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Fiscal capacity is the ability of the state to extract revenues to provide public goods and carry out other functions of the state, given an administrative, fiscal accounting structure. In economics and political science, fiscal capacity may be referred to as tax capacity, extractive capacity or the power to tax, as taxes are a main source of public revenues. Nonetheless, though tax revenue is essential to fiscal capacity, taxes may not be the government's only source of revenue. Other sources of revenue include foreign aid and natural resources.

In addition to the amount of public revenue the state extracts, fiscal capacity is the state's investment in "state structures -- including monitoring, administration, and compliance through such things as training tax inspectors and running the revenue service efficiently". When investment in these administrative or bureaucratic fiscal structures are specific to the state's power to extract resources, fiscal capacity is moreover related to a larger concept of state capacity. Finally, given that public goods funded by fiscal capacity include infrastructure development, health, education, military and social insurance, a state's fiscal capacity is essential to its economic growth, development, and state-building.

Definitions and Patterns

Because fiscal capacity is the ability of the government to raise revenues, a frequent measure of fiscal capacity is the proportion of total wealth or Gross domestic product generated by tax revenue. Overall, wealthier developed countries have larger, stronger tax administrations and raise more money through tax revenue than poorer, developing countries. . As is such, the more revenue a country raises, the its greater fiscal capacity is. However, fiscal capacity is measured not only by the level of tax revenue a state is able to raise, but by the quality and size of the tax administration itself, as well as the administration's ability to enforce tax policies.

Besley and Persson (2012) present a list of "stylized facts" that describe the evolution and patterns of fiscal capacity. These facts come from an an analysis of cross-sectional and time series data on 73 countries since 1800:
"Stylized Fact 1: Rich countries have made successive investments in their fiscal capacities over time.
Stylized Fact 2: Rich countries collect a much larger share of their income in taxes than do poor countries.
Stylized Fact 3: Rich countries rely to a much larger extent on income taxes as opposed to trade taxes than do poor countries
Stylized Fact 4: High-tax countries rely to a much larger extent on income taxes as opposed to trade taxes than do low tax countries.
Stylized Fact 5: Rich countries collect much higher tax revenue than poor countries despite comparable statutory rates."

Tax Structure

Fiscal capacity changes from state to state, not only in the amount of tax revenue that each state is able to extract but also the way in which revenue is extracted. Specifically, different types of taxes are considered more economically efficient--and thus more ideal--than others. More information can be found on tax types and economic efficiency in the page on Tax. The strength of a state's fiscal capacity is thus determined by not only the amount of revenue collected, but also the efficiency of its tax structure.

For instance, optimal taxation theory states that the ideal tax structure maximizes efficiency; inefficient taxes include tariffs and seignorage, while efficient taxes include income taxes and consumption taxes such as the value-added tax. As is such, richer developed countries and states with strong fiscal capacity tend to rely on these efficient tax types, whereas the opposite holds true for poorer, developing countries. Instead, poorer countries rely on less efficient tax types, such as corporate income taxes, tariffs, and seignorage, and accordingly have weaker fiscal capacities. Likewise, developing countries with weak fiscal capacities are more likely to be unable to provide public goods. Social science literature on fiscal capacity and economic development aims, in part, to solve this puzzle of why developing countries cannot strengthen fiscal capacity by simply increasing their use of efficient tax types and lowering the use of inefficient tax types.

Moreover, fiscal capacity reflects the political, social and economic conditions of a state. First, as countries differ in their investments on the military, public education, infrastructure (etc.), different tax structures can reflect varying preferences for private versus public goods and redistribution. Secondly, inefficient tax structure and weak fiscal capacity indicate the presence of tax evasion, a relationship that is further examined in the section below on informal economies. Overall, favorable tax types are correlated to greater fiscal capacity because they impose fewer economic efficiency costs, but also encourage more efficient tax collection by minimizing tax evasion.

Fiscal Capacity in Practice

Administration

A state's fiscal capacity is determined twofold; the amount of revenue that tax administration is able to raise, and the amount of resources that go into producing a tax administration. In "Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform", Richard Bird explains that the strength of a tax administration is determined by the number of trained personnel, adequate infrastructure (including technology and modern computer systems), as well as a functioning "information system". This information system determines the tax base, as well as identifies, classifies and monitors taxpayers. It further facilitates the collection of information from each individual, third parties, and other sources from within the tax administration. In addition, there should also exist a system of rewards and penalties to enforce tax compliance. And finally, there must be a system to both redress grievances and complaints should the system fail, and identify and address mistakes with the tax system before they occur.

Tax administrations are complex and require a vast amount of resources that not all states can afford. Fiscal capacity and tax structure depends immensely on the strength and capabilities of the administration itself. A revenue service acts as a monitoring body that aims to enforce compliance and deter tax evasion. As is such, different tax policies and structures may indicate the different ways countries deal with tax evasion in accordance to the different social and political situations that take place in each state. For instance, the Internal Revenue Service is an example of a strong tax administration, as it has a large number of employees and can therefore more easily monitor each individual in the US. On the other hand, where poorer countries lack tax personnel, an inefficient tax such as border tax is much easier to monitor. As discussed in the previous section on tax structure, while tariffs are less efficient, the recommended income taxes are much easier to evade.

In practice, collecting large amount of tax revenue without the use of inefficient taxes becomes complicated in the presence of tax evasion. A tax administration's goal is to therefore not simply maximize revenue and economic efficiency, but to monitor the peoples of a state and facilitate tax compliance.

Informal Economy

Despite the superior efficiency of certain tax types compared to others, taxes traditionally considered inefficient may better achieve fiscal goals in the presence of informal economies. By definition, informal economies are part of the economy that is not monitored or taxed by the government, and as is such informal economies signal low fiscal capacity because state-agents do not have the ability to effectively monitor and collect revenues from its populace. Informal economies exist when the general population can easily evade taxes due to factors such as low tax-morale, low-quality governance, and insufficient resources for large, administrative tax structures like that of the US's Internal Revenue Service. Informal economies also explain why developing countries cannot simply raise tax rates, like in their more developed counterparts, to attain a higher GDP or fund more public goods. In particular, when large informal economies exist and taxes are raised, people are more inclined to shift out of the formal sector into the informal sector of the economy. States with regions culturally unaccustomed to the idea of tax collection suffer from low tax morale, and are even more likely to circumvent the state's attempt to impose taxes. Thus, compliance depends on the social and political environment of the state as well as the ability of "effective bureaucracies [to] facilitate trust between government officials and the citizenry."

Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste estimated the 2002 size of the informal sector for a variety of countries. They find that "the informal economy on average is only about 15% of GDP among [rich] OECD countries, and thus small enough that it should not be a driving force in the choice of tax structure. However, among developing states, the median size of the informal economy they is 37% of GDP; examples range from 13% of GDP being attributed to the informal economy in Hong Kong and Singapore to 71% in Thailand and 76% in Nigeria.

As a solution to tax evasion, governments with lower administrative and technological capabilities place less efficient but more easily monitored taxes. Moreover, easily monitored taxes like tariffs do not necessarily require depend on a strong cultural of tax compliance. Additionally, Emran and Stiglitz (2005) argue that adding "tariffs may provide a less distorting source of tax revenue" because it may encourage tax evasion less than for instance, increasing income taxes. In other words, if certain types of taxes incentivize the general population to move into an informal economy out of the control of the government, it may be in the government's best interest to exact tax types that will discourage tax evasion in spite of economic efficiencies.

All in all, states with low fiscal capacity tend to use inefficient tax types when large informal economies are present, and if they do not have the administrative capacity to support the collection of efficient taxes.

Models of Tax Evasion

Besley and Persson's (2012) created an economic model to understand non-compliance, and why developing countries are not able increase their fiscal capacity by simply raising taxes. Focusing on taxes on income and services and goods at the household level (in comparison to corporate income taxes for businesses), Besley and Persson's model demonstrates that citizens always have the incentive to evade taxes, so as to keep the otherwise taxable income to themselves; they will only choose not to evade if the cost of evasion (i.e. a tax penalty) is too high. This cost depends on the government's ability to monitor individuals and sales, and enforce penalties. In other words, whether or not citizens choose to participate in the informal economy depends on previous investments in fiscal capacity. If citizens are more likely to participate in the informal economy, than the state cannot improve fiscal capacity by simply raising taxes.

In comparison to Besley and Persson's individual level study, Gordon and Li (2009) focus on the role of businesses and the financial sector in developed versus developing countries. They model businesses' participation in the financial sector--where Gordon & Li specifically refer to participation in the financial sector as using banks--as participation in the formal sector; they assume that tax authorities can monitor bank records, so that mass participation in the financial sector lends the state information and likewise, the power to tax. Gordon and Li (2009) demonstrate that because the financial sector is important in developed countries, businesses will choose to use banks and not evade taxes. Comparatively, the financial sector may be weaker in developing countries and businesses may have less incentive to use the banking system and instead opt to use cash. As is such, Gordon and Li (2009) conclude that "as the financial sector improves in effectiveness, more firms will be pulled into using it in spite of the tax implications of doing so".

Origins

As fiscal capacity refers to the state's ability to collect revenues, social science theory on the history and evolution of fiscal capacity has to do with understanding the origins of the state itself. Economic history highlights the importance of revenue collection in the evolution from the pre-modern state to the modern state, and has likewise proved essential to understanding the fiscal differences between developed and developing countries. In particular, social science theory not only highlights the role of tax structure and administrative capacity, but the incentives and constraints or the political motives that different actors have when building fiscal capacity.

Incentives and Constraints

Crucial to economic models and historical theories regarding fiscal capacity such as that of Besley and Persson, Charles Tilly, Gordon and Li, Jim Scott et al., are the different actors that create and shape fiscal, and likewise state, development. Broadly put, much of the social science literature on the topic assumes that the origins of fiscal capacity lie in the decisions, incentives and constraints of different, self-interested actors that compete against one another. These agents compete for power and resources.

In "Seeing_Like_a_State", James Scott for instance examines fiscal capacity through the competitive relationship between state agents and the general population. In addition to the political actors who collect tax revenues and build tax administrations, citizens and local elite can threaten the supply of an economic resource (tax revenue) to the state. Specifically, if the state suffers from poor fiscal capacity--meaning, lacking "both the information and the administrative grid that would have allowed it to exact from its subjects a reliable revenue that was more closely tied to their actual capacity to pay"--the citizens of the state can migrate away or leave the state, quietly resist or violently revolt against the state, or evade taxes.

Besley & Persson (2009) further demonstrate that as fiscal capacity develops over time, the choices made by current policymakers depend on the legal, political, and fiscal constraints imposed by the actors who previously held power. North and Weingast (1989) for instance, stressed "the importance of the imposition of constitutional constraints after 1689 in reining in the power of the monarch as a precondition for the subsequent success of the English state and economy." In a summary of literature regarding fiscal capacity, Johnson and Koyama (2015) further highlight an agreement among historians, that watershed moments in "the constitutional and fiscal history of England" as well as the "important role played by political elites and the formation of political parties" were essential to "granting the state previously undreamt of powers to raise taxes, spend and borrow" while preventing the crown from later exploiting the power to tax for itself. Johnson and Koyama also emphasize the goals of the elite: "it is not so clear where the support for these [fiscal] institutions comes from initially. Frequently it is the private-order institutions--such as family alliances, religious organizations, or informal trade networks--which from the bases around which public-order institutions [such as tax administrations, land registries or courts] are eventually built.

War

Political historians, such as Samuel P. Huntington and Charles Tilly, postulate that war is the primary incentive for states to invest in fiscal capacity. In War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, Tilly models the government as a self-interested, power-holding actor that wishes to extract revenue from its less-powerful citizenry; however, the state also protects its citizens from external threats in exchange for the resources and revenues that they provide. Likewise, a government or state has an incentive to make war against other states if it believes it will be successful, as it will then be able to collect more tax revenues from an expanded domain.

Tilly defines four main actions of the state as "war making, state making, protection [and] extraction", where "extraction" is "the means of carrying out the first three activities." "Extraction" takes place at all levels of the state--from the modern tax system to the pre-modern state, when individuals plundered each other's villages to extract resources. A parallel can be drawn to Marcus Olson's theory on roving and stationary bandits, in which the start of civilization stems from the incentive of a selfish 'stationary bandit' to capture and extract from a village over an extended period of time.

Since Tilly's monumental theories on war and state-building, his theories have since been reinforced by data and extended to non-European and contemporary states. Herbst for instance finds that while Europe's long history of war and violence led to the strong fiscal capacities today, most African states gained independence without war. Herbst first explains that war in Europe pressed governments to "to find new and more regular sources of income" by improving fiscal capacity, incentivized citizens "to acquiesce to increased taxation...because a threat to their survival will overwhelm other concerns they might have about increased taxation", and led to nationalism allowing governments to exact power and collect taxes with greater ease; Herbst then demonstrates that in the absence of war, many African states have lacked these same incentives and have thus not been able to increase fiscal capacity.

Nonetheless, studies have also found that despite evidence in Europe, the relationship between fiscal capacity and war does not hold true in South America and Africa.

Legibility and Simplification

Development economists Besley & Persson and Gordon and Li explain that fiscal capacity have to do with "deep structural change" that will be "conducive to extracting taxation". Both authors emphasize the importance of the formal sector and formal financial transactions, and specifically highlight that structural change comes from "mak[ing] transactions more visible to tax authorities". Likewise, to build fiscal capacity and create a modern state, political scientist James C. Scott emphasized that state agents must be able to operate and manage the state through processes of simplification, legibility and manipulation.

Primary examples of simplification, legibility and manipulation include the creation of standard metric system, in which consistent units of measurements would lead to legible prices and unify populaces to create a homogenous state. A standard metric system, Scott explains, laid the groundwork for additional practices such as centralized administrations and the creation of tax codes. Additionally, Scott emphasized that state naming and state mapping practices allowed states to be more easily administered, were "inevitably associated with taxes and hence aroused popular resistance." All in all, Scott emphasizes the important of legibility and simplification in order for state's to achieve fiscal capacity, and the role that fiscal capacity plays in state building via the incentives of the elite.

He for instance, cites the failed fiscal goals of pre-revolutionary Russian state officials to transform an open-field system in which individuals shared a common property, to independent farmsteads where land was associated with individuals or households. This transformation, he explains, exemplifies state agents' incentives to make the general population "simplified and legible"; for instance, Russian state officials attempted to create a cadastral map, which like a revenue agency, consists of competent administrative agents creating a clear, simple and explicit register of property ownership. However, state officials were unable to achieve this 'legible' regime because the state's power to simplify the state was overcome by the general population's capacity to "subvert, block and even overturn" the state's attempt to standardize its populace.

As is such, Scott highlights that the creation of fiscal capacity depends on the state agents' ability to simplify and make the state legible, as well as the power of the opposing citizenry and local elites.

References

Category:Fiscal_policy

Characteristics CUT OUT AND REPLACE W/ DEFINITIONS AND PATTERNS CONTENT

For instance,

To elaborate further, a wealth of historical, sociological, and political economy theory on state-building emphasizes the dependence of fiscal capacity on the "coevolution... of legal capacity and...political institutions," such as property rights, rule of law and Centralized_government. For instance, fiscal sociologist Charles Tilly (1985) lists "Extraction" as one of four different activities of the state. Central to the existence and development of these institutions are the incentives that agents have to build them. Where traditional economic theory on tax revenue and economic growth assumes pre-existing stable, centralized political institutions, emerging literature in public finance and institutional economics does away with these assumptions by considering incentives of rational agents.

Institutional models

With an emphasis on European history, institutional models such as that of Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) or Besley & Persson (2009, 2011, 2013) have highlighted the trajectory of elites to the formation of political parties, and model political institutions as constraints on the agents who determine fiscal capacity of a state. These constraints, represented by checks and balances on the government or political parties, come into existence differently depending on conditions such as culture and homogeneity, geography, and initial factor endowments.

Institutions are constraints on and devised by actors. (North, 1990; cited by Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson) They are the set of rules and norms that are created and determine the behavior of state actors and organizations. Fiscal capacity, property rights, and market structures are three essential economic institutions whose presence and shape play a role in people's decision making, and in state building. For instance, property rights gives people an incentive to invest in land and capital. (Agemoglu & Robinson) Likewise, a stronger tax administration will increase tax compliance and reduce tax evasion. (Besley & Persson, 2009) The forming of these economic--as well as political and legal --institutions can otherwise be referred to as State-building or building state capacity. Whereas social science literature has traditionally "assume[d] that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes", there has emerged a more recent, institutional economics literature that references the dependence that fiscal capacity has on political institutions, state capacity, or legal environments. (Besley & Persson, 2009) In particular, institutional and development economists have formulated models that heavily depend on the social, political and economic institutions that describe a state's environment, and likewise determine a state's level of fiscal capacity.

Political Institutions

• Economic and political institutions are interdependent (Acemoglu). Besley & Persson, major scholars in public finance and development, explain the interdependence of political institutions, their outcomes and social and legal conditions with fiscal capacity. They especially highlight political cohesiveness and political stability; these are not institutions per say, but they are the outcomes of political institutions.
• Besley & Persson for instance frame political institutions as "checks and balances" of political power, which without, agents do not have any incentive to invest in fiscal capacity. (Besley & Persson, 2009)
• Besley & Persson (2009) describe public goods, War, Political_stability, inclusive Political_institutions as the elements necessary to build fiscal capacity.
• Political cohesiveness: Besley & Persson (2011) model the effect of political constraints on fiscal capacity; essentially, they posit that incumbent groups in government desire to transfer government revenue to the group that they represent; political constraints ensure that the incumbent transfers revenues to non-incumbent groups. He demonstrates that political constraints are a measure of political cohesiveness; the more cohesiveness, the more constraints (and vice versa)
• Political stability: Besley & Persson (2011) model it as frequent turnover, or change between who is holding power
• Political elites played an important role in determining which political and economic institutions came into place, and whether they encouraged or discouraged fiscal capacity investment. (Acemoglu, CLASS READING).

MAY HAVE TO INCLUDE SECTION ON LEGAL INSTITUTIONS? Present in a lot of Besley & Persson Work.

QUOTES

• "Governments...face incentives and constraints shaped by weakly institutionalized political environments. The key challenge for the study of public finance and development is to appreciate how these incentives and constraints work, and how --if at all-- the situation could be improved for the benefit of citizens in those nations" (Besley & Persson, 2011)
• North and Weingast (1989) "emphasizes the imposition of constitutional constraints after 1689 in reining in the power of the monarchy as a precondition for the subsequent success of the English. state and economy". (Johnson & Koyama, 2015)
• "Economic history makes an important contribution to understanding how state capacity developed by 'decompressing' the historical coevolution of fiscal experiences of the countries which have eventually acheived rule of law states...We present two lessons drawn from historical research. The first is that institutions which respect the rule of law are unlikely to be robust unless a state has first adopted intermediate fiscal and political institutions which create incentives for, first eliets, and eventually the rest of the population, to support them. Second, we emphasize the difficulties associated with disentagling the role of public-order and private-order institutions in generating support for growth-enhancing institutions." (Johnson & Koyama, 2015)

Developing Countries (not developed)

• Herbst
• consider "taxation potential" (Kaldor, 1963). i.e: "the taxation potential of any country is strongly dependent on the prevailing inequality in the distribution of national income...from this point of view the underdeveloped countries of different regions of the globe...show the widest differences" (Kaldor, 1963)

Notes

• "the economic and cultural development of a country requires the efficient and steadily expanding provision of a whole host of non-revenue yielding services- education, health, communications systems, and so on, commonly known as 'infrastructure'--which require to be financed out of government revenue. Besides meetings these needs, taxes or other compulsory levies provide the most appropriate instrument for increasing savings for capital formation out of domestic sources." (Kaldor, 1963)
• "the government raises no revenue at zero fiscal capacity" (Besley & Persson, 2011)

'Structure as outlined by (Besley & Perrson, 2011):'

• economic factors on the incentive build a tax system
• role of political institutions, political instability (Choice of fiscal capacity)
• social structure (inequality)
• demand and value of public spending.
• non-tax income flows.

In addition to taxes, governments have other sources of income including transfers, natural resources, etc..

Bibliography

Currently reading:

• Acemoglu & Robinson.
• Bardhan, Pranab. 2015, forthcoming. "State and Development: The need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature". Journal of Economic Literature.
• Besley, Tim. Persson, Torsten. 2011a. "Public Finance and Development" WORKING PAPER
• Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics"
• Gordon, Roger; Wei, Li. 2008. "Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation".
• Herbst, Jeffrey I. 2000. "State and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control" Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Johnson, Noel D.; Koyama, Mark. 2015. States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints.
• Kaldor, Nicholas. 1963. "Taxation for Economic Development". The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol 1(1), 7-23.
• Migdal, Joel S. 1998. "Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World". Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Olken, Benjamin A, and Monica Singhal. 2011. “Informal Taxation.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3 (4): 1–28. doi:10.1257/app.3.4.1.
• Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1918. "The Crisis of the Tax State" International Economic Papers, vol. 4, 5-38.
• Tilly, Charles. 1985. "Warmaking and State Making as Organized Crime" in Evans Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), "Bringing the State Back In". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

May also read:

• Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, 2013, “Taxation and development”, Chapter 2 in Auerbach, A, R. Chetty, M. Feldstein, and E. Saez (eds.) Handbook of Public Economics.
• Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, 2014, “The causes and consequences of development clusters: State capacity, peace and income”, Annual Review of Economics 6, 927-949.
• Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2014. “Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (4): 99–120. doi:10.1257/jep.28.4.99.
• Best, Michael Carlos, Anne Brockmeyer, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Johannes Spinnewijn, and Mazhar Waseem. 2015. “Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan.” Journal of Political Economy 123 (6): 1311–55. doi:10.1086/683849.
• Cukierman, Alex, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini. 1992. "Seignorage and political Instability". American Economic Review, vol 82, 537-555.

Fisman, Raymond, and Shang‐Jin Wei. 2004. “Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from ‘Missing Imports’ in China.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (2): 471–96. doi:10.1086/381476.

• Gennaioli, Nicola, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2015. “State Capacity and Military Conflict.” The Review of Economic Studies 82 (4): 1409–48. doi:10.1093/restud/rdv019.
• Levi, Margaret. 1988. "Of Rule and Revenue", Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Piketty, Thomas, and Nancy Qian. 2009. “Income Inequality and Progressive Income Taxation in China and India, 1986–2015.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (2): 53–63. doi:10.1257/app.1.2.53.
• Pomeranz, Dina. 2015. “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax †.” American Economic Review 105 (8): 2539–69. doi:10.1257/aer.20130393.
• Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In; Strategies of Analysis in Current Research" in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., "Bringing the State Back In". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-44