User:MFIreland/Fireforce

The Rhodesian Security Forces produced a unique and deadly variant of the tactic of Air assault on a target by helicopter-borne infantry, which they called Fire Force.

Fireforce missions where to trap and eliminate ZANLA and ZIPRA insurgents, react to ambushes, farm attacks and would be called in by trackers or patrols who made contact with the enemy and called for reinforcements. It was first deployed in January 1974 and saw its first action a month later on the 24 February 1974.

Deployment

Fireforce was an operational assault or response composed of, usually, a first wave of 32 soldiers carried to the scene by three helicopters and one DC-3 Dakota (called "Dak"), with a command/gunship helicopter and a light attack aircraft in support. The latter was a Cessna Skymaster, armed with two machine-guns and normally two 30 mm rocket pods and two small napalm bombs (made in Rhodesia and called Frantan).

A Fireforce would be based at an airfield with usually four helicopters, one DC-3 Dakota and the Cessna (known as the "Lynx"). The helicopters were Alouette Mk IIIs (in 1979 a few Bell UH-1s were used) of which one was equipped with a MG 151/20 20mm cannon and seating arrangement for the fireforce commander. This machine/entity was called the K-car with a crew of three (pilot, gunner, and commander). The other three helicopters were known as "G-cars" armed with machine guns (originally one FN MAG replaced with twin Browning .303 machine guns each) and carried four soldiers (a stick leader, two riflemen and a machine gunner) along with the pilot and his technician (called a "tech") who also operated its machine guns. This carrying capacity of the G-car dictated the combat organisation of the Commando, which was called a "stop". Stop-1 was assigned to the first G-car, stop-2 to the second, stop-3 to the third. Stop-4 to stop-8 were paratroopers in the Dakota.

Each stop had four soldiers called a "stick". One was the commander, with a radio, a FN FAL, 100 rounds (7.62 × 51 mm NATO), several types of grenade. One was the machine gunner, with a FN MAG machine-gun and carrying 400 rounds. The other two were riflemen with a FN and 100 rounds, grenades, rifle grenades and medical equipment. During 1979 one of these two was issued a radio.

The Dak carried five stops. Two on the port side, three on the starboard. Apart from the parachutes the equipment was identical to the heli-stops. The gunner had to jump with his machine-gun strapped to his side and carrying 400 rounds.

These eight stops (32 men) were deemed the "First Wave". The Fireforce (of which there were only three main ones most of the time) had responsibility for huge swathes of the country (many thousands of square miles each). Any sightings of the enemy within the Fireforce zone was reported and a siren sounded in the base. The First Wave troops rushed to their helicopters (after of course donning their webbing and packs. The Paratroopers went first to the tent where their equipment and parachutes were held and the dispatchers and off-duty comrades would help them kit out. Normally the Second Wave (or Landtail) rushed to the trucks, although if "jousting" or the "scene" was nearby they would wait at the airfield to be picked up by the G-cars after the First Wave had been dropped off. Soldiers alternated as Heliborne, Paratroopers, Landtail and Off-duty throughout the Bush Trip. The Landtail was often an important factor in refueling of helicopters and recovering of deceased persons (enemy and civilian), parachutes and enemy weapons and equipment. Sometimes there was a small third wave if numbers permitted. Quite often only the First Wave was involved in the action. In general, most soldiers preferred to be in the Heliborne First Wave.

The most important factors (apart from the reaction of the enemy and the terrain) in a Fire Force operation were firstly the reliability of the sighting of the enemy and secondly the skill of the Fire Force commander. In the former case the majority of successful contacts were due to the skills of the Selous Scouts (many of which were former enemy). They had the capacity to insert observation posts (OPs) into the bush without being noticed by the inhabitants. In the latter case the difficulty of commanding the scene was extreme and good Fireforce commanders were highly prized by the troops.

How soon the enemy heard the approaching helicopters and his reaction to it was of course decisive. Wind direction and speed, the presence of a tree covered ridge line or a multitude of other factors would make the difference of life or death. Where he was caught in unfavourable terrain for him (like a village surrounded by open ground) he had no chance and normally none escaped (unless it was near nightfall).

Although the number of operational parachute jumps was remarkable, the majority of troops were carried into action by helicopter.

Tactics of Fire Force Operations

The following paragraphs are for the standard Fire Force assault of one K-car, three G-cars, a Dakota and the Lynx. Often there was no Dakota involved, or more G-cars. When in 1979 Cheetas (the Bell Hueys) were introduced, a fireforce might go into action with two or three of these, each carrying two (sometimes three) stops. There were many times when no Lynx was used.

The K-car was always the first to arrive at the scene. The K-car Commander had to first attempt to confirm the precise area where the enemy had been spotted by the OP (Observation Post). Usually the terrain was extremely broken and covered in vegetation, which made this task particularly difficult. The K-car Commander then had to make a plan - where to position the first stops, where to make the main sweep, and in what direction. The first stops to arrive were always transported in by the G-cars, which followed the K-car in column (sometimes a long way behind, for they were a little slower than the K-car). Sometimes the stops were dropped immediately, but on many occasions the G-cars would circle the scene several times (to the delight of the troops) before the commander made his final decisions. Very often the K-car occupants would see the enemy (or any perceived enemy), and then the Helicopter Gunner/Technician would attack them with his 20 mm cannon, using bursts of two to four shells (but no more than five). The accuracy of this firing was extraordinary, due to the machine flying in tight anticlockwise circles just a few hundred feet above the ground. The 20 mm cannon poked out of the port side, thus there was no "lead in", and the exploding high velocity shells would impact right next to and often on their intended targets - very few persons caught by this fire were ever found alive by the troops.

Usually the G-car stops were positioned in areas where the enemy would most likely run through (often a riverbed or dry "donga"), where there was more vegetation, therefore attempting to surround or cut off enemy movement. If there was a hill or ridge that gave outstanding observation, then more than one stop might be placed there. Sometimes G-car stop groups would form the main sweep line immediately they were deployed instead of the Paras, depending on the circumstances at hand.

Whilst the K-car was looking for, or engaging the enemy, the commander also had to decide on where to drop the Para-stops (and direct any strikes by the Lynx). The Drop Zone (DZ) position was of course dictated by the enemy's own position, and the terrain, but often there would be no clear DZ nearby, in which case the Para-stops would be dropped a mile or so away to be picked up and repositioned by the G-cars. Usually the Para-stops were dropped as close as possible, which resulted on numerous occasions with the Paras being fired at whilst floating down for a few seconds (drop heights normally varied from about 400 feet (120 m) to 600 feet). This firing was always ineffective, as no troops were ever hit. There was also a great variation on the dropping patterns of these stops, as sometimes they were all dropped at once, sometimes individually, or any combination thereof.

Whilst all this was taking place, one of the commanders main concerns was where the main sweep would occur. In a perfect scenario, the Para-stops would form the main sweep, and the G-car stops would carry out blocking actions. In reality, there was vast variation, so that there was little difference in being Para, or in the First Wave Helicopter assault. First Wave strikes in the G-cars however were generally the best stops to be in for those wishing action.

The Sweep

Each stop made a sweep every time it moved to a new location. This meant (usually) all four soldiers moving in a sweepline formation, spaced apart according to the terrain. In flat open land this may mean as much as twenty five metres or so. In heavy vegetation this dropped to several metres. Even then it was common to lose sight of comrades, pushing alone through the denseness. It was more effective to be spaced as far apart as possible.

Whether in the main sweep (which might be composed of any number of stops available) or in a stop's sweep, the tactics were the same and very simple, to sweep ahead observing your line of sight ahead through the bush and undergrowth.

The speed of this movement varied. Where it was thought (usually deemed by the commmander) the enemy lurked, the sweep would slow very much. When the troops sensed enemy ahead the sweep became even more slow, edging forward inch by inch, rifles held at chest level, pointed ahead with the safety catch off. MAG gunners would bear the gun at the hip, held by a sling from their shoulders.

Usually encounters with the enemy were resolved with great speed (a typical Fireforce action could take hours, whilst a fire fight might take just a few seconds). In the great majority of cases, the enemy were killed outright by swift shooting (sometimes hand grenades were used). Prisoners were taken on occasion. Although they were requested to take prisoners wherever possible, in a close-quarter fire fight and in thick bush, it was sometimes difficult to determine an enemy's intentions. Prisoners were usually extremely valuable as they might reveal important intelligence to Special Branch or Selous Scouts. Captured guerrillas were frequently turned to work for the Rhodesian Security Forces, sometimes as Auxiliary Forces (Pfumo Re Vanhu) from 1979.

The Stop Position

The other main experience was for an individual stop to sweep to a position thought most likely to intercept a fleeing enemy, and stay there for up to several hours (perhaps being moved around and maybe later on joining the main sweep). More often than not nothing happened but on many occasions one or more of the enemy came down the (usual) stream bed, or nearby. If there was a clear view then it was easy, once again just a few seconds shooting. Sometimes the process was repeated in the same spot, with fire being opened a bit earlier. Sometimes the enemy were seen behind in which case the stop immediately pursued. There were many occasions where the action was not so tidy due to terrain/vegetation, or even the sunlight blinding them.

The Importance of Air Power

Fireforce without air power is inconceivable. As the enemy did not have air power and was unable to shoot down significant numbers of aircraft (remarkably few helicopters, and no Dakotas were shot down in this conflict, though at least one Dakota was damaged by enemy fire in flight), Fireforce operations were invincible as long as the infantry performed correctly. The movement of the circling helicopters was enough to drown out the sound of the dropped attackers (there was no shouting or talking in the sweeps) so that often they surprised the hiding defenders - in effect ambushing them.

The terrain varied wildly, from villages surrounded by open fields on flat plains, to dense vegetation amongst huge boulders on mountain slopes. Usually there was plenty of cover. Where the enemy ran and a stop had been placed by the Fireforce commander in the right place the hunt was usually easy. The difficult thing was to walk up to the enemy hiding in a house or cave or behind a boulder and kill or capture him. Though the event was shocking (and often results in one or more persons being killed), it is far more efficient than firing or dropping ordnance from air and overall reduces civilian casualties.

The dedication of the Rhodesian Air Force to army operations was total and when patrolling the Rhodesian Army could expect prompt G-car response in any crisis.

References

External links

Counter-Strike from the Sky