User:Nobs01/Agent handling

Agent handler is a generic term common to many intelligence organizations which can be applied to Case Officers, those who aspire to be Case officers, "controllers", contacts, couriers and other assorted trainees.

The Business

Intelligence and Counterintelligence actually are two entirely different fields. Many writings on the subject of espionage often jumble the two together as the samething, yet it is important to understand the separation. They are entirely different specialties, with different objectives, and a different mindset required from those working in the field. Like the offense and defense on a football team, their approach to the game is entirely different, extending even their own terminology.

What can be learned from a successful espionage operation usually comes from counterespionage files, which then has the tendency to give a distorted or opaque view. For example, what is known about the CPUSA's secret apparatus, which operated a very large and successful organization in the United States from about 1921 to 1945, comes largely from FBI and SIS counterintelligence files. And these files really are fragmentary, given the time in question. While counterintelligence agents successfully identified perhaps a third of CPUSA & Soviet operatives between 1945 and 1950, only personal memoirs of the intelligence operatives in question, or successful testimony if it can be believed, or a peak into Soviet and Comintern archives, gives us a clue as to what the entire organizations' mission was and how they set about it for two and a half decades. The FBI counterintellignece files very often only contain three weeks of direct surveillance on their activities, and those being surveilled learned the operation had been compromised, so they broke their usual pattern of conduct. The terminology regarding their methods and objectives which makes its way into the history books however, usually comes from the counterintelligence source.

Counterintelligence

The objective of counterintelligence is to identify an intelligence operative. However, the intelligence operative's objective is not simply to evade detection; he has a more important mission to perform, and avoiding counterintelligence detection is just part of performing that mission. Once the identification has been made by counterintelligence, the operative is not just arrested and carted off to jail as in most crimes; a decision must be made, and he usually is temporarilly left in place so as not to tip off how he came to be identified, which would have the effect of compromising other counterintelligence operations.

First, he must be cut off from access to further secure information, without him knowing, then fed an elaborate stream of credible disinformation. Then an assessment must be made as to the extent of the damage and what information has been compromised. Eventually, the "mole" and his "handlers" will realize their operation has been compromised because of the useless disinformation being passed, yet this buys time for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards" to determine what has been compromised within the target organization. That's the point at which an arrest is usually made, though sometimes the process of feeding disinformation can be useful, so a discovered agent may be left in place for years.

Occassionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole, that is, gain his cooperation without exposing to his controllers that his cover has been blown. This can make him an unwilling agent of either side, either to continue the feed of disinformation, or being coerced at threat of imprisonment to betray his compatriot organization. In the famous case of Arkady Schevchenko, Soviet diplomat to the United Nations who asked to defect, rather than accept his defection, CIA required he remain in place and engage in espionage. Schevchenko was a professional diplomat, not a spy, and the stressful work he found nerve wracking. This is another example of CIA's inability to penetrate a target organization and coercing the wrong "recruit" into the business.

MICE

The concept of "MICE" originated among American counterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates a person to be willing to betray their own country. It can be regarded as one of America's contributions to the art and science of the business, now that both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simple mneumonic, to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents in the service of a foreign organization. The concept is simple, it is either money, ideology, coersion, or excitement, that causes a person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbors, their whole country, and go into the service of a foreign espionage organization. Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted for ideology, or "ego" for excitment, but the end result is the same. No one has produced a better list of motivations that traitors and espionage artists fall into.

Individuals who are motivated to betray their counrty for money, or greed, tend to be persons who feel life has cheated them out of their just rewards, so they have no qualms of being fairly compensated, in their own eyes, for their worth. At the same they can get back at the society which has misunderstood and not appreciated their talents. When Aldrich Ames bought an $80,000 Jaguar there wasn't the slightest pretense of hiding the fruit of his labors.

Ideology, however is the opposite end of the pole. These people are deeply committed to a system of beliefs they perceive sustains them, their families, communities, and their friends. And they will risk their lives for no payment, service to the cause being their reward. Both Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, as is becoming clearer now, were "patsies", or fall guys for a much larger conspiracy, most of whom walked away unscratched. But the Rosenbergs, Ethel too, were willing patsies, martyrs to a cause for which Julius was willing to see his own wife executed rather than implicate others, and Ethel was willing to orphan her own children, in service to the cause. As to intrigue, Kim Philby, who rose to the number two spot in British intelligence, and was poised to become head, assisted the United States to establish a peacetime espionage organization, but in doing compromised the CIA from it's founding, origninally was recruited into Soviet intelligence to spy on his father, St. John Philby.

Coersion can be used against an unwilling participant, homosexuality and bribery being two of the most common. The classic example of homosexuality is Donald Maclean who was compromised by Guy Burgess. As to bribery, once a government official takes a bribe, he is forever in the possession of those who paid him. He must continue taking money, whether he wants to or not, for fear of exposure. Coersion can also be used against a loved one, which can range from fear of exposure to violence and even murder.

John Walker was a juvenile delinquent ordered to enlist by a juvenile court judge or serve time in reform school. He chose the Navy and rose to a position of trust in charge of submarine fleet codes. Walker became very good at his work and was well compensated, but the sheer adrenaline rush of excitement was his motivation in everything he did.

Intelligence

The objective of the intelligence operatives, on the other hand are many and bountiful. In fact, there is no one single job among operatives. Each has his own particular position within an organizatrion. At the high end, it may be to penetrate and infiltrate a target organization. That is, to either infiltrate a target organization with one of your own personal, or to gain by MICE, and agent in place. If the job is to handle an agent in place, that requires a Case Officer or oversee the agent. Sometimes this is done indirectly, through lower level "handlers", "controllers", contacts and such. The CIA is fond of using "agents of influence", these really are second hand sources directed at a target, like the maid to an ambassador who digs through the trash for memoranda for example, because the CIA recognizes its weakness at the direct approach of recruitment.

Other positions among intelligence operatives are in support functions, primarily maintainence and operation of "safehouses", courier, etc.

Case Officer

The relationship between Case Officer and agent is very much akin to that of a psychiatrist and patient, because very often the person willing to become involved in espionage and the betrayal of his country, are people with emotional problems, or they develop serious emotional problems from the stress which is just in the nature of the work. The Case Officer is the complete intelligence professional in the operational field, ever the cool, level headed, in control of his emotions. Always ready to deal with a crisis, be it personal or imagined, or of the dreaded breach of security protocol type, sloppiness, laziness, stupidity, lack of motivation, carelessness. The Case Officer must constantly be looking after these concerns and be ready to mentor and exhort the bedraggled agent to carry on.

However, real history shows that after a source (agent) has been exploited, he is often no longer handled well by many services e.g. BND, MI6 and others. In reality agents are given incentives and promises are made which then turn out to become broken. Since probably every major service can be assumed to be penetrated by moles, every agent runs the risk of being tipped off, which happens frequently after major defectors change sides. Many Case officers privately lack respect of the agent who is risking his life, viewing them as most societies view people who betray their own friends, as scum. Norbert Juretzko of BND, for example, got sacked after they found he did not file the real names of his Russian spies, keeping them from being shot after KGB received their filed names.

Agent, recruitment, and training

The term "agent" refers to "one who acts on behalf of another", the "another", in this case being an organization or government. Agents can be either witting or unwitting. They can also by willing of unwilling. Agents are almost always a foreign national who is under the direction of an agent handler or controller. In the case of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, this handler is known as a Case Officer.

The spotting of potential recruit often is conducted through skimming of trade journals and professional proceedings for subject experts names and affiliations, vulnerable political and technical delegation members, trade conferences attendees, and foreign travellers whose activities make them potential subjects for coersion or inducement.

The assessment of a potential agent includes verification of their credentials and bona fides or true identities. A risk analysis should be conducted to determine the dangers of approaching the target recruit with a 'pitch' for cooperation. This is either done 'cold,' where the recruiter has no prior contact with the target, or 'warm,' in which the handler and the target are prior acquaintances. Recruitment of an agent can take many months or even years to accomplish.

After recruitment agents are given the training required to conduct espionage activities safely and effectively. CIA training often includes various tradecraft such as clandestine communications, elicitation, surveillance and countersurveillance, photographic and audio recording, concealment device construction, demolitions, use of small arms, all depending on the persons fitness and skills.

In some forms of infiltration, the agent may be provided with a false identity, which CIA calls a cover or legend, that might aid in their access and operability in regards to the target. Sometimes false or reproduced documentation, disguises, and other identity support techniques are used.

Agent in place

An agent in place refers to a subject known within a society, known to his friends, who may even have a position inside a government, and is willing to cooperate or assist. Case handling in these instances require much more caution, security, and training. It is extremely dangerous for both the Case officer and agent to publicly meet and have face to face contact, though initially this may be necessary to establish bona fides and some training regarding contacts. Usually the agent in place is then handed off to an inoccuous cutout, or series of cutouts, who act as go-betweens and courier, delivering instructions and retrieving material.

Unwitting agent

Sometimes after a risk analysis, it is determined recruitment is unfeasible. Yet the target may be valuable and someone close to him is willing, hence useful information can be gained unwittingly. Two example are Stephen S. Attwood and Walter Lippmann, in Attwoods case someone connected with the university he taught at was working Soviet intelligence; in Lippmann's case his personal stenographer had knoweldge of all his Washington D.C. contacts and their conversations. Wen Ho Lee, it appears now, through sloppy work habits and carelessness on both his part and Los Alamos National Laboratory, unwittingly passed vital information to the Chinese Communist Government.

Fronts and cutouts

A front organization in espionage functions within a system of "cutouts". A "cutout" is intended to shied or isolate a higher level infiltrator who has "penetrated" the target organization (governmnet bureau, for example). Once the Department penetration has been made, the higher level infiltrator may have any of three jobs: (1) to bring within the government agency, and to protect, lower level appointees who are also infiltrators; (2) to provide information from within the penetrated target organization to an outside intelligence organization; or (3) a combination of both.

A "ring" within a penetrated bureau consists of several collectors of information from different areas within the penetrated bureau. The most valuable source must be protected; so often the least "productive" infiltrator, i.e. the person lowest on the totem pole within the penetrated target, whose knowledge and ability to collect information is second or third hand, functions as the head of the group. He carries the information from higher level gatherers to outside persons, so as to "cutout" contact between a high level infiltrator and a foreign intelligence organization.

So the most valuable and productive members of the ring are isolated from contact with foreign Agent case officers, which is safest for both. One member gathers all the collected material from all infiltrators, then will pass the information to another cutout outside the government. That second cutout likewise is usually a natural citizen, though not employed by the target government, but who then can transmit the information directly to the foreign intelligence service.

The extensive use of cutouts, so long as they are trusted and reliable persons, can become a long chain of individuals. This performs another purpose, similiar to the extensive use of "front organizations"; by their sheer number, it becomes a shell game with counterintelligence investigators, who have finite and limited resources. When suspicion arises, the large number of persons and organizations connected to the conspiracy can devour endless hours and cost, which has the effect of slowing down the process of exposing an espionage organization.

Residuals

Valuable spies are sometimes not hanged but exchanged for spies from the opposite country. Many agencies tell their spies that they will not be forgotten in a foreign prison, but this is not always the case. During the Cold War many exchanges with eastern-bloc agents were made on the Glienicke Bridge between East Germany and West Berlin.