • He also questions B’s achievement, saying that if B had been dismissed in 1862, he would have been lost to history, while “Germany would almost certainly have been unified as a voluntary federation of sovereign princes” (p7), and if he had gone in 1867 “the North German Federation, his creation, might eventually have absorbed the south German kingdoms, but without a devastating war” (p7).
  • And he points out B's unification of Germany was “more accurately” a division, by excluding Austria. (p8)

Edit note: I’ve added the quotes in full to substantiate the comments made, but I wouldn’t necessarily want to add them to the text.