User:Skinny87/sandbox4

World War II
Part of Operation Dragoon
Date 15 August, 1944 Location Southern France Result Allied victory
Belligerents
United States United Kingdom	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick	General Frederick Wiese

Operation Rugby was the codename given to the airborne component of Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of Southern France that took place on 15 August, 1944.

Background

The Western Allies had first considered an invasion of southern France at the Trident Conference in May 1943. At the time, however, it was regarded as being too much of a risk, and was passed over in favour of an Allied invasion of Italy. At the Sextant Conference in December 1943, however, the invasion - which had been given the code-name of Anvil - was brought up again and the Combined Chiefs of Staff stated that Anvil would take place, as well as Operation Overlord, the planned invasion of Normandy. Anvil would either take place before, or just after Overlord, with the intention of weakening the German defences in France, or prevent German forces stationed in the south of France from being used to reinforce German forces in the north. Planning for Anvil began in late 1943, with a number of plans being devised, based on a varying number of divisions and whatever amphibious transports had not been tied down by Overlord.

In December Anvil had been envisioned as taking place in May, being launched at the same time as Overlord. However, in early January the commander of the Overlord ground forces, General Bernard Law Montgomery, argued that the assault on Normandy needed to be increased from three to five divisions to ensure it succeeded. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, backed Montgomery and authorized the extra two divisions for Overlord; the only way to transport these extra divisions would be to transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean, therefore severely limiting Anvil's potential size. Faced with these problems, Anvil was officially cancelled in April, 1944. But the idea did not completely die, thanks to the efforts of General Jacob L. Devers, commander of American Supply Services in the Mediterranean; he refused to reallocate the supplies gathered for the invasion, and ordered the new commanding officer of Seventh U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, to continue planning for Anvil.

Overlord took place on 6 June, 1944, but within a short period of time Allied forces were faced with a stalemate in the Normandy bocage. As a result, Anvil suddenly became an attractive proposition again, and it was believed that sufficient landing craft could be transferred from Normandy to the Mediterranean for use in the invasion. There was also the possibility that the fighting in the bocage might have forced German units in southern France to be transferred northwards, thereby weaking the remaining German presence there and also damaging their morale. With the need for Anvil now readily apparent, it was officially restarted in late June, and renamed Dragoon on 27 July. However, permission for the operation to take place was only given to the Mediterranean theatre commander, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, on 11 August, a mere five days before the invasion was scheduled to begin; it had taken more than a month and a half to overcome the objections of Allied military and political leaders, particularly those of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to the operation taking place.

Planning

Initial planning

Planning for the airborne component of Dragoon began on 4 December, 1943, under the direction of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force. The MAAF moved from La Marsa to Algiers, where it was joined by planning staff from Seventh Army and the Allied navies. An initial appraisal of what would be required to conduct the airborne operation was issued by the MAAF on 23 December, with orders sent to the formations under its command on 29 December. At this stage, however, further planning was stymied because of confusion over what size operation Anvil was meant to be, and whether it would even take place. The planners faced further obstacles by the fact that Seventh Army did not decide, until March 1944, on the exact geographical location that Dragoon would take place; the entire southern coast of France was considered, with plans even being based around landings at Genoa and Bordeaux. By the beginning of March the proposed area had been narrowed down to somewhere between Nice and Toulon, but ground force planners could still not decide on the precise location. For the airborne planners, the terrain around these two cities was not ideal for an airborne operation, and a number of locations were dismissed as unsuitable for airborne troops to land in.

As planning for Dragoon slowly progressed, the MAAF was also faced with a limited amount of transport aircraft that had been allocated to it. At the Sextant Conference, it had been announced that sufficient aircraft would be provided to transport two brigades, but on 8 January the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing was transferred to Britain for use in Overlord, followed by a detachment of the 315th Troop Carrier Group at the start of April. The commander of XII Troop Carrier Command, Brigadier General Paul L. Williams, had suggested to the commander of the MAAF, General Ira C. Eaker, that the detachment remain in the Mediterranean to be used in Dragoon. Eaker dismissed the idea, however, stating that the MAAF was obliged to send the detachment back so it could be used during Overlord. This meant that the only transport aircraft left in the Mediterranean were those that belonged to the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, with the remaining aircraft perhaps sufficient to carry a single regiment.

By the beginning of March, Seventh Army planners had chosen several beaches between Cavalaire and Agay as the site for Dragoon, and although the terrain was not ideal for an airborne operation, several locations did seem to be suitable for parachute and glider landings. Planning for an airborne operation therefore began to take place in late March and early April. As this planning progressed, however, 64 planes were detached from the 51st Troop Carrier Wing at the beginning of April and sent to Burma; with so few transport aircraft now remaining it seemed that a large-scale airborne operation would not be a feature of Dragoon after all. However, planning for an airborne operation continued, and a plan was presented to General Wilson on 29 April. According to this plan, the day before the amphibious assaults took place (D-1), three parachute battalions would be dropped before nightfall near the towns of Collobrieres, Le Luc and Le Muy; they would intercept German formations attempting to advance on the Dragoon beaches from the north and north-west. On the day after the amphibious assaults had taken place (D+1), another battalion would be dropped at night around Cap Benat to eliminate coastal batteries and cut the coastal road that ran west of the beachhead. Both of these missions would be flown by aircraft from the 51st Troop Carrier Wing based on Corsica. This remained the only plan for an airborne operation throughout May and most of June, as planning for Dragoon had come to an end for that period.

Planning resumed

Dragoon was resuscitated in late June, and planning resumed at the same time. On 21 June the detachment from the 51st Troop Carrier Wing returned from Burma and was stationed in Burma, ensuring that the planners had at least one Wing of transport aircraft at their disposal. General Wilson called for the addition of two more Wings to be transferred to the Mediterranean, stating in a message to the British Chiefs of Staff that their provision would greatly increase the chances of Dragoon succeeding. Although Eisenhower was initially unwilling to transfer any of his transport aircraft from Normandy, where he was contemplating an airborne operation against several ports in Brittany, the seizure of Cherbourg on 26 June allowed his Chief of Staff to pledge 416 transport aircraft for use in the Mediterrean, to be returned by late August. By 8 July, a directive had been sent to IX Troop Carrier Command to send two wings of aircraft to Italy, 390 in total, alongside a headquarters detachment and a pathfinder group.

On the same day, the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF) developed an outline plan for a large-scale airborne operation. This was to take place during daylight on D-1, using 394 aircraft and thirty gliders. They would transport the First Airborne Task Force (FABTF), commanded by Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick. The British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade Group would drop west of Le Muy, and the American 517th Parachute Regimental Combat Team near Le Luc; at the same time, the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 551st Parachute Infantry Regiment would drop by Carnoules. The airborne troops would be tasked with securing several vital road junctions, as well as high ground to the north, in order to prevent German forces reaching the Dragoon beachheads and secure a route for a rapid advance towards Toulon. This plan came with a major weakness, however: dispersion. Although Le Muy was only 10 miles (16 km) from several coastal towns, both Le Luc and Carnoules were further inland and therefore less accessible to the advancing ground forces; if the German response were quick enough, the American airborne forces might be defeated before they could be reinforced. Despite General Wilson asking whether it might be best to land the airborne forces in one area only, nothing was changed at the time. The operation was scheduled for 15 August, and in daylight to ensure that the chaos caused by the night-time landings during Operation Husky were not repeated; however, Eisenhower objected, stating that a daylight mission was riskier, and would ruin any chance of surprising the Germans the next day. As a result, the overall MAAF plan released on 12 July mentioned the morning of D-Day as an alternative time for the operation.

When Lieutenant General Patch read the plan, however, he became concerned about the dispersion of the airborne forces, and instead announced that the airborne forces would be dropped in two areas, which were close together and near to the coast. The 2nd Parachute Brigade would land north-east of Le Muy to cut the Argens valley highway, whilst the American airborne units would land together, midway between Le Muy and the village of Grimaud, 2 miles (3.2 km) west of St Tropez. They would then advance to the north, east and west of these positions, link up with the British paratroopers, eliminate coastal defences, and generally protect the left flank of the beach landings. Plans were initially made to include a French parachute regiment in the airborne assault, but a conflict with the commander of the Free French forces, General Charles DeGaulle, who wanted the regiment to be used in an entirely different operation led to them being withdrawn. Just as this second plan had been formulated, however, yet another was being suggested, this time coming from the United States Army Air Forces Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Presented to Allied commanders in Italy on 15 July, this plan called for an airborne division to seize five airfields near the city of Avignon around D+10, with three infantry divisions then being transported via heavy bombers onto the airfields. The entire force would then secure the Rhone Valley and ensure it could not be used by retreating German forces. However, the plan would require the use of 70% of the bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force for one to two months, as well as delay the return of the transport aircraft lent to the Mediterranean by Eisenhower, and was not well received. Numerous objections were raised by the assembled officers and planners, which lead to the plan being scrapped.

Operation Rugby

Two days earlier, on 13 July, Brigadier General Paul L. Williams, commander of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, and Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick, commander of the First Airborne Task Force began to jointly plan the airborne operation. Once again timings, locations and drop zones were altered, but by 15 July the two men had managed to formulate the final plan for the airborne component of Dragoon. The entire airborne operation was given the code-name of Operation Rugby, and would consist of the FABTF being dropped in a semicircular position 3 miles (4.8 km) north, east and west of Le Muy. By doing so, the Task Force would be able to block all of the roads that ran through Le Muy, and ensure that no German forces would be able to move south, towards the Allied beachheads. The first part of the operation would be a dawn paratroop mission code-named Albatross. 2nd Parachute Brigade would land north of Le Muy at drop zone 'O', with the village of La Motte to the south-east and the River Nartuby running along its southern edge. The brigade would seize the area around Le Muy and La Motte, eliminate all enemy units in the area, and interdict three roads which could be used by German forces moving south. Resistance was expected to be minimal, but it was believed that German reserves could be mobilized against the brigade within a few hours. A glider mission, scheduled for a few hours after the brigade had landed and code-named Bluebird, would bring in additional artillery support for the brigade.

The 517th Regimental Combat Team would be dropped 2 miles (3.2 km) west of Le Muy in drop zone 'A' and landing zone 'A', with the Nartuby at its northern edge and the 2nd Parachute Brigade 250 metres (270 yd) away from its north-eastern edge. It would eliminate all German forces it located, secure the high ground to the north and west of the town, and blockade the roads that led west towards Toulon and Draguignan, a German corps headquarters being based in the latter. Finally, the 509th Parachute Battalion would be dropped on drop zone 'C', to the south-east of Le Muy, a steep, rocky and mountainous area that would require "pinpoint accuracy" to ensure that the battalion was able to secure high ground to the south of the town. Williams was able to ensure that the majority of the three airborne units would be dropped during the first hours of daylight on D-Day, with the remainder of the FATBF landing in the afternoon. The next part of the operation would be code-named Canary and consist of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion landing on drop zone 'A'. Finally would come Dove, in which 325 transport aircraft and 270 gliders would transport the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion into landing zone 'A'. The latter would be protected by a heavy fighter escort. Williams was convinced that a daylight operation conferred a number of advantages on the Allies. The transport aircraft would have the advantage of darkness as they approached the drop zones, as well as surprise, and the airborne troops would be able to begin their assaults before the amphibious landings took place; they would also drop sufficiently late that the Germans would not have enough time to prepare to counter the beach landings. Having the remainder of the FATBF land by glider in the afternoon would give aircraft crews a rest after the initial drops, and would also also give the airborne troops time to clear the landing zones for the gliders.

Earlier plans for the airborne operation had called for the transport aircraft to be based in Italy, dog-leg around Corsica and then approach southern France from there. However, this would mean a longer trip for aircraft based in central Italy, and as such Corsica was dropped. Instead, the transport aircraft would take off from the north-east corner of the island of Elba, go past the north tip of Corsica, and then find the port of Agay, approximately 20 miles (32 km) east of the drop zones and landing zones. To ensure that there was to be no repetition of the airborne operations during Operation Husky, where Allied naval anti-aircraft fire had shot down many transport aircraft, safety corridors were established in which all anti-aircraft fire would be prohibited and advance notice of the aircraft passing over head would be sent to all anti-aircraft positions, both at sea and on land. Three beacon vessels were to be provided, to highlight where the aircraft would need to turn towards their destinations. They would be well-protected by fighter and bomber cover during their journey. From ten minutes before Rugby began to ten minutes afterwards, fighters from the Desert Air Force (DAF) would fly along the safety corridors, knocking out searchlights and anti-aircraft positions. 36 Spitfires from XII Tactical Air Command would fly behind the transport aircraft between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, and another squadron of Spitfires would patrol the Gulf of Genoa to deter any Luftwaffe fighters that attempted to disrupt the airborne operation. The morning glider flight in support of 2nd Parachute Brigade would be escorted by P-51 Mustangs, with twelve fighter-bombers from the DAF along to neutralize anti-aircraft positions, and the same would apply to the later glider missions. In an attempt to confuse the Germans and divert them from the airborne troops objectives, German radar would be jammed on D-Day, and bombers would drop Window radar counter-measures and dummy parachutists to give the impression that a large-scale airborne operation was taking place in between Marseilles and Toulon.

Preparation

Allies

Although planning involving it had moved at a rapid pace, the First Airborne Task Force had been a very recent creation. When considering using airborne troops as a part of Dragoon, the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff had called for a provisional airborne division be created to provide an overall command structure for the individual airborne units. Brigadier General Fredericks, commander of the 1st Special Service Force, was chosen to take command of the provisional division, which was activated on 12 July with the title of Seventh Army Airborne Division (Provisional). Frederick felt that the title was inappropriate, and on 21 July it was redesignated First Airborne Task Force. Training began on 20 July, but immediately ran into difficulties; although Frederick was qualified as a parachutist, he had no experience in planning large-scale airborne operations, nor were there many staff officers with such experience in the Mediterranean. As a remedy for this, 36 staff officers were detached from the 13th Airborne Division and Airborne Training Center to form FABTF Headquarters. The Task Force had an authorized strength of 9, 732 airborne troops, and could expand this an extra five percent if required.

With the command structure formed, individual units were then added to the Task Force. The 517th Parachute Combat Team, 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, 550th Glider Infantry Battalion and 1st Battalion, 551st Parachute Infantry Regiment were available to be attached to the Task Force. The veteran 2nd Parachute Brigade was an important addition, as apart from the 509th none of the other units had seen combat for more than a few weeks; it was attached to the Task Force with the proviso that it was returned to the Italian theatre when the operation was completed. Little training was required for the parachute units, and anyway time was too short to conduct large-scale exercises; those small exercises that were conducted had most of the chosen unit simulating a parachute drop. The glider-borne units, however, had never conducted an airborne operation before, and as such between 20 July and 5 August an instruction school trained them in loading and unloading equipment under combat conditions. A shortage of gliders meant that only one practice mission took place, on 12 August, and very few gliders landed. Four regimental pathfinder teams were formed from teams of ten men detached from each airborne battalion, with all four going through a thorough training program which included actual parachute drops.

Securing and then assembling gliders was an urgent task for the planners of the airborne operation; Rugby called for the use of 350 Waco CG-4 gliders, but the majority of the gliders that had been based in the Mediterranean had been transferred to Britain in March for use in Overlord. Around 140 were available, with the probability that another 100 at most could be found. Fortunately for the operation, another 350 gliders were dispatched from the United States on 23 June. To ensure that they would be ready in time, General Eakers ordered that their assembly be as quick as possible, taking precedence over all other air maintenance work. The first gliders arrived at Naples on 15 July, but not all were delivered until the end of the month. The deadline for their assembly was given as 10 August, and the day before that 327 had been assembled at Cercola, along with another nineteen at Brindisi. Communication equipment for the gliders was late in arriving, meaning that the glider pilots themselves had install them theirselves. Because the gliders had been late in arriving and then being assembled, there was little time for training, and there were also orders to limit the number of training flights to ensure a minimum of gliders were damaged before the operation began. Brigadier General Williams had originally decided that each glider would only have a single pilot, but General Fredricks was aware that if this pilot were wounded or even killed, the glider would crash. As a result he asked for each glider to have a co-pilot, and 375 extra glider pilots arrived in early August to supplement the 374 British and American glider pilots that were already in the Mediterranean.

The transport aircraft to be used during Rugby came under the command of the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division (PTCAD), commanded by Brigadier General Williams and activated on 16 July. Its principal units were the 50th, 51st and 53rd Troop Carrier Wings, all of which were based at ten airfields north of Rome. A total of 413 transport aircraft were under the control of PTCAD, as well as another twelve pathfinder aircraft which had been sent with pathfinder teams from the 101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division who would serve as instructors. The Wings encountered minor communication problems as they settled into their bases near Rome, as well as dusty conditions that forced all airfields to be covered in oil to ensure the dust did not delay aircraft taking off. More problematic was a lack of gasoline, with local supplies being minimal; this was solved by having two truck companies transport 50-gallon drums of gasoline to the airfields during the two weeks prior to D-Day. Several of the Troop Carrier Groups, particularly the 62nd and 64th belonging to the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, required extensive training, as it had been quite some time since the majority of their personnel had conducted an airborne operation. On the other hand, the 50th and 53rd Troop Carrier Wings had only recently been involved in Operation Overlord, and therefore conducted a minimum of rehearsals, which included simulated night drops, practice flights from Italy to Elba, and formation flying. Only one rehearsal exercise was conducted by all of the Wings, taking place on 7 August, which proved invaluable in tuning the performance of the Rebecca-Eureka radio beacons and familiarizing naval personnel under the safety corridors with the sight of the transport aircraft.

Final preparations for the operation took place throughout early August. On 6 August PTCAD briefed Wing and Group Commanders on their tasks, then issued its field order for Dragoon on 7 August, and between 8-14 August briefed squadron commanders, intelligence officers, and then finally flying personnel. Although photographs of the drop and landing zones were taken several days before Rugby began, they were unavailable for the briefings, which had to use photographs from 28 July; as a result, many of the anti-invasion measures that the Germans had constructed took the glider pilots by surprise. Only one detailed model of the terrain the airborne troops would be landing on was available for briefings, although 50th Wing was able to procure a sand table showing the area around Le Muy. Weather reports were taken on 13 and 14 August, with the latter predicting a likelihood of fog over the drop zones; General Eaker believed this was an acceptable risk and ordered that the operation take place as planned, without any delays.

Germany

The First Airborne Task Force, as well as the rest of the Dragoon invasion forces, would be opposed by the German Nineteenth Army, which was stationed throughout southern France and responsible for the 300 miles (480 km) coastline between Italy and Spain. Commanded by General Frederick Wiese and with an approximate strength of 250,000 troops, the Nineteenth Army was formed of three corps: IV Luftwaffe Field Corps, with its headquarters west of Narbonne; LXXXV Army Corps, which had its headquarters stationed at Cavaillon; and finally LXII Reserve Army Corps, whose headquarters were in Draguignan. The Army had suffered heavy losses before being moved south, and the troops transferred to it to make up these losses were of a poor quality, primarily detachments from divisions exhausted fighting in Normandy and Hiwi auxiliary troops; the latter were believed to be unreliable in combat. It had also lost its armoured formations and mobile reserves, as well as its best infantry divisions, to Oberkommando West for use in the Battle of Normandy. Morale was low amongst all of its remaining units, and levels of training were generally poor.

The 338th Infantry Division was positioned around the estuary of the River Rhone, but it only possessed three-quarters of its strength, with the rest having been transferred northwards. To its east was the 244th Infantry Division, which possessed several field artillery batteries, as well as 88 coastal guns, and to its west were stationed the 189th, 198th and 716th Infantry Divisions. In the area between Toulon and Agay was the 242nd Infantry Division, which possessed 106 coastal guns, a number of which had sufficient range to shell the invasion beaches. Finally, the stretch of coast from Agay to the Maritime Alps was guarded by the 148th Infantry Division; this formation was also understrength, only possessing two out of three brigades. There were only two reserve formations available to the Nineteenth Army, both under the control of Army Group G, commanded by Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz, responsible for all French territory south of the River Loire. The first was the only armoured formation available, the 11th Panzer Division commanded by Major General Wend von Wietersheim. Positioned in Bordeaux, it was at approximately half strength, with 11,000 troops but only 26 Mark IV and 49 Mark V Panzers. Until recently it had served on the Eastern Front for a considerable amount of time. The second reserve formation was the 157th Infantry Division, far north of the Cote d'Azur; however, it was heavily engaged in combating French resistance groups. There would be limited air support for Nineteenth Army, with the 2nd Air Division being the only Luftwaffe formation in the area. It possessed a total of 186 aircraft, a number of which were obsolete and the majority actually inoperative. Anti-aircraft defence was provided by the 5th Flak Brigade.

After Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had visited southern France in mid-May, who had been displeased with the state of the coastal fortifications, Army Group G had ordered the immediate strengthening of all coastal defences in the area commanded by Nineteenth Army. Minefields and barbed-wire were laid on all beaches, which in turn were covered by machine gun positions and civilian buildings transformed into blockhouses. Likely landing beaches were blocked off with pointed steel posts placed in the seabed, which were intended to tear apart landing craft, and anti-personnel mines were seeded in the areas likely to be used by advancing sea-borne infantry. The majority of these defences were constructed by a force of 14,000 workers from Organization Todt, as well as Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine engineers, along a 100 miles (160 km) section of coastline between Nice and Marseilles. To deter potential airborne landings, sharpened stakes were sunk into the ground in areas likely to be used as drop zones, and large poles with wire stretched between them, designed to damage gliders, were erected on potential landing zones.

As the date for the invasion grew nearer, signs signalling that it would occur began to appear. There was a sudden increase in air raids targetting coastal fortifications, radar sites, as well as intelligence reports from agents that the Allies would land on 15 August. The Germans were prevented from developing a coherent analysis of what the Allies might do, however, due to the lack of a central agency to collate and compare all the information they had. As a result, there was a considerable difference of opinion of where an Allied invasion force might land. The Wehrmacht Deputy Chief of Staff believed that a landing would be made on the Ligurian coast, whilst General Wiese and Oberkommando West thought they would land between the Vars and Rhone rivers. The commander of IV Luftwaffe Field Corps held yet another opinion, believing that any landings would be made near Narbonne and Sete. On 14 August, the day before the landings, Wiese believed the Allies would land east of the Rhone, around Marseilles and Toulon; this belief was based on the movement of Allied convoys, although even then he was concerned that they might only be a distraction to a landing elsewhere.

As a result of this confusion, the Germans were slow in mobilizing to defend the coast. Only on 9 August was 11th Panzer Division ordered moved to Avignon in preparation for action, and it took a further five days for it to actually begin moving. The same day Wiese ordered the division to deploy on both sides of the Rhone, with the 198th Infantry Division moved to defensive positions south of Nimes. More troops were deployed to the west of the Rhone, although their movement was delayed by destroyed bridges throughout the area. On 14 August, LXII Reserve Army Corps was ordered to place the 242nd Infantry Division around St Tropez-Toulon, 148th Infantry Division between the Var valley and Nice, and an understrength regiment near Le Muy. However, the Corps was still moving its troops on the morning of 15 August, when the Allied seaborne and airborne landings began.

Battle

At 21:00 on 14 August, two GEE radio beacons were activated to aid the transport aircraft as they approached the landing and drop zones. Less than five hours later, at 01:55 on 15 August - D-Day for Operation Dragoon - the diversionary airborne operation began. Five C-47 Dakota's belonging to 216 Squadron, Royal Air Force, took off from Corsica, and when they were approximately 90 miles from La Ciotat, they began to deploy Window to give the impression to German radars that they were five serials of transport aircraft. Then, between 03:49 and 04:19, the Dakota's used dummy paratroopers and small-arms fire simulators to simulate an airborne landing taking place between two towns some 15 miles north of Toulon. These seem to have been successful in confusing the German forces as to where the real airborne landings were taking place, and therefore delaying the deployment of German forces until they could make sense of the fragmentary information they were receiving through a communication network severely damaged by Allied bombing raids and sabotage by French resistance groups.

The airborne operation itself began at approximately 01:00, with 121 pathfinders flying in nine planes formed into three serials, each five minutes apart and destined for a seperate drop zone. All nine aircraft reached the French coast on schedule, but when they passed over the Riviera they encountered heavy fog, with the pilots attempting to navigate by aerial photographs of the area taken a few days previously. Even with this aid the lead serial, carrying pathfinder teams from the 509th and 550th Parachute Infantry Battalion, as well as the 551st Parachute Infantry Regiment, became lost; supposed to drop these pathfinders on drop zone 'C' at 03:23, they instead circled around for thirty minutes. One aircraft dropped its pathfinders at 03:53, the second at 04:00 and the third at 04:15. All three teams landed in a wooded area ten to fifteen areas east of the drop zone, and as a result were too far away to mark it for the main airborne landings. The second serial, carrying the pathfinders for the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, dropped the paratroopers at 03:28, two minutes early; as a result the pathfinders came down three and half miles east of drop zone 'A'. They waited until daybreak and then attempted to head for the drop zone, but were attacked by German troops; only after fending off this attack were they finally able to make their way to the drop zone and aid in the afternoon landings. The final serial carried the pathfinders for the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade Group, and despite the fog dropped them accurately on schedule at 03:34, with one team landing less than 100 yards of drop zone 'O'; after being aided by a French farmer, they were able to set up two Eureka beacons to mark the drop zone for the rest of the Brigade.

Albatross

Landings

A few hours later, the pathfinders were followed by the first, and largest, part of the airborne landings: 396 transport aircraft carrying approximately 5,600 airborne troops and more than 150 artillery pieces. Apart from 75 aircraft retained for towing the gliders that would arrive later in the day, PTCAD had used 90% of its total strength during Albatross, leaving it with a reserve of only 55 aircraft. The aircraft were formed into ten serials, flying in flights of nine in a formation of V of Vs, with each flight maintaining a distance of approximately 2,000 feet between themselves and the other flights. The paratroopers would be dropped at speeds of under 100 miles per hour, and a height of 1,500 feet with the exception of drop zone 'C', where they would be dropped at 1,800 feet. The pilots were under strict orders to drop their loads as close to the drop zones as possible, and that no evasive action was to be taken after passing Elba. The 50th Transport Carrier Wing were first to take off, with all of its serials en-route to the drop zones lifting off between 01:50 and 02:55, with only two aircraft damaged as they left the airfields. Next came the 53rd Transport Carrier Wing, whose aircraft were in flight by 02:43, and then the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, whose first aircraft took off at 02:11 and first serial passed Elba at 02:48.

No problems were encountered as the 100-foot formation formed up, and they countered good weather and no enemy activity as far as Elba. When the first aircraft reached the French coast, however, they found heavy banks of fog between 500 and 1,000 feet high; these would be particularly troublesome for the American paratroopers, who would have to land on their dropzones without aid from their pathfinders. The first two serials to drop their airborne troops were carrying 1,200 paratroopers from the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, as well as attached artillerymen and engineers, destined for drop zone 'C'. Despite heavy fog and no signals from the pathfinders, the aircraft of the first serial dropped their paratroopers at 04:21, with almost all coming down within 500 metres of the drop zone; twenty men were injured during the drop, two of them seriously. The second serial became lost due to the fog and dropped B and C Companies of the 509th, along with two artillery batteries, over St Tropez, some ten miles from the drop zone; the paratroopers were widely dispersed over a large area and came down in small groups, although they only suffered fifteen injuries. The next four serials were destined for drop zone 'A', carrying the entire 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment and an attached artillery unit. The first dropped 720 paratroopers of 2nd Battalion at 04:31, widely dispersing them and ensuring only a third were able to find the drop zone. The next serial dropped 3rd Battalion under extremely difficult conditions, splitting the battalion into three groups around the town of Fayence, fifteen miles from the drop zone. The third serial dropped the 460th Artillery Battalion with reasonable accuracy, but at least twenty aircraft dropped their loads too soon. The last serial, carrying 1st Battalion of the 517th, dropped the battalion in scattered groups several miles from the drop zone.

Thanks to the British pathfinders arriving on drop zone 'O' accurately and setting up their equipment, the serials transporting the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade Group and First Airborne Task Force headquarters were able to drop the airborne troops with a relatively high degree of accuracy. The first serial arrived over the drop zone at 04:54 and dropped its troops with great accuracy, followed by a second serial several minutes later which achieved similar results; the latter was so accurate that the brigade's commander, Brigadier C.H.V. Pritchard, landed within thirty feet of the site for his command post. The other two serials, which arrived a short time later however, dropped their airborne troops with a lesser degree of accuracy, with part of 5th Battalion landing near Fayence and a number of paratroopers being scattered miles away from the drop zone. In the aftermath of the operation, it was revealed that only 73 of the 126 aircraft transporting the brigade had located the correct drop zone.

Combat

In the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion's area, A Company and the majority of B Company, along with two batteries from the 463rd Field Artillery Battalion, landed accurately on drop zone 'C' and began to secure their positions; the whole battalion was tasked with holding the heights to the south of Le Muy, as well as denying to the Germans a road that led from that town to nearby Saint Maxime. The paratroopers were able to assemble by 07:00, but until dawn broke the artillerymen had trouble locating their guns in the darkness; by 12:00, however, they had three guns ready for action. By that time, the paratroopers had secured the heights and fortified the drop zone, as well as seized a bridge that led to Le Muy and learnt that the town was occupied by a German garrison. At around 17:00 the senior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Yarborough, learnt that a German column comprised of infantry and vehicles was moving towards the drop zone from Le Muy; he prepared to ambush the column, but the Germans were able to detect the paratrooper's attempts and a fierce firefight broke out. It lasted for two hours and ended with the Germans falling back after suffering a large number of casualties, and sixty prisoners were taken by the Americans.

Although the battalion's C Company had been accidently dropped just outside of Saint Tropez, along with some twenty men from B Company, entire force was able to assemble quickly, despite being accidently strafed by Allied aircraft. The company commander, Captain Walls, was informed by a local French resistance unit that the German commander of the city intended to destroy the port facilities located there. With a force of approximately 250 paratroopers, the Captain advanced towards the city at 07:45; after taking 250 prisoners and eliminating two coastal batteries during the advance, the paratroopers entered the centre of Saint Tropez, reinforced by some fifty French resistance fighters. Here they found that the remaining German troops had fallen back to an old citadel, there they intended to make a stand; the Allied force therefore kept the garrison contained with weapons fire until 15:00, when a company from the American 45th Infantry Division arrived with heavy weapons; after thirty minutes of bazooka and heavy machine gun fire the German survivors surrendered, although several more hours of street fighting would pass before the city was completely in Allied hands.

The 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Rupert D. Graves, was widely scattered when it was dropped. The regiment was tasked with occupying positions along the approaches to the town of Le Muy, and then holding a perimeter a few miles west of the town. It would link up with the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade on its right flank and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion. The regiment's 1st Battalion had one group land near a heavily-manned German position, under a mile from Le Muy; when dawn broke, it assaulted the position, taking thirty two prisoners and killing and wounding 50 Germans. The 3rd Battalion landed around three villages some 25 miles from drop zone 'A'. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Zais, was able to round up a group of eighty five paratroopers, and they headed for the village of Sainte Clariers. After several hours of marching, they were able to link up with a group of paratroopers from the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade Group's 4th Parachute Battalion, led by its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vic Coxen. The joint group moved towards Le Muy, encountering and destroying an enemy convoy enroute. Eventually enough of the regiment's men were able to find the drop zone and occupy their designated positions. When dawn broke, the regiment was able to occupy Trans en Provence and La Motte, both villages a short distance from the drop zone, but it was still well understrength. A Company, originally meant to be the regimental reserve, held the positions meant for 3rd Battalion with roadblocks manned by only a few men each. By D+1, 1st Battalion had only managed to gather together some 150 men, and 2nd Battalion could only muster 200.

• Include Bluebird mission in 2nd Para's section
• Add German reactions in seperate paragraph.

Canary

• Landings, then combat up until Dove arrive, with German reactions

Dove

• Landings, then combat by all airborne forces until finish of Rugby, along with German reactions. If it gets too long, split off post-Dove combat into 'Ground role' section.

Aftermath

Analysis

Although PTCAD headquarters reported that the pathfinder mission was completely successful, this view is "seriously incorrect" according to Warren, who states that only one pathfinder team landed accurately and was able to establish the required navigational aids.

• Warren, p. 100 for drop statistics for Albatross

Temp gallery

• 
  Paratroop C-47, 12th Air Force Troop Carrier Wing. Invasion of southern France, 15 August 1944.
• 
  Operation Dragoon Landings
• 
  Brigadier General Robert T Frederick, commander of First Airborne Task Force
• 
  Generalmajor Wend von Wietersheim, commander of 11th Panzer Division
• 
  British Gliders towed by Douglas C47 Dakota aircraft over Southern France for the Allied airborne invasion
• 
  Paratroopers of the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment prepare for Operation Rugby

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