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Portuguese-India relations

Portugal	India

Portuguese-India Relations describe foreign relations between post-independence India and Portugal and cover a period starting from 1947. These relations, which started off amicably - following the spirit of relations between Portugal and the British Indian Empire - went into decline after 1950 over Portugal's refusal to surrender its enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu on the west coast of India. By 1955, the two nations had cut off all diplomatic relations, simmering a crisis which precipitated in the Invasion of Portuguese India in 1961. Portugal refused to recognize Indian sovereignty over the annexed territories until 1974 when, following the Carnation Revolution, the new government in Lisbon restored diplomatic relations with India, and recognized Indian sovereignty over Goa, Daman and Diu.

Background

Prior to Indian independence in 1947, Portugal's relations with the British Indian Empire were derived from those with the United Kingdom, set within the framework of the The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373. This treaty, signed between King Edward III of England and King Ferdinand and Queen Eleanor of Portugal, established "perpetual friendships, unions [and] alliances" between the two seafaring nations and is the oldest active treaty in the world. This led to amicable relations - especially with regard to trade and transport - between British India and the Portuguese colonies in Goa.

Indian Independence, 1947

At the time of Union of India's independence from the British Empire in 1947, Portugal held a handful of territories on the Indian subcontinent - the districts of Goa, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli - collectively known as the Estado da Índia. Goa, Damman and Diu covered an area of around 1,540 square miles and held a population of 637,591. The Goan diaspora was estimated at 175,000 (about 100,000 within the Indian Union).. Religious distribution was 61% Hindu, 36.7% Christian (mostly Catholic), 2.2% Muslim. Economy was primarily based on agriculture, although the 1940s and 1950s saw a boom in mining - principally iron ore and some manganese.

Relations between Portugal and the Indian Union were quite cordial in 1947, particularly in light of Portuguese willingness to terminate the old Padroado treaty with the Holy See, which had traditionally given the Archbishop of Goa 'patriarchal' authority over other parts of India. On 12th August 1948, India and Portugal exchanged diplomatic missions.

Opening of Negotiations over Goa: 1950

Goa, Western India

On 27 February 1950 the Government of the India asked the Portuguese government to open negotiations about the future of Portuguese colonies in India. This followed Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's statement that "Goa is part of the Indian Union and it shall return." On 15 July 1950, the Portuguese government responded by declaring that the question presented "could not be discussed, much less accept the solution that was proposed." .

Portugal asserted that its territory in India was not a colony but part of metropolitan Portugal and hence its transfer was non-negotiable; and that the India had no rights to this territory since the Republic of India did not exist at the time when Goa came under Portuguese rule. The Portuguese constitution, which affirmed that the diplomatic and military defence of sovereignity was a compulsory imperative, was amended in 1951 to explicitly designate colonies in India and Africa as 'Overseas Colonies' although Goa has been treated as one since 1518.

In January 1953, the Government of India sent an aide memoire to the Portuguese government pointing out that "political barriers artificially created by ,an accident of history for which no justification existed at the present time can no longer stem the rising tide of the national urge for unity." Further the Government of India gave assurances to the Portuguese Government that it would "maintain cultural and other rights, including language, laws and customs of the inhabitants of these territories and make no changes in such and like matters except with their consent." When the Portuguese Government refused to respond to the aides memoirs, the Indian government, on 11 June 1953, withdrew its diplomatic mission from Lisbon.

In the course of 1954, the Portuguese appealed to Great Britain to bring pressure on India. Foreign secretary Alec Douglas-Home made it absolutely clear that the NATO alliance did not extend to Portuguese entanglements overseas, and that they should not expect anything more than a mediating role. He also warned that if Portugal invoked the old Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, Britain's response would be constrained, as she had no intention of engaging in hostilities with a member of the Commonwealth.

India attempted to use its position in the Non-Aligned Movement to gain support for its demands, while Portugal, as a founding member of NATO attempted to seek support amongst Western nations, as well as with India's rivals, Pakistan and China.

Estrangement: 1954

By 1954, the Republic of India instituted visa restrictions on travel from Goa to India which paralysed transporations between Goa and other enclaves like Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Meanwhile The Indian union of dockers had, in 1954, instituted a boycott on shipping to Portuguese India .

Between 22 July and 2 August 1954, armed activists - variously described by some as members of United Front of Goans under the leadership of Mr. Francis Mascarenhas assisted by the Indian nationalist organisation, Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh and by others as Indian nationals supported by regular troops and reserve police forces attacked and forced the surrender of Portuguese forces stationed in Dadra and Nagar Haveli. In anticipation of this operation, India sealed the border on June 28, 1954 and prevented the Portuguese from dispatching armed forces from coastal Damman to the inland enclaves.

On 30 November, 1954, Salazar addressed the Portuguese parliament, laying out the Portuguese position on Goa. Salazar dismissed India's claims to the territories as a 'fantasy', and lauded Goans for their steadfast patriotism in the face of 'Indian provocations'.

Satyagraha Movement and Breakdown of Negotiations

thumb|left|A 1954 attempt by unarmed protesters to storm Tiracol Fort in Goa and hoist the Indian flag on it was suppressed by the Portuguese.

thumb|left|CBS Cameraman Arthur Bonner and U.P. Correspondent John Hlavacek rescue a satyagraha activist shot by Portuguese police on the Goa border on 15 August 1955

On 15 August 1954, the Portuguese resisted an attempt by 49 non-violent Satyagrahi activists to march into Goa and hoist the Indian flag on Tiracol Fort resulting in deaths and injuries amongst the activists. .

On 15 August 1955, 3000-5000 unarmed Indian activists attempted to enter Goa at six locations and were violently repulsed by Portuguese police officers, resulting in the deaths of between 21 and 30 people. . In one incident at Banda, Portuguese and Goan policemen armed with rifles and sten guns and assisted by Portuguese and African soldiers from Mozambique opened fire on a group of 30 unarmed activists wounding one woman and two men in the presence of international journalists. The firing stopped when CBS Cameraman Arthur Bonner and U.P. Correspondent John Hlavacek, physically intervened and rescued the injured activists.

The news of the firing built public opinion in India against the presence of the Portuguese in Goa. Communist parties led protests marked by rioting in several locations in India as well as strikes in several factories demanding an armed response to the Portuguese. Indian prime minister Nehru described the Portuguese reaction as "brutal and uncivilized in the extreme." but added: "We will not be forced or hustled into what we consider wrong action . . . The Portuguese are deliberately trying to provoke us."

The press in India was sharply critical of Nehru's position on Goa. The Times of India attacked him for "vacillation, contradiction and appeasement.", while the Bombay Free Press Journal accused him of "obliquely encouraging the satyagrahis with vague, irresponsible statements that satyagraha will solve the problems of Goan freedom."

Subsequent to the incidents on 15 August 1955, the Government of India imposed restrictions on people going to Goa as satyagrahis. On 1 September 1955, India shut its consul office in Goa.

In August 1955, Portuguese prime minister António de Oliveira Salazar stated that there would be no transfer to sovereignty "by peaceful means," On, 17 September 1955, Nehru stated in Indian Parliament that reliance on peaceful methods to bring Goa into India "is not only a sound policy, but the only possible policy."

In 1956, Portuguese ambassador to France, Marcello Mathias, along with Portuguese prime minister António de Oliveira Salazar, argued in favour of a referendum in Goa to determine its future. This proposal was however rejected by the ministers for defence and foreign affairs. The demand for a referendum was again made by presidential candidate General Humberto Delgado in 1957. .

In 1957, the Indian army deployed anti-aircraft batteries near the Daman and Diu airfields and threatened to shoot down any aircraft that strayed into Indian airspace whilst taking off or landing at the newly built airports at these locations. On 03 April 1958, the Indian Government partially lifted restrictions imposed in 1955 on Indian nationals and residents, permitting them to come to Goa, Daman and Diu, which they were deprived of since the removal of the Indian Consulate in this city (Pangim), at the beginning of blockade and closure of the frontiers.

UN Involvement in Goa Crisis

On December 14 1960, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1514 (XV) urging all countries to take steps to place their colonies and non-self-governing territories on the road to self-determination in accordance with Article 73 of the UN Charter. Portugal claimed this resolution did not apply to them, as her colonies were overseas provinces, constitutionally integral to the nation, and thus exempt. On December 15 1960, the UNGA passed Resolution 1541 laying out the 12 conditions allowing the UNGA to determine the definition of a non-self-governing territory. This was immediately followed by resolution 1542 declaring that nine Portuguese overseas provinces (incl. Goa, Daman and Diu) met these conditions and were to be considered "non-self-governing" territories for the purposes of resolution 1514, even if the Portuguese constitution did not recognize them as such.

Indian Support to Partisan Movements in Goa

In addition to non-violent protests, armed groups such as the Azad Gomantak Dal (The Free Goa Party) and the United Front of Goans conducted violent attacks aimed at weakening Portuguese rule in Goa. The Indian government supported the establishment of armed groups like the Azad Gomantak Dal, giving them full financial, logistic and armament support. The armed groups acted from bases situated in Indian territory and under cover of Indian police forces. The Indian government - through these armed groups - attempted to destroy economic targets, telegraph and telephone lines, road, water and rail transport, in order to impede economic activity and create conditions for a general uprising of the population;

Commenting on the armed resistance, Portuguese army officer, Capt. Carlos Azaredo (now retired General) stationed with the army in Goa states in Portuguese newspaper O Expresso: "To the contrary to what is being said, the most evolved guerilla warfare which our Armed Forces encountered was in Goa. I know what I’m talking about, because I also fought in Angola and in Guiné. In 1961 alone, until December, around 80 policemen died. The major part of the terrorists of Azad Gomantak Dal were not Goans. Many had fought in the British Army, under General Montgomery, against the Germans."

International Efforts at Reconciliation

Portugal’s prime minister, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, alarmed by India’s hinted threats at armed action against its presence in Goa, first asked the United Kingdom to mediate, then protested through Brazil and eventually asked the UN Security Council to intervene. Meanwhile on 6 December, Mexico offered the Indian government its influence in Latin America to bring pressure on the Portuguese to relieve tensions.

Meanwhile, Krishna Menon, India’s defence minister and head of India’s UN delegation, stated in no uncertain terms that India had not “abjured the use of force” in Goa, and went on to link Goa to Angola, condemning Portugal’s anti decolonization policies in both cases. Indian forces were, at the time, serving in Congo as part of a UN operation and had been involved in the fighting.

American diplomatic initiatives to prevent an armed conflict in India had to balance its relationship with India and its NATO alliance with Portugal, and to dispel the idea that such initiatives were being made under pressure from the Portuguese government, while avoiding any NATO involvement in the issue. The U.S. government stopped short of suggesting self-determination for the people of Goa, as this, they realized, would be needed to apply to all other Portuguese holdings worldwide, and would damage U.S.–Portugal relations.

The American ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, requested the Indian government on several occasions to resolve the issue peacefully through mediation and consensus rather than armed conflict. Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru postponed the invasion of Goa and expressed his willingness to come to the negotiating table, on the condition that Portugal first announce its intentions to withdraw from Goa. This condition was however rejected by the Portuguese as contrary to the spirit of a negotiation.

President John F. Kennedy, in a message to Nehru, argued that if India used force against Goa, this, along with its military presence in Congo, would make an otherwise Gandhian nation look belligerent.

On 8 December, C.S. Jha, India's delegate at the United Nations Security Council, expressed India's disregard for international pressure by stating: "(The invasion of Goa) is a question of getting rid of the last vestiges of colonialism in India. That is a matter of faith with us. Whatever anyone else may think, Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council, that is our basic faith which we cannot afford to give up at any cost."

On 14 December, Acting UN Secretary-General U Thant addressed identical letters to Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Salazar. He urged them to "ensure that the situation does not deteriorate to the extent that it might constitute a threat to peace and security", and to enter into negotiations to seek a solution to the problem.

Eventually, on 10 December, nine days prior to the invasion, Nehru stated to the press that "Continuance of Goa under Portuguese rule is an impossibility". United States's response was to warn India that if and when India’s armed action in Goa was brought to the UN security council, it could expect no support from the U.S. delegation.

Attack on the Sabarmati

On 24 November 1961, the Sabarmati, a passenger boat passing between the Portuguese-held island of Anjidiv and the Indian port of Kochi, was fired upon by Portuguese ground troops, resulting in injuries to the chief engineer of the boat, as well as the death of a passenger. The action was precipitated by Portuguese fears that the boat carried a military landing team intent on storming the island. A Portuguese investigation into the matter revealed that the boat had also been fired upon a seven days earlier, when it accidentally strayed into Portuguese waters. The incidents lent themselves to foster widespread public support in India for military action in Goa.

Indian Invasion of Goa: 1961

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