User:MaggieMaeve/Fampoux Railway Accident

Fampoux Railway Accident
Lithograph, Félix Robaut (1799-1880).
Details
Date	1846 ~3:00 p.m.
Location	Near the Scarpe Viaduct
Coordinates	50°17′55.7″N 2°52′43.9″E
Country	France
Line	Paris-Lille
Operator	Compagnie du chemin de fer du Nord
Incident type	Derailment
Cause	Unclear. Likely excessive speed.
Statistics
Trains	Steam locomotives
Passengers	220
Deaths	17
Injured	~40

The Fampoux Railway Accident, also called the Fampoux Catastrophe, took place in northern France on 8 July 1846, in the commune of the same name in Pas-de-Calais, when the derailment of a train on the newly opened Paris-Lille line killed 14 and injured 40.

Circumstances

Background

At the time, the telegraph line between Paris and Lille was still under construction. As a result, both the authorities and the press were slow in distributing news about the crash, and initial reports were confused. It is nevertheless possible to reconstruct the essential facts of the incident retrospectively, particularly through the use of judicial sources.

A newly opened line

The state had built the Paris-Lille line in successive sections, as well as its extension toward the Belgian rail network. On September 9, 1845, the Minister of Public Works awarded the line as a concession to "Mssrs. Rothschild brothers, Hottinguer & Co., Charles Laffitte, Blount & Co.", who, after some judicial and financial maneuvering, created the Compagnie des chemins de fer du Nord (Northern Railway Company) on September 20, 1845. Once the line was equipped, a grand inauguration was held between June 14 and 15, 1846, and it was opened to the public five days later.

In order to respond to the contemporary craze for rail transport while most of the line remained unfinished or with only one-way tracks, in its first weeks after opening the Company had to run very long and heavy trains. This necessitated double-traction engines.

On Wednesday, July 8, a convoy regrouping trains for Lille and Valenciennes left the Gare du Nord at 7 a.m. In accordance with its composition and load, it was drawn by two steam locomotives, and five of its cars were equipped with brakemen. It comprised 26 vehicles in total— baggage cars, passenger cars divided into three classes, and nine flat cars carrying coaches, postal carriages, and Berlin carriages belonging to various public figures.

At Amiens, two flat cars were attached, one of which carried a Rouen-Lille coach.

The accident

Around 8 kilometers out of Arras Station, which it had left at 3:45 pm, the train, pulled by Locomotive No. 44 followed by No. 48, descended the 4% incline preceding the viaduct over the river Scarpe, and then began to climb the embankment (sloped at 4.5%) built over the swamp en route to Roeux. At 3:55 pm, a sudden, violent burst came from the front of the convoy. While the first engine stayed on the tracks, the second, in which the engineer had immediately reversed the steam, derailed, along with the cars behind it. Of the two baggage cars in front, only the first remained linked to the locomotives, and remained with them for about 200 meters. Behind, the coupling of the second broke, and the rest of the train rolled about 100 meters on the tracks before veering to the left towards the edge of the embankment, around 7 meters high. Thirteen cars hurtled down the embankment towards the edge of the water, crashing chaotically after breaking their couplings. Four of them plunged into the pond left by an abandoned peat bog and disappeared into the water, 3-4 meters deep. Five others followed, but were not completely submerged, being supported by the debris of those preceding, while the last four were stopped on the bank.

The rest of the train stayed on the embankment, the last eight cars not having derailed.

Response

As soon as the accident occurred, the passengers of the cars which remained safe attempted to rescue the passengers stuck in the wreck, and some performed acts of bravery which the press would later report on. The wife and daughter of the Marquis d'Audiffret, peer of France, Minister to the Court in Finances, were rescued from their sunken car in this manner, and lifted onto the bank by an English traveler.

Similarly, certain employees of the train also distinguished themselves in the rescue operations. The conductor of the lead car, Benoit Hocq, jumped into the water and saved eight people, which later earned him a medal and a Prix Montyon. An oiler named Carré plunged into the swamp and drew out five people after being ejected from the walkway where he found himself at the moment of the derailment. The sub-inspector Pierre Hovelt took charge of the organization and directed the response in his capacity as chief the train, after having swum away from his flooded car,

The local population also came to aid the victims. Workers arrived very quickly from the surrounding peat bogs with their boats and tools and saved a number of passengers imprisoned in the wreck or escaping through the water. Notably, they rescued a Dr. Lestiboudois, a politician as well as a physician, who then gave emergency care to other passengers. Among them was the aide de camp of Marshal Oudinot, who was gravely wounded. Around 40 wounded passengers received first aid at Fampoux, where the residents opened their doors to the victims, following the example of their priest; at Rœux, the mayor welcomed them in his home after having witnessed the accident. Those in gravest need were sent to hospitals at Arras or Douai, while the rest remained.

The journal l'Indépendance Belge nonetheless criticized the inhabitants, stating that "The peasants of the area crowded around the accident, standing amazed and surrounding the passengers, who struggled to obtain water to clean their wounds"

The rescue operations intensified towards the end of the day, after two trains arrived from Arras and Douai around 6 p.m. They brought doctors, military engineers, and soldiers, as well as administrative and judicial officials, including the mayor of Arras and the Crown Prosecutor.

They were able to bring four cars back onto the rails; these, along with the eight which had not been derailed, were sent back to Arras, before being sent to Douai and Lille on the adjacent track.

Because of the geography of the site, and the fact that the other track remained open, the process of clearing the wreck was delicate and risky. The following day, a train departing Brussels at 7 a.m. and crossing the site of the wreck at 2 p.m. snagged and knocked over a crane being used to dredge the train cars. This wounded three soldiers, one of whom would later need his leg amputated. This new accident raised the urgency of the situation in the press, and gave rise to court actions.

On July 11, the Minister of Public Works Pierre Sylvain Dumon visited the site, accompanied by the mayor of Arras.

Results

Several hours after the accident, 11 bodies were left in the sand of the bank, and three other were found hidden in the debris. While the removal of the rubble had not even begun, the authorities believed they could definitively announce that the number of fatalities was 14.

This number was immediately contested. Witness stated that the three flooded cars had been filled with passengers, notably 15 military reservists going to join their regiment in Lille, and that therefore many bodies were left to be found in the swamp. At the same time, the initial death toll was raised, as one M. Bertrand d'Aigny, aide-de-camp of General Oudinot, succumbed to his injuries. Le Journal de la Somme announced that three of the wounded had subsequently died in the following days, bringing the total to 17 dead. A reader of the paper Le Siècle, presenting himself as an eyewitness, wrote a letter affirming that the number of dead was "at least triple" that announced. Other journals posited numbers in the range of 35 dead, or 58 disappeared.

The company and the authorities attempted to refute these claims of underestimation, similar to those propagated four years earlier after the Meudon Accident. They thus denied the death of the aforementioned Bertrand d'Aigny, and explained that the car which many believed they had seen carrying reservists was only transporting baggage. In order to eliminate doubt, one week later, after 15 cavalrymen had entered the bog to explore, they announced that there was nothing left but insubstantial debris.

Despite the denials, an estimated death total of almost 200 would be brought before a court. Before the first hearing, on November 11, as his counterpart did before him at the hearings regarding the Meudon Accident, the King's advocate referenced these rumors but called them an "exaggeration," and affirmed the official number "with certainty".

Concerning the injured, of whom the true number must have been around 40, the magistrate would only count the most seriously wounded, and stated that "10 persons were gravely injured".

Aftermath

Reactions

While the state had not previously ruled out granting monopolies regarding the railway network, the law of June 11, 1842 finally enshrined a mixed system, reserving for itself the construction of platforms and engineering work, but delegating to companies the laying of tracks and the running of trains. The spectacular nature and the high death toll of Fampoux, of which the news made its way to the Paris stock exchange long before being made public, offered the press an occasion to critique this arrangement, connecting state power with private enterprise.

Most papers contented themselves to remind both the government and the companies of their respective obligations. Thus, Le Siècle, a monarchist journal, insisted on the responsibility of the state, writing "We are assured that the company is taking all necessary measures to avoid any possible danger. We hope that the government will take an interest. It incumbent upon the state to keep an closer eye on these things, as it was responsible during a year of work and at all times of the public trust." The Journal des débats politiques et littétaires, a liberal publication, emphasized on the duties of the companies— "We have been sincere advocates of the creation and use of the railways by the Companies; we remain as such still, more than ever. But we are aware, and we do not forget, the obligations which the Companies contracted with the public the day on which they accepted the contract giving them a railway concession".

Frustrated with this cautious neutrality, the republican journal Le National opposed the concession of railways to the private sector, stating ironically— "Thus begins the operation of M. Rothschild!" and indignantly, "This Northern Railway has already caused in the financial world, as well as the moral world, serious disorder; it was one of the instruments of the most scandalous conversions in the Chamber; is it not enough that it should corrupt those around it? Must it be that in the first days of its existence it kills those who had faith in it?"

Placement of responsibility

While the accident gave rise to numerous investigations, uncertainty remained as to its causes. However, the courts would ultimately assign blame to those responsible.

Multiple investigations

The events at Fampoux created an unusual number investigations, likely due to the importance of determining liability between the state and its private partners. The first analysis of the accident, coming from the Company and widely publicized through its press releases, was based on an account from sub-inspector Hovelt, the conductor. Soon came a more detailed administrative report created, at the request of the Minister of Public Works, Pierre Sylvain Dumon, by the Division Inspector of Roads and Bridges Pierre-François Frissard, published on July 13, and reproduced in full in most national papers. To these were added two more specific judicial reports, requested by the counselor-reporter of the Royal Court of Douai: one on July 26 by M. Gillot and M. Beaumal, on the balance of facts concerning the case, the other July 22 and 26 by M. Le Gavrian, inventor and mechanic, on the state of the locomotives.

Outside of the inquests, many other inventor experts would intervene, all functionaries of the state and having for the most part participated in the construction of the line.

Uncertainty of the causes

All the occupants of the train had observed that in approaching the place of the accident, the cars had had an unusual yaw just before the initial shock, which was followed by the derailment. Among the potential causes put forth to explain the accident, one was the subsidence of the embankment, constructed by the state on the unstable soil of the swamp 18 months prior, and remitted to the Company on April 1, 1846, who then laid down the tracks on top of it. This was the hypothesis favored by the Company, who observed that other parts of the line conceded by the state had the same structural flaws, and let it be known that it would seek damages from the state to protect itself in the event it was found liable.

However, the official inquests did not find this explanation likely. The administrative report of Pierre-Antoine Frissard, sent by the Minister, concluded "The Fampoux disaster cannot be attributed to neither the construction nor the maintenance of the railway. The cause must therefore be searched for elsewhere". The judicial report given to the Royal Court at Douai went in the same vein in establishing that the earth of the embankment "is now very stale, and no detectable settling could be found". Differences in height were observed, but judged minor, and "could not have had any influence on the accident".

If the yaw movement which could have caused the derailment was not caused by the poor state of the embankment, many other explanations were possible, and were put forth at the subsequent hearings. That which seemed the most likely was the speed of the train, even if it was known only through much approximation. The time needed to travel the 8 kilometers from Arras corresponds to an average of 22 km/h, but the bulk of witnesses stated that at the moment of the accident the train, which was coming out of a decline and then climbing an incline, must have been traveling between 35 and 40 km/h. For most experts, this speed could only reinforce the yaw movement in a convoy with an asymmetric center of gravity due to its heterogenous composition, containing notably cars heavily laden with carriages. It heavily exceeded the 24 km/h limit imposed on double-traction trains by Article 17 of the ministerial order of May 31, 1846, regulating the running of the line, enforced by the prefect of Pas-de-Calais.

It remained to explain how the speed and yaw combined to produce the derailment, and there the experts differed in their theories. For some, during the transition between decline and incline, the end of the train would have exercised an excessive force causing the front of the train to derail. For others, it was the coupling between the first and second baggage cars which, in breaking and lodging in the ground, had initially pushed these two cars off the rails. For others still, it was the engineer of the second locomotive who, in reversing the steam engine, created an extremely abrupt stop for the train, leading to the accident.

For others still, it was the rail itself which could not withstand "a convoy of enormous weight", traveling at this speed, with two locomotives in front each weighing 26 tons. The rim of one of the locomotive's wheels showed traces "of a considerable, instantaneous shock produced by meeting a hard object, such as the end of a rail," according to an expert. Since a rail with a bent end was found nearby, it is possible that this rail was raised at a slight angle from the others and caused the derailment. This explanation seemed all the more likely since an examination of of the rail ties revealed that some seemed to have moved suddenly before the accident. A reader of La Presse, based on his experience as "head of service of one of our railways," commented on the insufficient monitoring of rail dilation during periods of very hot weather.

Whatever the causes of the derailment, the judicial authorities decided that responsibility should be limited to four Company employees who were supposed to have had control over the composition and conduct of the train. By order of the Royal Court of Douai, August 20, 1846, the following were brought before the police tribunal of Lille: Jules-Alexandre Petiet (33 y.o., operations engineer, in charge of general service organization); Pierre-Joseph Hovelt (37 y.o., sub-inspector, acting conductor); Alexandre Duthoit (26 y.o., locomotive engineer); Antoine-François Bolu (46 y.o., locomotive engineer).

Trials

First Hearing

The trial took place between the 11th and 15th of November, 1846. After a long cross-examination involving 35 witnesses, the Crown prosecutor called for the conviction of the four accused, saying they were responsible for the excessive speed which caused the accident. Their defense attorney, Eugène Bethmont, previously defense counsel at the proceedings regarding the Meudon railway accident, contested the authority of the official railway speed limit. Article 14 of the July 15, 1845 law established that this police order should be taken seriously as a public regulation. Above all he pled doubt as to the causes of the accident, stating "Will justice say that only speed is responsible? It is not justice to single out just one factor. It would behoove the court to remember that it is only powerful and respected insofar as its orders and decisions are made with complete certainty. When society is on one side, criminal law in hand, and an individual on the other, justice abstains. In the presence of doubt, it judges through abstention". The tribunal followed this plea for prudence and released the four accused. Despite coming after long proceedings, the judgement was brief and "