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The Siberian Chemical Combine was established in 1953 in Tomsk-7 now known as Seversk.

Introduction

The Siberian Chemical Combine played an important role in the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons program. The facility produced plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and fabricated warhead components using produced plutonium and HEU.

As the Cold War came to an end, the Siberian Chemical Combine's HEU production ceased and the last plutonium production reactor at the facility was shut down in 2008. Although production has halted, the facility remains a major site for storage and handling of weapon-usable materials and nuclear weapon components.

Presently, the facility supplies Russia's low enriched uranium fuel needs and enriches reprocessed uranium for foreign customers. The facility is one of the largest sites that stors low and intermediate level nuclear wastes from reprossesing with more than 30 million cubic meters stored via deep-well injection.

References

Beginning in 1949, the Soviet Union began the production of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) at the Ural Electrochemical Combine in Sverdlovsk-44, now called Novouralsk.

History

The Ural Electrochemical Combine was important to the Soviet Union due to its history of foreign partnerships. The facility was heavily involved in the construction of centrifuge plants in Shaan-xi and Lanzhou, China in the 1990s to serve China's domestic fuel needs. The facility also enriched uranium for Kazakhstan, with the Soviet Union receiving a share of 50%, proportionate to the need to enrich to 6000 tU/yr.

The Soviet Union began replacing its gaseous diffusion equipment with centrifuge technology in the 1960s. By the end of the Cold War, when all equipment had been replaced, the facility had the capacity to produce almost 12 million SWU per year.

The facility is now converted to civilian use and no longer produces highly enriched uranium. Today, the facility enriches uranium for Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel, and develops technologies for industrial applications.

References

The Nuclear Cities Initiative is an initiative which purports to support the now struggling community and structures of post-USSR nuclear research, aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation.

Introduction

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, concerns about the fate of the Soviet "nuclear cities" fell into the hands of Russia. It was in these secret, highly restricted cities that the Soviet Union designed and produced its nuclear weapons. Due to the great importance of these cities, they were generously funded by the Soviet Union. After the fall of the USSR, the 600,000 residents and workers of these cities were left enormous funding problems over the past decade of political, social, and economic difficulties in Russia.

Despite attempts by Moscow to create self-sustainable infrastructure, the attempts ultimately failed. The RANSAC, now the Partnership for Global Security, responded by launching the Nuclear Cities Initiative. The initiative was brought about after a 1997 report by the RANSAC recommended action to prevent the "nuclear know-how" of the workers in the cities falling into undesirable hands. United States president Bill Clinton and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin made the deal in September 1998, confirming their approval of the overall concept. In 1999 $15 million were procured from American assistance programmes, but a Russian financial crisis and Congress' decision to halve funding to $7.5 million reduced funding to the project.

The project at first worked only on a few of the cities; Russia disallowed development elsewhere until success could be proven in a handful of cities first.

In 2001, the U.S. General Accounting Office criticised the progress made so far, and recommended merging NCI and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention into a single programme to improve efficiency. By the end of the Clinton administration, over $30 million had been secured for the project, but this was heavily cut by the following Bush administration who reduced expenditure to $6.6 million. However, the 2002 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, which merged IPP and NCI, resulted in a substantial increase in funding to $42 million as it brought funding from the Russian Transition Initiatives budget, which was further increased by $15 million after the September 11 attacks.

Russia's Ten Nuclear Cities

1. Sarov (location of VNIIEF-Federal Nuclear Center and Avangard Electromechanical Plant). Formerly known as Arzamas-16.
2. Snezhinsk (location of VNIITF-Federal Nuclear Center). Formerly known as Chelyabinsk-70.
3. Zarechnyy (location of Start Production Association). Formerly known as Penza-19.
4. Novouralsk (location of Ural Electrochemical Combine). Formerly known as Sverdlovsk-44.
5. Lesnoy (location of Elektrokhimpribor Combine). Formerly know as Sverdlovsk-45.
6. Ozersk (location of Mayak Production Association). Formerly known as Chelyabinsk-65.
7. Trekhgornyy (location of Instrument Making Plant). Formerly know as Zlatoust-36.
8. Seversk (location of Siberian Chemical Combine). Formerly know as Tomsk-7.
9. Zheleznogorsk (location of Mining and Chemical Combine). Formerly known as Krasnoyarsk-26.
10. Zelenogorsk (location of Krasnoyarsk-45 Electrochemical Plant). Formerly known as Krasnoyarsk-45.

External links

• Nuclear Cities Initiative, Nuclear Threat Initiative, at www.nti.org.
• Nuclear Cities Initiative, at www.y12.doe.gov.

Category:Nuclear proliferation Category:Cold War

The Krasnoyarsk-45 / Zelenogorsk Electrochemical Plant was located in the closed city of Krasnoyarsk-45, currently Zelenogorsk, was established in 1962 to produce highly enriched uranium for the Soviet nuclear weapons program.

History

The plant began in 1962 as a gaseous diffusion plant, and began to produce enriched uranium in 1964. At this time, the U.S. intelligence community predicted that the plant would reach its design capacity in 1967, but the plant was not fully operational until 1970. Since becoming fully operational and through the end of the Cold War, the facility's enrichment capacity ranged from 1 million SWU/yr to 6-7 million SWU/yr.

In the early 1960s, the Soviets began to replace their gaseous diffusion machines with centrifuges, but it was not until 1990 that the final gaseous diffusion cascade was shut down.

The Electrochemical Plant in Krasnoyarsk-45 currently accounts for 29 percent of Russia's enrichment capacity. It has been converted to civilian use and no longer produces any highly enriched uranium. Since 1997, the facility has been involved in down-blending highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled weapons under the U.S.-Russian HEU agreement. The plants primary activities include processing, transportation, and storage of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel.

References

Category:Nuclear power stations built in the Soviet Union

The Global Rocket 1 (GR-1) was a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) developed but not deployed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The system also was given the NATO reporting name SS-X-10 Scrag, and carried a Soviet GRAU index of 8K713.

Development

In 1961, faced with the prospect of development in the United States of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system to intercept conventional ICBMs, the Soviet Union began development of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) to defeat these interceptors. Soviet Chief Designer, Sergei Pavlovich Korolev designed the Global Rocket 1 (GR-1). The concept was to construct a missile that could be launched into low earth orbit (150 km), from which a 1500 kg nuclear warhead equipped with a deorbit stage could be dropped to its targets in a non-ballistic manner and without giving away its target until final descent. This concept would allow for very little warning to the U.S. because the rocket would be able to approach the United States from any direction and avoid missile tracking radar by flying below its coverage. Not only could such a missile hit any point on earth, but the enemy would also be uncertain when it would be deorbited onto target. The main disadvantage was lower accuracy of the warhead in comparison to an ICBM. Korolev insisted on sticking to the liquid oxygen/kerosene propellants of his R-9 Desna ICBM design, despite the military's preference for the more toxic but storable propellants used by other designers. The GR-1 was intended to utilize the launch pads of Korolev's R-9 Desna which was being phased out of service.

Korolev unofficially started work on the missile on 15 March 1962 based on a verbal go-ahead by Khrushchev. The draft project for the GR-1 was completed in May 1962, and a mock-up had already been built and drawings released to the production shop by the time the official resolution was issued on 24 September 1962. Test flights were scheduled to start in the third quarter of 1963. Further development of the GR-1 missile was halted in 1964 in preference of the orbital R-36 missile.

The GR-1 project was cancelled in 1964 citing engine delays, a fate which became permanent for all of the FOBS designs after the SALT II agreement of 1979. Even earlier, in 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty removed the primary reason for such a weapon.

Operator

Soviet Union

The Soviets cancelled the GR-1 before it entered operational service with the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Specifications

Global Rocket 1 (GR-1) Characteristics
Maximum Range	40,000 km (24,000 mi)
Number of Warheads	1
Warhead Yield	2,200 KT
Boost Propulsion	Liquid Oxygen/Kerosene
Cruise Engine	RD-0110
Total Length	35.505 m
Missile Diameter	2.85 m
Launch Weight	116 t
Number of Stages	3

See also

• List of missiles

Category:Cold War intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union Category:Abandoned military projects of the Soviet Union GR-1