User:Slvrar

Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs
[[File:]]
Leader	Aslan Byutukayev
Dates of operation	2002-2005, 2008-
Active regions	Dregestan, Ingushetia, Chechnia and other parts of Russia
Status	EXAMPLE: Designated as Proscribed Group by the UK Home Office
Size	Insert Size of the Organization. You must cite this as well. Example: 500–1,000 operatives (2001)

Riyad-us Saliheen (Russian: Риядус-Салихийн, also transliterated as Riyadus-Salikhin, Riyad us-Saliheyn or Riyad us-Salihiin) is the name of a small "martyr" (shahid) force of Islamic suicide attackers. Its original leader (amir) was the Chechen separatist commander Shamil Basayev. In February and March 2003 the group was designated by the United States and consequently by the United Nations[1] as a terrorist organization. After several years of inactivity, Riyad-us Saliheen was reactivated by the Caucasus Emirate in 2009,[2] and as of 2011, it is commanded by Aslan Byutukayev (more commonly known as Emir Khamzat).[3]

History

This highly autonomous group was founded and led by Shamil Basayev under the name of Riyadus Salihiin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (later also known as Islamic Brigade of Shaheeds) in October 1999 as a "special battalion to carry out acts of sabotage" in retaliation for the Grozny missile attack.[5] The truck bomb attack at Chechnya's FSB headquarters in Znamenskoye which killed more than 50 in 2003, the truck bomb attack at a Russian military hospital in Mozdok, North Ossetia, which killed at least 50 the same year, and a series of "Operation Boomerang" suicide bombings (many of them conducted by women) which have killed over 200 civilians in Moscow and elsewhere in Russian heartland, including 90 killed in the simultaneous aircraft bombings over two Russian regions in 2004. Riyad-us Saliheen also took responsibility for the involvement in the hostage crises in Moscow in 2002 and Beslan in 2004, which together have resulted in more than 500 hostage fatalities. In 2005 the group has been reportedly disbanded by Basayev under pressure from the Chechen separatist president Sheikh Abdul Halim, as a condition for Basayev to enter the official leadership of the separatist government. In any case it did not display any activity for more than four years after September 2004.

In early 2009, the leader of pan-Caucasian mujahideen, Dokka Umarov, announced the revival of the group as Riyad-us-Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs (without its "Chechen" part of the name, although the group is often referred by media as such anyway), saying he has 20 people fully prepared for "martyr operations".[6][7] Since then the now much more ethnically-diversified group took responsibility for a series of suicide and other attacks in the Russian republics in North Caucasus and elsewhere, including the 2009 car bombing which killed at least 25 at police headquarters in Nazran, Ingushetia, a car bomb assassination attempt at the Ingush president Yunus-Bek Yevkurov,[8] and the killing of scores of policemen in numerous smaller suicide attacks in Chechnya and Ingushetia, and since the beginning of 2010 eventually also in Dagestan.[9] It also took responsibility for the 2009 Sayano-Shushenskaya hydro accident,[10] was blamed by some for the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings,[11] and has also been alleged to be behind the 2011 Domodedovo International Airport bombing.[12] The most recent operation claimed by the Brigade was the assassination of Russian war criminal Yuri Budanov in Moscow on 10 June 2011.[13] However, this was refuted by the rebel website Kavkaz Center the very next day,[12] triggering confusion over the original claim.

Motivation

The overall motives of Riyadus-Salikhin (RS) are grounded in the injustices that they perceive are directed at them on ‘their lands’. (IIPER, #14) Their grievances are best summed up by amir Umarov himself:

We see from a small episode, that in the territory of Caucasus, even if a person, out of humanitarian motives, out of compassion, gives a piece of bread to a Muslim, if he brings a loaf of bread, then this person is eliminated. Even if a doctor, who took a Hippocratic oath, if he bandages a Mujahid, the this person is eliminated forever, he disappears. (IIPER, #3)

They believe that it is naïve to think that Muslim faith can be spread without shedding of blood and that Islam “blossoms” out of the blood of Martyrs. Meanwhile, “Muslim lands” is a vague term that has been used to refer to everything from Chechnya to Siberia.

In a map the CE uses to depict its territory, it is comprised of the entire North Caucasus, including predominantly ethnic-Russian populated regions like Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories. Other Russian territory north of the CE and the Transcaucasus lying to its south – including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – are labeled “occupied Muslim lands.” (IIPER, #14)

The individual attackers are often bereaved relatives of killed mujahadin and are often times very young. Conversely, many join the organization while fleeing authorities (IIPER, #5)

Strategy

The attacks carried out by the RS follow a seasonal pattern. In the winter the fighters retreat to the mountains and it is uncommon to have even two attacks in February. During this time RS forms their strategic plans for the year. (IIPER, #10) At the start of spring, through the summer and continuing into fall, RS pursues a ceaseless campaign of suicide bombings averaging about 5 killings a week in Dagestan alone in 2010. (IIPER, #33)

RS subdivides its front into the ‘near enemy’ and ‘far enemy’ fronts. The ‘near’ front includes Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan while the ‘far’ front includes every other part of Russia that they target, with the most valuable target being Moscow. (IIPER, #4)

Since the beginning of 2009, RS reversed its policy of not targeting civilians. They have also justified the use of WMDs and appear to seek their acquisition. The data, however, does not seem to show a spike in civilian casualties on the ‘near’ front. (IIPER, #9) (IIPER, #33)This is likely explained by the demographic makeup of the ‘near’ front where Sunni Muslims constitute a 90%+ majority.

Funding

RS funding comes from the collection of ‘zakat’ from the local population and from corrupt government officials and criminals. (IIPER, #32)

Recruitment and Training

The head of RS must take a ‘byat’ loyalty oath to the amir of CE (IIPER, #25). There are contrasting claims on the nature of recruitment. Russian authorities have claimed on many occasions that the suicide attackers were under the influence of narcotics and that female suicide bombers are bought from their families for $2,000-$3,000. The RS has repeatedly denied these claims and has shown videos of martyrs before their attacks as proof. (IIPER, #3) Meanwhile, the Russian authorities claim that security videos of the Domodedovo airport bombing show the suspect wondering aimlessly under the influence of drugs for an hour before exploding. (IIPER, #35)

The martyrs undergo four weeks of training that involves hours of religious counseling. (IIPER, #12)

Buryatskii’s Ideological Role

Said Abu Saad Buryatskii (Aleksandr Tikhomirov) was a highly influential and inspirational leader and scholar within the ranks of CE. Strong evidence has been presented that he was the amir for RS. His online appeals have reached a large audience. (IIPER, #1) It has also been speculated that Buryatskii was the one who convinced amir Umarov to restart suicide bombing campaigns. (IIPER, #5). He was killed on March 9th, 2009 along with 7 of other mujahedin and recorded a sermon on his cell phone saying his last farewell before dying. (IIPER, #10)

Changing Focus

As its former name implies, Chechnians used to dominate every part of RS structure, however, with its revival the organization has increasingly moved away from its Chechen nationalist roots. For example, during the first 10 months of 2010 attacks in Chechnya have decrease by 46% from all of 2009 and by 45% in Ingushetia. Meanwhile, attacks in Dagestan have spiked by 50%. (IIPER, #29) This change in tactics is accompanied by a change in funding and priorities in the same direction and has caused the splinter of four prominent amirs from the organization to form the independent Nokchicho Vilaiyat. They are ‘Mansur’ Hussein Gakaev, Aslanbek Vadalov, Tarkhan Gaziev, Abu Anas Muhannad. It remains to be seen, what impact this will have on RS operations. (IIPER, #25) (IIPER, #28)

Furthermore, RS has shifted its focus more towards the ‘far’ front and has begun to target Moscow more often and to greater effect than before.

External links

• Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report [1]

--Slvrar (talk) 22:19, 15 November 2011 (UTC)