User:Sscoulsdon/Karonga War

The name Karonga War is given number of armed clashes that took place between mid 1887 and mid 1889 near Karonga at the northern end of Lake Malawi in what is now Malawi between a Scottish trading concern the African Lakes Company Limited and elements of the Ngonde people on one side and Swahili traders and their Henga allies on the other. In the 19th century, it was referred to as the “Arab War”, despite few Arabs being involved. Although these conflicts predate formal endorsement of a British Central Africa Protectorate west of Lake Malawi 1891, European involvement, both by the African Lakes Company and German attempts to prevent Swahili slave trading around Lake Tanganyika in German East Africa, upset the previous balance between the Ngonde and their neighbours and created the conditions for this conflict.

Situation before the conflict

The area to the west of northern Lake Malawi was occupied by two indigenous peoples, the Tumbuka and Ngonde, and the recently-arrived Ngoni. Although the Tumbuka were already involved in the East African ivory trade, in the 1820s and 1830s Swahili traders from the Indian Ocean coast and backed by Indian financiers in Zanzibar, as much interested in slaves as ivory, entered the area and displaced the earlier merchants. Finally, in the late 1870s, the African Lakes Company began trading in ivory along the shores of Lake Malawi, establishing trading posts in the early 1880s.

Local peoples

The Tumbuka probably entered the area between the Luangwa valley and northern Lake Malawi in the 15th century. At the start of the 18th century, they formed a number of groups, of which the Henga was one, living in small, independent communities without a central organisation, spread thinly over this area. By the mid-18th century, traders dressed “as Arabs” although coming from the Unyamwezi region of what is now Tanzania were involved in trading for ivory and to some extent slaves as far inland as the Luangwa valley. They formed alliances with groups of Henga, and their leader established a dynasty ruling a federation of small chiefdoms around the lakeshore. By the 1830s, this Chikuramaybe dynasty was in decline and the area reverted to a state of political and military disorganisation.

The Ngonde (as they are known in Malawi) occupy the north-western shore of Lake Malawi south of the Songwe River are an offshoot of the Nyakyusa, who live north of that river in Tanzania. They probably moved into Malawi around 1600 and densely settled the area between the Songwe and North Rukuru rivers, with relatively strong local chiefs, and a paramount chief or king from one of two princely lineages. Because the environment of the Karonga plain was favourable for their mixed farming practices, the Ngonde gradually extended the area they occupied, but were not involved in ivory trading networks before the late 19th century.

The Ngoni of Mbelwa (also known as M'mbelwa) were a branch of Zwangendaba’s Ngoni, which began its migration from South Africa between 1819 and 1822, eventually reaching southern Tanzania and remained there until Zwangendaba’s death in the mid-1840s. After this, his followers split into several groups, one of which under his son Mbelwa settled permanently in what is now the Mzimba district of northern Malawi around 1855.

Mbelwa’s Ngoni treated the Henga as a subject population, exacting tribute and taking captives through raiding. These captives were rarely sold to the Swahili traders, but retained as unfree agricultural workers or enrolled in Ngoni regiments. Some Henga soldiers fled back to their original homeland around 1879 but were attacked by the Ngoni in 1881 and forced north into Ngonde territory, where the Ngonde settled them as a buffer against their enemies. Zwangendaba’s Ngoni had raided the Ngonde in the 1840s and Mbelwa’s Ngoni did so in the 1850s and 1870s. Each time, the Ngonde had to surrender many cattle, so feared further raids.

Advent of the Swahili and Europeans

Around 1880, a group of Swahili traders established in the elephant-rich Luangwa valley sent one of their number, Mlozi bin Kazbadema from Ujiji, now in Tanzania, to act as their agent to the north-west of Lake Malawi. He headed a party which established camp near Mbande Hill, the seat of the Ngonde king about 15 miles inland, and a stockade at Chilumba on Lake Malawi from where ivory and slaves could be shipped across the lake. This was followed by other stockades, from where Mlozi also carried out an active trade in ivory with the African Lakes Company’s depot at Karonga.

Contemporary Europeans in East Africa described these traders as Arabs, one dividing them into three classes: a few “White Arabs” from Oman, other Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Iran or Balochistan and the majority, either Muslim “Mswahili” from the east coast of Africa or Nyamwezi people from Unyamwezi, who imitated Arab dress and customs but were rarely Muslim. Other Nyamwezi who had not adopted Arab ways and who acted as the traders’ armed guards were known as Ruga-Ruga.

The African Lakes Company, which cooperated closely with the Scottish missions, began its transport and trading concern that aimed to replace the slave trade by legitimate commerce and develop European influence in 1878. Its local managers, the brothers John Moir and Frederick Moir concentrated on trading ivory rather than cash crops, facing stiff completion from established Swahili merchants. In 1883, the company set up a base in Karonga to exchange ivory for trade goods.

Growth of tensions

Trading rivalries

The popularity of the so-called Arab traders arose from the ready supply of a wide range of trade goods they brought, not only guns and ammunition, but also iron tools and utensils, and cloth. This varied supply, for which African chiefs were prepared to exchange slaves as well as ivory, was one which the African Lakes Company could not match. The Swahili initially had good relations with the Ngonde, but as many of their stockades were built in the area where the Henga had been settled, the Ngonde began to distrust both the Henga and the Swahili.

Initially, relations between Mlozi and Low Monteith Fotheringham, the African Lakes Company’s local representative, were cordial, but their relationship later deteriorated, partly because of the company’s delays or unwillingness to provide guns, ammunition and other trade goods, and also because the Swahili traders turned more to slaving and began to attack Ngonde communities that the company had promised to protect.

The African Lakes Company’s failure lay in part with its lack of the finances to realise its ambitious plans, but also because it thought that trading in ivory and in slaves were intimately connected, as David Livingstone among others had observed recently-enslaved Africans being forced to carry ivory to the coast. However, by the 1870s, most ivory porters were paid specialists, and the relation between in ivory and slaves was a negative one: the increasing European demand for ivory led to a depletion of the elephant herds in many areas, whose people were then forced to sell slaves in exchange for the trade goods they had formerly bartered for ivory.

After several years unsuccessfully trying to undermine the Swahili trading networks, by 1884 the African Lakes Company was almost bankrupt. It blamed the Swahili, and tried to revive its fortunes by making treaties with Ngonde chiefs on the Karonga lakeshore, with a view to preventing them trading with the Swahili traders. These treaties were not only commercial but promised protection, which the Ngonde interpreted as protection against the Swahili and Henga, not only the Ngoni, which is what the company intended.

Although the African Lakes Company was formed with the benevolent aims of cooperating with the Scottish missions and combating the slave trade, its local agents claimed to have made a series of treaties with local chiefs around its trading station at Karonga. There was little documentation for these, some of which may have been spurious, but several treaties offered protection and claimed to a transfer sovereignty to the company, which may have had the ambition to become a Chartered company. This ambition was strongly opposed by missionaries based in Blantyre, south of Lake Malawi and Hawes, the Consul to the Lake Region, but initially supported by missionaries based further north in Livingstonia.

Indigenous volatility

The Ngonde were concerned both about Mbelwa’s Ngoni, even though they were settled some distance to the south, and the closely related Nyakyusa people to the north, who raided the more affluent Ngonde. To protect their northern border, they resettled those Henga warriors who had been drafted into Ngoni regiments but had later revolted, and hoped to use the Swahili traders and their well-armed guards to protect the south, although the Swahili preferred to remain on good terms with the Ngoni. The Henga, who were trained soldiers, could not adapt to life as farmers and remained unassimilated into Ngonde society, although they initially prevented Nyakyusa raids.

After the death of a strong Ngonde king in 1878 or 1879, his successor was weak and unable to provide firm leadership. In 1885 several powerful men signed treaties with the African Lakes Company which claimed to cede large areas of land to it without consulting the king, and one Ngonde faction planned to massacre the Henga without the king’s knowledge. This faction wished to use the African Lakes Company to oppose and possibly replace the king, who attempted to use the Swahili to strengthen his position.

In addition to the internal conflict within the Ngonde state, in 1887 the Henga leader died and his following split into two groups, one led by his son, which represented the warriors, the other included those that had adapted to agricultural life.

The War

Although conflict between the Swahili traders their guards and their Henga allies continued with greater or less intensity from mid 1887 to 1895, the accounts of Fotheringham and Lugard, which only record fighting which involved Europeans, identify four distinct periods: in October to December 1887, March 1888, May to August 1888 and February to March 1889, although minor incidents occured at other times, and the war was formally ended by a treaty on 22 October 1889. Both these accounts are written from the British perspective and give no clear indications of the size of the forces of the Swahili and their allies or the Ngonde. Fotheringham's own account admits that one of the main sources of the company’s problems in 1887 was that it had bought a large quantity of ivory from the “Arabs” on credit, more than could be paid for by a single boat-load of trade goods, and the creditors and their armed followers were forced to wait for several months for satisfaction, expecting the local Ngonde to supply food. Quarrels between the Swahili traders and the Ngonde people from whom they demanded supplies began in late 1886 and culminated in a violent assault on a trader in July 1887.

This assault was used by Mlozi as the pretext to strike at the Ngonde before they decided that the Swahili were superfluous to their needs. After the killing of a local chief in reprisal, the Swahili, their Ruga-Ruga guards and their Henga allies drove out the Ngonde villagers from the Karonga Plain to a depth of 12 miles from the lake over the next few months and, in October 1887, killed a paramount chief or king of the Ngonde.

Although Mlozi was careful not to antagonise the Europeans directly, after this attack he proclaimed himself Sultan of Nkonde and demanded tribute from the African Lakes Company in October 1887, although did not attack when this was refused. The Ngonde sought protection from the African Lakes Company, which was initially refused. However, after fighting in which the Ngonde were defeated and their paramount chief’s village was sacked, many fled to Karonga, where they were given shelter on the African Lakes Company’s compound. Fotheringham claimed that the Swahili wished to drive the Ngonde from their homeland and replace them with the Henga mercenaries they had recruited, and that they also intended to attack Karonga, so he issued arms to company employees and strengthened Karonga's defences. Fotheringham also feared that the advance of the Swahili would jeopardize the company’s independent position and reduce it to dependence on Mlozi. Although it was portrayed as a fight against slavery, it was as much a trade war.

The first periods of fighting

The small African Lakes Company presence at Karonga consisted of Fotheringham, his assistant and about 60 African company workers: they had had few firearms and little ammunition. Fotheringham appealed to the African Lakes Company headquarters in Blantyre for assistance, and the British Consul at Mozambique, O'Neill, whose was outside his area of consular authority but acting on behalf of Hawes, the Consul to the Lake Region, who was absent organised a relief expedition. On 4 November, O'Neill reached Karonga by lake-steamer with three other Europeans. After some weeks of stand-off, Mlozi’s men made several armed attacks between 23 and 28 November but were beaten off and retired. However, O'Neill and Fotheringham abandoned Karonga as too difficult to defend, and sought shelter with a group of Nyakyusa north of the Songwe River, where they were later reinforced by a small group which Hawes, Consul to the Lake Region, back from leave, had brought by a steamer which also carried arms and ammunition. On 23 December 1887, the company force with its Nyakyusa and Ngonde allies attacked Mlozi’s headquarters, resulting in an indecisive skirmish, after which the majority of Europeans returned to the south.

There followed a dispute between the two consuls, Hawes wishing to discontinue the armed conflict while O'Neill wanted to attack Mlozi again. O'Neill returned to Mozambique, but Hawes also quarrelled with John Moir of the company, who was supported by most of the European settlers in Blantyre, and he departed on leave after appointing John Buchanan as Acting Consul. Hawes was later reassigned to Zanzibar and Buchanan remained in post until Henry Hamilton Johnston arrived in March 1889 Frederick Moir, John’s brother took a small party of armed men north, arriving at the abandoned site of Karonga on 3 March 1888; Buchanan arrived a few days later, with the aim of negotiating a settlement, meeting Mlozi and other Swahili leaders on 20 March. These apparently agreed to evacuate the Ngonde country and destroy their stockades, but later declined to sign an agreement to that effect, so Buchanan left. Meanwhile, Frederick Moir and Fotheringham, manager of the Karonga depot, had recruited some 500 African fighters, 270 with firearms, and rebuilt the Karonga stockade, after which they launched an abortive attack on a Swahili-controlled village in which Moir was severely wounded

Lugard’s arrival

In May 1888, Captain Lugard of the Indian Army, later Frederick Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard arrived in Blantyre, after meeting O’Neill in Mozambique. O’Neill had told him that the forces at Karonga needed a competent commander. When he reached Blantyre he told Buchanan that, in his opinion, immediate military action against Mlozi and his followers was necessary to protect the missions and the Ngonde people, and to prevent other Swahili traders who did not support Mlozi from joining forces with him, However, Buchanan declined to give him official support in view of Hawes’ opposition and the wish of the British government to avoid involvement. Although Buchanan, and later the Foreign Office and War Office, gave Lugard no official support, they did not oppose his actions on the basis that they were ostensibly to protect the missions rather than the African Lakes Company.

Lugard left Blantyre in mid-May 1888 and, with around 20 Europeans including John Moir and six company employees, travelled up Lake Malawi by steamer, pausing at Bandawe to recruit 200 Tonga as soldiers, who were to march to KarongaHis first aim was to attack Mlozi’s stockade at Chilumba, where slaves and ivory were ferried across the lake. This was captured in a surprise attack and destroyed, after which the steamer continued to Karonga, arriving on 28 May, to reinforce the African Lakes Company employees and numerous Ngonde refugees in the company stockade, which Lugard strengthened and extended.

After the arrival of the Tonga troops, Lugard prepared to attack the Swahili stockades. His attack, on 16 June, failed after he was wounded, and most of the expedition withdrew in August, leaving a small party in Karonga. This attack failed and Lugard decided to ensure that Mlozi evacuated his strongholds or to force him out. On 16 January 1889, he took delivery of a 7 pounder gun and gave Mlozi an ultimatum to depart by 31 January. After the ultimatum expired, Lugard, with a force of nine Europeans armed with rifles, around 250 Africans, most armed with antiquated muskets, and the gun, attacked one Swahili stockade on 14 February and another on 13 March. Although the field gun caused casualties, its shells did not destroy either stockade. Shortly after the second failure, Lugard left Karonga, leaving Blantyre on 9 April and arriving at Zanzibar on 3 May 1889 on route to Britain. Six European African Lakes Company employees and an unknown number of armed Africans remained in Karonga, and there was stalemate as neither the company nor the Swahili traders could expel the other. The company’s failure to expel Mlozi and the other hostile traders put an end to its political claims to become a Chartered company with a protectorate over this area.

Treaty and aftermath

Lugard never returned to Nyasaland but his activities put pressure on the British government to intervene and, in November 1888, it appointed Harry Johnston as Consul in Mozambique, with an area of consular authority covering Central Africa as well as the Portuguese controlled coast. Johnston arrived in Blantyre in March 1889: at that time he had no significant military forces, and agreed a truce with Mlozi in October 1889 to avoid confrontation with him and other slave traders in the north. However, despite the provisions in the truce agreement to allow the Ngonde to return to their villages unmolested and to reduce the number of Swahili stockades, Buchanan, who visited Karonga in March 1891 and met Mlozi, reported to Johnston that, rather than Ngonde being allowed to return, more were being driven out and the Swahili traders were building more fortified villages and restricting the African Lakes Company’s trading activities.

Although on the formation of the British Central Africa Protectorate in 1891, Johnson was provided with a small force of Indian troops and, over the next few years, trained more African soldiers, he was fully engaged in the south of the protectorate until 1894. Between 1891 and 1894, Mlozi and his Henga allies had made further attacks on the Ngonde people and, the African Lakes Company claimed, threatened to attack Karonga again. Mlozi refused either to meet Johnston, who visited Karonga in June 1895, or curtail his raiding activities, so Johnston decided on military action.

Johnston first secured the neutrality of the Swahili ruler of Nkhotakota through a subsidy and prepared to attack the “north end Arabs”. In November 1895, he embarked a force of over 400 Sikh and African riflemen, with artillery and machine guns on steamers at Mangochi, bound for Karonga. Without any prior warning, he assaulted two smaller stockades on 2 December and, on the same day, surrounded Mlozi’s large, double-fenced stockaded town, bombarding it for two days and finally assaulting it on 4 December, facing stiff resistance. Mlozi was captured, given a cursory trial and hanged on 5 December: between 200 and 300 of Mlozi’s fighters were killed, many while attempting to surrender, as well as several hundred non-combatants killed in the bombardment. The other Swahili stockades did not resist and were destroyed

The Karonga War was minor in terms of combatants and causalities compared to the First Matabele War and Second Matabele War in Southern Rhodesia but its major significance for the history of Malawi, particularly the north of the country, was that it forced a change in British government policy. This had been to ensure that no other power controlled the area west and south of Lake Malawi without itself assuming any sovereignty over it, to one where it felt it necessary to proclaim a protectorate. Like the roughly contemporaneous Abushiri revolt in German East Africa, it represented the end of any political influence of Swahili traders acknowledging the Sultan of Zanzibar’s authority in East and Central Africa, and the end of attempts of Chartered companies to assume or retain control in place of their home governments.

Sources

• M. Douglas (1950). Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region: East Central Africa, Part 1, London International African Institute.
• L. M. Fotheringham, (1891). Adventures in Nyasaland, London, Gilbert & Rivington.
• O. J. M. Kalinga (1980). The Karonga War: Commercial Rivalry and Politics of Survival, Journal of African History, Vol. 21, pp. 209-18.
• O. J. M. Kalinga (2012). Historical Dictionary of Malawi (fourth edition), Toronto, Scarecrow Press, ISBN 978-0-8108-5961-6.
• I. C. Lamba, (1978). British commerce as an Anti-slavery Device in Malawi, The Journal of the Central African Historical Association. Vol. 9. pp.13-22.
• F. G. Lugard (1893). The Rise of Our East African Empire, Vol 1: Early Efforts in Nyasaland and Uganda (1968 reprint), Abingdon, Routledge. ISBN 0-415-41063-0.
• J McCraken (1977). Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875-1940, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-21444-5.
• J. McCracken, (2012). A History of Malawi, 1859–1966, Woodbridge, James Currey. ISBN 978-1-84701-050-6.
• B. Pachai, (1967). In The Wake of Livingstone and The British Administration: Some Considerations of Commerce and Christianity in Malawi, The Society of Malawi Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 40-70.
• B. Pachai, (1978). Land and Politics in Malawi, 1875–1975, Kingston (Ontario), The Limestone Press. ISBN 0-91964-282-9.
• R. L. Pouwels, (1987). Horn and Crescent, Cultural Change and Traditional Islam in East Africa, (800-1900), Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-52309-5.
• R. I. Rotberg, (1965). The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873–1964, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-67477-191-8.
• P. T. Terry, (1965). The Arab War on Lake Nyasa 1887-1895, The Nyasaland Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1 pp. 55-77. (Part I)
• P. T. Terry, (1965). The Arab War on Lake Nyasa 1887-1895 P. T. Terry, (1965). The Arab War on Lake Nyasa 1887-1895 Part II, The Nyasaland Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 13-52.

External links

• L M Fotheringham, (1891). Adventures in Nyasaland, [[1]]
• F. G. Lugard (1893). The Rise of Our East African Empire, Vol 1: Early Efforts in Nyasaland and Uganda [[2]]

Category:History of Malawi Category:Nyasaland Category:Wars involving Malawi Category:Conflicts in 1887 Category:Conflicts in 1888 Category:Conflicts in 1889 Category:1887 in Africa Category:1888 in Africa Category:1889 in Africa Category:1880s in the British Empire Category:1880s in the German colonial empire