User:Richiar/Workspace 5

Politics, Government, and "Politics and Government" article development

"The 2000 election was the first I had spent in the United States since 1980, and I was stunned by the personal animus I saw among parisans of both parties. In my career, I had worked with both Republicans and Democrats and found that while we often disagreed on approaches, we shared many of the same basic objectives....In retrospect, I was naїve in thinking that a mature democracy like ours would naturally embrace the rule of law and engage in polite discourse instead of the tooth and claw I had seen operate abroad. In this case, the shameless lust for power, and the genuine hatred amont the right wing for Bill Clinton, just overwhelmed the Democrats. I was appalled by the gutter tactics of the out-of-state rabble that bullied public servants and intimidated tham into stopping the recount of ballots in Miami-Dade County. I had rallied against such conduct in flawed elections in Africa, and disliked it just as much in my own country. The Politics of Truth p. 282"

JW found himself to be naïve in assuming our democracy would embrace a mature and adult-like discourse in approaching issues in contrast to the flawed election processes he witnessed in Africa

"....Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld had already raised the possibility of using the terrorist attacks as a pretext to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein: "Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al Qaeda?" he asked. Rumsfeld was speaking not only for himself when he raised the quesiton. HIs deputy, Paul C. Wolfowitz, was committed to a policy that would make Iraq a principal target for the first round in the war on terrorism, according to Woodward. The Politics of Truth p. 286"

JW reports the president's secretary of defense suggested using the attacks as a pretext for the overthrow of the non ally regime

the deputy secretary of defense was committed to a policy that would make the hostile country a principle target on the planned war on terrorism

"....in the first National Security Council meeting of the Bush presidency, on January 30, 2001-more than seven months befor 9/11-the administration made the decision that the ouster of Saddam Hussein would take center stage on the policy agenda, while at the same time they would disengage from mediation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Politics of Truth p. 286. A quotation from Ron Suskind's The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neil."

The president's first National Security Council meeting, seven months before the attack, showed the administration had already made regime change the center of the policy agenda while simultaneously disengaging from mediation of the Isreaeli-Palestinian conflict

"....Paul Wolfowitz and fellow neoconservatives had long seen Saddam as the most dangerous threat to peace in the Middle East. The seeds of the new Iraq war had been sown in the first Gulf War in 1991 and grew in the frustration that Saddam had not been deposed then. The trigger that propelled the renewed effort to take him down was a monstrous national calamity not of Saddam's making, nor any immediate threat that Iraq posed to our national security. That a tragedy would be used to abuse the instruments of government, deceive the American people, and entangle us in a foreign adventure guaranteed to fail before we put the first soldier across the border is a travesty. It was also a strategic mistake of historic proportions. The Politics of Truth p. 287"

This group viewed Saddam Hussein as the most dangerous threat to peace in the Middle East

This group was frustrated that the dictator was not overthrown in the first Gulf War

The tragedy of the 9/11 attack renewed the effort of the regime change group

JW makes the accusation that there was gross abuse of the instruments of government and deception practiced on the American people

JW makes the claim that our country became involved in a war that was destined to fail before we started

"Wolfowitz and his colleagues persisted in arguing that the only way to deal with the menace of Iraq was with invasive militay action. For many years they had lobbied to build support in Congress....However, the United States does not invade a country simply because it has an evil leader; it only does so if that country poses a grave and gathering danger to our national security." op cit p. 288-9

The deputy secretary of defense and his colleagues persistently argued the "only way to deal with the menace of Iraq was with invasive military action."

JW challenges the justifiability of that premise

"Before 9/11, regime change by invasion was still just a fringe part of the debate about how to handle Saddam Hussein. The Iraq Liberation Act was viewed mostly as a way to bring additional pressure to bear on him by activating other tools at America's disposal-funding of resistance efforts, subversion, and propoganda-and not as a call to commit American troops to war....Very few saw the act as presaging a military offensive. But one who did was Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni....Zinni understood that this was no mere gesture but a rallying point for the prowar crowd. It was a preliminary stride toward invasion, not just another small step in the political campaign to undermine Saddam." P & T pp 289-90

Before 9/11 regime change by invasion was still just a fringe part of the debate about how to handle Saddam Hussein

The Iraq Liberation Act was viewed mostly as a way to bring additional pressure on him through indirect means

General A. Zinni saw the Act as a rallying point for the war advocates for invasion

When Brent Scowcroft and I would talk about the strident tone of the neoconservatives, he was dismissive....Brent had worked with Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld since the Ford Administration. He had been part of the team that coined the phrase "New World Order" to encapsulate a vision of an interconnected global security system that fostered international cooperation to deal with threats to our common good. " P & T pp 290-1

Brent Scowcroft had been part of the team that coined the phrase "New World Order" to encapsulate a vision of an interconnected global security system that fostered international cooperation to deal with threats to our common good

"Perle and his colleagues argued for the redrawing of the political map of the Middle East to serve Israel's security interests. The strategy included the overthrow of Saddam-"a laudable goal in its own right," remarked the paper-as well as the neutralization of Israel's other neighbors....In a denmocracy we are all participants in that decision....The power advocates were little inclined to listen to the views of others. They had made up their minds long ago, and now it was a matter of ramming their agenda through the decision-making process." P & T p. 292

Perle and colleagues argued for the redrawing of the political map of the Middle East to serve Israel's security interests

The strategy included the overthrow of Hussein

The war advocates were little inclined to listen to the views of others: it was for them a matter of ramming their agenda through the decision-making process

"Brent Scowcroft was becoming increasingly concerned that perhaps his earlier optimism had been misplaced....He warned of potential disaster if we tried to deal with Saddam militarily. Former Secretary of State James Baker III, too, was caustionary; he wrote in teh Washington Post that whatever we decided had to be underpinned by an international consensus and coalition. " P & T p. 294

Brent Scowcroft became increasingly concerned that his earlier optimism had been misplaced; former Secretary of State James Baker III also expressed similar concern

" I made the point furthermore, that this was not a question of war vs no war, but a choice between smart military action for the right reasons and a misguided war fought for dumb reasons." p. 295

"Dr. Rice, a Scowcroft protégée, had been brought into the National Security Council during the first Bush administration. At the time of the first Gulf War, she had been in charge of Soviet Affairs." p. 296