User:Thomasmeeks/Rough draft4
Democracy
[edit]One of the basic claims that results from public choice theory is that good government policies in a democracy are an underprovided public good, because of the rational ignorance of the voters. Each voter is faced with a tiny probability that his vote will change the result of the elections, while gathering the relevant information necessary for a well-informed voting decision requires substantial time and effort. Therefore, the rational decision for each voter is to be generally ignorant of politics and perhaps even abstain from voting. Rational choice theorists claim that this explains the gross ignorance of most citizens in modern democracies as well as low voter turnout. Rational abstention creates the so-called "Paradox of voting" in which a strict cost-benefit analysis implies that no one should vote.
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[edit]http://www.gordon.edu/ace/pdf/hill=f&e34.pdf
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