User:Phlsph7/Mind - Relation to matter
Relation to matter
[edit]Mind–body problem
[edit]The mind–body problem is the difficulty of providing a general explanation of the relationship between mind and body, for example, of the link between thoughts and brain processes. Despite their different characteristics, mind and body interact with each other, like when a bodily change causes mental discomfort or when a limb moves because of an intention.[1] According to substance dualism, minds or souls exist as distinct substances that have mental states while material things are another type of substance. This view implies that, at least in principle, minds can exist without bodies.[2] Property dualism is another form of dualism that says that mind and matter are not distinct individuals but different properties that apply to the same individual.[3] Monist views, by contrast, state that reality is made up of only one kind. According to idealists, everything is mental.[4] They understand material things as mental constructs, for example, as ideas or perceptions.[5] According to neutral monists, the world is at its most fundamental level neither physical nor mental but neutral. They see physical and mental concepts as convenient but superficial ways to describe reality.[6]
The monist view most influential in contemporary philosophy is physicalism, also referred to as materialism,[a] which states that everything is physical.[8] According to eliminative physicalism, there are no mental phenomena, meaning that things like beliefs and desires do not form part of reality.[9] Reductive physicalists defend a less radical position: they say that mental states exist but can, at least in principle, be completely described by physics without the need for special sciences like psychology. For example, behaviorists aim to analyze mental concepts in terms of observable behavior without resorting to internal mental states.[10] Type identity theory also belongs to reductive physicalism and says that mental states are the same as brain states.[11] While non-reductive physicalists agree that everything is physical, they say that mental concepts describe physical reality on a more abstract level that cannot be achieved by physics.[12] According to functionalism, mental concepts do not describe the internal constitution of physical substances but functional roles within a system.[13] For example, part of the functional role of pain is given by its relation to bodily injury and its tendency to cause behavioral patterns like moaning and other mental states, like the desire to stop the pain.[14] One consequence of this view is that mind does not depend on brains but can also be realized by other systems that implement the corresponding functional roles, possibly also computers.[15]
The hard problem of consciousness is a central aspect of the mind-body problem: it is the challenge of explaining how physical states can give rise to conscious experience. Its main difficulty lies in the subjective and qualitative nature of consciousness, which is unlike typical physical processes. The hard problem of consciousness contrasts with the "easy problems" of explaining how certain aspects of consciousness function, such as perception, memory, or learning.[16]
Brain areas and processes
[edit]Another approach to the relation between mind and matter uses empirical observation to study how the brain works and which brain areas and processes are associated with specific mental phenomena.[17] The brain is the central organ of the nervous system and is present in all vertebrates and the majority of invertebrates. The human brain is of particular complexity and consists of 86 billion neurons, which communicate with one another via synapses.[18] They form a complex neural network and cognitive processes emerge from their electrical and chemical interactions.[19] The human brain is divided into regions that are associated with different functions. The main regions are the hindbrain, midbrain, and forebrain.[20] The hindbrain and the midbrain are responsible for many biological functions associated with basic survival while higher mental functions, ranging from thoughts to motivation, are primarily localized in the forebrain.[21]
The primary operation of many of the main mental phenomena is located in specific areas of the forebrain. The prefrontal cortex is responsible for executive functions, such as planning, decision-making, problem-solving, and working memory. [22] The role of the sensory cortex is to process and interpret sensory information, with different subareas dedicated to different senses, like the visual and the auditory areas. A central function of the hippocampus is the formation and retrieval of long-term memories. It belongs to the limbic system, which plays a key role in the regulation of emotions through the amygdala. The motor cortex is responsible for planning, executing, and controlling voluntary movements. Broca's area is a separate region dedicated to speech production.[23] The activity of the different areas is additionally influenced by neurotransmitters, which are signaling molecules that enhance or inhibit different types of neural communication. For example, dopamine influences motivation and pleasure while serotonin affects mood and appetite.[24]
The close interrelation of brain processes and the mind is seen by the effect that physical changes of the brain have on the mind. For instance, the consumption of psychoactive drugs, like caffeine, antidepressants, alcohol, and psychedelics, temporarily affects brain chemistry with diverse effects on the mind, ranging from increased attention to mood changes, impaired cognitive functions, and hallucinations.[25] Long-term changes to the brain in the form of neurodegenerative diseases and brain injuries can lead to permanent alterations in mental functions. Alzheimer's disease in its first stage deteriorates the hippocampus, reducing the ability to form new memories and recall existing ones.[26] An often-cited case of the effects of brain injury is Phineas Gage, whose prefrontal cortex was severely damaged during a work accident when an iron rod pierced through his skull and brain. Gage survived the accident but his personality and social attitude changed significantly as he became more impulsive, irritable, and anti-social while showing little regard for social conventions and an impaired ability to plan and make rational decisions.[27] Not all these changes were permanent and Gage managed to recover and adapt in some areas.[28]
Notes
[edit]Sources
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- Stoljar, Daniel (2010). Physicalism. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-14922-2.
- Barrett, Lisa Feldman (2009). "The Future of Psychology: Connecting Mind to Brain". Perspectives on Psychological Science. 4 (4). doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01134.x.
- Frankish, Keith; Kasmirli, Maria (2009). "8. Mind and Consciousness". In Shand, John (ed.). Central Issues of Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-4051-6270-8.
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- Macmillan, Malcolm; Lena, Matthew L. (2010). "Rehabilitating Phineas Gage". Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. 20 (5). doi:10.1080/09602011003760527.
- APA Staff (2018g). "Neurotransmitter". APA Dictionary of Psychology.
- Reisyan, Garo D. (2015). Neuro-Organizational Culture: A new approach to understanding human behavior and interaction in the workplace. Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-22147-2.
- Yukalov, V. I.; Sornette, D. (2014). "How Brains Make Decisions". In Freund, Friedemann; Langhoff, Stephanie (eds.). Universe of Scales: From Nanotechnology to Cosmology: Symposium in Honor of Minoru M. Freund. Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-02207-9.
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- Popescu, Aurel I.; Opris, Ioan (2017). "Introduction: From Neurons to the Mind". In Opris, Ioan (ed.). The Physics of the Mind and Brain Disorders: Integrated Neural Circuits Supporting the Emergence of Mind. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN 978-3-319-29672-2.
- Opris, Ioan; Casanova, Manuel F.; Lebedev, Mikhail A.; Popescu, Aurel I. (2017). "Prefrontal Cortical Microcircuits Support the Emergence of Mind". In Opris, Ioan (ed.). The Physics of the Mind and Brain Disorders: Integrated Neural Circuits Supporting the Emergence of Mind. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN 978-3-319-29672-2.
- Bigaj, Tomasz; Wüthrich, Christian (2015). Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-31082-7.
- Searle, John R. (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-515733-8.
- Blackmore, Susan (2013). Consciousness: An Introduction. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-4441-2827-7.
- Weisberg, Josh. "Hard Problem of Consciousness". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 22 April 2024.
- Stoljar, Daniel (2024). "Physicalism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 22 April 2024.
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- Kim, Jaegwon (2005). "Mind, Problems of the Philosophy of". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. Archived from the original on 11 April 2024. Retrieved 29 March 2024.
- Jaworski, William (2011). Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction (1 ed.). Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4443-3367-1.
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- Stoljar 2024, § 2.2.1 Type Physicalism
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- Searle 2004, p. 62
- ^ Levin 2023, § 1. What is Functionalism?
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- Jaworski 2011, pp. 136–137
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- Blackmore 2013, pp. 33–35
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- Frankish & Kasmirli 2009, p. 107
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- ^ Macmillan & Lena 2010, p. 655