User:ShirbachaHazara
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This user is awarded the Barnstar of Hazara Heritage for working in preserving over Six thousand years of history and heritage for the Hazara people. |
WikiProject Hazara
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from | - |azaraBoyz(talk) 08:59, 26 September 2009 (UTC)
___________________________________Origin of Hazaras! _______________________________________
Much of the information about the Hazaras has been based almost solely on reports drawn up by agents of various countries with an interest in Afghanistan, such as Britain, and Russia. Much of this is a doubtful academic value as it is mostly derived from secondhand sources for political rather anthropological or historical purposes. Often it is based on information from Western and other freeing travelers and adventurers. Second, few of the scholars who have written about the Hazaras or are familiar with Hazaragi dialect, and so have always relied on interpreters or second-hand texts, while some writers have never even visited Afghanistan. Third, the monopoly of power and racial discrimination by the Pashtun people against the Hazaras over the post two hundred years has not only led to a lack of political and economic development in the Hazaristan, but also to a lack of cultural and historical cohesion in Afghanistan. Fourth, systematic and academic research on the history of the Hazaras is further complicated by the fact that much of what has been written on these people is incorporated into wider and more general studies in Iran, Afghanistan and India (and today Pakistan). Since research on the Hazaras has never been approved of, let alone encouraged, by the ruling powers in Afghanistan, little if any attention has been paid to the subject by scholars from Afghanistan, while research carried out by western scholars has been inevitably been limited by political problems on the one hand, and regional and tribal complexities on the other, all of which have contributed to making it virtually impossible for foreign scholars to obtain permission to visit central Afghanistan for most of the past 200 years. Fifth, because of continuous discrimination against the Hazaras by the central government, most of the first hand and valuable political and historical documents available are safeguarded by various Hazara families and individuals, and so is simply inaccessible to most scholars. There is much about the history of Afghanistan and in particular the history and identity of the Hazaras that remains unrevealed and unknown to this day. Finally, it is a fact that very little work at all has been carried out on Afghanistan its people in general. What little work has been done by scholars of Afghanistan itself, is unfortunately based, for the most part, on analyses of, and is more than, the repetition or review of works by western scholars who have many shortcomings. Consequently, little if any original or academically reliable work exists by social scientists from Afghanistan. This, in my opinion, is the most significant reason for the existence of diverse theories and inconclusive social scientific research, in particular in the field of anthropology and ethnology, on Afghanistan. The reasons mentioned above are no doubt not entirely exhaustive.
The theory of the Mogol origin is based more on non- or ill-documented assumptions and guesswork than anything else. That the Mogols invaded today’s Iran and Afghanistan is a historical fact; that Hazaras bear great physical resemblance to the Moghols is beyond doubt. However, these are insufficient grounds for classifying the Hazaras as Moghols. Furthermore, the advocates of this theory fall into different categories. Firstly, there are those believe the Hazaras to be descendants of Changhis Khan’s soldiers. This is highly questionable and unacceptable; no first-hand documents so far discovered confirm that either Changhiz or his commanders ordered their respective troops to settle Down in what is the Hazaristan(Bacon, 1951:241). Secondly, there others who believe the Hazaras to be descendants of Nikoudari soldiers and not of Changhiz Khan’s; an equally unfounded theory. For the Nikoudaris first settled in the Hazaristan several years after Changhiz’z invasion, after being defeated at the hands of Timur-e Lang’s soldiers. "It is not until 1383, after invading Sistan, that Timur ordered his commanders Miran Shah and Amir Mohammed to attack the Nikoudaris, who at the time were in the lowlands of Qandahar" (timorkhanov, 1980:21). Thus, while it is true that the Nikoudaris have influenced the formation of the Hazara peoples, there is no evidence to suggest that they were their original ancestors. Nor is there enough evidence for the view that the Hazaras are a mixed race of Moghols and Turks only. Once again, while Moghol and Turkic influence in the formation of the Hazara race cannot be denied, it is not accurate to consider them as the original or only ancestors of the Hazaras. A fundamental point in relation to Hazarology which must not be overlooked is that no document has as yet been found that actually speaks of "Moghol Hazaras"; nor has any scholar come across Moghol-speaking Hazaras. Of course, this is not to deny the influence of the Moghols on the Hazara peoples, for the dominant influence of the Moghols, Tajiks, and the Turks, more than any other peoples, is self-evident. However, as Schurmann points out, "the Hazaras, Moghols and Aimaqs are three distinct peoples"(1962:110). As such it is not correct to regard the Hazaras either just Moghol or Turco-Moghol. The theory of the Hazaras as amixed race, while much more plausible than the two mentioned, remains incomplete and ambiguous as it stands. On the one hand, it is of course possible to generalize such a theory to apply to virtually all ethnic groups worlwide [in opposition to the theory of 'pure race' as propounded by Nazi Germany and present day South Africa]. On the other hand, the identity and role of the various mixed races said to make up the Hazara race is not clearly discussed. For example, no mention is made of the historical geography of the region, and in particular of the identity of the ancient inhabitants of present-day Hazaristan. Nor is there serious consideration of the various migratory waves across Central Asia, Iran, Turkey and Northern India. Any anthropological research on the ethnography of the peoples of the region requires a step by step academic journey back into, and along, the migratory patterns, and ensuing geographic boundaries of the region. Historically speaking, at least 1000 years before the incursion of the Moghols in Khorasan (present day Afghanistan), Buddhism reigned strong in the Central, Northern and Eastern Hindu Kush (Habibi, 1988:7-10). As such it attracted thousands of Chinese pilgrims annually to Bamiyan. More significantly still, the region had for some centuries been the settling ground for generations of members of the 'yellow race'. One is example is the Ephthalites(425-566 A.D.), a tribe of Moghols who, at the time of the reign of the Sassanids, invaded Balkh and Khiva, and gained access via Takharistan to kabul and Zabul. In 420 A.D., they attacked iran and succeeded in conquering the whole of presentd-day Afghanistan and to extend their rule to Kashmir and Central India. In time they mixed with the viarous peoples of these areas and gave rise to the Khawarazm poeple (Ghobar, 1980:54; Alawi, 1975:6; Habibi, 1988;29). Thus it becomes possible, if not irrefutable, to trace the Mogholi appearance of the Hazara inhabitants of Northern Afganistan much further back in history, long before the incursion of Chaniz Khan and Amir Timur, whose appearance on the historical scene in this part of the world becomes relatively recent within this context. It is also possible to extend the Ephthalite conneciton to the presence of Turkish words in Hazaragi: Al Biruni traces the Ephthalites back to the Tibetan Turks, and identifies their first ruler as Barha Tageen or Barah Tageen who was the first of no less than 60 successive rulers from the same line of descent (1958:349). The last of the Tageen rulers were the Ghaznavids, who reigned in tehir capital of Ghazni, in Khorasan, some 1000 years ago. Most interesting of all, is that the term Moghol is itself new; the Moghols were Turks: ________________________________________ "The qaums khown at this time (1310 AD) as Moghols were not originally known as Moghols, but were given that name later...the Moghos were one of the many Turkish qaums,..[It was] only after the multiplication of the Moghol peoples and their majority over other qaums, that name "Moghol" replaces Turk in usage, as had the name Tatar, previously, during the dominance of the Tatars" (Rashid, 1959:25-27) ________________________________________ Turkish words are not only to be found in Hazaragi, but in many other languages of the arean, and to more or less the same extent: in Farsi, Urdu, Punjabi, and Hindi. This linguistic amalgamation is the result of the cultural amalgamation that has inevitably taken place over some 2000 years. This ethnic composition, most evident in language, religion, social structure and relations, is explained very well by Canfield: "The Indo-Aryan peoples who in ancient times occupied the region now called Afghanista were invaded, mostly from the north, by more kinds of people then anyone will count--epoples whose identities, if they are known at all, are only vaguely familiar to most of us: Seythians, Massagetae, Sakas, Dards, Huns, and Ephthalites. In the more recent past Arabs, Turks, Mongols, and Persians invaded the region. These many and diverse kinds of people passed through, hid in, or were trapped in this territory. And they left behind the melange of modern Afghanistan” (1986:89). On the basis of what has been said in the previous sections, it can therefore be concluded that the Hazaras, like the other peoples of Afghanistan, are: a) one of the oldest inhabitants of the region, and are b) of a mixture of races and ethnic groups, of which Changiz Khan and Amir Timur’s Moghol soldiers are but one, and c) whose main influence has been on the tribal and linguistic structure of the Hazaras (in the same as the influence of the Arabs has been on their religious structure, and of Farsi on their culture). Further, this Turkic influence is not restricted to the period only of the Moghol invasion, but also to much longer periods of Turkish incursion and settlement in the region of peoples such as: the Gharj, Ghaz and the Ghouris, who established, respectively , the Gharjistan, Ghaznavi and Ghuri dynasties in Central Afghanistan; and the Ephthalites, the pre-Islamic inhabitants of the area. However, in the most recent past, the ethno-tribal mixture of the Hazaras with others can be described as follows: Moghol influence on the Hazaras is undeniable. Given the recurrent attacks by Moghol soldiers on the area, and the ensuing settlement amongst, and contact with, the people of this area of Central Asia, it is inevitable that the Moghols must have played a formative role in the culture and development of the Hazara people. These soldiers first spoke only Moghol and their influence on the language of the Hazaras was very distinct, even up until the beginning of this century, and can be seen in many Farsi writings by Hazaras; today more than 10 percent of Mogholi terms are still used by the Hazaras. The Hazaras are also of Moghol physical appearance. Furthermore, the Hazaras are partly descended from relatives of Moghol warriors, serfs, and descendants of Moghol feudal lords, themselves related to Changiz’z commanders. To this day, many Hazara tribal and family names are taken from Moghol leaders and commanders, for example: one Hazara group is named “Day Choupan”, after one of the landlords close to Abu Sa’id, known as ‘Amir Choupan’, who led his army into eastern Khorasan and settled there (eastern Khorasan possibly referring to the area known today as Orozgan) (Temirkhanov, 1980:19; Orazgani, 1913:29). During the 19th century, R. Leech, the English traveler who met the “Day Chopan” Hazaras, was taken by them to Gereshk, a nearby town, to visit the tomb of Amir Chopan, whom they regarded as having first brought their ancestors to the area (1845:333). The Behsudis, another major Hazara tribe, are named after Behsud or Bisud, one of Changiz’z relatives, also known as Jigou Hakou (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:887;Orazgani, 1913:56). Tajik influence on the Hazaras is also undeniable, for the Tajiks were the previous inhabitants of Afghanistan, and Farsi was their language. Many Tajiks still live amongst or in close proximity to the Hazaras; in Ghazni, Bamyan and Panjshir, Tajiks and Hazaras live amongst one another. This peaceful co-existence has, over the centuries, resulted in the penetration of the Farsi language and culture amongst the Hazaras. The Hazaras have also taken up farming, cattle breeding, and other skills from the Tajiks. Indeed, Farsi culture has played a fundamental role in the formation of the Hazara people. Hazara Khans built durbars or dewans(courts) resembling Persian palaces, and adopted education techniques from them; classical Farsi writings such as the Ferdausi’s Shah Nama, and poetical collections by Hafez and Sa’di, are perhaps studied with more fervor by them than by many other Farsi speakers (Temirkanov, 1980:25). Intermarriage with Tajiks is still more common than with any other people, followed by intermarriage with Uzbacks. Turkish influence on the Hazaras dates back to the incursions of Amir Timur and his army into this area. As mentioned before, the inhabitants of Jaghouri regard themselves as being descended from Amir Timur, while the Sheikh Ali Hazaras believe themselves to be of Turkish ancestry, most probably of the Khalaj and Qarloq Turks. Along the main road through the Sheikh Ali area and near Qalloq, there is a tomb in honor of Baba Qallogh, regarded by the Sheikh Ali people to have been their forefather. In the travelogues of Oghouz, the original ancestor of the Moghols, the people of this area are referred to as Qarloq, meaning the “children of snow”, because of its cold climate (ibid:23). The common Turkish root of these names, Qarloq, Qalloq and Qallogh, indicative of Turkish influence on the Hazaras. Indeed more Turkish terms can be found in Hazargi dialect than in Farsi, in particular amongst the names of herbs and roots, which are virtually all Turkish. The Afghans(Pashtuns), neighboring the Hazaras on the East, have also had their impact on the Hazaras. Abdali, the name of one of the major Pashtun tribes of Qandahar, also refers to one of the Hazara tribes of Behsud: the Abdal. Similarly, the Hazaras of Gonbad end their names In zai, used by Pashtuns meaning ‘son of’, such as Dawzai and Mohammadzai of the Dai Choupan tribes. Pashto is also the name of a sub-section of the Polada [Foladi] Hazara (Adamec, 1995, vol.6:648), while the Pashayes or Pashai are also a sub-section of the Jaghouri Hazaras. The Pashtun nomads were also the first people in modern times to enter Hazaristan, with the permission of the central government in Kabul, in order to take up trade with the Hazaras. While this development was to bring about the destruction of existing economic, social and political relations amongst the Hazaras, it nevertheless opened up the closed trading and barter economy, and the generally feudal socio-economic system of the Hazaras. Cultural amalgamation with Uzbacks has taken place as a result of the undefined nature of the boundaries separating the Hazara areas from Uzbak areas; this has led to the predominance of inter-marriage between the two nations, which explains the similarity of appearance between the two groups. Relations with the Uzbaks have been at times both peaceful and bloody. In more recent times, intermarriage between different peoples living in the same area has been a common phenomenon, encouraged in order to establish peaceful co-existence; this has been particularly the case between the Hazaras and other peoples of Northern Afghanistan, and the Baluchis of Quetta, Pakistan. During the first half of the 19th century, fusion took place as a result of inter-tribal feuds. While this was the case between all tribes in Afghanistan, it was particularly frequent between the Uzbaks and the Hazaras. After defeat, the victorious tribe always took slaves. These were sold at slave markets such as the one in Kunduz, and sent to India for trading, or exchanged for Tatar horses, or used as farming labour and servants in the houses of Khans (Harlan, 1939:82, 83, 126, 127). Fusion has also taken place between Hazaras and Arab Shia Sayyeds considered to be descendants of Imam Ali, himself related to the prophet by marriage to Fatima, the prophet’s daughter. While marriage between Sayyed women and Hazara men is rare, inter-marriage with Hazara women is very common; hence, the existence of Sayyeds with Hazara features, referred to as Hazara Sayyeds.
Religion of Hazaras: __________________
The Hazaras are mostly Shias Muslims, and inhabit the heart of Afghanistan, surrounded by Sunni Muslims. The question thus arises; how and when did the Hazaras become Muslims, and out of the two branches of Islam, how or why did they choose Shi’ism? According to Aristov (1895:286), the Hazaras adopted Islam from the original inhabitants of the area, i.e., from the Tajiks, who were apparently Shi’as. However, the accuracy of this assertion is open to question. Firstly, Aristov fails to provide any documentation to support his theory; secondly, the religion of Khorasan (the original name of Afghanistan) was Sunni Islam; centuries before the emergence of Shi’ism as the official religion of ancient Iran, which also included today’s Afghanistan, Sunnism was the dominant and official religion of the region. A second theory suggests that the Hazaras adopted Shi’ism at the time of Shah Abbas Safavid (1589-1629). This theory was first proposed by Vambery in 1895, who maintained: “Shah Abbas forced them [the Hazaras] to accept Shi’ism” (1864:132). Some time later, apparently without any knowledge of Vambery’s view, Schurmann was to propose a similar theory: “.......Shi’ism could only have been introduced into the Hazaristan from the west, from Persia, the only important Shi’ite nation in the Muslim world. Hazara Shi’ism, like that of Persia, is Isna-Ashari (Twelver). Given the extreme pro-Shi’ism of the migrant Berberis, one can conclude that there are no important theological differences between Persian and Hazara Shi’ism. Although Shi’ism of history is almost as old as Islam itself, it was not until the rise of the Safavids (16th century) that Shi’ism became the state religion and that the masses of Persia were completely Shi’ized. Before the 16th century, Shi’ism existed as a religious sect enjoying a more or less uneasy relationship with the dominant Sunnism. Thus one can assume that Shi’ism was introduced among the Hazaras some time after the rise of the Safavids, i.e., sometime during or after the 16th century” (1962:120). This theory of their conversion to Shi’ism at the time of Shah Abbas is confirmed by the Hazaras themselves. I have encountered this view amongst Hazaras in conversations with respected scholars, such as Mohammad Ismail Mobaleegh, and Mohammad Ali Modarris. This theory, however, is not without its weaknesses. According to one of the most reliable historical texts of the Shah Abbas period, History of Abbasid Amirs, written by Iskandar Beg Turkmani: “the Hazaras were already Shias at the time of Shah Abbas; two to three thousand Hazara soldiers, under the command of Din Mohammad Khan Uzbek, fought against Shah Abbas’s army” (1916:567-9). A third theory maintains that the Hazaras adopted Shi’ism as soon as they converted to Islam. This theory was first proposed by Temirkhanov. According to him the Hazaras were idolaters; it was some thirty years after the death of Hala-Kou Khan that his followers converted to Islam (1980:31, 32). According to Rashiduddin Fazlullah, Ghazan-Khan showed an inclination towards Shi’ism from the very beginning of his conversion to Islam. Ghazan-Khan often undertook pilgrimages to the tome of Ali and his sons. He was always fond of respected Sayyeds and Shiites, providing them with regular stipend, mosques, money and wealth. After Ghazan-Khan his son, Abu Said, continued his father’s tradition (Rashid, 1959:984-985,997). Thus, according to this theory, Shi’ism was first established and encouraged in Afghanistan by Ghazan Khan and his son Abu Said. It could be argued that the theories of Schurmann and Temirkhanov are both correct, i.e., it is possible that some Hazaras were converted to Shi’ism by Ghazan Khan and Abu Sa’id, a fact which need not contradict the theory holding Shah Abbas responsible for further encouraging Shi’ism amongst the Hazaras. Thus, it can be maintained that Shi’ism amongst the Hazaras began at the time of Ghazan Khan, but that it was not until the Safavid period when Shi’ism became the official religion of Iran that the process was completed. There had of course existed, previous to this time, Shias in today’s Afghanistan and other Islamic countries, in historical opposition to the Sunnis (Orazgani, 1913:69:72; Yazdani, 1989:38-56). But it was the Safavids who were able to turn this opposition into an organized and official political force. The original Shias in Iran and Afghanistan were the descendants of Ali, known as Sadat-e Alavi. They were, for the most part, on the run and in a state of political exile, in order to escape the Omavids and later the Abbasids (Habibi, 1988: 868-869; Yazdani, 1989:39-44). Thus the original followers of Shi’ism entered Afghanistan long before the Moghols; possibly at the time of Imam Reza ( the eighth Shias Imam), who was called to Toos (today’s Mashhad) by al-Mamoun, the Abbasid Caliph, to take the throne, and whose followers must have joined him there (habibi, 1988:872). After the murder of Imam Reza by al-Mamoun, the Shias were once again forced into exile; it was at this time that they may have traveled East to China. The conversion of the Hazaras to Shi’ism did not take place at one particular period; it is not possible to maintain that the Hazaras converted to Shi’ism at one particular moment in history. Indeed such mechanical analyses of any historical and social phenomena are bound to be incorrect; every change in human society takes place over a period of time during which it follows its process of development. The ‘Shiaization’ of the Hazaras, like other social and historical phenomena, took place over a long period of time; entering a new phase even during the past few decades. Thus, it may be maintained that the Hazaras first turned to Shi’ism at the time of Ghazan Khan and that this continued throughout the reign of his son Abu Said and later when it was further encouraged, and so flourished fully, at the time of Shah Abbas Safavid. Most Hazaras are Shia, although some, such as the Sheikh Ali and Firozkohi Hazaras, have remained Sunni. Shi’ism itself is divided into smaller sects. The majority of Shia are Dovazdah Imami, while the Ismailis form a minority, living mainly in India and Pakistan. The Ismailis themselves are divided into smaller sects still. These divisions are also found in Afghanistan, in particular amongst the Hazaras. According to Canfield: “The Ismailis are here referred to as sects, in the plural, because the Ismailies toward the southern end of their territories pay respect to a different saint than those of the northern end (those called in the ethnographic literature, “Mountain Tajiks”) and because in certain minor respects their beliefs are different, the southern type having renounced some years ago the veneration of Saints” (1973:1). The spread of Ismailies in Afghanistan is said to have begun in 755 AD, when it entered Afghanistan from Iran (habibi, 1988:873). What is interest here is the political dimension of the question of religion. For, while in purely religious terms, Sunni and Shia have no basic differences, this has not been borne out in reality, where the existence of the two sects has led to bloody wars, the emergence of new political boundaries, and religiously determined social strata. Over the past hundred-odd years in Afghanistan, the Hazaras have been victimized socially and deprived of their natural and human rights because they are Shia. Until 1919, some Hazaras were still kept as slaves by the Pashtuns; although Shah Amanullah banned slavery in Afghanistan during his reign, the tradition carried on unofficially for many more years. Nor did the power of propaganda against, and the victimization of the Hazaras remain restricted to the border of Afghanistan; famous scholars are also known to have been influenced. One of the most internationally respected and famous scholars, a founder of the Islamic Renaissance in Afghanistan, Sayyed Jamaluddin Afghani (1901), referred to the Shia Hazaras as ghali. Many years later Temirkhanov was to repeat the mistake. Fortunately this was later corrected and put into its proper perspective by Canfield in his valuable and more scholarly and accurate study of the Hazaras. The outstanding peculiarity of the situation of the Hazaras is the escalation of what should have been no more than a tribal conflict into an all-out national conflict under consecutive Pashtun regimes, reaching its height during the reign of Abdur Rahman (1880-1901). With the aid of Sunni clerics, Abdur Rahman Khan declared the Hazaras “infidels’ and waged Jihad on them (kakhar, 1971:213). Their sin being that they were not willing to accept Imam Ali as the fourth Caliph to succeed Mohammad, but in fact regarded him as the prophet’s only successor. This, in short, is the essence of the differences between the two branches of Islam, Shi’as and Sunni.
WHAT IS THE LANGUAGE OF HAZARAS?
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Linguistic research on Hazaragi, the language and dialect of the Hazaras, has concentrated on two aspects. First, the relation between Hazaragi and the major languages that have influenced Hazaragi, such as Farsi, Mogholi, and Turkish, and the extent of the influence of each of these on Hazaragi; and second, the particular characteristics and origin of Hazaragi itself. What research has so far revealed is that Hazaragi is a mixed dialect of Farsi, moghol and Turkish, with its own oral but not written tradition. No books have ever been written in Hazaragi; Hazara intellectuals, scholars and writers have always written in Farsi or Arabic, and more recently in European languages, but never Hazaragi. From a linguistic point of view, dialect is amore accurate name for Hazaragi than language.
Upon this basis, one can maintain that Farsi is the only language of the area, covering Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan in the former Soviet Union(Heravi, 1983;73), and that within their political (as opposed to cultural) boundaries, each of these peoples has a different dialect. The table illustrates this:
Farsi
Afghanistan - Iran Kabuli - Tehrani Hazaragi - Gilani Balkhi - Shushtari Ghaznici - Isfahani Herati - Sherazi
Amongst these, one factor distinguishes the dialect of the Hazaras in Afghanistan and the Gilanis in Iran from other dialects: the linguistic origins of many of the terms used by these two groups. Both dialects include many pure Farsi terms, rarely used in Tehran or Kabul, where these have been replaced by loan words from other languages. Hazaragi is composed of 80% Farsi, 10% Moghol and 10% other languages. The dialect of the Hazaras differs greatly from that of other Farsi speakers also because of the influence of the Turks and Moghols.
The Hazarajat Boundaries:
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Hazarajat never had true and specific borders, but wherever the Hazaras came in contact with the dwelling of non-Hazara tribes, i.e., at the ethnic gray line, those places where considered to the boundaries of Hazarajat. According to the recently published maps of Afghanistan by Humlum, Dullin, Dupree, Ferdinand, and especially maps published by the War Office, United States Army, Washington, MC. Hazarajat lies roughly between 600 and 680 East-West and 330 and 350 North-south covering about 15,000 square miles, it stretches from the east about a distance of 50 miles of west Kabul. I.e., in the region of Unai Kotal-Maidan, the west nears the Chakcharan in Ghorat. Although Koh-e Baba is considered the northern limit of Hazarajat, the border stretches farther north, in the region of Dara-e Yousuf, Yak Aolang, and east of Bamyan. To the south, Hazarajat's boundaries stretch down to the foothills of Ghazni, Muqor and just north of Qandahar. Thus Hazarajat of today includes the western extremity of the Hindu Kush girdle of mountain valleys immediately bordering to the southwest, north, and northeast, on the original Tajik areas, Besides the Hazarajat proper, small groups of Hazaras also live in Badakhshan, Mazari Sharif, Afghan Turkistan, Qataghan and most of the urban areas, especially Kabul, Ghazni, Herat, etc. outside Afghanistan large number of Hazara live in Pakistan and Iran.
Before 1900s the area of the Hazarajat was twice as large as what it is today. The Pashtoon expansionism led by the Pashtun ruler Amir Abdul Rehman led to the large scale massacre of Hazara population and the contraction of Hazarajat boundaries. Hazaras lost approximately 60% of their population in the war of independence against Pashtun expansionism. That could in fact indicate the loss of 60% of the area of the then Hazarajat. Communication and Transportation
Because of the rocky nature of Hazarajat, communication between its valleys is extremely difficult. People have to travel a long distance through the narrow passes just to visit a village a few miles away. This mountains character of the land has not only isolated the Hazaras from their non-Hazara neighbors, but also kept them away from each other.
The area known as Hazarajat comprises Bamyan, Daykundi, Ghor provinces in whole and parts of adjacent provinces Ghazni, Uruzgan, Balkh, Samangan, Kabul, Wardak, Jozajan, Herat and Kandahar. The center comprises the districts of Shebar, Bamyan, Panjao, Waras, Yakawlang (Bamyan province); Balkhab (Jowzjan); Dar-e-Souf (Samanghan); Lal o Sari Jangal (Ghor); Daykundi, Sharistan (Uruzgan); Malistan, Jaghori, Nawor (Ghazni); Behsud I and Behsud II (Wardak). Although it would be possible to argue for a historically larger concept of Hazarajat, all of these districts would be generally recognized as being part of Hazarajat and so this definition fits with agencies' operational realities. The area so defined also includes all of the poorest Hazara districts.
Conflict and inability of the population to feed itself means that population movements, both temporary and permanent, have long been a feature of Hazarajat. Currently, there are three main types of population movement in Hazarajat: migration out, mainly in search of work; returnees from Iran, usually at least to some extent forced; and IDPs, caused mainly by the conflict. The line between voluntary migration and forced displacement is not always clear in practice, especially when considering population movements caused by food shortages.
The 1992-4 fighting in Kabul in some ways benefited Hazarajat, as educated people fled the city for safer places — and whilst some went to Quetta, Iran, and even further a field, a small educated group came back to Hazarajat, where they provide the core of professional staff for many agencies. Fighting in Mazari Sharif in 1997 and 1998 brought more IDPs (Internally Displaced People), as did the fighting in Bamyan in 1998. In May 1999, the fighting and destruction in Bamyan Town and surrounding villages sent terrified families fleeing to the hills. Many came through Yakawlang and their stories precipitated a wave of IDPs from there also, although these were not as desperate as the Bamyan IDPs as they were at least able to take things with them. At that time Solidarites recorded a total of 13,032 families, or 89% of the population, leaving Bamyan. Of these, 5,615 went to Behsud and 1,987 to the mountains of Koh-i-Baba. Others went to Puli Khumri, Kohmard, Kabul and even further a field. The weather at that time was still very cold and Solidarities recorded that 155 children died of cold and 78 women and old people died of hunger and cold, plus a further 23 from the fighting. The number of single women heading households rose from 24 in January to 248 by August. At the end of 1999, 424 IDP families from Bamyan were still known to be living in central Hazarajat. 150 of these were in Yakawlang, mostly living with relatives, mainly in far away villages; 53 more families were in Panjao center; 23 in Lal center; and most of rest in the remote areas of Targai, Mur and Tarapas. There were also IDPs from the fighting in Dara e Suf, 25 in Lal centre." (UN's Coordinator Office, March 2000, Part I)
This number includes an exodus of 45,000 people from the central highlands to other parts of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. According to the UN Regional Coordinating Officer, three quarters of this number indicated they were leaving for Iran (90 percent) or Pakistan (10 percent). The 25 percent who remained behind in Afghanistan are located in Kabul [east] , Ghazni [south east] and Herat [west]. A further 5,000 are estimated to have been displaced in late January due to violent clashes near Yawkawlang, in Bamyan Province. Relief agencies expect that impoverished residents in the central highlands will try to cope over winter by reducing their food consumption. UN sources estimate a high mortality over winter as many families who chose to remain are unprepared." (IRIN 8 February 2001)
After the traditional lull during winter in 1999, fighting progressively intensified. In February, opposition forces briefly captured the Hazarajat town of Yakowlang, 100 kilometers west of the provincial capital, Bamyan, and briefly Bamyan itself. The Taliban offensive to capture these areas caused significant levels of destruction and displacement. Sporadic guerrilla activity has taken place in the eastern, northwest and western provinces throughout the year." (UNOCHA, UNRCO November 1999)
"Between March and May 1999, some 115,000 people were uprooted in Bamyan, fleeing to the neighboring districts and provinces, to Kabul, northern Afghanistan and to Pakistan. People displaced from Bamyan have sought refuge in all surrounding districts, including Kamard, Yakaolang, Panjao, Waras, Behsud 1 and Behsud 2. Central Bamyan and parts of neighboring Saigan District and Shibar were totally depopulated by the climax of the fighting on 15 May. Many of these displaced people have been relocating from one district to another, trying to find accommodation and food to enable them to survive the winter. (UNOCHA 14 October 1999)
"Following clashes between the Taliban and Hezb-e-Wahdat forces in the central highlands in the beginning of 1999, it was reported that " there was a steady exodus of the civilian population from Bamyan from February to mid-April 1999 and that the civilian population had been almost totally displaced from the area by the end of the conflict there in mid-May." "[M]ost of the population evacuated the city and took refuge in the mountains. They were facing a serious situation given the weather in the cold mountainous areas and the acute shortage of food. It was reported that a group of 150 people, including women and children, were taken captive by the Taliban from Berson village and transferred to Parwan province. Yakawlang was also evacuated by people who feared being killed or arrested by the Taliban. A few families managed to reach Ghazni while others went to Panjab or Bahsood districts."
Hazarajat, being a high elevated mountainous region, is dominated by a cold and long winters, its climate is mostly alpine tundra, and has been described as extremely cold and dry. While the winters are long and dominated by heavy snowfall and snow storm, the summers, on the other hand are short and hot. The winter starts by the end of September; the first now falls in October; and from December on heavy snow falls and lies on the ground for the next four or five months. Wherever meteorological stations were built, scantly information about rainfall is available thes weather stations are located in Bamian, Lal, Moqur, Nawar and Panjab showing the annual rainfalls of 1.92, 7.06, 5.5, 5.4 and 9.0 inches, respectively. During summer months, most of the Hazarajat weather is dry with clear blue skies, little or no rain falls during the summer months and days are comfortable warm and nights are briskly cool.
Environment:
Flora)
Like most of Afghanistan, Hazarajat also lacks greenery and is poorly covered with vegetation, there is no forest in the region and the slopes are bare.
Fauna)
Like the limited plant species found in the region, the animal kingdom of the Hazarajat is also limited. Of the inferior animals wolves, foxes and hares are commonly found in the mountains and populated valleys. The wild sheep and goats (Markhor) are found in Dai Zangi region. Deer could be found in the mountain ranges which offer springs and fountains. Domesticated dogs and greyhounds can also be found in the valleys. The stress, and rivers of Hazarajat are filled with fish of different dins. The lake of Band-e Amir are especially known for fish of considerable size, which are of yellow color and locally, knows as Chush. Mules and donkeys which are used for transportation are found in the valleys.
Economy:
Minerals) Hazarajat has been known to be rich in minerals and in the past rulers of the neighboring countries and states have tried to subjugate the Hazaras to control the mineral reservoirs. Harlan mentioned Uzbek tribal leader Murad Beg of Kunduz, who had attacked Dai Zangi for its mineral wealth. Another Englishman, Wood, reported the presence of copper and sulfur. It has also been reported that there are deposits of jade, beryl, quartz, mica, marble, antimoine, cuivre, aargent, zinc, iron, graphite and gypsum more recently, Griffiths reported the discovery of large and very high grade iron ore deposits near Hajigak in the Bamian region. These all reports were produced during the cold war. The recent government of Taliban bend all the foreign projects in Afghanistan. Now there are only some of the Oil companies are involved in the region.