User:Valjean/Mowatt-Larssen

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Infobox borrowed from Gary Berntsen, so needs to be altered.

Valjean/Mowatt-Larssen
Born	July 23, 1957
Espionage activity
Allegiance	United States
Agency	CIA
Service years	1982–2005
Operations	Invasion of Afghanistan Battle of Tora Bora

Lead (temporary)

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, who served 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer and was the first Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,

Early life and education

Birthdate and age.

"Mowatt-Larrsen, a distinguished retired CIA case officer and senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center, and Jaworski, a retired CIA operations officer." https://www.thecipherbrief.com/book-review/viva-la-cia-vampire

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/experts/rolf-mowatt-larssen

Former Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy

Prior to his appointment as a senior fellow at the Belfer Center, Mr. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen served over three years as the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy.

Prior to this, he served for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in various domestic and international posts, to include Chief of the Europe Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counterterrorist Center, and Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support.

Prior to his career in intelligence, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served as an officer in the U.S. Army. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. He is married to Roswitha and has three children.

He is a recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, the George W. Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Secretary of Energy’s Exceptional Service Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, Secretary of Defense Civilian Distinguished Service Medal, and the National Intelligence Superior Performance Medal, among others. He is the author of State of Mind: Faith and the CIA (2020).

https://www.justsecurity.org/author/mowatt-larssenrolf/

Member, Board of Editors

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen is senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He served over three years as the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy. Prior to that position, he served for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in various domestic and international posts, including Chief of the Europe Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counterterrorist Center, and Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. Prior to his career in intelligence, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served as an officer in the U.S. Army. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. He is a recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, the George W. Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Secretary of Energy’s Exceptional Service Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, Secretary of Defense Civilian Distinguished Service Medal, and the National Intelligence Superior Performance Medal, among others.

https://thebulletin.org/biography/rolf-mowatt-larssen/

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Previously, he spent three years at the Energy Department as the director of intelligence and counterintelligence and 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer. His posts included chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counterterrorist Center; chief of the Europe Division in the Directorate of Operations; and deputy associate

director of Central Intelligence for Military Support.

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/mowatt-larssen-succeeds-ryan Mowatt-Larssen Succeeds Ryan

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former senior fellow with the Belfer Center and long-time intelligence officer, has been named Director of the Center’s Intelligence and Defense Projects and Project on Saudi and GCC Security. He succeeds Brigadier General (ret) Kevin Ryan, who joined the Center in 2005.

Mowatt-Larssen has been affiliated with the Center as a senior fellow since 2009, following his service as Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy and as head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s WMD and counter-terrorism efforts. Prior to his appointment to the top intelligence position in the Department of Energy, Mowatt-Larssen served for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in various domestic and international posts, including as Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support and Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department and the Counterterrorism Center.

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Mowatt-Larssen is the recipient of a number of awards including the CIA Director’s Award, Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, Commendation Medal, and Secretary of Defense Civilian Distinguished Service Medal.

Kevin Ryan joined the Belfer Center in 2005 as a senior fellow and in 2009 founded the Center’s U.S.–Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism. He served as the Center’s Executive Director for Research from 2010 to 2013, at which time he became founding Director of the Center’s Intelligence and Defense Projects.

Ryan will continue as an associate at the Center working on intelligence and defense issues with a focus on Russian military and security issues. He will also remain, along with Mowatt-Larssen, part of The Elbe Group, which Ryan launched in 2010 to maintain open communications between high-level defense and intelligence officials in the U.S. and Russia.

“We will greatly miss interacting with Kevin on a daily basis,” said Belfer Center Director Graham Allison, “but we are fortunate to have Rolf taking his space as head of our intelligence and defense and Saudi/GCC initiatives and as manager of our Recanati-Kaplan Foundation Fellows Program. We have benefited for a number of years from Rolf’s insights on intelligence, nuclear security, and other issues, and look forward to having him here full-time in his new position.”

“I am looking forward to continuing the cutting-edge work of the Belfer Center,” Mowatt-Larssen said, “bringing intelligence and defense issues of policy relevance into focus for students, experts and researchers, in the U.S. and internationally.”

{{blockquote|

Views about Donald Trump

Mowatt-Larssen described Donald Trump's vulnerabilities to Russian manipulation and how Putin "flirted with Trump and flattered him. Putin and his social media minions supported him openly — and with secret political warfare operations. So perhaps Putin had only to influence Trump to win influence in return." He said: "I could never have imagined that an American president could — whether it's witting or unwitting — betray American interests so thoroughly to the Russians as has occurred in the last four years."

Lots of relevant articles about Trump here: https://www.justsecurity.org/author/mowatt-larssenrolf/

https://www.justsecurity.org/59497/rolf-mowatt-larssen-helsinki-summit-time-choosing-three-observations-senior-cia-officer/

In his stops in Brussels, London and Helsinki, President Donald Trump demonstrated that he is as much an advocate for Russia’s interests than if he were indeed recruited by Russian intelligence and formally responding to Russian tasking. In fact, his handlers would probably exercise a greater degree of subtlety and discretion to ensure he did not go too far in revealing himself as an agent for Russian policies and interests.

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/top-presidential-leadership-helsinki-summit {{blockquote|

Trump as a Russian Target – Through the Eyes of a former CIA Russian Expert https://www.justsecurity.org/57914/trump-russian-target-eyes-american-intelligence-officer-cia-kompromat/

https://www.justsecurity.org/42272/making-russian-spy-roadmap-fbi-resolve-russia-gate/

{{blockquote| Following standard Russian intelligence practice, Moscow might have set three broad goals and tactics for its intelligence operations for and against Trump and his associates:

https://www.justsecurity.org/42272/making-russian-spy-roadmap-fbi-resolve-russia-gate/

If any Russian national passed derogatory information concerning an American citizen, it would clearly be a test as to whether he/she would report this approach as a recruitment “pitch” to a U.S. government official. A willingness to accept intelligence information without reporting it to one’s own government would represent a compromising act that would expose a vulnerability of one’s willingness to cooperate as a foreign agent of Russia. by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen

June 19, 2017

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Filed under:

Jared Kushner, Michael Flynn, Mueller investigation, Russia Investigation

James Comey’s testimony has established that either President Donald Trump or the former FBI Director is lying, given the clear discrepancies in their versions of the conversations that transpired during their meetings together. This leaves us with the questions: Who is lying? And why?

While it is not possible to draw a conclusion one way or the other based on Comey’s written and oral testimony before Congress, what has become clear is that President Trump has drawn the mistrust of the former FBI Director, retired Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper, and former CIA Director John Brennan. Such a trifecta of contempt for the president that is being expressed from this nation’s highest custodians of our secrets should concern us all as citizens.

More importantly, why would they lie? They are well-respected as being objective observers of events, as befits their office. They are known as being independent straight shooters, whatever one thinks of their decision-making styles and performances while in government. They are men to be respected as public servants, not dismissed as being “a nut job” to the Russians, in the Oval Office, no less.

It’s certainly reasonable to question the motives of one of these three senior intelligence and law enforcement officials, all of whom know more about the facts of Russian intelligence and cyber machinations than anyone in the government. But all three? Together, they have strong credentials as long serving public servants, or at least they did before the administration and its supporters began attacking their credibility and integrity. For these three men, as for Paul Revere, the alarm bells rang when they called out the truth.

This broader prism through which to view Comey’s gut-wrenching concerns about the president’s intentions is only one factor in determining who is lying and who would have reason to lie. Comey’s testimony takes us back to the importance of conducting an independent, unobstructed and thorough FBI investigation into the targets of Russian intelligence activity.

As new facts emerge concerning the Russian intelligence “active measures” (influence) campaign — such as the alleged NSA document on Russian attempts to hack into polling stations — the U.S. intelligence community leadership’s early public statements that the intent of the Russian operation was to influence the outcome of the U.S. presidential campaign in Trump’s favor has been validated.

Through deliberate leaking of classified or nonpublic information, it is clear that the intensity and scale of Russian intelligence activity was far more pervasive than previously known, at least publicly. The Russians were not merely content to influence the campaign. Using cyber and human (espionage) means, they sought to discredit Hillary Clinton and thereby bolster Trump’s chances of winning. If they had been successful, the Russians would have reportedly penetrated polling stations to alter the vote count. Today, no one should seriously doubt Russian intentions at the highest levels, even if this was previously unclear.

Comey’s testimony concerning his interactions with the president take us back to the Russia investigation and “the cloud” it created, which provoked the president, by his own admission, to fire Comey. Trump’s action in firing the man who was in charge of clearing him of wrongdoing seems inexplicable, unless he had concerns that he wouldn’t be exonerated by the FBI.

Ongoing revelations largely pertain to the cyber-related portion of the larger Russian operation to elect Trump. In terms of deciphering its broader modus operandi, it is important to understand that Russian intelligence places a premium on conducting espionage: They first identify vulnerabilities in people, and then compromise them in an effort to recruit them as agents of Russian intelligence. This “human factor” of systematically exploiting human frailties and weaknesses drives Russian planning in terms of how they strive to achieve their objectives.

In this light of the classical Russian intelligence “Chekist” mindset (which Vladimir Putin shares), the contents of former British secret agent Christopher Steele’s dossier are eerily consistent with what is now known, in terms of the basic timeline of events, on how the Russians in all likelihood went about targeting individuals associated with the U.S. presidential election. It is thus reasonable to presume that every target – human and cyber – to whom the Russians had access in the run-up to the election would have been approached in some manner and exploited to the greatest extent possible.

Surely, FBI investigators presume Russian intelligence would not have overlooked the travel of Trump associates to Russia. The Russian “special services” meticulously track all Americans when they visit Russia. It’s an art form. All means of surveillance and compromise are made available to the Federal Security Service (FSB): You want money. We have money. You want a woman. We have women. You have an ego. We’ll massage it. Try this. Try that. Until something works.

The point is something usually does work. The trick is to find someone’s genuine vulnerability – a secret – and tap into it. This is not to suggest that Trump associates were compromised and recruited by Russian intelligence during their visits to Russia. But based on the long history of Russian espionage in action against the “glavniy protivnik” (“main enemy”—a.k.a. the United States) Trump associates would have been approached by Russian intelligence – whether or not they knew or now know they were targets is a different matter.

What would the Russians be hoping to achieve in targeting the man they were trying to elect, or in compromising his associates? What should the public and close observers know about standard Russian intelligence practices so they understand clues and the potential threat?

Following standard Russian intelligence practice, Moscow might have set three broad goals and tactics for its intelligence operations for and against Trump and his associates:

Establish a witting or unwitting collusion (a conspiracy) between members of the Trump campaign acting on behalf of Trump’s candidacy and Russian officials acting on the basis of intelligence-tasking— passing intelligence information to the Trump campaign for the purpose of discrediting Hillary Clinton and thereby influencing the US election. For Russian intelligence, it would not matter for purposes of compromising Trump, whether the collusion was witting or unwitting. It is only important that the recipient of any insider information understood the sensitive, derogatory nature of the information and that it was being provided by the Russian government for the purpose of influencing the campaign in Trump’s favor.

Compromise Trump associates, thereby making them witting or unwitting agents of Russian intelligence, by passing clandestinely collected information from a foreign official. The act of compromising an individual entails establishing either an explicit or tacit understanding that the Russian government is using him or her in a cooperative or collaborative, secret relationship in order to compromise the integrity of the U.S. election process and thereby damage U.S. national security interests. The essence of compromise lies in working with a hostile intelligence service on a basis which is incompatible with broader U.S. national security interests.

Establish a clandestine relationship between Trump associates and Russian intelligence, whether or not candidate or president Trump was involved or aware of any such activity. It’s hard to imagine that any American subjects of the FBI investigation into Russia-gate would not have been aware of the gravity of their interaction with Russian officials, notwithstanding whether the Russians with whom they were in contact identified themselves as Russian intelligence officers. Trump associates are certainly not naive; they had sufficient experience living or working in Russia to be aware of the nature of FSB approaches in attempting to recruit western businessmen and government officials as agents of Russian intelligence.

What is the standard that all Americans should be expected to follow in their interactions with foreign powers? It is not as hard to discern as one might think to do the right thing. It is a moral question of one’s intentions – not a test of one’s knowledge of right and wrong.

If any Russian national passed derogatory information concerning an American citizen, it would clearly be a test as to whether he/she would report this approach as a recruitment “pitch” to a U.S. government official. A willingness to accept intelligence information without reporting it to one’s own government would represent a compromising act that would expose a vulnerability of one’s willingness to cooperate as a foreign agent of Russia.

It is in its simplest terms a loyalty test.

About the Steele dossier

https://www.justsecurity.org/42272/making-russian-spy-roadmap-fbi-resolve-russia-gate/

In this light of the classical Russian intelligence “Chekist” mindset (which Vladimir Putin shares), the contents of former British secret agent Christopher Steele’s dossier are eerily consistent with what is now known, in terms of the basic timeline of events, on how the Russians in all likelihood went about targeting individuals associated with the U.S. presidential election.

https://www.justsecurity.org/42272/making-russian-spy-roadmap-fbi-resolve-russia-gate/

The most critical objective for Russian intelligence to engage Trump campaign staffers would not be to consummate business deals, but to use business deals as the basis for developing a target for recruitment purposes. For instance, the Rosneft connection that was revealed in the Steele dossier, if true, is a classic example of using the prospect of pursuing business deals as a means of setting up, and ultimately compromising the target, in this case, Trump’s associates.

Bibliography

• A State of Mind: Faith and the CIA, memoir https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/state-mind-faith-and-cia
• Vampires Rule!, satire about the spy games between CIA and the KGB https://www.thecipherbrief.com/book-review/viva-la-cia-vampire

Categories

Category:People of the Central Intelligence Agency

Source dump

• https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=Rolf+Mowatt-Larssen

From Wikipedia search

Give attribution

• Zero Days: Mowatt-Larssen, as himself, was interviewed for the film.
  • http://www.magpictures.com/profile.aspx?id=64947ec4-924e-485d-bd50-fba8fdd59a29
  • https://web.archive.org/web/20160423042306/www.magpictures.com/profile.aspx?id=64947ec4-924e-485d-bd50-fba8fdd59a29
  • https://dev.thecrimson.com/article/2016/5/2/cyber-warfare-belfer-discussion/ Documentary Cautions Against Clandestine Cyber Warfare, By Lena R. Episalla, The Harvard Crimson, May 2, 2016

• List of CIA station chiefs: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Moscow, c.1994, 2000
• Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence: The office's first director was former CIA officer Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, who joined DoE in November 2005. Larssen served as director for three years before joining Harvard's Belfer Center in 2009.
• Nuclear terrorism:
  • According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the U.S. Department of Energy, there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."
  • From the moment of its foundation in 1988, al-Qaeda had a military subcommittee on nuclear weapons and tried to purchase fissile material from former Soviet Union and its former satellite states.
  • Nuclear terrorism, according to a 2011 report published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, can be executed and distinguished via four pathways:
• The use of a nuclear weapon that has been stolen or purchased on the black market
• The use of a crude explosive device built by terrorists or by nuclear scientists who the terrorist organization has furtively recruited
• The use of an explosive device constructed by terrorists and their accomplices using their own fissile material
• The acquisition of fissile material from a nation-state.
• Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction
  • In May 1999, during the anniversary of Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan's nuclear security is the strongest in the world. According to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's nuclear safety program and nuclear security program is the strongest program in the world and there is no such capability in any other country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear weapons. This claim is strongly disputed by foreign experts, citing the precedent of previous attacks of Pakistani military facilities and the nation's high level of instability.
  • A report published by The Times in early 2010 states that the United States is training an elite unit to recover Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organisation. This was done in the context of growing Anti-Americanism in the Pakistani Armed Forces, multiple attacks on sensitive installations over the previous 2 years and rising tensions. According to former US intelligence official Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, US concerns are justified because militants have struck at several Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been denied access to most of them. However, during a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates denied that the United States had plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled 'Securing the Bomb 2010', found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth".

According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US Department of Energy there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."

• Khalid al-Aruri: On 5 February 2003, Al-Aruri as Abu Ashraf was mentioned in the speech of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the U.N. Security Council. As Abu Ashraf, he was shown on a partial organization chart which was linked to four cells operating in Europe. Cited were a "UK poison cell" a "Spain cell" a "French poison cell", and a "possible Italy cell." Former Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy and CIA veteran Rolf Mowatt-Larssen stated that "Secretary Powell’s information used for this part of speech proved to be accurate in the course of events."
• Aafia Siddiqui: Siddiqui was on the CIA's list of suspected al-Qaeda terrorists it was authorized to "kill or capture." According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen of the Counterterrorism Center at the CIA, what set Siddiqui apart from other terrorism suspects was "her combination of high intelligence (including general scientific know-how), religious zeal, and years of experience in the United States ... So far they have had very few people who have been able to come to the U.S. and thrive. Aafia is different. She knows about U.S. immigration procedures and visas. She knows how to enroll in American educational institutions. She can open bank accounts and transfer money. She knows how things work here. She could have been very useful to them simply for her understanding of the U.S."
• Mohammed Loay Bayazid: In 2002, the CIA sent Rolf Mowatt-Larssen to again interview al-Duri and Bayazid, to see if they could be made to defect and aid the United States in its War on Terror, but both refused to collaborate.
• Gerti Bogdani: In 2023, Bogdani organized the publication of the Albanian-language edition of former CIA officer Rolf Mowatt-Larssen's memoirs, "A State of Mind: Faith and the CIA," which explore the intersection of religious faith and service. He also wrote the prologue to the edition.
• Mubarak al-Duri: In 2002, the CIA sent Rolf Mowatt-Larssen to again interview al-Duri and Bayazid, to see if they couldn't be made to defect, although both refused.
• Integrative Center for Homeland Security#Homeland Security Lecture Series: ICHS hosts a Presidential Library lecture series focusing on homeland security that meets monthly at the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Past speakers include ... Mr. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen (Director of Intelligence & Counterintelligence, United States Department of Energy).

Other sources

• "Intelligence Matters": Former Moscow chief of station Rolf Mowatt-Larssen on the state of play in Ukraine

https://web.archive.org/web/20220518100747/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-rolf-mowatt-larssen-state-of-play-intelligence-matters/

"Intelligence Matters" Podcast With Michael Morell

In this episode of "Intelligence Matters," host Michael Morell speaks with former senior CIA operations officer and Moscow station chief Rolf Mowatt-Larssen about the likely trajectory of the war in Ukraine, including the possibility of a negotiated peace — or dangerous escalation. Mowatt-Larssen offers insights on Putin's options, potential rifts among his intelligence agencies, and persistent rumors about the Russian leader's health. Morell and Mowatt-Larssen also discuss Western involvement in the conflict and the lingering potential for the Kremlin to use weapons of mass destruction. 

"So we're in a stalemate that favors Ukraine."

two books that Rolf has published. The first is his memoir, 'A State of Mind: Faith and the CIA,' and the second is a satire about the spy games between CIA and the KGB called, 'Vampires Rule!'