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User:Raoulduke47/Template04 Mahdist

Mahdist is the term used to qualify the followers of Muhammad Ahmad, a late 19th century self-proclaimed muslim prophet who ruled over Sudan for a brief period. The Mahdists called themselves Ansar(helpers) a word from the islamic tradition, that was originally used for the helpers of the prophet Muhammed. The British generally called them Dervishes, a term normally applied to members of the Sufi orders, apparently to denote the |perceived fanaticism of the Mahdist warriors as they appeared excessively zealous in pursuit of the jihad, or holy war.

References

• Churchill, Winston S. (1952), The river war - an account of the Reconquest of the Sudan', Eyre and Spottiswoode, London.

• Thomas Archer(1885–1887), The war in Egypt and the Soudan. An episode in the history of the British Empire, being a descriptive account of the scenes and events of that great drama, and sketches of the principal actors in it. 4 Volumes. Blackie & Son, London 1885–1887 (Available at the Cornell University website: Volume 1, Volume 2, Volume 3, Volume 4)

• Spiers Edward M.(2005), Dervishes and Fanaticism: Perception and impact, in Hughes M. and Johnson G., Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age, Cass Series--Military History and Policy. Available here

• THE MAHDIYAH, 1884-98, at the Library of Congress-Country Studies [2]

The Fall of Kabul, April 1992

After the departure of Soviet troops in 1989, the PDPA regime now headed by Mohammad Najibullah, proved unexpectedly capable holding its own against the mujahideen. Backed by a massive influx of weapons from the Soviet Union, the Afghan armed forces reached a level of performance they had never reached under direct Soviet tutelage, and were able to prevent all major cities from falling.

By 1992 however, after the collapse Soviet union, the regime began to crumble. Food and fuel shortages undermined the capacities of the Army, and a resurgence of factionalism split the regime between Khalq and Parcham supporters.

A few days after it was clear that Najibullah had lost control, his army commanders and governors arranged to turn over authority to resistance commanders and local notables throughout the country. Joint councils or shuras were immediately established for local government in which civil and military officials of the former government were usually included. In many cases prior arrangements for transferring regional and local authority had been made between foes.

Collusions between military leaders quickly brought down the Kabul government. In mid-January 1992, within three weeks of the demise of the Soviet Union, Massoud was aware of conflict within the government's northern command. General Abdul Momim, in charge of the Hairatan border crossing at the northern end of Kabul's supply highway, and other non-Pashtun generals based in Mazari Sharif feared removal by Najibullah and replacement by Pashtun officers. The generals rebelled and the situation was taken over by Abdul Rashid Dostum, who held general rank as head of the Jowzjani militia, also based in Mazari Sharif. He and Massoud reached a political agreement, together with another major militia leader, Sayyed Mansour, of the Ismaili community based in Baghlan Province. These northern allies consolidated their position in Mazar-i-Sharif on March 21. Their coalition covered nine provinces in the north and northeast. As turmoil developed within the government in Kabul, there was no government force standing between the northern allies and the major air force base at Bagram, some seventy kilometers north of Kabul. By mid-April the air force command at Bagram had capitulated to Massoud. Kabul was defenseless, its army no longer reliable.

On March 18, Najibullah announced his willingness to resign, and on April 17, as his government fell apart, he tried to escape but was stopped at Kabul Airport by Dostum' forces. He then took refuge at the United Nations mission, where he remained until 1995. A group of Parchami generals and officials declared themselves an interim government for the purpose of handing over power to the mujahideen.

For more than a week Massoud remained poised to move his forces into the capital. He was awaiting the arrival of political leadership from Peshawar. The parties suddenly had sovereign power in their grasp, but no plan for executing it. With his principal commander prepared to occupy Kabul, Rabbani was positioned to prevail by default. Meanwhile UN mediators tried to find a political solution that would assure a transfer of power acceptable to all sides.

Civil war

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar placed Kabul under intensive rocket bombardment in February 1993. Some sources cite the number of up to 3,000 rockets fired on Kabul daily(http://www.massoudhero.com/English/biography.html). Many civilians were killed. After a series of negotiations in Kabul and in Peshawar, arranged by the power players of the Afghan Civil War - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran - the warring factions failed to find a peaceful solution.

Masood ordered a retreat from Kabul on April 7, 1996 after another round of intense bombardment from the Taliban and its Pakistani supporters in the ISI.

Resistance against the Taliban

As the Taliban took control of around 90% of Afghanistan, the warring factions had no choice but to form an alliance called the 'United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan'. Because most factions were from the north of Afghanistan, the Western media called them the 'Northern Alliance'. The alliance consisted of warlords and tribal leaders like Haji Rahim, Commander Piram Qol, Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, General Dostum, Qazi Kabir Marzban, Commander Ata Mohammad and General Malik. From the east were Haji Abdul Qadir, Commander Hazrat Ali, Commander Jaan Daad Khan and Abdullah Wahedi. From the northeast areas, Commander Qatrah and Commander Najmuddin participated. From the southern provinces, there were Commander Qari Baba, Noorzai, and Hotak. From the western and southwest provinces came General Ismail Khan, Doctor Ibrahim, and Fazlkarim Aimaq. From central Afghanistan Commander Anwari, Said Hussein Aalemi Balkhi, Said Mustafa Kazemi, Akbari, Mohammad Ali Jawed, Karim Khaili, Commander Sher Alam, and Abdur Rassul Sayyaf were members of this union. The alliance consisted of warlords who had been ousted by the locals from all regions of Afghanistan. The alliance was supported by India because of their rivalry with Pakistan, Iran because of their opposition to a Strong Sunni Taliban government, Russia and Tajikistan because of the growing Islamic movements in Chechnya and Central Asia.

In 1998, the CIA, a long time aide of Massoud, offered Afghanistan's anti-Taliban opposition leader a substantial bounty for the capture of Osama bin Laden, dead or alive. [3] The claim was further supported by former US president Bill Clinton in an interview with New York Times in 2001. Clinton said, "At the time, we did everything we can do ... I authorised the arrest and, if necessary, the killing of Osama bin Laden, and we actually made contact with a group in Afghanistan to do it."

In April 2001, Nicole Fontaine invited Massoud to address the European Parliament. In his speech, he warned that the Taliban had connections with Al-Qaeda, and that an important terrorist attack was imminent. The US and European governments paid no attention to these warnings.

Abdullah, Mohammed Fahim, Yunus Qanuni and Abdul Rahman.

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Lyakhovskiy, Aleksandr. "Ахмад Шах(Russian)". http://artofwar.ru/. Retrieved 2007-03-23. {{cite web}}: External link in |publisher= (help); Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)

• Roy, Olivier(2002); Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan; UNHCR([4])
• http://youtube.com/watch?v=-pHKV9IEYN4&mode=related&search=
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQ2g-d22G7k

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Military conflict

Soviet and DRA operations

Phases of the conflict

Phase one: occupation (December 1979 to February 1980)

The first phase began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their first battles with various opposition groups.

Soviet troops entered Afghanistan along two ground routes and one air corridor, quickly taking control of the major urban centers, military bases and strategic installations. However, the presence of Soviet troops did not have the desired effect of pacifying the country. On the contrary, it exacerbated a nationalistic feeling, causing the rebellion to spread even more. Babrak Karmal, Afghanistan's new president, charged the Soviets with causing an increase in the unrest, and demanded that the 40th Army step in and quell the rebellion, as his own army had proved untrustworthy. Thus, Soviet troops found themselves drawn into fighting against urban uprisings, tribal armies(lashkar), and sometimes against mutinying Afghan Army units. These forces all fought relatively in the open, and Soviet airpower and artillery made short work of them.

Phase two: Soviet offensives (March 1980 to April 1985)

The war now developed into a new pattern: the Soviets occupied the cities and main axes of communication, while the Mujahideen, divided into small groups, waged a guerilla war. Almost 80 percent of the country escaped government control. Soviet troops were deployed in strategic areas in the Northeast, especially along the road from Termez to Kabul. In the East, an important presence was maintained to counter Iranian influence. Conversely, some regions such as Nuristan and Hazarajat were virtuallly untouched by the fighting, and lived in almost complete independence.

Periodically the Soviet Army undertook multi-divisional offensives into Mujahideen-controlled areas. Between 1980 and 1985, nine offensives were launched into the strategic Panjshir Valley, but government control of the area did not improve. Heavy fighting also occurred in the provinces neighbouring Pakistan, where cities and government outposts were constantly under siege by the Mujahideen. Massive Soviet operations would regularly break these sieges, but the Mujahideen would return as soon as the coast was clear. In the East and South, fighting was more sporadic, except in the cities of Herat and Kandahar, that were always partly controlled by the resistance.

On his arrival in power, in march 1985, the new Soviet General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his impatience with the Afghan conflict. He demanded that a solution be found before one-year deadline. As a result, the size of the LCOSF was increased to 108,800 and fighting increased throughout the country, making 1985 the bloodiest year of the war. Despite suffering heavily, the Mujahideen weren't defeated. Having failed to defeat the rebellion militarily, the Soviets began working on an exit strategy with emphasis on political solutions.

A Soviet Spetsnaz (special operations) group prepares for a mission in Afghanistan, 1988.

Phase three: exit strategy (April 1985 to January 1987)

The first step of the exit stategy was to transfer the burden of fighting the Mujahideen to the Afghan armed forces, with the aim of preparing them to operate without Soviet help. During this phase, the Soviet contingent was restricted to supporting the DRA forces by providing artillery, air support and technical assistance, though some large-scale operations were still carried out by Soviet troops.

Under Soviet guidance, the DRA armed forces were built up to an official strength of 302,000 in 1986. To minimize the risk of a coup d'état, they were divided into different branches, each modeled on its Soviet counterpart. The ministry of defense forces numbered 132,000, the ministry of interior 70,000 and the ministry of state security(KHAD) 80,000. However, these were theoretical figures: in reality each service was plagued with desertions, the army alone suffered 32,000 per year.

The decision to engage primarily Afghan forces was taken by the Soviets, but was resented by the PDPA, who viewed the departure of their protectors without enthusiasm. Consequently, the first operations conducted by DRA forces were disappointing. In the spring of 1986, an offensive into Paktia Province briefly occupied the Mujahideen base at Zhawar only at the cost of heavy losses. In May–June 1987, an attack into Arghandab District, in reprisal for Mujahideen raids in Kandahar, met with sharp resistance and was driven back.

Phase four: withdrawal (January 1987 to February 1989)

In the last phase, Soviet troops prepared and executed their withdrawal from Afghanistan. They hardly engaged in offensive operations at all, and were content to defend against Mujahideen raids.

The one exception was Operation Magistral, a successful sweep that cleared the road between Gardez and Khost. This operation did not have any lasting effect, but it allowed the Soviets to symbolically end their presence with a victory.

The first half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawn between 15 may to August 16, the second from 15 november to 15 February 1989. The Mujahideen did not interfere with the withdrawal. Now fighting alone, the DRA forces were obliged to abandon some provincial capitals. However, no vital cities were lost, and contrary to many expectations the Afghan regime did not collapse immediately.

Soviet tactics

Operations

Usually employing 10,000 to 15,00 personnel, Soviet large-scale operations were supposed to destroy rebel groups and restore the authority of the DRA in strategic areas. By concentrating a weight of firepower that the Mujahideen could not hope to match, the Soviets could generally occupy any given point of the country.

However, several factors limited their overall effectiveness. The first operations relied exclusively on Motorised Rifle units, the mainstay of the Soviet army. Their armoured personnel carriers had only limited mobility in Afghanistan's difficult terrain, and their movements were restricted to the limited road network. Because of this, Mujahideen groups could easily predict the path of Soviet offensives, and avoid being trapped in pitched battles.

Later operations took the form of land-air attacks, but they still suffered from a slow and unimaginative execution by a rigid, highly centralised command structure, and from the inability to take advantage of intelligence gained by the local intelligence service, the KHAD.

Also, for political and logistical reasons, the number of Soviet troops deployed in Afghanistan never exceeded 108,800 men. Of these, 40 percent were tied down guarding strategic cities and lines of communication, while another 30 percent carried out escort duties, freeing only a limited proportion for active combat missions. The scope and tempo of operations were limited and the troops were constantly being redeployed across the country. In general, Soviet-occupied areas were handed over to Afghan communist forces, but their lack of commitment precluded any effective control.

Counterinsurgency

The Soviet military doctrine emphasised the importance of large-scale operations, at the expense of small-unit tactics. Junior officers were not taught to take the initative, and conscripts were not given sufficient training. This proved to be a grave flaw in a guerilla conflict, which is a series of tactical engagements.

Moreover, the Soviet army was prepared for a conventional war against NATO or China, and had no experience in counter-insurgency warfare. Basic methods for dealing with guerillas had to be learned by trial and error, during which time heavy casualties were incurred.

Despite this, the Soviets constantly improved their tactics throughout the war. Soviet commanders learned to rely less on mechanized forces, and more on air assault and spetsnaz units, who were better able to carry the fight to the Mujahideen. During the later stages of the war, most operations were spearheaded by paratroopers, as they had better training and were better able to fight independently. The Spetsnaz carried out raids and ambushes along Mujahideen supply routes, but despite inflicting heavy casualties, they were never able to completely interdict Mujahideen logistics. It was a Spetsnaz unit that captured the first stinger missiles, in early 1987, in Kandahar province.

The air war

Airpower played an essential part in the Soviet strategy. Aerial forces often acted as a substitute for an occupation by ground troops, especially as the pace of ground operations lessened.

A Soviet Mi-24V "Hind-E". The Mi-24 became emblematic of this war.

Helicopters proved indispensable in maintaining the Soviet and DRA presence. Mi-8 and Mi-6 lift ships were used for air assault missions as well as resupplying isolated outposts. Attack helicopters were also used intensively, flying close air support, convoy escort and air interdiction missions. The armoured Mi-24, with its payload of 128 rockets, 4 missiles and a multi-barrelled machine-gun, was an important threat for the Mujahideen. In the early years, before they had established an effective air defense organisation, Mi-24s roamed unchallenged over Afghanistan. They were the principal means of providing close air support to ground troops.

Various types of jet aircraft also saw intensive service. While carpet bombing by Tu-16 bombers produced few results, the new Su-25 ground attack aircraft, with its considerable payload, made a successful combat debut in Afghanistan. Along with other types, these aircraft were used to attack Mujahideen positions, and in systematic de-population campaigns. In an attempt to deny the rebels any support from the local population, entire villages were razed to the ground, killing thousands of civilians and forcing millions to flee, becoming refugees.

After 1986, air operations were severely limited by the introduction of Stinger missiles.

Ref2

• http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_52.html