User:The Land/Dreadnought

Origins

The Imperial Japanese Navy's Satsuma; the first ship designed as an 'all-big-gun' battleship

The distinctive all-big-gun armament of the dreadnought was developed in the first years of the 20th century as navies sought to increase the firepower and range of their battleships. Most pre-dreadnoughts had a main armament of four heavy 9.4-13.5 inch (24-34 cm) guns, a secondary armament six to eighteen 4.7-7.5 inch (12-19 cm) quick/rapid-firing guns, supplemented by a range of smaller weapons. Some American designs had an intermediate battery of four (later eight) 8 inch (20.3 cm) guns. By 1903, however, serious proposals for an all-big-gun armament were circulated in several countries.

All-big-gun designs were begun almost simultaneously in three navies. The Imperial Japanese Navy authorised Satsuma, designed with twelve 12-inch guns, in 1904, and she was laid down in May 1905. The Royal Navy began the design of HMS Dreadnought in January 1905 and she was laid down in October 1905. The United States Navy gained authorisation for USS Michigan, carrying eight 12-inch guns, in March 1905 and she was laid down in May 1906.

The exact reasons for the move to an all-big-gun design are still a matter of some controversy. The newest, fast-firing 12-inch guns had more long-range firepower than a gun of 10-inch of 9.2-inch calibre. It is often stated that mixed-calibre guns prevented accurate fire control because of the potential for confusion between shell-splashes of different calibre. However, more recent work suggests that shell-splashes and salvo firing were not of much importance in decision-making.

Long-range gunnery

The pre-dreadnought battleships combined heavy-calibre ship-killing guns, typically of 12 in calibre, with a secondary and tertiary armament that could generate a hail of fire destroying the less protected parts of enemy ships. At the Battle of the Yalu River (1894) and the Battle of Santiago de Cuba (1898], this hail of fire destroyed most of the vessels of the defeated side. At Santiago, none of the four US battleships present scored a single hit with their 12- and 13-inch guns. These were short-range engagements. At the Battle of the Yalu River, the victorious Japanese did not open fire until the range had closed to 3,000 yards; naval guns were still too inaccurate to score hits at a longer range.

By the early 1900s, British and American admirals expected that in future battleships would engage at considerably longer ranges. They would need to do so, because torpedo ranges were increasing; ; for example, in 1903, the US ordered a torpedo effective to 4,000 yards Both British and American admirals concluded that they needed to engage the enemy at longer ranges. In 1900, Mediterranean Sir John A. Fisher commanding the Royal Navy Mediterranean Fleet ordered gunnery practice, with the 6-inch guns, at a range of 6,000 yards. By 1904, the US Naval War College was considering the effects on battleship tactics of 7-8,000 yard range torpedoes.

At the short ranges expected for combat in the 1890s, lighter guns had good accuracy; combined with their high rate of fire, this produced the lethal 'hail of fire' effect. As ranges increased, the accuracy of light and medium-calibre guns declined more rapidly than that of heavier weapons. "Moreover at long ranges gunners had to 'spot' the fall of shot to correct their aim... The longer the range, the lower the maximum theoretical rate of spotted fire."

The early years of the 20th century saw the effective range of heavy guns increase. This was established on gunnery ranges by 1904, and proven in action at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.

The All-big-gun Mixed-Calibre ship

One approach to making more powerful battleships was to reduce the secondary battery, and substitute additional heavy guns: typically 9.2- or 10-inch. These ships, described as 'all-big-gun mixed-calibre' or later 'semi-dreadnought', included the British King Edward VII and Lord Nelson, the French Danton , and the Japanese Satsuma. The design process for these ships often included discussion of a pure, 'all-big-gun one-calibre', alternative.

The June issue of Proceedings of the US Naval Institute contained an article by US Navy's leading gunnery expert Prof P.R Alger proposing a main battery of eight 12-inch guns in twin turrets. The future chief constructor David W Taylor also responded suggesting that battleships of the future would be powered with steam turbines. In May 1902, the Bureau of Construction and Repair submitted a design for the Mississippi class battleship with twelve 10-inch guns in twin turrets, two at the ends and four in the wings. Lt. Cdr. H. C. Poundstone submitted a paper to President Roosevelt in December 1902 arguing the case for larger battleships. In an appendix to his paper, Poundstone suggested a greater number of 11-inch and 9-inch guns was preferable to a smaller number of 12-inch and 9-inch. The Naval War College and C&R developed these ideas in studies between 1903 and 1905. War game studies begun in July 1903 "showed that a battleship armed with twelve 11- or 12-inch guns hexagonally arranged would be equal to three or more of the conventional type."

In the British navy the same trend occurred. A design had also been circulated in 1902-03 for "a powerful 'all big-gun' armament of two calibres, viz. four 12-inch and twelve 9.2-inch guns." However, the Admiralty decided to build three more King Edwards (with a mixture of 12-inch, 9.2-inch and 6-inch) in the 1903-04 programme instead. The concept was revived for the 1904-05 programme, the Lord Nelson class. Restrictions on length and beam meant that the midships 9.2-inch turrets became single instead of twin, thus giving an armament of four 12-inch, ten 9.2-inch, and no 6-inch. The constructor for this design, J.H. Narbeth, submitted an alternative drawing showing an armament of twelve 12-inch guns, but the Admiralty was not prepared to accept this. Part of the rationale for the decision to retain mixed-calibre guns was the need to begin the ships quickly because of the tense situation produced by the Russo-Japanese War.

The switch to all-big-gun designs

The replacement of the 6-inch or 8-inch guns with weapons of 9.2-inch or 10-inch calibre improved the striking power of a battleship, particularly at longer ranges. However, making the move to a uniform calibre of heavy guns offered a number of benefits.

A uniform heavy-gun armament offered advantages for logistics and damage control. When the US were considering whether to have a mixed-calibre main armament for the South Carolina class, For example, Sims and Poundstone stressed the advantages of homogeneity in terms of ammunition supply and the transfer of crews from the disengaged guns to replace wounded gunners.Friedman, US Battleships, p.55</ref>.

A uniform calibre of gun meant streamlined fire control. The designers of Dreadnought prefered an all-big-gun design because it would mean only one set of calculations about adjustments to the range of the guns. It is often argued that a uniform calibre was particularly important because the risk of confusion between shell-splashes of 12-inch and lighter guns, which is held to make accurate ranging difficult. More recent investigation suggests that fire control in 1905 was not advanced enough to use the salvo-firing technique where this confusion might be important; confusion of shell-splashes does not seem to have been a concern of those working on all-big gun designs. Nevertheless, the likelihood of engagements at longer ranges was important in deciding that the heaviest possible guns should be adopted as standard; hence 12-inch rather than 10-inch.

Furthermore, the newer designs of 12-inch gun mounting had a considerably higher rate of fire, removing the advantage previously enjoyed by smaller calibres. In 1902, a 12-inch gun might fire two rounds per minute; in 1895, one round every four minutes was more likely. In October 1903, the naval architect Vittorio Cuniberti published a paper in Jane's Fighting Ships entitled "An Ideal Battleship for the British Navy", which called for a 17,000 ton ship carrying a main armament of twelve 12-in guns, protected by 12-inch armour, and having a speed of 24 knots (44 km/h). Cuniberti's idea - which he had already proposed the idea to his own navy, the Regia Marina - was to make use of the high rate of fire of new 12-inch guns to produce devastating rapid-fire from heavy guns to replace the 'hail of fire' from lighter weapons. Something similar lay behind the Japanese move towards heavier guns; Japanese shells contained a higher than normal proportion of high explosive, and were fused to explode on contact, starting fires rather than piercing armour. The increased rate of fire overcame the principal objection to 12-inch guns and laid the foundations for future advances in fire control.

Building the first Dreadnoughts

In Japan, the two battleships of the 1903-4 Programme were in fact the first to be laid down as all-big-gun designs, with eight 12-inch guns. However, the design had armour which was considered too thin, meaning a substantial redesign; the financial pressures of the Russo-Japanese War and the short supply of 12-inch guns which had to be imported from Britain meant that these ships were completed as the with a mixed-calibre 10-inch and 12-inch armament. The 1903-4 design also retained traditional triple-expansion steam engines.

The dreadnought breakthrough occurred in Britain in 1905. The new First Sea Lord, Jackie Fisher had long been an advocate of new technology in the Royal Navy and had recently converted to the idea of an all-big-gun battleship. Fisher is often credited as the creator of the Dreadnought type and the father of Britain's great dreadnought battleship fleet, an impression he himself did much to reinforce. However, it is now seriously suggested Fisher's main interest was in developing the battlecruiser and not the battleship. One of Fisher's first actions on coming to office was to set up a Committee on Designs to consider future battleships and armoured cruisers.

The Committee's first task was to consider a new battleship. The specification for the new ship was a 12-inch main battery and anit-torpedo-boat guns but no intermediate calibres, and a 21-knot speed (two or three knots faster than existing battleships). The initial designs intended twelve 12-inch guns, though difficulties in positioning these guns led the chief constructor at one stage to propose a return to four 12-inch guns with sixteen or eighteen 9.2-inch. The Committee settled on a design carrying ten 12-inch guns as her main armament, along with twenty-two 12-pounders (3 inch, 76 mm) as her secondary armament. The Committee also took the adventurous step of giving Dreadnought steam turbine propulsion. This was unprecedented in a large warship. The greater efficiency of the turbines meant that the 21-knot design speed could be achieved in a smaller and cheaper ship

Construction took place at a remarkable rate; her keel was laid on 2 October 1905, she was launched on 10 February 1906, and she was completed on 3 October 1906—an impressive demonstration of British industrial might. The new ship was named Dreadnought; the previous Dreadnought, having been stricken from the effective list in 1905.

The first US dreadnoughts were the South Carolina class. Detailed plans for these were worked out in July-November 1905, and approved by the Board of Construction on 23 November 1905. However building progress was slow; specifications for bidders were issued on 21 March 1906, and the two ships were laid down in December 1906, after the completion of the British Dreadnought.