User:Totoama/Communism in Colombia
History
[edit]In the early 20th century, Colombia was linked to the international economy through its mass exportation of coffee, minerals, fruits, and even oil. Such exportations paired with importation of European goods, international loans, and the presence of international companies, such as the United Fruit Company and Tropical Oil Company, created a booming Colombian economy. However, Colombian society still consisted mainly of poor laborers living in rural, undeveloped land. Further burdening the booming nation, was a history of civil wars and political corruption which pit the liberal and conservative factions of Colombian governance against one another to the detriment of the public. This set the stage for a laborer uprising inspired by the Russian October Revolution.
Origins of Socialist Ideology
[edit]The labor movement in Colombia was marked by the differences it held compared to movements in other Latin American countries. While socialist ideology in countries like Argentina and Brazil were influenced by European immigration, Colombia had no such connection to left-wing European ideologies. Rather, the labor movements in Colombia were inspired by the disconnect laborers felt with the major political parties.[1] The perceived lack of representation led to the creation of Colombia's first Socialist party in 1919. The creation of the party, inspired by Bolshevik ideology[2] and the end of the first World War, was led by Colombian intellectuals and left wing media. Among these figures, was Luis Tejada, a co-editor of left wing newspaper 'El Sol', who published multiple articles praising the importance of Lenin. Tejada, alongside Russian immigrant Silvestre Savitski, further supported the study of Marxism among the liberal youth.[1][2]
In the early years of the party, no major steps were taken to establish a connection with the international community of Communist parties despite the importance of international affairs being discussed and analyzed in the Third Socialist Conference of 1921. The proposal to seek membership in the Comintern was rejected, however it became apparent that Bolshevik ideology was growing in popularity amongst Colombian Socialist intellectuals. After failure in the 1922 elections, backing moderate Socialist candidate Benjamin Herrera, this iteration of the party began to split apart due to the lack of interest in joining international efforts to pursue communist thought.[2] However, the party ideology was revived by young Colombian Bolsheviks who took over the Socialist Congress in 1924.
Pro-communist ideology amongst intellectuals was fully displayed in 1924 at the Socialist Congress held in the Colombian capital, Bogota. The leaders of this congress broke ties with the previous three socialist conferences and immediately pursued international involvement.[2] This conference became the first attempt for Colombian socialists to establish communications and partnership with the Moscow Third International.[1] The conference attendees declared their affiliation to the Comintern and approved the 21 conditions of Leninism, however with no true party capable of executing such policies and establishing a political presence in Colombia, the Latin American sector of the Comintern resisted approving the affiliation.[2] Following the conference, Socialist leader Luis Tejada passed away, and Silvestre Savitski was expelled from the country by the Colombia government a year later for his efforts in spreading communist doctrine.[1]
The Comintern and Colombian Communism
[edit]By the mid 1920's, at the Second Worker's Congress in Bogota, socialist ideology continued expanding and was not longer moderate. The year prior to the Congress a large strike led by Labor Union leader Raul Maheca was organized against the the Tropical Oil Company in Barrancabermeja which resulted in the firing of 1200 laborers and the arrest of strike leaders.[1] The Congress proceeded by establishing a National Workers Confederation (CON) which would serve as the organization that managed and coordinated any future labor movements of the Congress. Depite serving as a radical trade union of sorts, the leaders of CON believed that the organization would better serve its purpose under the guidance of a new revolutionary party. In 1926, as part of the Third Workers Congress, the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR) was established with the goal of seeking affiliation with the Comintern.[1] This goal would be achieved when the PSR was officially recognized and approved for affiliation with the Comintern during the Sixth World Congress in 1928.[1] Such affiliation would expedite the spread of socialism and strengthen the current labor movements in Colombia. Within a year, the Comintern and PSR leaders would be involved in one of the biggest, and deadliest strikes in Colombian history, the Banana Workers Massacre in Santa Marta.
The Banana Workers Massacre (1928-29)
[edit]- Also known as the Santa Marta Massacre.
The United Fruit Company (UFCO) was a multinational company that exported fruit such as bananas and pineapples mainly from Latin American banana-growing countries to the United States and Europe. UFCO workers on banana plantations in Colombia organized a labor strike in December 1928. The national labor union leaders Raúl Eduardo Mahecha and Maria Cano who traveled to the plantations to organize the strikes demanded that the workers be given written work contracts, that they be obligated to work no more than eight hours per day and six days per week, and that the company stop the use of “food coupons”, or scrip.
The union leaders were protesting at the banana zone of Santa Marta, the capital of the Magdalena department in the north of the country.
After U.S. officials in Colombia, along with United Fruit representatives, portrayed the worker's strike as "communist" with "subversive tendency", in telegrams to the U.S. Secretary of State,[3] the government of the United States of America threatened to invade with the U.S. Marine Corps if the Colombian government did not act to protect United Fruit’s interests.
The ruling Conservative government's President Miguel Abadia Mendez sent troops led by General Carlos Cortés Vargas to capture the strike leaders, send them to prison at Cartagena, and send additional troops to protect the economic interests of the United Fruit Company. U.S. warships carrying troops were on the way to Colombia to protect U.S. citizens working for the United fruit Company in Santa Marta and property . The Colombian army also opened fire on people who gathered at the main plaza of the city of Ciénaga to support the strikers. The popular Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán used the term "La Masacre de las Bananeras" to raise opposition among Colombian society against the massacre. The Liberal Party press criticized the brutality used to break the strike by the Colombian government. The Comintern was indirectly involved in the planning and execution of the strike in Santa Marta and its failure was openly discussed in the First Conference of Latin American Communist Parties that took place in Buenos Aires the following year.[1] The conference sought to uncover the reasoning behind the failure of the labor uprising and determine who was to blame for it. Maheca, along with other leaders of the Partido Socialista Revolucionario, provided a report that detailed the key reasons for failure, along with other facts of the strike. Maheca reported that over 32,000 workers were armed and prepared to strike against UFCO, yet he blamed indecision from their liberal allies in Bogota for the general failure of the uprising.[1] The Liberal party - with whom they sought a united front- did not provide solidarity with the strike or with the attempt for revolution, directly weakening the cause of the PSR. The Comintern also provided their own report outlining their interpretation of the failure in Santa Marta. The letter from the Comintern made clear the belief that the uprising would have been successful and revolutionary had it been under the leadership of a true communist party.[1]
La Violencia
[edit]Following the events of "El Bogotazo", a decade long civil war broke out among the Conservative and Liberal factions of Colombian politics. The conflict, which would claim the lives of over 200,000 people, was known as "La Violencia". While directly resulting from the assassination of liberal politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the rising tensions that resulted in "El Bogotazo" and "La Violencia" can be attributed to the return to power of the Conservative party in 1946[4] and its encouragement of seizing back territories held by liberal officials and supporters.[4] As a result, conflict broke out among the politically polarized lower classes in the countryside of Colombia, leading to a Liberal-Conservative Civil war. By the end of the conflict, the majority of the casualties would be of peasants and laborers. [5]
The end of the conflict came in 1958 with the development of a unified political party between the Liberal and Conservative factions in Colombia. The new bipartisan system became known as La Frente Nacional (National Front) and involved alternating political power between the Liberal and Conservative branches of the new party.[6] This movement also resulted in the establishment of a political superpower that would effectively prevent the involvement of other political groups, such as the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) in government. The National Front system lasted until 1990.[6][7] In that time, the new party system led to the consolidation of socio-economic, military, religious, and political power. With the support of the military, the church and corporations, the National Front effectively surpassed opposition political movements and and any type of political or social reforms.[8][7]
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Meschkat, Klaus (2008). "Helpful Intervention? The Impact of the Comintern on Early Colombian Communism". Latin American Perspectives. 35 (2): 39–56. ISSN 0094-582X.
- ^ a b c d e Vanegas, Isidro; Otis, Martha (2008). "International Links to Early Socialism in Colombia". Latin American Perspectives. 35 (2): 25–38. ISSN 0094-582X.
- ^ https://web.archive.org/web/20120717004708/http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/santamarta.htm
- ^ a b Livingstone, Grace; foreword by Pearce, Jenny (2004). Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War. Rutgers University Press. p. 42. ISBN 0-8135-3443-7.
- ^ Richani, Nazih (2002). Systems of Violence: the political economy of war and peace in Colombia. Albany, New York: SUNY Press. pp. 23–28. ISBN 978-0-79145-345-2.
- ^ a b Leech, Garry (2009). Beyond Bogota: Diary of a Drug War Journalist. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. pp. 242–247. ISBN 978-0-8070-6148-0.
- ^ a b Hylton, Forrest (2006). Evil Hour in Colombia. Verso. pp. 51–52. ISBN 978-1-84467-551-7.
- ^ Avilés, William (2006). Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia. SUNY Press. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-7914-6699-5.