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Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is the name commonly used in the United States for Preferential Voting. There are campaigns for IRV in a number of states and local jurisdictions in the U.S. which have been largely promoted and supported, in recent years, by a non-profit educational and advocacy organization called FairVote.

Opposition to this campaign can be classified into two broad categories:

  1. Those who prefer to maintain the status quo, which is generally Plurality voting, or two-round runoff elections.
  2. Those who prefer reforms other than Instant Runoff Voting.

The arguments of these two groups are different, and sometimes the same argument is used on both sides; for example, some IRV advocates claim that IRV will help third parties to gain a toehold and, if they can eventually muster majority support, to win elections. This argument has been summarized as "IRV will allow third parties to grow without being spoilers." In seeming agreement with this, some opponents of IRV argue that IRV will indeed damage the two-party system, which these critics consider important to American democracy.

On the other hand, critics of IRV who prefer other reformed methods have claimed that IRV will help preserve the two-party system, pointing to the countries that use single-winner STV, which have long maintained strong two-party systems with little exception. Further, some support for IRV comes from major-party supporters who want to eliminate the spoiler effect caused by vote-splitting, as with the Ralph Nader vote in Florida in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, which presumably came largely from voters who would prefer Al Gore over George W. Bush, and which vote was more than enough to turn that election. These supporters of IRV expect that it will help maintain the two-party system by preventing spoiled elections.

Controversies over Instant Runoff Voting can be broken down into a series of specific issues. These may be defined by arguments being made, Pro or Con;

Arguments made in favor of IRV and the debate over them

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Pro: IRV allows one ballot to determine a majority winner

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Rank ballots allow a simulated runoff process to eliminate candidates without asking voters again for their top remaining choice. The process logically must end in a majority winner (or a tie) when two final candidates remain.

It is possible for a winner to be chosen with a majority of ballots indicating a preference between the two finalists, rather than a majority of the total ballots originally cast.

There are two sources of this failure of incomplete ranking:

  1. Some IRV implementations don't allow complete ranking, either due to voting machine limitations or other reasons; for example, in San Francisco, only three ranks are available on the ballot.[citation needed]
  2. Voters who don't rank enough of the candidates to express a preference between the final two candidates.

In both cases such ballots, with all choices eliminated, are considered exhausted and don't count for or against the winner, unless the election still requires a majority of ballots cast in that race, as with the process introduced in the Vermont legislature in [supply year when sourcing].[citation needed] In such a case, "instant runoff voting" may avoid some runoffs or other further process, but does not eliminate them.

In order to avoid this issue, some jurisdictions using IRV have required that voters rank all candidates, which, by definition, creates a majority winner, because ballots not ranking all candidates are considered spoiled and invalid, but this has not been proposed for the United States. It is done in Australia.[citation needed]

In comparison, a two round system (with a majority requirement) will always allow interested voters to participate in the runoff round, and the result satisfies requirements of election by majority. However, depending on election timing, it is argued, there may be a significant drop-off in voter turnout in the second round and it is possible that the nominal "majority" winner of the second round may receive fewer votes than the loser received in the first round of voting.[1] This drop-off did not occur in runoff elections in Cary, NC, probably because the runoffs were held with the general election in November, the primary being held a month before,[citation needed] and this shift of election timing was proposed in the debate over Ranked Choice Voting in San Francisco as an alternative.[citation needed]

Pro: IRV will eliminate the Spoiler effect

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If a third party candidate draws sufficient votes away from what would otherwise be a majority winner, causing a candidate to win with only minority support, the election has been "spoiled."

Historically, IRV has reduced the spoiler effect, as in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where IRV was implemented by referendum and which then resulted in the election of the city's first African-American mayor, a Democrat. Prior to this, the mayor of Ann Arbor had been Republican, due to vote splitting between the Democratic Party and the Human Rights Party. A new referendum to rescind the reform was then placed on the ballot for a special election, with low turnout, which reversed the reform.[1]

However, critics of IRV point out that there are other reforms which could also reduce the spoiler effect, including Condorcet methods, and the commonly used Runoff voting. Bucklin voting, as actually used for a time in some jurisdictions in the United States, did allow apparently sincere preferences to be expressed without spoiling elections.

Thus addressing the Spoiler effect is an argument for election reform, not necessarily specifically for Instant-runoff voting; which reform is most appropriate would depend upon other characteristics of the voting systems being considered.

Pro: IRV will encourage sincere voting

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All election reforms known to be under serious consideration do encourage increased sincerity in voting, and there is no controversy over the necessity of compromise under Plurality voting.

IRV advocates can make a strong claim that it encourages sincere voting, particularly in a two-party system or other elections where there are only two strong candidates. In such conditions, sincere ranking at the top entails no risk and insincere ranking in lower ranks offers no incentive.

However when there is a strong third candidate, situations can arise where there is an incentive for a voter to abandon a favorite for a compromise who looks like a stronger competitor to win.

This compromise incentive occurs with all single-vote runoff (actual or "instant") methods because compromise candidates may be dropped before the final round. Voters who want to maximize their influence must consider two questions: "Whom would I prefer to win?" and "Who can win the final round?" and may find these differ.

Studying whether or not this incentive to compromise occurs in practice is difficult because IRV elections depend on individual ballot data. Complete ballot by ballot ranking data was made public following San Francisco, CA and Burlington, VT, IRV elections, which may allow for further analysis on this point. [2]

Theoretical studies of the relative likelihood of election "pathologies" have been done, particularly through simulations; however, they have not been published in peer-reviewed journals or other reliable sources.

Based on the similarity in some respects between IRV and Runoff voting, though, there are election examples showing, most notably, failure to find the best compromise, and some elections in San Francisco have been won with only minority support expressed; in such a situation, it is possible that the winner would have lost in a direct contest with another candidate.

Other methods may be monotonic, i.e., raising a candidate in preference can never cause that candidate to lose, but these methods may then fail the later-no-harm criterion, in which sincerely indicating a second choice may harm that voters first choice.

In major partisan elections in the United States, IRV is unlikely to run into problem election scenarios that would encourage insincere voting; however, they may occur in non-partisan elections with more than two viable candidates.

Pro: IRV gives voters a wider range of choices

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Like the two round system, IRV tends to give voters a wider range of choice among candidates than plurality. More independent and third party candidates are likely to run because the spoiler problems are less severe. [2]

Pro: IRV will reduce negative campaigning

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John Russo, Oakland City Attorney, argued in the Oakland Tribune that "Instant runoff voting is an antidote to the disease of negative campaigning. Under the system, candidates would be less likely to engage in malicious campaigning because such tactics would risk alienating the voters who support 'attacked' candidates."[3] However, critics allege there is a lack of evidence that such an effect actually occurs.[4] No formal studies are known to have been conducted. In any event, any reduction in negative campaigning would likely only be between those candidates nearest to each other politically. Candidates who are far apart politically would have little incentive to refrain from attacking each other, as they would be unlikely to win second preferences from voters at the other end of a political spectrum.

Pro: Like plurality, IRV requires the winner to have core support.

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FairVote has asserted, "We believe a winner should be at least one voter’s first choice, meaning they would receive more than 0% in current rules."[5] Essentially, if a candidate is dropped in the first round, even if this candidate is everyone's second choice, that candidate cannot win, and, of course, a candidate with no votes would be immediately dropped.

Other reformers, such as Range voting and Condorcet method advocates, don't consider "core support" a meaningful criterion.[6] "Core support" would be connected to having a party working for the candidate, and may be related to an ability to govern if elected, but the likelihood of a candidate being relevant to a real election with no first place support would be low, and harm from electing such a candidate, should it occur, has not been shown.

Arguments against IRV and the debate over them

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Opposition to instant-runoff voting consists of those who favor plurality or other systems over this particular preferential voting system. The organized opposition to IRV has sometimes taken the form of newspaper editorials opposing local and state IRV initiatives[7].

Con: With IRV, voting for a candidate can cause the candidate to lose

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[clarification needed] Instant runoff voting, like the two-round runoff election method, is non-monotonic, which means that voting for a candidate can cause the candidate to lose the election, by altering which candidates make it into the final runoff tally.[8] Visualizations of this are available from multiple independent sources.[9][10] The extent to which this can occur in real-world elections is disputed.[11] In cases where there is a Condorcet Winner, and where IRV does not choose it, a majority would, by definition, prefer the Condorcet Winner to the IRV winner.

For instance, consider 3 candidates, A, B and C. A is well ahead in first preference votes but doesn't have 50%; all votes for B have A as second preference; and all votes for C have B as second preference. So for A to win, s/he needs B, rather than C, to be eliminated (so that A can receive B's preferences). So it is possible to have a situation where a supporter of A needs to vote for C as first preference in order for A to win. If the voter, instead, votes for A, C could be eliminated first and then B wins. By raising the rank of A, from second rank to first rank, the A supporter causes A to lose.

Voters may try to exploit this weakness in any forced elimination runoff using a "push-over strategy."[citation needed] This strategy is relatively easy to attempt within a traditional runoff where a bluff vote can be made and reversed in later rounds. IRV makes this strategy riskier because a single ballot doesn't allow the push-over to be changed back to the true preference in the final round.

There is disagreement on the significance of using the monotonicity criterion to evaluate IRV. For example, Austan-Smith and Banks argue that "monotonicity/nonmonotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue." Moreover, "depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic."[12]


Con: IRV violates the one person one vote mandate

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Ann Arbor, Michigan, through a petition drive, implemented "preference voting" in 1974. The arguments given in letters to newspapers included "Gives minority candidate voters two votes." In the other direction, it was argued, "The same 'two vote privilege' is extended to supporters of losing candidates in primaries or where there are run-off elections."[3] This procedure went before the Michigan courts, and a ruling was issued in Stephenson vs. the Ann Arbor Board of City Canvassers in 1975. Majority Preferential Voting (or M.P.V., as it was called) was upheld as in compliance with the constitution. In his decision, Judge James Fleming wrote that

"Under the 'M.P.V. System', however, no one person or voter has more than one effective vote for one office. No voter's vote can be counted more than once for the same candidate. In the final analysis, no voter is given greater weight in his or her vote over the vote of another voter, although to understand this does require a conceptual understanding of how the effect of a 'M.P.V. System' is like that of a run-off election. The form of majority preferential voting employed in the City of Ann Arbor's election of its Mayor does not violate the one-man, one-vote mandate nor does it deprive anyone of equal protection rights under the Michigan or United States Constitutions."[4]

On the other hand, in Minnesota, there is the precedent of Brown v. Smallwood, a case which addressed the constitutionality under Minnesota law of Bucklin Voting.[13] Bucklin also involves, like IRV, alternative votes, coming from lower ranks, but it amalgamates them in a different manner, bringing them in as additional votes instead of through substitution. Focusing on an alleged one-person, one-vote violation in this, advocates of IRV have claimed that Brown v. Smallwood will not apply, in any challenge, to IRV. However, the majority argued in Brown v. Smallwood, repetitively, against the principle of any kind of alternative vote, so some legal opinion has been given that Brown v. Smallwood does indeed apply to other alternative voting systems.[14] There was a dissent in Brown v. Smallwood which specifically attempted to refute the one-person, one-vote argument, and there is reference that the predominant legal opinion of the time, as well as other precedent in U.S. law, was reversed by the court, and the judgment in Brown v. Smallwood was not replicated elsewhere.

Michigan Secretary of State Mark Ritchie, who assisted Minneapolis in coming up with instant runoff rules, asked the state's attorney general to outline the legal issues surrounding IRV. The response was troubling. Citing Brown v. Smallwood, a 1915 Minnesota Supreme Court case involving an IRV precursor in Duluth, the memo stated that if Brown holds up, then switching to instant runoff elections "probably is not permitted."[15]

Con: "if it ain't broke don't fix it" or "plurality voting is good enough"

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Plurality supporters point to the fact that most elections in the U.S. use plurality voting, and voters seem to accept plurality winners as legitimate. The fact that some revered leaders, such as Abraham Lincoln, did not receive a majority of the vote is sometimes mentioned.

It can be claimed that the spoiler effect is not a weakness but a strength because it encourages and rewards like-minded candidates and voters to work together before the election. This encourages the formation of strong coalitions or parties, who attempt to best represent a collective position to the largest set of voters they can. Thus once an election is held, all compromising work has been completed and it's up to the voters to decide a first choice and accept the results as best.

Writing in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, Harold J. Jansen studied the Alternative Vote in Canada, concluding that "On balance, it differed little from the single member plurality system."[5]

Con: IRV will help preserve the two-party system

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In a country such as the UK where a third party already has some representation, IRV has been rejected because, rather than giving voters more choices, it could actually disfavour the third party. The British Independent Commission on the Voting System known as the Jenkins Commission (UK) found that, far from doing much to relieve disproportionality, it is capable of substantially adding to it, and its effects are "disturbingly unpredictable."[16]

References

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  1. ^ Jonathan Marwil, A History of Ann Arbor (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 164-165.
  2. ^ Amy, Douglas J. (2000). "Behind the ballot box: A citizen's guide to voting systems" (Document). {{cite document}}: Cite document requires |publisher= (help)
  3. ^ Oakland Tribune, John Russo
  4. ^ Dunbar, John (2005-11-17). "Instant Runoff Voting Not Meeting Expectations".
  5. ^ FairVote. "Alternative Systems Comparison: Alternative Systems Comparison".
  6. ^ Shentrup, Clay. "An IRV example refuting Richie's "Core support" theory". {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ Center for Range Voting. "A Message to IRV Fans - Look Beyond the Hype".
  8. ^ Doron, Gideon, and Richard Kronick (1977). "Single Transferable Vote, An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function." American Journal of Political Science 21:303-311.
  9. ^ Yee, Ka-Ping (2005-04-21). "Voting Simulation Visualizations".
  10. ^ Voting and Election Reform, Brian Olson
  11. ^ http://rangevoting.org/DebateHillIRV1.html
  12. ^ Austen-Smith, David (June 1991). "Monotonicity in Electoral Systems". American Political Science Review. 85 (2). doi:10.2307/1963173. JSTOR 1963173. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  13. ^ Brown v Smallwood
  14. ^ Legal analysis to Minneapolis Charter Commission
  15. ^ Jonathan Kaminsky, Will Minneapolis pioneer instant runoff voting?
  16. ^ Jenkins Commission Report, section 85.
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Advocacy organisations
Opposition positions
Analysis

Others

See also

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