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Battle of Brody (1941)
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
Drive of 11 Pz Div during the Battle of Brody
Date 23–30 June 1941 Location Brody, Soviet Union (then nominally part of Poland until 1945) Result German victory
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Gerd von Rundstedt Walther von Reichenau Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel	Mikhail Kirponos
Strength
750 tanks	3500 tanks
Casualties and losses
Only against 8th Mech. Corps: ~ 200 tanks lost	Heavy: Forces rendered non-operational 8th Mech. Corps: ~ 800 tanks lost

The Battle of Brody (other names in use include Battle of Dubna, Battle of Dubno, Battle of Rovne, Battle of Rovne-Brody) was a tank battle fought between the 1st Panzer Group's III Army Corps and XLVIII Army Corps (Motorized) and five mechanized corps of the Soviet 5th Army and 6th Army in the triangle formed by the towns Dubno, Lutsk, and Brody between 23 and 30 June 1941. It is known in Soviet historiography as a part of the "border defensive battles". Although the Red Army formations inflicted heavy losses on the German forces, they were outmanoeuvred and suffered enormous losses in tanks. Poor Soviet logistics, German Air supremacy as well as a total breakdown in Red Army command and control ensured victory for the Wehrmacht despite overwhelming Red Army numerical and technological superiority. This was one of the most intense armoured engagements in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa and one of the largest tank battles of World War II.

Background

Further information: Generalplan Ost and Lossberg study

Marcks Plan for Operation Barbarossa

Adolph Hitler's enmity toward Communism and his desire for Lebensraum for German ethnic expansion to the east appeared as central themes in Mein Kampf when it was published in the 1920s. Once in power Hitler was pragmatic in his policy toward the USSR and in 1939 he authorized his Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to negotiate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The pact contained secret protocols where the USSR and Nazi Germany defined spheres of influence, and recognized territorial divisions that paved the way for their joint invasion of Poland in September that triggered a declaration of war by France, Great Britain and allies in the Commonwealth against Nazi Germany. France collapsed quickly the next year, and thenceforth Adolph Hitler's "pragmatic" concern was the looming possibility of a two front war with England in the west and the Soviet Union in the east.

Even before the ink dried on the the terms of French surrender, on July 29th, Erich Marcks was assigned the job of drawing up a tentative plan for a "preemptive" strike on the USSR. When Herman Goering's Luftwaffe failed to subdue English air power during the Battle of Britain, the planned invasion of England was shelved, and Adolph Hitler made a public appeal for peace with England but it fell on deaf ears. In Hitler's view, the last remaining European powers capable of challenging German authority had to be dealt with: England or the Soviet Union needed to be neutralized because Germany could not risk a two front war -- if the Soviet Union could be defeated rapidly, before the first winter, and before England could get back on its feet, a two front war of the kind that ended in German defeat in World War 1 could be avoided. Plans for the attack on the Soviet Union were firmed up in the Lossberg study and Hitler insisted, over the adamant objection of Admiral Raeder, that with the USSR out of the way, England would come to terms; "it was mandatory that Germany eliminate its last opponent on the European continent before the final showdown with Britain," a US Army study of German planning and operations observed in 1955. Thus in the face of an intransigent yet unassailable England Hitler believed that Germany must strike at the Soviet Union before Joseph Stalin was ready to do the same, "since an eventual conflict between the National Socialist and Communist ideologies was inevitable, the Fuehrer preferred to extend the war into eastern Europe right then to being forced to resume hostilities after a few years of intermittent peace."

Most historians believe that Stalin pursued the Molotov-Ribbentrop because he felt it safeguarded Soviet interests by postponing the inevitable war with Germany by engaging it against the Western European Allies in a protracted war, a plan that was initially successful, but foiled by the rapid defeat of France. Molotov was later quoted as saying that "We did everything to postpone the war. And we succeeded – for a year and ten months. We wished it could have been longer, of course. Stalin reckoned before the war that only in 1943 would we be able to meet the Germans as equals."

A "war of annihilation" conducted on the breadth of the front was not even considered by STAVKA, which believed that the main thrust of the attack would have the limited territorial objective of recapturing the lands originally won by the Central Powers for the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917, predicting that it was"most likely, the main forces of the German army... will be deployed south of the line Brest-Demblin for carrying out a strike in the direction Kovel, Rovno, Kiev,"'', the precise line of attack and defense that would culminate in Battle of Brody. The earliest Wehrmacht plans for Barbarossa followed this line for the main attack, but Halder demurred, instead opting to place the main Wehrmacht effort into a thrust on Moscow.Kiev Special Military District as the key theater of war. Consequently, Army Group South, which was to undertake the thrust along the Lutsk-Dubno-Rivne corridor to Kiev had substantively less resources than Army Group Center to its north, but was facing a greater concentration of Red Army troops because STAVKA identified the Kiev Special Military District as the key theater of war.

On December 18, 1940, Hilter issued The Directive 21 ordering the attack on the Soviet Union, and on January 31st OKH issued the initial deployment orders for Operation Barbarossa. Army Group South had been given the operational mandate that would put it in the Lutsk-Dubno-Brody triangle where it would clash with core of the Red Army armoured strike forces.

The mobile formations of Army Group South will direct their main strength in the general direction of Kiev. Common goal -- to destroy the Soviet troops in Galicia and Ukraine west of the Dnepr River and to speedily seize a bridgehead over the Dnepr in the Kiev region, and to its south, thus creating the conditions for continued operations east of the Dnepr. The offensive should be conducted so that the mobile forces are concentrated to attack from the district of Lublin in the direction of Kiev. -- OKH deployment orders of January 31, 1941

Disposition of the Opposing Armies and Operational Planning

Map of South Western Front (Ukrainian) at 22 June 1941

On the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941, the bulk of Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South was deployed in a tightly packed group around Lublin in occupied Poland: The 6th Army and 17th Army had seven infantry corps and one mountain corps between them, and the 1st Panzer Group had three Panzer Corps; the III Motorized Armeekorps, the XIV Panzer Corps and the XLVIII Panzer Corps. This force was supplemented by a host Slovak and Italian expeditionary forces, and later the Hungarian army.

Across the border, Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos's Kiev Special Military District, which was soon to be renamed the Southwestern Front at the outbreak of war, touched upon three national borders, newly reordered by the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Following the frontier with the Third Reich it stretched southward from the Pripyet Marshes abreast of the Bug River, crossed the river westward toward the Eastern Carpathian Mountains just north of Lviv; then followed the contour of the mountain range southeast along the Hungarian border until it reached the Danube Delta; here it cut back east and ran along the Romanian border until it reached Chernivtsi and the Front boundary with it's sister organization the Odessa Military District. Respectively from north to south, the 5th Army and the 6th Army, were deployed north and east of Lviv, across the border from von Rundstedt's main force; the 26th Army and 12th Army, were deployed upon the eastern foothills of the Carpathians along the Hungarian border down to Romania where the southern flank of the 12th Army butted up against remainder of Army Group South's invasion force; the Romanian Third Army, the Wehrmacht 11th Army and the Romanian Fourth Army that were poised on border of the Odessa Military District, but separated from von Rundstedt's primary strike force by a 400km stretch of nearly vacant "neutral" Hungarian mountain territory.

Athwart the direct route between Lublin and Kiev, more than 200 km from the frontier at the "Fortified Zones" of the Stalin Line located on the recently erased Soviet-Polish border, the Southwest Front command held another five Infantry Corps, a Cavalry Corps and a further four Mechanized Corps under direct command of the front HQ. These had recently been buttressed, north and south of Kiev, by the addition of four Rifle Corps and a Mechanized Corps from the 16th Army and the 19th Army that arrived on the express orders of STAVKA's newly appointed Chief of the General Staff, Georgy Zhukov, as part of the general intensification of mobilization for war with Germany.

Some Soviet Mechanized Corps of the period officially fielded as many tanks as the entire force of 800 tanks and self-propelled guns within the ranks of von Runsdedt's only Panzer Group. In total the allied Axis tanks in operation against the Southwestern Front and the Odessa Military District had fewer than 1000 machines opposing a combined Soviet force with an official establishment of over 8000 tanks, albeit ranging in quality from the most modern heavy tanks to nearly obsolete light tanks, many in need of repair. Despite a raw inferiority of numbers in tanks, Wehrmacht mechanized formations were supplied with far greater quantities of auxiliary transport vehicles, such as trucks, cars and motorcycles. Neither the Red Army or the Wehrmacht could not yet claim to be a fully mobile army, and both relied heavily on quantities of horse transport, but where the Wehrmacht had about 600,000 trucks in the Eastern theater, the Red Army had 272,600 trucks dispersed throughout the Soviet Union. This deficit made Wehrmacht mobile infantry and artillery support for mechanized operations much more efficient than it was for their Soviet counterparts, whose activities were often hampered for lack of transport, lack of air support and far inferior communications and command control.

On Junde 22nd, 1941 the total Axis forces operating with Army Group South including Romanian, Italian and Slovak forces amounted to 62 divisions (43 Wehrmacht; 14 Romanian; 3 Italian; 2 Slovak) against the 87 Soviet divisions of the Southwestern Front (61) and the Odessa Military District (26), as a whole. . When compared to Army Group Center von Runsdedt had slightly more divisions but half the number of mechanized forces to wield against a far greater number of Soviet troops, supported by the Red Army's primary armoured strike force.

The Battlefield

The separation of Rundstedt's Army Group into two parts and the resulting concentration of Wehrmacht forces around Lublin was the outcome of Hitler's ticklish diplomacy and the facts of geography. Rundstedt had originally desired to create a direct line of communication to the south by using his 17th Army as the backbone of a joint German-Hungarian "Carpathian Group" that could form the southern claw of a double pincer envelopment, but Hitler forbade discussion of war operations with Hungary prior to its outbreak for security reasons, and Hungary officially remained neutral until the 27th of June 1941. This split the front in two.

The largest part of the front on the Hungarian border south to the Black Sea was dominated by the Carpathian Mountains -- a natural obstacle that could be lightly defended, or not at all since Hungary was officially neutral at the start of the campaign. Conversely the Carpathians provided no such advantage to the Soviet armies at the foot of the mountains because Hungary was expected to join in the initial German attack, a von Runsdept wanted. As a result the Southwestern Front Armies were dispersed more or less equally along the entire frontier, while eighty percent of von Rundsdedt's command was squeezed into a 400km front between the Pripet Marshes and Carpathian Mountains. Whether or not von Rundstedt liked this arrangement, this concentration of roughly 800,000 regular Wehrmacht soldiers gave his Armies a distinct advantage of men-in-arms at the point of direct contact with the Red Army near Lviv, but he could not avoid a "head-on with the three Soviet armies in the Galician-Podolian bottleneck between the Pripet swamps and the eastern Carpathians."

Here, the lay of the land was such that the Soviet line jutted into Nazi occupied Poland around Lviv, creating a partial salient at the point where the German line pushed out to meet the Bug River, partly enveloping the Soviet forces around Lviv from the north -- a fact that Army Group South HQ intended to take full advantage. However, the proposed battlefield held a number of natural obstacles that were to make operations difficult for the Wehrmacht but would also later prove to confound Soviet attempts to stymy the German attack. There were numerous rivers, swamps and wooded areas between the Sokal on the Bug River and Rivne on the road to Kiev. This meant that most operations, especially mechanized ones, would be heavily dependent on the meager road system that existed on the Soviet side of the border in 1941.

It was exactly these difficulties of terrain that led Soviet commanders to have a false sense of security about the partial German envelopment of their forces around Lviv at the break point between the 5th and 6th army. This combined with a lack of accurate intelligence in the opening phase of the war meant that they initially failed to comprehend the direction of attack and underestimate the force of the blow that was delivered along the Bug River at Sokal and Volodymyr-Volynskyi.

German Plan of Attack

The 1st Panzer Group, led by Generaloberst Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist, in conjunction with Field Marshal von Reichenau's 6th Army, was ordered to secure the Bug River crossings and advance to Rovno and Korosten with the strategic objective of Kiev. In the aftermath of a massed infantry attack conducted by three Corps of the 6th Army the 1st Panzer Group was to deploy two Corps forward and advance between Lviv and Lutsk in order to cut the Lviv–Kiev railway line and drive a wedge along the junction point between the Soviet 5th Army and 6th Army, while threatening to envelope Soviet forces defending Lviv by trapping them against Carpathians, and opening a direct route to Kiev at the same time.

On the direct route between Lublin and Kiev, skirting the most southern sector of the Southwestern Front, there were 44 Soviet division. These were divided roughly into two parts with a frontier echelon, made up mostly of Rifle Corps and a second reserve/reaction echelon with over four thousand tanks organized in 14 divisions and filled out with additional infantry. Considering that the effective establishment of troops in each Wehrmacht division exceeded the effective strength in manpower of their Soviet counterparts by as much as 50%, Von Runsdedt had roughly a 1.2:1 ratio of manpower in the 36 odd divisions in his strike force, but it faced an unprecedented concentration of armour -- fivefold the number of tanks as in the five Panzer Divisions of the 1st Panzer Group. On paper at least, the Southwestern Front should have been an immovable object that soon blunted the German attack.

German Schwerpunkt doctrine overcame the relative parity of total forces by seeking to concentrate forces at weak sectors of the enemy front in order to create a breakthrough that could be exploited by a rapid advance of tanks and mobile infantry in order to maintain initiative and keep the enemy off-balance. At the Lviv salient von Rundsdedt would bring nearly the entire weight of his Army Group strike force to bear on Schwerpunkt on the boundary between the 5th and 6th Soviet Army, where the former defended the fortified zone between Volodymyr-Volynskyi and Sokal at the Bug River crossings.

In total, the combined forces of the 5th and 6th Soviet armies at the point of contact on the border amounted to seven Rifle Divisions, three Tank Divisions, one Motorized Rifle Division and a single Cavalry Division that was attached to the 6th Soviet Army, with one Tank, one Motorized Rifle and one Rifle Division from the 5th Army in ready reserve, likely around 150,000 men. Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel's 17th Army provided two Corps comprised of six Infantry Divisions and a Mountain Division to pin the 6th Soviet Army in place while two Panzer Corps of the 1st Panzer Group and four Infantry Corps of the 6th Army together attacked the 5th Soviet Army with eleven Infantry Divisions, Four Tank Division, Two Motorized Infantry Divisions and one "Security" Division, excluding reserves, nearly 400,000 troops, creating odds of 2.6:1.

All but one of von Kleist's five tank divisions were committed to this axis of attack, with the 9th Panzer Division, the SS -- "Viking" Motorized Division (Non-German SS volunteers) and the SS -- Motorized "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" Regiment of the XIV Panzer Korps held in reserve.

In comparison to the 15,000 men in each Wehrmacht infantry division, Red Army Rifle Divisions of the Southwestern Front were still at their peacetime strength of 8000 to 10,000 men in the majority of cases, despite the mass call up of reserves ordered by STAVKA in late May. . Increasing the odds still further at the precise Schwerpunkt seven Wehrmacht Infantry Divisions of the Wehrmacht 6th Army, and three Panzer Divisions and one Motorized Division of the 1st Panzer Group would fall upon just two Soviet Rifle Divisions of the Soviet 5th Army, the 82nd and 124th -- roughly 160,000 attackers against a force of 20,000 defenders; 8:1.

Coordinating masses of troops over the deep rivers and around the many bogs and swamps by way of the limited road arteries and bridges of Soviet Galicia would create issues of congestion that would make concentration of forces difficult. Von Kleist would overcome the problem of overcrowding and confusion at the front by deploying and advancing the 1st Panzer Group in three echelons.

Once the border defenses had been breached by the initial infantry assault, the first echelon of mechanized divisions of the 1st Panzer Group would penetrate toward Lutsk through Volodymyr-Volynskyi led by the 13th and14th Panzer Divisions of III Armee Motorized Korps, while XLVIII Panzer Korps's 11th Panzer Division would drive toward Dubno through Sokal. In the second wave the 16th Panzer and the 16th Motorized Division of the XLVIII Panzer Korps would leapfrog forward in the path of the 11th Panzer from their jump-off point well behind the Lublin-Zamosc road. A final echelon of infantry from the XXIX Armee Korps, on loan to the 1st Panzer from the 6th Army, would bring up the rear and consolidate the flanks of the expanding breach in the line.

The two Panzer corps would then move side by side through Dubno and Rivne toward the Soviet supply and command center of Shepetivka and Kiev beyond.

Soviet Planning

Further information: Molotov Line, Stalin Line, and Soviet offensive plans controversy

Fortified Zones of the Molotov Line: 9,10,11 included in jurisdiction of 5th Army, Kieve Special Military District/Southwestern Front

In the days and months preceding the Wehrmacht assault on the Soviet Union the Red Army apprehensively prepared for the daunting task that few admitted they expected: defeating the most experienced modern mechanized, and as yet undefeated, army in Europe. The unexpected result in the west set off rapid mobilization amid renewed defensive preparations along the new frontier.

Prior to the division of Poland in 1939 one logical venue for a German attack would have been along the Baltic Coast, where the Kriegsmarine was emerging as a dominant force, and by land from Prussia through Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia , three countries that the Soviet Union quickly absorbed without German protest after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. In 1935, STAVKA ran war games that hypothesized a German invasion from Polish territory, backed up by the 50 divisions of the Polish army.

Annexing eastern Poland may have added an additional 200km buffer of Soviet territory, but also put the Wehrmacht square on a 1200km length of border. Franz Halder Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) Chief of General Staff, observed that the Red Army could not trade land for time, as the Russians had done during Napoleon's 1812 invasion of Russia, because they could ill afford the loss of the valuable land, resources and industries it needed to supply a modern army with a hundred divisions or more. The Soviets for their part prepared to defend, speeding up construction of land fortifications on the "Molotov Line" which required stripping equipment from the, now obsolete, Stalin Line, along the Dnepr River that ran along the old border with Poland.

The exact intent of Soviet pre-war planning is a subject of considerable debate. Revisionist historians such as Suvarov, in his book Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War, make the claim that the circumstantial evidence, such as speeches about "offensive war", military concentration in the westerns Soviet union, and movement of troops to the border prove Stalin intended to initiate war with Germany with an attack on the Third Reich through occupied Poland in July 1941, and that Barbarossa was launched in order to preempt a impending Soviet attack in July of 1941. More recently, these arguments have be supplemented with evidence from unsealed Soviet archives and explored by Mikhail Meltyukhov in Stalin's Missed Chance and by Mark Solonin. Detractors of this theory point out that the existence of a plan of attack might simply be foresight and preparation for fighting a defensive war on foreign soil, as Solonin points out; "Equally inarguable is also that the offensive direction of the plans and of the combat training system of the armed forces can in no way serve as proof of the aggressive foreign policy of the state. The army in any country, even most peaceful, is created for the victory," but he also points out that all uncovered archive materials are "descriptions of a plan of the preparation and conduct of a large-scale offensive operation outside the international borders of the USSR. Strategic defense on own territory is not considered in them even as one possible option of the actions." With no direct evidence other than a plan, Solonin goes on to note the Soviet "reputation" of expansionism under Stalin to reinforce his argument: Poland 1939; Finland in 1940, the occupation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia.

Russian, fortification Upper Dnestr -- Stalin Line

The great majority of established historians are more sanguine. Victor Kamenir, calls Suvorov "sensationalist" and saying that "the truth, as it always tends too, most likely lies somewhere in the middle. Soviet Union did have aggressive intentions, just not in July 1941... but in the spring of 1942." And Gabriel Gorodetsky suggests diplomatic intrigue and Stalin's suspicions that Britain might make peace in the wake of the Flight of Rudolph Hess, and that Soviet troop movements were "a last-ditch attempt to thwart a German attack" based on reliable foreign intelligence, in June.

More mildly, Alexander Hill in his article Offense, Defence or the Worst of Both Worlds? Soviet Strategy in May-June 1941 sums up Soviet strategic thought of the 1930s, observing that the view "that defense might mean offense in appropriate circumstances was not in question."

If the enemy forces war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most aggressive ever of all the offensive armies. We will wage an offensive war, determined to totally defeat the enemy on his own territory. -- Red Army Field Manual

Three facts are clear: Either preemptive or reactive, the Soviet war plan was founded on offense; STAVKA assessed the southern end of the border in Galicia around Lviv opposite Lublin on the road to Kiev as the key point of conflict; the Red Army was in a state of flux organizationally and positionally, not having come to fully man its, as yet unfinished, front line positions on the Bug River along the Molotov Line.

At the turn of the year, just after his appointment to the post of Chief of Staff for STAVKA in January, Georgy Zhukov began to implement the "Plan for the Defense of the State Frontier" (DP 41) that detailed rapid expansion of the Red Army, with a mass call up of 500,000 reserves, and further expansion of border fortifications. The Luftwaffe made numerous incursions over the border, but little was done. When a reconnaissance mission accidentally came down in Soviet territory, and photographs of key installations discovered on board the pilots were returned to the Third Reich without protest, and two days before the attack began a flight of German fighters was intercepted without incident, and escorted home. Rumours were rampant. In early June, just before the war began vice-Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky commander of the Sebastapol fleet warned his captains that war was imminent

In May and June the Konev's 19th Army and Lukin's 16th Army were shifted to the Kiev region. On the 16th of June the 62nd Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps was moved directly to the border, and the 135th Division of the 27th Rifle Corps was also moved from Dubno, west to Lutsk on the eve of the invasion. Rjybashev reports being ordered to have the 8th Mechanized Corps take on ammunition and fuel on June 20th, indicating preparations for operations in the immediate future. Similarly Zhukov ordered that the Southwest Front command moved from Kiev forward to Tarnopol, and the 5th Army command was moved to Kovel, in order to shorten the communication lines to the frontier.

The basic outline of the intended counter stroke was outlined tersely by Lt. Gen. B.Arushanyan commander of the 12th Army in his short essay on his command from the beginning of the war, until his army was destroyed in the battle of Uman:

The Military Council and Staff of the Army developed a detailed operational plan covering the state border. According to this plan, the army operations would be structured in two echelons: the first comprised of infantry corps to create a strong defense, the second - Mechanized Corps for the application of a powerful counter-attack in the case of an enemy breakthrough.

Whether or not the plan was intended to be preemptive or reactive, STAVKA had a clear plan of attack prepared in the event of war: Strike out from Ukraine into the underbelly of occupied Poland through Prymsyl and Lublin toward Radom and cut the Third Reich in two. It was thought that replicating the route of attack taken by the Red Army's cavalry army during the Soviet Union's unsuccessful invasion of Poland in 1920 would avoid a protracted war of attrition on the river defensive lines in Prussia on the approaches to Warsaw. It was this pre-war plan that lay at the heart of STAVKA's decision to issue STAVKA Directive No. 3, ordering the Southwestern Front to immediately counterattack at the opening of hostilities, setting into motion the clash between the the 1st Panzer Group and the greater part of the best Soviet Mechanized Corps available to the Red Army in the western USSR.

Soviet Disposition and Operational Plan

The Southwestern Front, under the command of General Mikhail Kirponos, had received incomplete intelligence on the size and direction of the German attack. They were surprised when Stavka ordered a general counter-attack under the title of directive No. 3 on the authority of Chief of General Staff Georgy Zhukov. Most of the headquarters staff were convinced that the strategy would be to remain in a defensive posture until the situation clarified. Later Hovhannes Baghramyan, a staff officer of the front headquarters who wrote the initial report to Moscow, said that "our first combat report to Moscow was full of generalities and unclear instructions." The general orders of directive No. 3 read:

While maintaining strong defence of the state border with Hungary, the 5th and 6th armies are to carry out concentric strikes in the direction of Lublin, utilizing at least five mechanized corps and aviation of the Front, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy group of forces advancing along the Vladimir-Volynski-Krystonopol front, and by the end of June 24th to capture the vicinity of Lublin.

By the end of 22 June, Zhukov was on his way to the Southwestern Front headquarters at Ternopil along with Nikita Khrushchev, the former head of the Organizational Department of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee, to ensure these orders were carried out. Five Soviet mechanized corps, with over 2,500 tanks, were massed to take part in a concentric counter-attack through the flanks of Panzer Group 1. The intention was to later attempt a pincer movement from the north (Soviet 5th Army) and south (6th Army) that met west of Dubno in order to trap units of the 6th and 17th German Armies on the northern flank of Army Group South. To achieve this, the 8th Mechanized Corps was transferred from the command of the 26th Army, positioned to the south of the 6th Army, and placed under the command of N. I. Muzychenko's 6th Army. This essentially brought all the mobile assets of the Southwestern Front to bear against the base of von Kleist's thrust toward Kiev. The primary German infantry formation operating on this sector of the front, IV Army Corps (von Schwedler) of the 17th Army (Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel) were advancing south-east with the objective of cutting Lviv-Kiev railway line.

The First Days

A burning BT-7 and fallen Soviet soldier June 1941

Yet, on the night of June 22nd, and despite the fact that it was the Kiev Military District that first obtained information from a defecting German corporal of the 75th Infantry Division who swam across the Bug River the night before to warn the Soviet authorities of the precise date and time of the attack, the main part of the frontier defense division, aside from a few battalions assembled in the fixed defenses at the border, of the Kiev Military District remained in their barracks. A decision reflecting the opinion of the upper echelon of the command, direct from Stalin that information about an impending attack was the work of provocateurs seeking to foment war between the USSR and the Third Reich.

Stalking ordered that the defector be taken out and shot as a spy.

Even as the initial border battles began as German commando formation breached the front around 2:00 am, the general alarm was raised in the 5th Army but with the oblique STAVKA issued caveat to subordinate commands that units were "not to respond to provocations", an order that doubtlessly contributed to the initial confusion cause by the assault.

In Belyirussia, D.G. Pavlov the commander in charge of the Western Military District took in a play in Minsk a 150km from the frontier despite reports of a German buildup on the border. in charge of the Kiev Military District, Mikhail Kirponos, was not so sanguine. Dutifully, Kirponos telephoned his front line commanders to relay the instruction from Moscow, but then stayed up all night preparing orders to be issue in case of a surprise attack. It is possibly because of Kirponos's more wary attitude to the chance of the German attack that the Kiev Military District was not entirely caught flat-footed at 4:00 am on June 22nd when the first reports of enemy action rolled in the from the front as the divisions of Army Group South left their jump off points, and attacked the 5th and 6th Armies on a broad front.

The 5th Army consisted of two Rifle Corps and a single Mechanized Corps. With these the 5th Army covered three key bridge crossings of the Bug River: In the north on the road to Kovel; in the middle at Ustilug, west of Vladimir-Volyn on the direct route to Lutsk; south near Sokal on the road to Dubno, at the junction where the 5th Army joined the 6th. These key points contained a network of bridges that would enable rapid deployment of an invading army over the Bug River and as a a consequence they were being turned into defensive strong points, with machine gun pill boxes and artillery emplacements, covered by battalions of frontier guards, NKVD, and reinforced with a smattering of battalions from the 5th Army.

The 45th and 61st Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army sat astride the Kovel highway, while the 87th and 124th Rifle Divisions of the 27th Corps covered the crossing of Ustilug and Sokal, respectively. Between these last two lay a 20km stretch along the bank of the Bug covered by a series of "fortified" zones consisting of prepared entrenchments and pill boxes, manned by small detachments of border guards. But in general, the main force of the 5th Army Rifle divisions were garrisoned up to 20km away away from the border. In the case of war, these division were to form up and march forward and spread out to take up position in defense of the east bank of the river in the prepared positions.

The front line assets of the 5th army were augmented by the 41st Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps, stationed at Vladymir-Volyn on the morning of the 22nd. To the rear at Lutsk, the 135th Rifle Division of the 27th Rifle Corps served as a second reserve echelon, nearly 50km from the front, and even further back at Rivne, 100km from the border, a third echelon reserve force comprised of one tank and one motorized division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps.

The main brunt of this attack fell on just two divisions of the 27th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army, defending the Bug River along the Vladimir Volyn-Lutsk Axis in the north and Sokal-Dubno Axis further to the south at the junction point between the 5th and 6th Armies.

Battle in the air

The condition of the Soviet Air Force assigned to the Southwestern Front followed the pattern of the entire front line: the majority of its aircraft had been destroyed on the ground as a result of Stalin—disregarding intelligence that a German attack was imminent—refusing to put Soviet forces on alert. For example, Lieutenant Arkhipenkos' 17th Fighter regiment were caught on the ground and almost totally destroyed by the third day of the war. The remainder of the regiment, comprising only ten I-153s and one Mig 1, retreated to a reserve airfield near Rovno. Still, the Soviets sent their surviving aircraft to support the offensive.

The air battle resulted in heavy casualties for the attacking Soviets. JG 3, under the command of Fliegerkorps IV, shot down 24 Tupolev SBs on the first day. Among the casualties was the Commander of 86 SBAP, Podpolkovnik Sorokin. Just 20 of the initial 251 SBs remained with the unit. German losses were also heavy, with 28 destroyed and 23 damaged aircraft (including 8 He 111s and Ju 88s). The efforts of the Red Army Air force were not without effect, as the Southwestern Front air force flew 523 sorties between 22 June and 24 June, dropping 2,500 bombs. Gustav Shrodek, a tank commander of the 15th Panzer regiment (11th Panzer Division), recorded the scene: "At dawn of June 24th, the regiment underwent its first attack by Russian bombers. It shall not be the only one this day; completely the opposite. As a result of this the regiment now has several dead and wounded." Near total Luftwaffe air superiority was to be a major factor in breaking up the Soviet counter-attack.

Mobilization

The attack combined six mechanized corps under the command 5th Army to the north and the 6th Army to the south, under the general direction of Southwestern Front commander Kirponos. Under the 5th Army command, Konstantin Rokossovsky's 9th and N. V. Feklenko's 19th Mechanized Corps were to be deployed north-west of Rovno, while the 22nd Mechanized Corps was to assemble northeast of Lutsk. To the south, under the command of the 6th Army, Dmitry Ryabyshev's 8th and I. Karpezo's 15th Mechanized Corps were to be deployed to the south-west and north-east of Brody, while The 4th Mechanized Corps under A. Vlasov was to be deployed between Sokal and Radekhiv, on the left flank of the 15th Mechanized Corps. The plan called for these forces to assemble and begin offensive operations at 22:00 on 23 June, 36 hours after the initial German onslaught, in an attempt to catch the attackers off guard, and before they could solidify their position by bringing up reinforcements from the rear in support of their fast-advancing 11th Panzer Division.

Conditions were difficult for the Soviet Corps commanders: loss of communications, constant harassment by the Luftwaffe, lack of transportation, and the movement of large numbers of refugees and retreating soldiers on the roads made it difficult for the counter-attacking forces to assemble at their jumping off points. While communication between the Front headquarters and the individual army commands was generally good, communication to the front-line units was seriously flawed, because it was dependent on the civilian telephone and telegraph network. German sappers, air attacks, and Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas had aggressively targeted these systems. Many Soviet front-line commanders were left to their own devices, and this had an impact on the effectiveness of Soviet command and control. In one instance, the commander to the 41st Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps, for want of any new directives, moved his division to the designated assembly point for his corps at Kovel laid out in the pre-war plan and, and in so doing, moved his division away from the fighting. Another endemic problem was the lack of transport for the infantry component of the Mechanized Corps. Motorized in name only, many of these divisions had only part of their full transportation establishment. Individual corps commanders had to improvise solutions to bring their full complement of soldiers to their assembly points.

Rokossovsky commandeered 200 trucks from the district reserve at Shepetivka, but this still left him in the position of mounting much of his infantry on tanks. Even then, many soldiers had to walk, since the trucks were carrying critical munitions and supplies. In one case, heavy artillery pieces belonging to the 22nd Mechanized Corps was simply left behind for want of tractors to pull them. The commander of the 19th Mechanized marched his corps forward in two echelons with the tank divisions far in advance of his lagging infantry, which meant that his armored units arrived at the battlefield without infantry support. Ryabyshev, commander of the 8th Mechanized, reported similar problems. His artillery was towed by exceedingly slow tractors that held up the movement of the entire column: "The columns were moving at top speed. Unfortunately, the tractor-towed corps artillery was falling severely behind; the difference in speed was slowing down the overall concentration of forces."

These complications were compounded by the apparent inability of the Soviet commanders to assess an appropriate axis of attack in the context of the rapidly developing German salient. Between 22 June and 24 June, the 8th Mechanized Corps received three different locations for its assembly point: the original order from the Front Command, a new one from the commander of the 6th Army, and on 24 June another order from the Front command. The Corps crossed its own path and backtracked several times before finally arriving at Brody.

Ryabyshev later wrote:

Around the second half of June 25, the Corps' units deployed to the northwest of Brody. During the nearly 500 kilometer march, the Corps lost up to half of its older tanks and a substantial portion of its artillery and anti-tank guns to both enemy air attack and mechanical breakdowns. All of the tanks still in service also required varying degrees of maintenance work and were not capable of operating over long distances. Thus, even before the start of the counteroffensive the Corps found itself in a drastically weakened state.

As a result of these and other problems assembling the forces for the attack, the scheduled time for the operation was set back 6 hours to 04:00 on 24 June. By the time this decision was made on the evening 23 June, barely 48 hours since the war had begun, the 11th Panzer Division, with the 16th Panzer Division traveling in its wake, had already penetrated 40 miles into Soviet territory. The 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions were well their way up the road to Lutsk with the objective of reaching the Styr River on the 24th, and the 44th, 298th, and 299th Infantry Divisions were moving up to consolidate the advance. Even with the delayed schedule, the counter-attack began piecemeal, since the full complement of forces could not be brought into position until two days later. The 4th, 8th, 9th, and 19th Mechanized Corps were still on the march and supporting infantry corps were even further away. Kirponos's Chief of Staff, General Maksim Purkayev, argued against the political officer attached to the Southwest Front, Commissar Nikolai Vashugin, on this point but Vashugin and Zhukov won out: the attack would begin without delay. Only two tank divisions of 15th Mechanized Corps in the south and a single tank division of 22nd Mechanized Corps in the north were in position to begin the attack on the 24th.

Soviet counter-attacks

Three Soviet formations deployed a potent force of modern T-34 and KV tanks: the 4th, 8th, and 15th Mechanized Corps. The 717 such tanks comprised almost a half of the country's 1,600 production of these two models. Throughout the battles, the scale of the intended operations and the precise role of each corps in the plan were communicated poorly or not at all. Ryabyshev noted that "the Corps battle orders spoke only to its own mission objectives". There was little to no communication between the individual corps to ensure co-ordination.

10th Tank Division

The Soviet 10th Tank Division was subordinate to 15th Mechanized Corps. On 22 June 1941, the forward battalions captured Radekhiv from the German infantry, losing two tanks. The next day it faced the German 11th Panzer Division there, destroying 20 German tanks and losing 6 T-34 tanks and 20 BT tanks. It withdrew in an orderly fashion for the lack ammunition. On 26 June 1941, the division destroyed 23 German tanks and an infantry battalion near Radekhiv, losing 13 KV and 12 BT-7 tanks.

15th Mechanized Corps

Commanded by I.I. Karpezo.

The 15th Mechanized Corps as a whole had 749 tanks, including 136 T-34 and KV tanks. Due to a series of inconsistent orders, the Corps spent the battle moving chaotically in the Radekhiv-Brody-Busk triangle. Except for the two engagements with the 10th Tank Division, its forces were not in combat. On 7 July 1941 it reported in Berezovka (300 kilometres (190 mi) from the former border) with nine per cent of its tanks.

22nd Mechanized Corps

Commanded by Major-General S.M. Kondrusev.

On 24 June the 22nd Mechanized Corps attacked towards Vinnitsa. On 29 June it reported as having 19 per cent of its former number of tanks. On 1 July one regiment unsuccessfully attacked toward Dubno. On 15 July 1941 the 22nd MC had 4 per cent its tanks remaining.

19th Mechanized Corps

Burning T-34 believed to be from 19th Mechanized Corps near Dubno

Commanded by Major General N.V. Feklenko.

On 26 June it attacked towards Dubno from the north, but failed to reach it by a few kilometers. On 29 June the corps had 32 tanks remaining out of the original 453.

8th Mechanized Corps

Ryabyshev's 8th Mechanized Corps finally arrived on the scene on the 25th. On 26 June 1941, the 8th Mechanized Corps as a whole successfully attacked in the direction of Brody-Berestechko against parts of the German 11th Panzer Division. Despite haphazard arrangements and difficulties, the Soviet attack met with some initial success, catching the Germans on the move and outside their prepared positions, their tanks sweeping aside hastily arranged German anti-tank positions manned by motorcycle troops attached to the 48th Panzer Corps. Later the 8th MC split, with some amalgamating into Popel's group and a second force remaining under the command of Ryabyshev.

Popel's group

Soviet Prisoners June 1941

Popel's group had about 300 tanks, including no less than 100 T-34 and KV tanks. On 27 June, Popel's group surprised and defeated the rears of 11th Panzer Division and captured Dubno, a road crossing of strategic importance. This was the most successful Soviet action of the battle, as it cut off supply lines of the German armoured spearhead (the 11th Panzer Division). However, this was not exploited by Soviet command, who failed to communicate with Popel' and to provide supplies or reinforcements. The group waited in Dubno and prepared for defence, losing the operational initiative.

The situation was considered "serious" by the German high command:

In the Army Group South sector, heavy fighting continues on the right flank of Panzer Group 1. The Russian 8th Tank Corps has effected a deep penetration of our front and is now in the rear of the 11th Panzer Division. This penetration has seriously disrupted our rear areas between Brody and Dubno. The enemy is threatening Dubno from the southwest ... the enemy also has several separate tank groups acting in the rear of Panzer Group 1, which are managing to cover considerable distances.

— General Franz Halder, diary

By 28 June the Germans had gathered enormous forces. The Popel's group came under attack by elements of the 16th Motorized, 75th Infantry Division, two other infantry divisions, and the 16th Panzer Division. Encircled in Dubno, Popel' defended until 1 July, when he retreated.

Ryabyshev's group

Ryabyshev's group had 303 tanks, including 49 T-34 and 46 KV. On 28 June, in an attempt to follow Popel', it met and attacked the German 57th Infantry and 75th Infantry Divisions, as well as elements of 16th Panzer Division. The attack was unsuccessful and the Soviets quickly retreated. On 1 July Ryabyshev reported in Tarnopol with 207 tanks, including 31 T-34 and 43 KV tanks. With no further combat, the 8th MC moved to Koziatyn, where on 7 July 1941 it had 43 tanks – 5 per cent of the pre-war number.

4th Mechanized Corps

The 4th Mechanized Corps commanded by Andrei Vlasov was the strongest in the Ukraine, having 313 T-34 and 101 KV among its total of 979 tanks. It reacted slowly to orders and failed to assemble for attack. The most it achieved was on 28 June, when it secured the retreat of 15th Mechanized Corps from the pushing German infantry. Whilst not attacking or being attacked, the corps reported it retained no more than 6 per cent of its KV tanks, 12 per cent of its T-34 tanks, and 4 per cent of its light tanks on 12 July.

Besides these, there were no more notable Soviet counter-attacks in this battle.

Decision, indecision, and confusion of command: the historical debate

The impact of the hesitation and confusion of command on the 27th of June on the outcome of the battle and the German attack into Ukraine is hard to determine.

When the Soviet forces took Dubno and cut off the leading edge of the main German attack, Kirponos thought that the same German attack threatened to outflank and encircle the Soviet forces attacking from the south. This led him to order a halt to the offensive and a general retreat in order rationalize (shorten) his front line, "so as to prevent the enemy tank groupings from penetrating into the rear of the 6th and 26th Armies", according to H. Baghramyan.

After a debate with the Front commander and his staff, Georgy Zhukov quickly had these orders countermanded; orders for a renewed attack were issued two hours later. This led to even more of the confusion that was symptomatic of the Soviet command at the Battle of Brody. Rokossovsky, who was in command of the 9th Mechanized Corps attacking from the north, simply balked at these new orders, stating that "we had once again received an order to counter-attack. However, the enemy outnumbered us to such a degree, that I took on the personal responsibility of ordering a halt to the counteroffensive and to meet the enemy in prepared defenses". Meanwhile, Ryabyshev commanding the 8th Mechanized Corps to the south, complied with the order and remounted the attack.

Ryabyshev seems to take the position held by Zhukov at the time, which is that if the attack had continued aggressively and without delay, the Soviets might have been successful. However, subsequent events seem to vindicate Kirponos's position, which was that the attack was premature and would destabilize the solvency of the entire front. Shortly after the Soviet counter-attack was routed, Marshal Semyon Budyonny was given overall command of the combined Southwestern and Southern Front. Disaster unfolded at the Battle of Uman and 100,000 Soviet soldiers were killed or captured and another 100,000 wounded when three Red Army formations; the 26th, 12th and 18th army were encircled after Army Group South renewed its attack by pivoting south from the positions it had achieved during the Battle of Dubno—an outcome that Kirponos had foreshadowed in his arguments with Zhukov about the wisdom of the counter-attack at Dubno.

The confrontation between Kirponos and Zhukov led Zhukov to tell the Southwestern Front political officer, Nikita Khrushchev, "I am afraid your commander (Kirponos) here is pretty weak", a charge that Kirponos would never be able to answer, since he died in the battle of Kiev after it was surrounded.

Summary

The battle between Panzer Group 1 and the Soviet mechanized corps was the fiercest of the whole invasion, lasting four full days. The Soviets fought furiously and crews of German tank and anti-tank guns found to their horror that the new Soviet T-34 tanks were almost immune to their weapons. The new KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks were impervious to virtually all German anti-tank weapons, but the Red Army's logistics had completely broken down due to Luftwaffe attacks.

The German Kampfgeschwader bomber wings, namely KG 51, KG 54, and KG 55, contributed a series of heavy low-level attacks against Soviet ground targets. The headquarters of the Soviet 15th Mechanised Corps was destroyed, and its commander, General-Major Ignat Karpezo, was wounded. The Luftwaffe destroyed some 201 Soviet tanks in this area.

The five Red Army corps were mishandled while being concentrated into large powerful groups. The German troops sought to isolate individual units and destroy them. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe ranging over the battlefields was able to separate the supporting infantry and deny them resupply of fuel and ammunition. Ultimately due to lack of adequate planning and overall coordination, the Soviet counter-attack failed to meet at Dubno.

After the battle

Panzer Group 1 took a severe battering in the battles around Dubno, losing many of its tanks, but it survived the battle still capable of operations. The Soviet forces took severe casualties, rendering most of its forces non-operational. This defensive success enabled the Germans to continue their offensive, even if it had been delayed substantially by the tenacity of the Soviet counter-attack. The 8th mechanized core was so badly depleted, that the Stavka disbanded its headquarters and parceled out its remaining assets to other formations of the Southwestern Front.

Discussion of German and Russian Doctrine and Equipment

German Armor

At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, German armor was composed of a mix of Czech and German tanks, as well as captured French and British tanks, in addition to vehicles supplied by the collaborationist Vichy France. Furthermore, nearly 50% of the tanks deployed by the Wehrmacht were the virtually obsolete Panzer I and Panzer II light tanks. Of the 4000 armored vehicles available to the Wehrmacht, only 1400 were the new Panzer III and Panzer IV. In the first few hours of the invasion, German commanders were shocked to find that some Soviet tanks were immune to all anti tank weapons in use by the Wehrmacht.

During pre-war exercises, Heinz Guderian noted that on their own, tanks were very vulnerable to infantry platoons. To destroy a tank on its own, the infantry needed to merely maneuver around to the more vulnerable sides and rear. From these positions, enemy infantry could either destroy the drive sprocket gear completely immobilizing the tank, or simply climb on top and drop a grenade down the hatch (hatches were never locked on any tank due to the need to make a quick escape in the event of a fire). The tank could then be destroyed at leisure. Furthermore, Guderian also noted that tanks lacked the heavy caliber weapons needed to knock out reinforced concrete bunkers and heavily fortified positions, a role that could only be performed by heavy artillery or air strikes. While dispersing tanks among infantry formations solved many of the tank's weaknesses, it also negated all of their strengths. Therefore, German military theorists concluded that to reach their full potential, armored units needed to be concentrated in their own formations and integrated with mobile artillery, mobile infantry, and close air support.

Soviet Armor

At the beginning of June, the Red Army boasted over 10,000 tanks in their inventory, however the vast majority of those were either World War I era tanks, or light tanks such as the T-26 or BT-7. The front armor for the T-26 was just 15mm thick, and the BT-7, just 22mm, offering virtually no protection against any anti tank weapon at any range. Furthermore, the poor design of Soviet shells meant that most rounds shattered on contact, rather than detonating. More modern tanks and shells, such as the KV-1 and the T-34, were only beginning to roll off production lines in Leningrad, Kharkov, and Stalingrad and were not available in anywhere near the numbers that were needed to throw back the German advance. A Russian state television documentary, Soviet Storm, stated that for Soviet light tanks, it would prove to be a very short, very bloody war.

During the interwar years, far sighted military theorists such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky came to similar conclusions as Heinz Guderian regarding tanks in modern warfare. However old cavalry men such as Semyon Budyonny held favor with Stalin and Tukhachevsky was executed. Budyonny believed that tanks would never replace horses in warfare, and only existed to support infantry platoons in breaking through fortified strong points. Therefore, Red Army tanks were dispersed widely throughout infantry divisions in the 1930s. Then came the shock of the Fall of France. Surviving armored warfare theorists such as Konstantin Rokossovsky were quickly and quietly reinstated in their positions and began assembling tanks into concentrated formations with all possible speed. However, by June 1941 this process was barely half complete, so many of the 10,000 tanks in the Red Army arsenal were still dispersed among infantry divisions on the eve of the invasion. This ensured that even if the Red Army had a unified command, many of its armored units would be committed piece-meal.

German Logistics

At full strength, a German Panzer Division had between 150 and 200 combat tanks. However, tanks and crews require regular supplies of food, fuel, ammunition, and most critically; spare parts. To support these logistical needs, each panzer division was supported by 2000 trucks. Furthermore, each Panzer division had its own integral artillery and infantry support which meant that rather than providing a supporting role for infantry, German panzers performed a leading role, with infantry providing support. Furthermore, Wehrmacht doctrine stressed the importance of training soldiers in roles performed by other men. Tank crews were trained in artillery roles, infantry trained as tank crews, etc. Most importantly, Tank crews were also trained as mechanics, giving them the knowledge to fix broken equipment in the field.

Soviet Logistics

At the insistence of Stalin, no defensive preparations were made in the Soviet Union. That meant that ammo and supply dumps were not concealed. Compounding the problem is that Stalin strictly forbid any Red Army unit from opening fire on reconnaissance patrols, allowing the Germans to easily identify all major command posts, air fields, and supply dumps in the border districts. The result of these poor preparations meant that all of these points were all knocked out or heavily damaged by air raids in the opening hours of the war.

Furthermore, Soviet tank crews were not trained on the mechanical details of their machines. That meant that simple mechanical problems resulted in hundreds of Red Army tanks being abandoned on the road side en route to the battle. Those units that did manage to show up at their jumping off points then discovered that the supplies had either been destroyed or moved to another location without updating their locations. After receiving orders to attack and now out of fuel or ammo, the crews of these tanks responded to their orders by blowing up their own vehicles and retreating. Hundreds of additional tanks were lost in this way before joining battle.

Compounding these logistical difficulties was that each Red Army tank division had 300-400 tanks, but were supported by only 1500 trucks, contrasting with a Wehrmacht tank division which had only 150-200 tanks, but 2000 trucks. Experience would prove that the Germans got it right.

Balance of the tank forces

On 22 June 1941, the balance of tanks over the entire area of the German Army Group South and the Soviet Southwestern Front, including but not limited to the main battle of Brody, was as follows.

German corps	German divisions	Total German tanks	Tanks with 37 mm cannon (incl. Panzer 38(t) and Panzer III)	Tanks with 50 mm or larger cannon (incl. Panzer III and Panzer IV)	Assault Guns (Misc.)
III Panzer Corps (Germany)	13th, 14th	296	42	140
XXXXVIII Panzer Corps (Germany)	11th, 16th	289	47	135
XIV Panzer Corps (Germany)	9th	143	11	80
Any other unit of Army Group South		0	0	0
Total		728		355

Soviet corps	Soviet divisions	Total Soviet tanks	T-34 and KV	Other Vehicles	Motorcycles
4th Mechanized Corps	8th Tank Division^	400	200	1250	400
8th Mechanized Corps	12th, 34th, 7th	858	171	3581	461
9th Mechanized Corps	20th, 35th, 131st	300	0	1200	181
15th Mechanized Corps	10th, 37th, 212th	733	131	2050	131
19th Mechanized Corps	40th, 43rd, 213th	450	11	950	18
22nd Mechanized Corps	19th, 41st, 215th	707	31	1340	47
Total		3448	544	10 682	1238

• Only 8th Tank Division of 3 Divisions participated in counterattack. Numbers are estimated.

Notes for Livedawg

16 May 1941 the same Marshall Kulik sent to head of the Western OVO artillery in Minsk the following telegram: "I am ordering immediately, by operative transport outside of the regular transportation plan to direct armour-piercing rounds to the forces, first of all to the tank divisions". A month expired plus four days. 20 June, at 15:30 Marshall Kulik is sending the next telegram (number 1543) in Minsk: "According to a report by one of PTABR (antitank artillery brigade) commanders, the district is not issuing to the brigade allotments of artillery rounds. I am ordering immediately to issue to all PTABRs allotments of ammunition including entitlement armour-piercing rounds. Telegraph 21 June your order and explanation of the cause of unacceptable delay with issuing allotment of ammunition". (TSAMO, fund 48, list 3408, case 7, pg. 175, 262).

Soviet 272,600 trucks

MK 22. 2000 tanks false intelligence.

Halder pg 185, agrees with Rokossovsky on harrassment from Pripyet marsh.

"The Military Council and Staff of the Army developed a detailed operational plan covering the state border. According to this plan, the army had operational structure in two echelons: the first comprised infantry corps to create a strong defense, the second - Mechanized Corps for the application of a powerful counter-attack in the case of an enemy breakthrough."

"throwing out his tank and motorized formations and the main blow on the left wing of Kiev, to destroy Russian forces in Galicia and in the western part of Ukraine, and timely seize crossings over the river Dnepr in Kiev area and below it down the river with a view to ensuring further advance to the east of the Dnieper River"

Operational Directive of the General Staff of the German Army (OKH) № 05/41 on January 31, 1941

"PJj3posJjy._on_^ gives food for thought. If^ one discounts the much-advertised idea that the Russians want peace and would not attack on their own account, one cannot help admitting that their troop dispositions are such as to enable them to pass to the offensive on shortest notice. Ihis might become extremely unpleasant for us."

Halder page 58

Kirponos a Colonel in charge of a provincial miltiary school just two years before invasion

Aircraft emergency landing found to have cameras and photos of Soviet installations, but pilots let go

Rumours flew vice-admiral Filip Oktiabrsky commander of the Sebastapol fleet warned his captains that war was imminent in early June.

Repeated violations of Soviet airspace. On June 20th 6 German fighters strayed over the border and were peaceably escorted home by the Soviet air force.

26th Army Fyodor Kostenko 12th Pavel Ponedelin

In the 22nd Mechanized 2000 men did not speak Russian.

10th Tank at Radezhov, 20 hits. Claim 46 kills.

"Average operational density of enemy troops in the area of ​​his main attack in the 5 th Army was one division at 5 km front."

"Plan covering the Kiev Special Military District, the preamble of which has been cited above, suggested a breakdown border into four districts cover. District number 1 cover 170 km from Vlodava to Krystynopolya had to defend the forces of the 5th Army MI Potapov. This is the 45 th, 62 th Infantry Division, the 15th Infantry Corps, 87, 124, and 135 th Infantry Division 27th Infantry Corps. 135th Infantry Division its line of defense had not been included in the body and reserve. As a result, the density of building troops of the 5th Army was 42.5 km Infantry Division. [48] Given the 135th Infantry Division, the density increased to 34 km on a single connection. Reserve army commander was the 22th Mechanized Corps, which his line of defense did not get and was intended for a counterattack."

Notably, the Wehrmacht did not deploy an infantry support tank, opting for Assault Guns, such as Sturmgeschütz III

An early operational plan for the attack on the USSR was drawn up (Brig. Gen.) Erich Marcks and presented in August 1940, where it was noted that:

"On the other hand, the Russians could not repeat the maneuver of 1812, by which they had avoided giving battle. A modern force of 100 divisions could not simply abandon its sources of supply."

"On 31 July, toward the end of a conference at Berchtesgaden that was mainly concerned with Operation SEELOEWE, Hitler declared that a showdown with Russia would have to take place the following spring. The quicker the USSR was defeated, the better. The entire campaign made sense only if the Soviet Union was smashed in one fell swoop: territorial gains alone would prove unsatisfactory, and stopping the offensive during the winter months might be dangerous. Therefore, it was best to wait until May 1941 and then bring the campaign to a successful conclusion within five months."

Background: "finally freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism".

Story of 8th Mechanized breakout June 29th

//In his well–known to specialists monograph Vladimirsky (as of the beginning of the war - deputy head of Southwestern Front 5th army headquarters operative department) without special emotion states: "In the Vladimir-Volynsky UR also was equipped the security zone 1 to 4 km deep. It included ten battalion field type areas built along the right bank of Bug River. Readiness: 80-90 percent" (Vladimirsky, 1989).

The word "also" relates here to the preceding description of the forefield corridor of the Kovel fortified area[29] where, based on the words of the same Vladimirsky, "in every battalion area, in the UR security zones were built 130-135 field-type defense facilities each, actually, earth-and-timber emplacements and trenches, and several bunkers each. The facilities of each [battalion] area included: 3-4 reinforced concrete casemates for 45-mm cannon and mounted machine guns, 6-9 earth-and-timber emplacements – semi-caponiers for mounted machine guns, 6 anti-fragmentation machine gun nests, 12-15 hiding fire positions (SOT), 6 anti-fragmentation dugouts for 45-mm and 76-mm cannon..." Just small change. Nothing was properly built...//

Stalin overrode objections from Zhukov and Timoshenko to continue work on the Stalin Line, so that new weapons could be directed to the new Molotov line. The generals thought that weapons sent forward might be lost in a German attack, the weapons themselves were not suitable for the new defense line, but also because they thought the old Stalin Line might be of some use. Despite this the generals did what they could to ready the Stalin Line to support a defense in depth, and in April, with war looming, Zhukov ordered that the Stalin Line be readied for war, and a small number of troops were allocated to man them.

At the same time work was accelerated on the Molotov Line, with priority placed on reinforcing and arming physical strong points over logistics support such as communications and power. 2300 strong points were completely by the time of the German invasion, but of these most were armed only with machine guns, and lacked obstacles and minefields, and were not properly integrated with communications trenches between emplacements.

Sources

• Bergström, Christer (2007). 'Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December 1941. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-8578-0270-2.
• Deichmann, Paul (1999). Price, Alfred (ed.). Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army 1939–1945. New York: Ivy Books.
• Kamenir, Victor (2008). The Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941. Minneapolis: Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0-7603-3434-8.
• Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1971). Talbott, Strobe (ed.). Khrushchev Remembers. Vol. 1. André Deutsch.
• Popel', Nikolaĭ (2001). В тяжкую пору (in Russian). Moskva: Izd-vo AST. ISBN 5-17-005626-5.
• Ryabyshev, D.I. (19 September 2002). "On the role of the 8th Mechanized Corps in the June 1941 counteroffensive mounted by the South-Western Front". The Russian Battlefield. Retrieved 19 June 2013.
• Sołonin, Mark (2007). 22 czerwca 1941 czyli Jak zaczęła się Wielka Wojna ojczyźniana (in Polish). Poznań, Poland: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis. ISBN 978-83-7510-130-0.

Further reading

• Haupt, Werner (1997). Army Group Centre: The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945. Atglen: Schiffer Military History. ISBN 0-7643-0266-3.

Category:Battles and operations of the Soviet–German War Category:Battles involving the Soviet Union Category:Battles of World War II involving Germany Category:Operation Barbarossa Category:Tank battles