User:Romanov loyalist/Sandbox II
Military
[edit]The Qing dynasty did not have a unified military force.[1] The decision to have a decentralized military of two entirely separate branches and a complicated command structure was deliberate by the Manchus, who feared the possibility of a Han Chinese army overthrowing the dynasty, but this system was becoming unworkable as the empire faced threats from industrialized European powers and Japan.[2] While on campaign, a Chinese army was put together from units with separate command structures, and the leaders of the expedition were taken from the civilian bureaucracy, to prevent any one military officer or official from becoming too powerful.[3]
The traditional armed forces of the Qing consisted of the Eight Banners and the Green Standard Army. The Bannermen were hereditary and included ethnic Manchus, Mongols, and Han Chinese, descended from the warriors that took over China in 1644. The adult males of the banners were automatically considered soldiers and received pay from the government, in addition to other special privileges. They were stationed in the capital and in major cities across China. The Green Standard Army was the largest force, estimated to number 500,000, and consisted of Han Chinese stationed in each province, though despite its name the Green Standard served as a militia and police force rather than as an army.[4][5] The military skills of the Banners and the Green Standard gradually declined as training was not considered important. These forces were only capable of putting up a minimal defense, and by the mid-19th century they had little military value.[6] There was also a total lack of any transport, medical, engineering, or supply corps. This meant that Chinese troops had to live off the land and requisition goods from the local population whenever they were on campaign.[4] Many of them were equipped with long bows, swords, and spears; it was estimated in the 1890s that only three-fifths of the Chinese army had firearms, and many of those were the antiquated matchlock.[7]
Starting in the 19th century two other forces emerged in China in response to the Taiping Rebellion: mercenaries hired by provincial governors known as braves, and modernized units consisting of braves who were trained along European lines.[4][8] The most prominent of the latter were Zeng Guofan's Xiang Army and Li Hongzhang's Huai Army.[8] The braves, relatively well armed and paid, were estimated to make up ten percent of the Qing dynasty's armed forces.[4] The braves were private armies that were organized and funded by provincial officials.[9] Starting from the 1860s a number of Green Standard units began undergoing a partial modernization to make them more similar to the braves, but this had a limited success.[10][11] They were still used for local security[11] while the braves served as a rapid response force that could be deployed to any part of the empire.[4] On the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War the Huai Army were considered the best troops of the Qing dynasty,[12][13] though they were still outmatched by the Imperial Japanese Army.[14]
The Qing dynasty's most radical military reforms came after its best forces took heavy losses in the war against Japan. In 1895 Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong began forming Western-style forces that were eventually called the New Armies. They were organized into a regular structure of infantry, cavalry, and artillery branches, along with technical units, and placed emphasis on strict discipline and better training.[15] But these reforms remained limited until after the Boxer Rebellion. An Army Reorganization Commission was created in 1903 and started work on a ten-year plan in 1906 to create 36 New Army divisions across China. Western-style military schools were also opened in every province to educate a new officer corps. Significant progress was made and by 1911 the New Armies were China's main military force,[15] especially Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army, though the traditional forces were still kept. The Banners continued to exist right up until 1911 and the Green Standard were turned into a reserve for the New Armies.[16]
- ^ Paine 2003, p. 141.
- ^ Paine 2003, p. 144.
- ^ McCord 1993, pp. 19–20.
- ^ a b c d e Paine 2003, pp. 141–143.
- ^ Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). . Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- ^ McCord 1993, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Paine 2003, pp. 149.
- ^ a b McCord 1993, pp. 22–23.
- ^ McCord 1993, p. 143.
- ^ Fung 1996, p. 1027.
- ^ a b McCord 1993, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Fung 1996, p. 1028.
- ^ McCord 1993, p. 33.
- ^ Fung 1996, pp. 1024–1026.
- ^ a b McCord 1993, pp. 33–35.
- ^ McCord 1993, p. 38.
- Fung, Allen (1996). "Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895". Modern Asian Studies. 40 (3) – via JSTOR.
- McCord, Edward A. (1993). The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-08128-4.
- Paine, S.C.M (2003). The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-81714-1.