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[For page Dirty bomb]

Possibility of terrorist groups using dirty bombs <Edit to this>

Terrorist organizations may also capitalize on the fear of radiation to create weapons of mass disruption rather than weapons of mass destruction. A fearful public response may in itself accomplish the goals of a terrorist organization to gain publicity or destabilize society. Even simply stealing radioactive materials may trigger a panic reaction from the general public. Similarly, a small-scale release of radioactive materials or a threat of such a release may be considered sufficient for a terror attack. Particular concern is directed towards the medical sector and healthcare sites which are "intrinsically more vulnerable than conventional licensed nuclear sites". Opportunistic attacks may range to even kidnapping patients whose treatment involve radioactive materials. Of note is the public reaction to the Goiânia accident, in which over 100,000 people admitted themselves to monitoring, while only 49 were admitted to hospitals. Other benefits to a terrorist organization of a dirty bomb include economic disruption in the area affected, abandonment of affected assets (such a buildings, subways) due to public concern, and international publicity useful for recruitment.

Detection and Prevention

Dirty bombs may be prevented by detecting illicit radioactive materials in shipping with tools such as a Radiation Portal Monitor. Similarly, unshielded radioactive materials may be detected at checkpoints by Gieger Counters, gamma-ray detectors, and even Customs and Border Patrol (CBS) pager-sized radiation detectors. Hidden materials may also be detected by x-ray inspection and heat emitted may be picked up by infrared detectors. Such devices, however, may be circumvented by simply transporting materials across unguarded stretches of coastline or other barren border areas.

One proposed method for detecting shielded Dirty Bombs is Nanosecond Neutron Analysis (NNA). Designed originally for the detection of explosives and hazardous chemicals, NNA is also applicable to fissile materials. NNA determines what chemicals are present in an investigated device by analyzing emitted γ-emission neutrons and α-particles created from a reaction in the neutron generator. The system records the temporal and spatial displacement of the neutrons and α-particles within separate 3D regions. A prototype dirty-bomb detection device created with NNA is demonstrated to be able to detect uranium from behind a 5cm-thick lead wall. Other radioactive material detectors include Radiation Assessment and Identification (RAID) and Sensor for Measurement and Analysis of Radiation Transients, both developed by Sandia National Laboratories.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommends certain devices be used in tandem at country borders to prevent transfer of radioactive materials, and thus the building of dirty bombs. They define the four main goals of radiation detection instruments as detection, verification, assessment and localization, and identification as a means to escalate a potential radiological situation. The IAEA also defines the following types of instruments:

• Pocket-Type Instruments: these instruments provide a low-power, mobile option to detection that allows for security officers to passively scan an area for radioactive materials. These devices should be easily worn, should have an alarm threshold of three times normal radiation levels, and should have a long batter life - over 800 hours.
• Handheld Instruments: these instruments may be used to detect all types of radiation (including neutron) and may be used to search specific targets flexibly. These instruments should aim for ease of use and speed, ideally weighing less than 2 kg and being able to make measurements in less than a second.
• Fixed, installed instruments: these instruments provide a continuous, automatic detection system that can monitor pedestrians and vehicles that pass through. To work effectively pedestrians and vehicles should be led close to the detectors, as performance is directly related to range.

Legislative and regulatory actions can also be used to prevent access to materials needed to create a dirty bomb. Examples include the 2006 U.S. Dirty Bomb Bill, the Yucca Flats proposal, and the Nunn-Lungar act. Similarly, close monitoring and restrictions of radioactive materials may provide security for materials in vulnerable private-sector applications, most notably in the medical sector where such materials are used for treatments. Suggestions for increased security include isolation of materials in remote locations and strict limitation of access.

One way to mitigate a major effect of a radiological weapons may also be to educate the public on the nature of radioactive materials. As one of the major concerns of a dirty bomb is the public panic proper education may prove a viable counter-measure. Education on radiation is considered by some to be "the most neglected issue related to radiological terrorism".

Personal Safety

See Acute radiation syndrome

The Dirty Bomb Fact Sheet from FEMA states that the main danger of a dirty bomb comes from the initial blast rather than the radioactive materials To mitigate the risk of radiation exposure, however, FEMA suggests the following guidelines:

• Covering the mouth/nose with cloth to reduce risk of breathing in radioactive materials.
• Avoiding touching materials touched by the explosion.
• Quickly relocating inside to shield from radiation.
• Remove and pack up clothes. Keep clothes until instructed by authorities how to dispose of them.
• Keep radioactive dust inside.
• Remove all dust possible by showering with soap and water.
• Avoid taking Potassium iodide, as it only prevents effects from radioactive iodine and may instead cause a dangerous reaction.

[For page Radiological weapon]

Deployment <Edit to>

Other proposed dangers of deployment include commonplace liquid deployment systems such as crop-dusters and trucks with sprayers. Simply dispersing aerosolized radioactive materials could constitute an attack.

Recovery from

Official Guidelines

The United State Department of Homeland Security has currently standing guidelines for developing plans for "Protection and Recovery following Radioloigcal Dispersion Devise (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) incidents". It may be used to determine what actions are reasonable to take at certain times given certain levels of exposure to radioactive materials. This includes such information as how to react to the early (emergency), intermediate, and late phases; and how to manage critical infrastructure such as water and electricity. The following guidelines are suggested for each phase:

(1) Early: suggested response demands immediate action and priority to life-saving first aid. Preventative/protective actions to reduce additional areas from exposure is recommended, but may not be successful. Specifically, protective actions are defined as "activities that should be conducted in response to an RDD or IND incident in order to reduce or eliminate exposure of the public to radiation or other hazards". Principal protective actions include evacuation and sheltering, while secondary protective actions include decontamination and application of medicine. Primary goals are to protect public health and welfare in the first few hours and days, relegating radioactive material removal to later phases as necessary.

(2) Intermediate: this phase ideally starts once the initial sources and releases of the radiological incident are brought under control. In this phase, more protective actions may be taken to reduce public exposure to the radioactive materials. In addition, decisions may be made on plans to begin recovering and reopening critical infrastructure. Priority should be decided on a public health basis, giving additional importance to resources such as hospital entry roads.

(3) Late: this phase extends from the point in which operations to reduce radiation levels are in progress and ends when the area returns to a normal state. Whereas actions in previous phases should primarily be decided quickly by public officials to create an appropriately fast response, long-term decisions should involve outside stakeholders and experts to optimize the cost and impacts of several alternative plans.

Alternatives

A recent report from a NATO security group suggests another model. The plan proposed works as an adaption of United States plans to deal with biological and chemical incidents. The proposal is based on four concepts - (1) Accurate and timely communication to the public. (2) Repeated application of the techniques presented. (3) Optimization of resources throughout remediation of the problem. (4) Acknowledgment that understanding of many technical details is limited and requires outside help. Whereas the Homeland Security guidelines contain three phases, the proposed plan contains six that constitute the same three. Several suggestions are influenced by the reclamation efforts on the Marshall Islands. The six phases of the proposal are:

(1) Notification: this phase is the initial response and is based around identifying suspect release sites and alerting the proper agencies in a chain of information transfer.

(2) First Response: this phase involves generating an initial threat assessment to gauge the needed severity of the response. This includes determining whether Hazmat is necessary and determining if radiation levels warrant decontamination efforts.

(3) Characterization: goals of this phase include determine the specific nature (what elements and isotopes) and spread of radioactive contamination. This phase requires aerial monitoring and on-site laboratory analysis.

(4) Decontamination: actions in this phase center around cleaning areas affected by persistent health risks (as determined by the Characterization phase). Priority is to be given to critical infrastructure such as water and electricity. In cleaning, first priority is to be given to stabilization methods that limit the spread of radioactive materials. Waste must also be minimized or stabilized during this phase.

(5) Clearance: clearance is an evaluative phase used to determine if an affected area has met set goals of reducing radioactive risk. This may be determined by cancer risk and general quality of public health risk.

(6) Restoration/Reoccupancy: this phase entails the measures taken to restore an area after primary threats have been cleared. This includes actions taken to renovate, reoccupy, and monitor public health.

Outside United States

Another example of a reaction plan is the Belgian government's 2003 update to the radiological and nuclear emergency plan. The plan follows the following procedures:

(1) Automatic sheltering is instituted by the governor and authorities are alerted.

(2) Authorities take control of the situation once mobilized.

(3) Experts are called in to begin disposing of materials.

A separate automatic monitoring network also exist for the nuclear facilities around the country.

Sources

[A] DETECTION OF ‘DIRTY BOMBS’ USING NANOSECOND NEUTRON ANALYSIS (NNA) TECHNIQUE in Prevention, Detection and Response to Nuclear

and Radiological Threats [NATO Science for Peace and Security Series]

[B] United States Customs and Border Protection’s Radiation Portal Monitors at Seaports

[C] RADIOLOGICAL EVENTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES by CHARLES R. WOODRUFF JR, BS; LEONARD A. ALT, MS ; C. DOUGLAS FORCINO, PhD ; and RICHARD I. WALKER, PhD

[D] Transcendental Terrorism And Dirty Bombs: Radiological Weapons Threat Revisited by Chad Brown, CDR, USN

[E] https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/1150

[F] SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS in COUNTERING NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

[G] COMBATING RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM – A MULTI-FACETED CHALLENGE in COUNTER NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

[H] Terrorist "Dirty Bombs": A Brief Primer

[I] Response after RDD attack in Countering Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

[J] Operational Framework for Recovery from an Attack Involving a Radiological Dispersal Device/Improvised Nuclear Device in Nuclear Terrorism and National Preparedness

[K] http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1312_web.pdf