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Cause-specific death rates during pre-famine and famine periods; relative importance of different causes of death during famine: Bengal

Cause of death	Pre-famine 1937–41		1943		1944
	Rate		Rate	%	Rate	%
Cholera	0.73		3.60	23.88	0.82	0.99
Smallpox	0.21		0.37	1.30	2.34	23.69
Fever	6.14		7.56	11.83	6.22	0.91
Malaria	6.29		11.46	43.06	12.71	71.41
Dysentery/Diarrhea	0.88		1.58	5.83	1.08	2.27
All other	5.21		7.2	14.11	5.57	0.74
All causes	19.46		31.77	100.00	28.75	100.00

relief

The Bengal govt organised disaster relief after the October '42 cyclone, but then cut aid back and did nothing 'til late August 1943.

Then price controls August 28, but these just drove rice underground, even while the rails were broken so none was coming from other provinces. [p. 130]. Began setting up gruel kitchens, good table p. 130.

• 19. The provision of cooked food to starving people was the most important relief measure during the acute stages of the famine. In November 1943 the total number of food kitchens reached 6,825. Of these, 551 were financed by private relief organizations, 4,469 by Government, while the remainder were 'subsidized by government but run by other agencies. Most of the kitchens 'were opened after the issue in August of the circulars giving instructions about relief measures. From December 1943 onwards the food kitchens were gradually closed down and homeless and indigent people were housed and fed in workhouses, destitute homes, and orphanages.

  — IARIHDD8-001362

Relief efforts

Orphans who survived the famine

Aside from the relatively swift but inadequate provision of humanitarian aid for the cyclone-stricken areas around Midnapore beginning in October 1942, the response of both the Bengal Provincial Government and the Government of India was remarkably slow. A "non-trivial" yet "pitifully inadequate" amount of aid began to be distributed from private charitable organisations in the early months of 1943 and increased through time, mainly in Calcutta but to a limited extent in the countryside. In April, more government relief began to flow to the outlying areas, but these efforts were restricted in scope and largely misdirected, with most of the cash and grain supplies flowing to the relatively wealthy landowners and urban middle-class (and typically Hindu) bhadraloks. This initial period of relief included three forms of aid: agricultural loans (cash for the purchase of paddy seed, plough cattle, and maintenance expenses), grain given as gratuitous relief, and "test works". Agricultural loans offered no assistance to the large numbers of rural poor who had little or no land. Grain relief was divided between cheap grain shops and the open market, with far more going to the markets. Supplying grain to the markets was intended to lower grain prices, but in practice gave little help to the rural poor, instead placing them direct purchasing competition with wealthier Bengalis at greatly inflated prices. Thus from the beginning of the crisis until around August 1943, private charity was the principal form of relief available for the very poor.

According to Greenough (1982) the Provincial Government of Bengal delayed its relief efforts primarily because they had no idea how to deal with a provincial rice market crippled by the interaction of man-made shocks, as opposed to localised shortage due to natural disaster. Moreover, the urban middle-class were their overriding concern, not the rural poor. They were also expecting the Government of India to rescue Bengal by bringing food in from outside the province (350,000 tons had been promised but not delivered). And finally, they had long stood by a public propaganda campaign declaring "sufficiency" in Bengal's rice supply, and were afraid that speaking of scarcity rather than sufficiency would lead to increased hoarding and speculation.

Both private and public relief efforts were neglected, abused, misdirected or disputed in some manner: private relief was greatly hampered by Hindu and Muslim communalism, with bitter accusations and counter-accusations, first charging unfair distribution of the amount or the types of grain distributed, and then unfair rationing. There was also rampant corruption and nepotism in the distribution of government aid; often as much as half of the goods disappeared into the black market or into the hands of friends or relatives. Despite a long-established and detailed Famine Code that would have triggered a sizable increase in aid, and a statement privately circulated by the government in June 1943 that a state of famine might need to be formally declared, this never happened.

Grain began to flow to buyers in Calcutta after the interprovincial trade barriers were abolished in May 1943, but on 17 July a flood of the Damodar River in Midnapore breached major rail lines, severely hampering import by rail. As the depth and scope of the famine became unmistakable, the Provincial Government began setting up gruel kitchens in August 1943; the gruel, which often provided barely a survival-level caloric intake, was sometimes unfit for consumption—moldy or contaminated with dirt, sand, and gravel. The rails had also been repaired in August and pressure from the Government of India brought substantial supplies into Calcutta during September, Linlithgow's final month as Viceroy. However, a second problem emerged: the Civil Supplies Department of Bengal was undermanned and under-equipped to distribute the supplies, and the resulting transportation bottleneck left very large piles of grain accumulating in the open air in several locations, including Calcutta's Botanical Garden. Field Marshal Archibald Wavell replaced Linlithgow that October, within two weeks he had requested military support for the transport and distribution of crucial supplies. This assistance was delivered promptly, including "a full division of... 15,000 [British] soldiers...military lorries and the Royal Air Force" and distribution to even the most distant rural areas began on a large scale. In particular, grain was imported from the Punjab, and medical resources were made far more available. That December, the "largest [rice] paddy crop ever seen" in Bengal was harvested, and the price of rice began to fall. Wavell made several other key policy steps, including promising that aid from other provinces would continue to feed the Bengal countryside, setting up a minimum rations scheme, and (after considerable effort) prevailing upon Great Britain to increase international imports. He has been widely praised for his decisive and effective response to the crisis.

quotes

• was confined to personal charity and to kitchens organised by charitable organisations,

  — Camb. J. Econ.-1977-Sen-33-59

• Officials reading the Bengal Famine Manual (1941) found clear directions on when to act and what to do to relieve famine. The fundamental doctrine of the manual (and the parent Famine Code) was that during a famine the government must act quickly to enable poor villagers to buy a basic diet in the market by providing "test" relief for those prepared to work, gratuitous relief for those incapable of labor, and agricultural loans for those with land to cultivate. Able-bodied members of indigent bhadralok (respectable) families, unwilling to undertake manual labor, were to be provided for from private donations to charitable relief funds administered by district relief committees. The grain market was to be the source of food, and only in rare circumstances were officials to buy or sell rice (GBR 1941:32, 41, 49-50, 56). The

  — Brennan_govrelief_88

• . the provision of foocl to famine victims will Dot be out of place in this section 'Of our report. During the second half of 1943, from August and September 'Onwards, a large number of kitchens for the freE' distribution of cooked food were opened throughout Bengal. The number reached 0,625 in :lihe beginning of Kovember and it was re~koned that during this month about 2'1 'million people were being fed daily. According to figures supplied by the Government of Bengal, some 110,000,000 free meals were provided; this includes meals supplied aTter the :\fidnapore cyclone in October 1942. Free kitchens were also set up by charitable a~enCle!; in both Calcutta and the mofussil, with the emphasis strongly on Calcutta, where dIstress was most evident to the well-to-do and mtunt:rry relief workers easily obtainable. Nearly hal? the kitchens in Calcutta.

  — IARIHDD8-001362

• we.re run by charitable organizations.

  — IARIHDD8-001362

• 'n WlO,S reckoned that in the middle of October the number in Calcutta rose to onear1y 100,000. In the early weeks of the famine, there was some individual .distribution of food by the charitable, Destitutes in Calcutta begged for food ::and so~ht ~or .scrap1J even in refuse bins. They flocked round military and 'hotel kitchens to get such food as they could. They .lay on pavements even dB. !he 'busiest pa~.?f the. c~ty, and .. corpses b?came a familiar sight. C_omqdaints of delay and ~?lic.iency were made agamsfi the authorities responsible "or the removal and dispoBal of corpses. Ii was . af! this stage tha.t most of

  — IARIHDD8-001362

The gruel supplied in the kithhens usually consisted of a mixture of grains' ??in which millsts predominated. In Oalcutta equal quantities of rice, baira, jowar and dha.l were included. Some of the charitable organizations supplied more rice in the gruel when they could obtain it. Small quantities of other ingredients such as vegeta.bles, spices and sugar were also. usua;Uy added to -the mixture. The gruel as issued did noli at the best supply more than 800-800 ??calories for adults and about half this number for children. The, millets,.?? notably ba.jra, were unfamiliar and unpalatable food and it was Iwidely s??s.ted' that they were so indigestible that they produced intestinal irritation, diarrhoea"? and death in numerous destitutes.

— IARIHDD8-00136

• Calcutta saw the famine mainly in the form of masses of rural destitutes, who trekked from the districts into the city; by July 1943 the streets were full. To start with, relief was confined to personal charity and to kitchens organised by charitable organisations, but by August relief for destitutes in Calcutta was accepted as an official policy. While cautious parsimony prevailed?e.g. meals were given 'at the same time of the day in all kitchens, to prevent destitutes from getting more than one meal'??there is little doubt that a destitute who had found his way into Calcutta had a much better chance of survival than anywhere else in Bengal. Nevertheless, since the relief offered was quite inadequate, unattended dead bodies could be found everywhere in the city? 3363 had to be disposed of by relief organisations in October alone.

  — j The number of starving and sick destitutes in Calcutta was estimated to be 'at least 100,000' in October. A decision was taken by the end of the month to remove the destitutes from the city. The Bengal Destitute Persons (Repatriation and Relief) Ordinance, passed on 28 October, was a rather controversial piece of legislation, since it was alleged that 'repatriation' was rather more firmly achieved than 'relief' in the many 'destitute homes' and 'camps' set up outside Calcutta.^ For Calcutta, however, the worst of the famine was over, and the death rate came down sharply, jf In fact, the situation in the districts also eased as some relief reached there directly, and with the harvesting of a good autumn crop and an outstanding winter one. The continued increase in the death rates in the districts was largely the result of famine-induced epidemics (see Sen, 1976A).,

• The arrangement of supplying charitable organizations, "including Birla and certain Marwaris," he also assured the Viceroy, was taking place under strict official supervision. (A few days later an order was passed barring any private organization from feeding more than 50 people a day in Calcutta. 100 ) With Kirby

  — Mukherjee_hungry_2015

was confined to personal charity and to kitchens organised by charitable organisations, but by August relief for destitutes in Calcutta was accepted as an official policy. While

— sen_77

• British and Indian governments, both at the center and in the provinces and states, were dealing with crop failures and subsistence crises from the outbreak of war in summer 1939 onward. The 'man-made' famine argument ignores the substantial efforts undertaken by groups ranging from the War Cabinet in London to small princely states and private relief organizations, as well as the obstacles and clearly evident shortages of food reserves that they faced. The 'man-made famine' argument blames the British for the Bengal famine while ignoring British concerns regarding the Japanese attacks on shipping and the food needs of other regions dependent on Britain. The argument also seems to minimize the Japanese threat, evidenced by the Japanese atrocities reported from Burma, and from which British and Indian military forces protected Bengal and the rest of India.110

  — 

• famine became only more deeply enmeshed in the structures and collective psyche of Bengal. The countryside lay in ruins, with the social fabric of rural society torn to shreds by disease, dislocation and death. Whole villages had been wiped out, and hardship continued to take a devastating toll. With an "end" to famine declared in official circles, however, the relief efforts begun late in 1943 were rolled back and imports to ward off further catastrophe were withheld from London. Provincial politics, meanwhile, became increasingly acrimonious, revolving around the highly charged issues of famine and the continuing hardships that citizens of Bengal faced. With the Muslim League in control of the Ministry, moreover, the debate became increasingly more entrenched in communal rancor. Accusations of bias in private relief, contentions about the communal make-up of rationing schemes, and dire predictions of a looming "second famine," became ever more dangerously entangled in opposing claims of "Hindu" versus "Muslim" interests. These communalized contentions reverberated in national politics, and lent a dark and elemental tone to negotiations in Delhi as well.

  — 

• A day before the second Statesman photo-essay came out, Bengal Governor, Jack Herbert, wrote to Governor-General Linlithgow that he was satisfied with the way things were shaping up in Bengal. Despite "unhelpful tales of horror in the Press," he assured the Viceroy, "[Government could] claim to have made good progress with [its] plans and organization."112 Arrangements for the use of A.R.P. evacuation centers on the outskirts of Calcutta for the "detention" of "beggars" had been made, and round-ups were continuing apace. The use of the bamboo A.R.P. shelters, moreover, was preferable to earlier warehouse schemes because they could be easily "destroyed to prevent infection and rebuilt for their original purpose." 113 In addition, plans "for getting control" of the summer aus crop were almost complete. Government "relief" centers, Herbert also informed Linlithgow, had gotten off the ground, and firm control of private relief operations had been established. The remaining problems, Herbert complained, were the

  — 

• Such distinctions also became entangled in relief. With official relief operations extremely belated and inadequate, private organization had stepped in to fill the void, and these efforts too were quickly sucked into the current of communal bitterness and accusation. With Congress energies and funds channeled through the Hindu Mahasabha, its leader Shyama Prasad Mookherjee, became the de facto "Relief Commissioner" for large sections of Bengal. Under his auspices the Bengal Relief Committee (BRC) was set up, becoming the umbrella organization for a large contingent of private relief efforts. The primary objective of the BRC, however, was for the relief "middle-class Bengalis"23 - code-words, to many, for "Hindu" sufferers. Lending credence to detractors who detected a biased approach to the efforts of the BRC, the organization set up most of its relief centers only in Hindu majority villages and wards.24 A parallel organization, the Hindu Mahasabha Relief Committee, was also set up under the leadership of Mookherjee, because "many of the donors... expressed the desire that their money should be spent

  — 

• Counter-accusations of bias on the part of the Hindu Mahasabha were also rife. Shyama Prasad Mookherjee was an extremely divisive figure and his directorship of private relief measures, alone, was enough to alarm Muslim citizens. The Revenue Department of the Government of Bengal, in charge of relief operations, fielded complaints that the Mahasabha was only giving relief to Hindus and issued a warning that Government would cut off their supplies if the practice continued.27 Members of the Mahasabha admitted that they had given differential relief to Muslims - uncooked grains, rather than cooked food - but denied observing any "consideration of caste or creed" in relief operations.28 Other, less overt, measures that would have discouraged Muslims from seeking relief seem to have been current however. When Journalist T. G. Narayan visited a Hindu Mahasabha hospital in Midnapore he found, much to his surprise, that fifteen out of forty beds were empty. But apart from few patients, he found that "every room in the hospital had a picture of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookherjee [on the wall.] I don't know what therapeutic effect that had... [but] it would have been much better to have filled up the hospital with dying patients."29

  — 

• Without the necessary wherewithal to deal with the deteriorating situation in Calcutta, the city's administration fell back, again, on its tired implements developed in relation to war and famine. Refugees were removed from Lal Bazar and other police compounds where they had collected, and carried in police lorries to famine relief camps operated by the Relief Department.153 These relief camps, however, soon filled up with panicked and desperate refugees, and additional provisions needed to be made. The horse stables at the Calcutta Turf Club were selected as a suitable place to warehouse those who had been driven from their homes by mob violence and could not be accommodated in existing famine camps. The stables were fitted out with supplies gathered from A.R.P. air-raid shelters, and opened to additional refugees. The Civil Supplies Department, also established during famine, meanwhile cut off all its deliveries except to "priority" sites, namely: hospitals, relief camps, and facilities for "essential" personnel such as the Kesoram mills.154 "Regular rationing to the public," it was decided at a closed-door meeting at Civil Supplies headquarters on August 18th, "would be a sheer impossibility until confidence was restored."155 In the meantime, as in the case of famine, private relief organizations did the bulk of the heavy lifting, sheltering and feeding the vast majority of the nearly 200,000 people dislocated.156

  — 

• ^ According to Greenough, "some important factors were the price and availability of rice in local markets, the surplus or deficit status of the locality, the wage-rate offered to labour as well as the opportunities for employment, and the extent of public and private relief"; see Greenough (1982), p.142.

  — 

• Arrangements for the use of A.R.P. evacuation centers on the outskirts of Calcutta for the "detention" of "beggars" had been made, and round-ups were continuing apace. The use of the bamboo A.R.P. shelters, moreover, was preferable to earlier warehouse schemes because they could be easily "destroyed to prevent infection and rebuilt for their original purpose." 113 In addition, plans "for getting control" of the summer aus crop were almost complete. Government "relief" centers, Herbert also informed Linlithgow, had gotten off the ground, and firm control of private relief operations had been established. The remainin g problems, Herbert complained, were the

  — Mukherjee_hungry_2015

• Shyama Prasad Mookherjee was an extremely divisive figure and his directorship of private relief measures, alone, was enough to alarm Muslim citizens. The Revenue Department of the Government of Bengal, in charge of relief operations, fielded complaints that the Mahasabha was only giving relief to Hindus and issued a warning that Government would cut off their supplies if the practice continued. 27 Members of the

  — Mukherjee_hungry_2015

• Witnesses were called to testify from the Government of India, the Government of Bengal, military and private relief organizations, and commercial interests involved in the rice trade in one form or another. No testimony was given by any representative of the India Office or His Majesty's Government in London.

  — Mukherjee_hungry_2015

• famine, private relief organizations did the bulk of the heavy lifting, sheltering and feeding the vast majority of the nearly 200,000 people dislocated. 156

  — Mukherjee_hungry_2015

• This incomplete survey shows that India had several regional famines during 1939-1944, with crop failures, food shortages, high prices, relief difficulties, and deaths from starvation and diseases. 96 Many people, from government officials to traders to educated people in the towns and often villagers, were aware of this situation and attempted to alleviate these subsistence crises. Provincial governments appealed to central authorities for supplies, negotiated among themselves to obtain emergency allotments, and applied an array of policies from requisitions to rationing to obtain food from internal stocks. Private charitable organizations, like the Bijapur Relief Commission, raised funds, organized relief and exposed failings in government relief efforts. Even opposition groups, such as the government of Congress rebels formed in Midnapur after the ?Quit India? movement in fall 1942, worked to alleviate these famines.97

  — 

• 1.) The contraction of private charity indicated by the wandering of paupers.

  — 

• -expectation of timing and availability of government handouts and private charity

  — 

• Many people, from government officials to traders to educated people in the towns and often villagers, were aware of this situation and attempted to alleviate these subsistence crises. Provincial governments appealed to central authorities for supplies, negotiated among themselves to obtain emergency allotments, and applied an array of policies from requisitions to rationing to obtain food from internal stocks. Private charitable organizations, like the Bijapur Relief Commission, raised funds, organized relief and exposed failings in government relief efforts. Even opposition groups, such as the government of Congress rebels formed in Midnapur after the "Quit India" movement in fall 1942, worked to alleviate these famines.97

  — tauger09

• in 1802-04, ??private charity was also active, and merchants distributed dishes of grain

  — ograda_2009_shorthist

• One morning a very skinny man appeared in our school compound behaving in a deranged way, which"as I would learn later"is a common sign of undergoing prolonged starvation. He had come in search of food from a distant village, wandering around hoping to get help. In the days that followed, came tens, then thousands, then a procession of countless people"emaciated, hollow-cheeked with dazed eyes, often carrying in their arms children made of skin and bone. They were looking for charity from better-off families and from the government. There was indeed a non-negligible amount of private charity, though this was pitifully inadequate to save the millions affected by the famine. But for various reasons the authorities in British India did not see their way to initiating any large-scale public relief for nearly six months after the famine had begun. It is hard to forget the sight of thousands of shrivelled people" begging feebly, suffering atrociously, and dying quietly The nature of the social failure must be seen to be all the more catastrophic in view of later works on the famine which showed that the total food supply in Bengal was not particularly low at all during the famine period. Those who died lacked the means to command the food that was there. I shall come back to this general issue later in this article.

  — nineyearsold

• The Bengal Famine Code is an encompassing document, outlining detailed plans for identifying and ameliorating famine. Central to the "duties of officers and local government in ordinary times," is to watch for and promptly report on any "rise in prices above 20 percent over normal rates." Instructions on bi-weekly reporting of crop conditions, rainfall, "the health of the people" and the "existence of any scarcity or distress" are given. Statistical compilations of records that can be used to determine "normal rates" for prices are sketched in detail. If these normal rates fail to apply a report should be made, and in the event that prices continue to remain abnormal, prompt reporting of early signs of impending famine are required. They include: 1.) The contraction of private charity indicated by the wandering of paupers.

  — Mukherjee_hungry_2015

• - expectation of timing and availability of government handouts and private charity

  — Bowbrick

old

The Provincial Government of Bengal had little help from the Government of India (centred in New Delhi) until September 1943, largely due to New Delhi's failure to understand or acknowledge the nature and scope of the crisis, and the unwillingness of other provinces to help. Grain began to flow into Calcutta in after the interprovincial trade barriers were abolished in May 1943, but on 17 July a flood of the Damodar River in Midnapore breached major rail lines, severely hampering import by rail. The rails were repaired in August and substantial supplies began to flow into Calcutta during September, Linlithgow's final month as Viceroy. However, a second problem emerged: the Civil Supplies Department of Bengal was undermanned and under-equipped to distribute the supplies, and the resulting transportation bottleneck left very large piles of grain accumulating in the open air in several locations, including Calcutta's Botanical Garden. Field Marshal Archibald Wavell replaced Linlithgow that October, within two weeks he had requested military support for the transport and distribution of crucial supplies. This assistance was delivered promptly, including "a full division of... 15,000 [British] soldiers...military lorries and the Royal Air Force" and distribution to even the most distant rural areas began on a large scale. That December, the "largest [rice] paddy crop ever seen" in Bengal was harvested, and the price of rice began to fall. Wavell made several other key policy steps, including promising that aid from other provinces would continue to feed the Bengal countryside, setting up a minimum rations scheme, and (after considerable effort) prevailing upon Great Britain to increase international imports. He has been widely praised for his decisive and effective response to the crisis.

quotes again

• [In early September 1943 Linlithgow also pressed his Executive Council to use Section 93 to take power, but their responses were so divided and acrimonious that he gave up the idea.{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=127}}{{efn-ua|The history and composition of the Viceroy's Executive Council are described in "Hungry Bengal" pp. 97''ff'. Linlithgow feared negative reaction from the Indian public if he overrode the Council.}}]

[This is already looking too long, perhaps....]

After the personal intervention in November [1943] by the new Viceroy, Lord Wavell, troops and officers belonging to the Indian army were deputed to assist the Civil Supplies Department in carrying food and other relief supplies the remotest villages.133 Still, the sheer quantity of grain waiting to shipped from Calcutta to rural relief kitchens and cheap grain sales-centers became embarrassing; there were not enough warehouses to store it all, and rice was heaped up on the ground, on railway platforms, and in the botanical garden, shrouded with tarpaulins.134 In these months a strange phenomenon occurred, in defiance, it seems, of the generalizations of economic science: the City began to feed the Countryside. By the end of the year not only was new grain being harvested and sold, but the "old", stored rice emerged from its village resting places to mingle with the new in a rejuvenated market. Government procurement operations suddenly became simple, and more than a million tons of rice and paddy were quickly brought up. By January 1943 official relief work came — Greenough 1982 p. 136

to an end and attention turned to the rehabilitation of famine victims and the continuing problem of epidemic diseases which starvation had brought in its train. p. 137

These studies' criticism of British authorities as indifferent to the famine is also inaccurate, most importantly because almost all studies of the famine focus on Bengal, and ignore the broader picture. British and other government authorities in India had to confront a series of subsistence crises that emerged from drought and other factors in many parts of India during the war, crises that were publicly recognized and often officially declared to be famines. For the British and for most Indians, the Bengal famine was part of a much larger crisis.4 This article argues that these crises are more accurately described as the Indian famine crises of World War II rather than narrowly as the Bengal famine. Natural disaster caused crop failures, food shortages, and famine in several regions. Governments at all levels worked to alleviate these famines, although some regional authorities were more successful than others. The circumstances of World War II made relief difficult: the Viceroys Lord Linlithgow and Viscount Wavell repeatedly appealed to London to allocate shipping to transport food supplies to India, but London focused on war in 1942-1943, had limited shipping capacity because of continual losses to German and Japanese submarines, and could not provide much aid until later. Finally, in response to this crisis, which was at root a problem of production and shortage more than of markets, the British began efforts to increase food production with the 'Grow More Food' campaign that led to development policies in independent India and Pakistan.

— Tauger, 2009

When Viscount Archibald Wavell took over as Viceroy during fall 1943, he recognized that the famine was more serious than Linlithgow realized because he decided it was the result of a large shortage, and he criticized the War Cabinet for working from manifestly false statistics that underestimated the shortage.109 He too sent insistent demands to the War Cabinet asking for a million tons of grain, and again he was put off for months and then offered a small fraction of what he requested until the wartime situation stabilized.

— Tauger, 2009

7. The role of theory in policy failures The inadequacy of official policy in tackling the Bengal famine has been widely noted and criticised. The Famine Inquiry Commission (1945A) provided a detailed analysis of the policy failures both of the Bengal government as well as of the Indian government (see especially Chapters X and XI). The famine became a focal point of nationalist criticism of British imperial policy in India (for a classic work on this, see Ghosh, 1944), and official complacency came under particular attack. The refusal of the British government to permit more food imports into India, by re-allocating shipping as an emergency measure to tackle the famine, was severely criticised, f Lord Wavell, who became the new Viceroy at the last stage of the famine and who had to battle hard for increasing food imports into India, went on record in this context as saying that he felt that 'the vital problems of India are being treated by His Majesty's Government with neglect, even sometimes with hostility and contempt'. Does our thesis that the Bengal famine did not arise from a drastic decline in food availability negate these criticisms' I do not believe that it does, since, no matter how a famine is caused, the methods of breaking it require a large supply of food in the public distribution system. This applies not only to organising rationing and control, but also to undertaking work programmes and other methods of increasing purchasing power for those hit by shifts in exchange entitlements in a general inflationary situation.

— Sen, 1977

See the Secretary of State's telegram to the Viceroy on 16 January 1943, Document no. 350 in Mansergh (1971), pp. 514-515. London continued to turn down requests by the government of India for shipping allocations throughout 1943; see Documents nos. 59, 71, 72, 74, 98, 139, 157, 207, 219 in Mansergh (1973), and also Wavell (1973), chs. 2 and 3.

— Sen, 1977

Later Amery repeated the general's argument: conditions in Bengal were becoming 'a serious menace to supply operations and the movement of troops, and also very bad for troop morale.' To no avail: on 24 September the War Cabinet decided that diverting ships to lifting grain for delivery in India before the next Indian harvest would not be possible. This prompted Amery to muse in his diary that 'Winston [Churchill] may be right in saying that the starvation of anyhow under-fed Bengalis is less serious than sturdy Greeks, at any rate from the war point of view, but he makes no sufficient allowance for the sense of Empire responsibility in this country.'54 Although in mid-October Amery was still referring in public to only 'scarcity verging on famine,' in private he must have known that the game was up. His missive to Lord Wavell, who had just taken over as viceroy from a culpably ineffective Linlithgow, really explains it all. Amery recognized the 'natural and widespread feeling here that somehow or other the ultimate responsibility rests with us and that this country could or should have done more.' But

— O'Grada, 2015

As the crisis worsened by the week, Linlithgow, clearly affected by the mounting tide of criticism within Bengal, declared that 'it will have to come back on His Majesty's Government'. But London continued to prioritize military requirements and 'the food situation nearer home'. Amery confided to the Viceroy that 'famine in Greece has been, I imagine, even worse than in Bengal and one of the most urgent needs of the immediate future will be the shipping of food into Greece to help the insurgents, of whom something like 50,000 are under arms today and playing a really important role in the whole war effort.' In a letter to the incoming Viceroy, Lord Wavell, Amery recognized the 'natural and widespread feeling here that somehow or other the ultimate responsibility rests with us and that this country could or should have done more'. But he continued:

— O'Grada, 2009

Even as late as October 1943 London needed convincing that 'everything has been done within India to extract hoarded supplies and get them to the starving districts'. In an exasperated response to London's reluctance to supply more grain in early 1944, Wavell warned that the famine was 'one of the greatest disasters that has befallen any people under British rule and [the] damage to our reputation both among Indians and foreigners in India is incalculable'.

— O'Grada, 2009

distributed only once a day, barely enough to hold body and soul together, in over five thousand gruel kitchens. In order to prevent abuse, it was distributed simultaneously at all centers, for an hour at noon. When a new viceroy, Lord Wavell, arrived in Bengal in October 1943 he found a situation still 'grim enough to make official complacency surprising', with thousands of destitutes from the countryside camped in Calcutta's streets and open areas. He initially rejected demands for an official inquiry into the famine on the grounds that its findings would probably embarrass the authorities in London.25

— O'Grada, 2009

71 Mahalanobis, 'Recent experiments'; Bowbrick, 'Causes of famines'; Tauger, 'Entitlement', pp. 60'3; Islam, 'Great Bengal Famine'. Mahalanobis ('Recent experiments', p. 333) cryptically noted: 'Although by [1942], owing to Japan's entry into the war, the food situation in Bengal had already become difficult, I failed completely to persuade the government to extend the sample survey to cover the paddy crop in Bengal. The Bengal famine occurred in 1943'. Early in 1944, Lord Wavell warned in private against attempts at proving 'on the basis of admittedly defective statistics' that no help was needed, and that experience on the ground gave the lie to a 'rigid statistical approach' (Moon, Wavell, p. 55, entry for 9 Feb. 1944). Others, both at the time and later, acknowledged the supply problem. Pinnell (With the sanction of government, pp. 94, 97), a key figure, noted the failure of the aman crop and 'reports of widespread disease in the incoming crop', although 'one was inclined to suspect that the reports might be exaggerated by speculators', and Binjay Ranjan Sen, the official responsible for emergency relief in Bengal at the time and later head of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, would refer in his memoir to 'the total failure of a ripening rice crop' and 'the aman crop failure' (Sen, Towards a newer world, pp. 47, 49). See also Greenough, Prosperity and misery, p. 160.

— O'Grada, 2008

In a letter to the incoming Viceroy, Lord Wavell, Amery recognized the 'natural and widespread feeling here that somehow or other the ultimate responsibility rests with us and that this country could or should have done more'. But he continued:

— O'Grada, 2008

convincing that 'everything has been done within India to extract hoarded supplies and get them to the starving districts'.120 So furious was Wavell, a conscientious and energetic administrator, at the reluctance to supply more grain in early 1944, that he warned that the famine was 'one of the greatest disasters that has befallen any people under British rule and [the] damage to our reputation both among Indians and foreigners in India is incalculable'.121

— O'Grada, 2008

Linlithgow sent several more telegrams, pleading the case, noting that the Food Conference held in Delhi on the 14th and 15th of December had revealed that the situation was even worse than he had originally thought.40 All efforts being made from Delhi to deal with the crisis were further hampered by a lack of competent personnel, and if nothing was done, he warned, there would even be the possibility of "shortage being felt by the armed forces here."41 Amery remained skeptical, wondering whether or not the statistics that Linlithgow was using were of any merit: "judging by the use which the Congress people have made of the Midnapore disaster," he replied, "they are no doubt capable of doing their utmost to aggravate the food situation by encouraging hoarding on the one hand and, on the other, [by] denouncing the Government for deliberately starving the people."42 Linlithgow persisted, assuring Amery that Government would take every measure possible to "place maximum food supplies at disposal of Government," but maintained that immediate imports were "absolutely essential."43 He also enlisted the influence of the Commander-in-Chief for South and Southeast Asia, Field Marshall Archibald Wavell, who agreed that the situation was grave. Military rations, Wavell informed the War Cabinet, were already being cut for both men and draught animals.44

— Mukherjee, 2015

allowed to keep any stocks at all. The city of Dacca, meanwhile, "decided to announce itself by an outbreak of stabbings," which were reported to have stemmed from contentions related to the Drive. Public suspicion only escalated further when it was announced on the 17th of June that Field-Marshall Archibald Wavell, then Commander- in-Chief of Armed Forces in Asia, had been selected to replace Linlithgow as the next Viceroy and Governor-General of India. Wavell had overseen the defeats in Malaya, Burma and Singapore, and he had only recently suffered yet another humiliating failure in the Arakan. Now he would be the head of the Government of India. With military presence already pervasive, and uniformed and armed agents beating the bushes for rice, the appointment of Wavell "[came] as a surprise to most people. The average Indian regards it as the prelude to martial law."

— Mukherjee, 2015

But little was being done, either in Delhi or London to round off that long corner. Amery, heeding Linlithgow's increasingly strident concerns, pressed the War Cabinet again to consider immediate imports of food grains. In his initial discussion with Minister of War Transport, Lord Leathers, the Secretary of State was disheartened by the response. Leathers was unmoved by Amery's urgent appeal: the necessary shipping space simply could not be arranged. With Field Marshall Wavell as the incoming Viceroy, however, efforts were made to enlist high ranking military officers to back the demand for imports. Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Claude Auchinlek, convinced of the urgency of the situation, telegrammed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Alan Brooke, to recruit high-ranking support in London. "So far as shipping is concerned," Auchinlek assured Brooke, "the import of food is to my mind just as if not more important than the imports of munitions."120 The lack of any humanitarian language in Auchinlek's correspondence is no surprise. The question of what famine would mean to the war effort was the only code with which famine had been discussed for some time now. Brooke, together with the other Chiefs of Staff, presented a memorandum to the War Cabinet. In it they warned that "unless the necessary steps are taken to rectify the [food] situation, the efficient prosecution of the war against Japan by forces based in India will be gravely jeopardized and may well prove impossible."121 Amery authored his

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell himself was known to be a rather dry and austere man, unimpressed by ceremony and unafraid to speak his own mind. He was sworn in on the 20th of October, and set to work on the famine situation at once. He, like Linlithgow, judged clearing Calcutta to be of primary importance, but (in fairness) he also seems to have been the first British official to view the loss of innocent life in Bengal as a moving priority as well. He set up a Distress Relief Fund within days of assuming office and, whereas Linlithgow had failed to visit Bengal himself at any time during the famine, Wavell was "off to Calcutta" within a week to assess the situation first hand.164 Wavell landed in Calcutta on the afternoon of the 26th and began an "incognito" tour of the city that same evening. He met with "sick destitutes" himself, some of whom, despite the effort to

— Mukherjee, 2015

165 The Statesman, "Lord Wavell Sees Plight of Destitutes in Calcutta," October 27, 1943

— Mukherjee, 2015

But substantial help, no matter how late, and how insufficient relative to the immensity of the catastrophe that had befallen Bengal, was on its way. Field Marshall Wavell was good to his word, and perhaps more importantly, understood the famine to be a humanitarian disaster that demanded immediate and large-scale action. The new Viceroy had been shocked at the inertia and apathy which he had found in Calcutta. Acting Governor, Sir Thomas Rutherford, was unhappy with his assignment and was only biding his time until he could be relieved of the monstrosity of Bengal and return to Bihar.195 Wavell found him to be "second rate, at best" and told the Secretary of State, "I do not think he is really trying very hard in Bengal.. and the impression he left on me was very poor."196 The Bengal Ministry, meanwhile was tying itself in knots, with Ministers "more concerned in their political rivalries than with the famine."197 And in London, there was only more denial.

— Mukherjee, 2015

The very day he returned from Bengal, Wavell telegraphed the Commander-in- Chief for India and requested immediate, and substantial, military assistance to cope with famine in Bengal. His request was granted without hesitation, and on the second of

— Mukherjee, 2015

Only three days after his return to Delhi, then, Wavell could inform London that troops were being located throughout the hardest hit districts and supplies were moving out of Calcutta and into the countryside at pace. Additionally, arrangements were being made for large-scale medical relief, and materials for temporary shelters for the homeless were being sent. The alacrity with which Wavell organized these relief efforts was, at once, a testimony to his own initiative, as well as a very troubling contrast to the apathy and indifference with which at least a million people had already been left to starve. Linlithgow himself, in his discussions with Wavell before turning over authority, had predicted that as many as one and a half million were likely to die of famine in Bengal before the end of 1943, which, he admitted, "would be getting off better than [I] had thought was possible."199 In the end, there is no question that Wavell's prompt and comprehensive engagement saved an inestimable number of lives, but the situation in Bengal had been allowed to deteriorate to such a degree that the relief initiated in November of 1943, for many, was far too little and far too late. And the cards were still stacked against Wavell's own initiative.

— Mukherjee, 2015

Meanwhile, Amery was making the best of Wavell's decisive action. On November 11th he informed the House of Commons that the "military machinery for detailed distribution [was] already working," and surmised that "there [was] good reason to be satisfied with the progress made."206 Military relief programs were operating efficiently and aid was getting into the far reaches of the Bengal countryside. Even mules were being used to pack rice into remote villages.207 Just as importantly, the aman crop was fast ripening and it looked to be a healthy and abundant harvest. Amery reported to Wavell that his efforts had made an excellent impression in England.208 To the Viceroy's

— Mukherjee, 2015

By December of 1943 it was apparent that the all-important aman crop, harvested in late autumn, would be a bumper crop. With London's continued refusal of imports, this promising aman yield, above all else, was being counted on to relieve famine. The new Viceroy, Field Marshall Archibald Wavell had also managed to implement an extensive and efficient military relief operation, almost overnight. Major-General Stuart (in over-all charge of military assistance) had, at his command, twelve to fifteen thousand British troops to aid relief operations, and Major-General Wakely (in charge of movements) was given considerable transportation priority to move rice out of Calcutta and into the districts. Although the official line was still that famine had been precipitated by the hoarding of cultivators, orders were passed that seemed to belie a less perfunctory understanding of the causes of famine. The export of rice and paddy from Bengal was strictly prohibited early in December.3 Direct purchases from large industrial firms were banned,4 and a ban was also levied on the movement of rice and paddy out of 12 principle rice-growing districts. Perhaps most importantly of all, the Central Government in New Delhi committed itself to feed Calcutta through direct imports from outside of Bengal.5 These measures, combined, would take immense pressure off the countryside, which was suffering incalculable misery at the expense of Calcutta.

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell himself was in Bengal in December for a second tour of the province. At his first public speech as Viceroy, he encouraged members of the combined Chambers of

— Mukherjee, 2015

6 The Statesman, "Lord Wavell's Assurance," December 21, 1943

— Mukherjee, 2015

On the 12th of January, 1944, in an obvious effort to punctuate the political embarrassment of starvation in India, Wavell telegraphed Amery in regards to a "Bengal Famine Enquiry." The proceedings, he suggested, should take the form of a Royal Commission, which might be organized "almost immediately." He also again urged that the enquiry should "be concerned with the future rather than with the past."10 The "terms of reference" that the Viceroy suggested were succinct: "to investigate and report to the Governor-General in Council upon the causes of widespread distress, starvation and

— Mukherjee, 2015

The Viceroy, Archibald Wavell, to his credit, understood the Bengal Famine to be the most pressing and grave responsibility of colonial governance in India. His sense of urgency - and even compassion - as well as his military connections, resulted in a commendable, if still inadequate and woefully belated, relief effort. His patience was thin, however, for the constitutional arrangements outlined in the Government of India Act of 1935, which had established "Provincial Autonomy." Like his predecessor, Wavell had little, if any, faith that the elected government in Bengal had the wherewithal or sincerity to cope with the magnitude of the crisis in the province, and was alarmed by "the reckless way in which political capital [was being] made of the Bengal trouble."65 He found the Chief Minister, Kwaja Nazimuddin "honest but weak,"66 and he estimated the much more formidable Food Minister, Shaheed Suhrawardy, "all big talk and small action."67 What Bengal needed, Wavell thought, was "inspiring leadership" with a broad mandate. The only way to realize this necessity, the Viceroy concluded, was - once again - to enact Section 93, in order to abolish the provincial government and grant the Governor, under direct authority of the Viceroy himself, emergency rule in Bengal. The procedure of superceding provincial autonomy and enforcing autocratic white-rule in

— Mukherjee, 2015

The resignation of the Ministry, on the other hand, would dampen the impression of heavy-handedness on the part of the colonial state. A possible route to Section 93 by resignation had been laid out by Wavell's predecessor. Under Section 52-(I) (a) of the Government of India Act, the Governor could claim extraordinary powers in any province if the "peace and tranquility" of that province was under threat. These powers, in concert with those granted under Section 126A which allowed Central Government to "direct" the provincial legislature, might be used to create conditions that "no self- respecting Government" could or would agree to, resulting in resignation.69 Acting Governor, Thomas Rutherford, however, questioned the constitutionality of the scheme, unwilling as he was to take on such responsibility. Wavell disappointed in the Acting Governor's refusal, wished for a permanent Governor "who [did] not worry too much about constitutional form and [was] determined to get things done."70 He also wished that Linlithgow had taken a firmer hand earlier in the famine, "when Ministers were thoroughly frightened and prepared to do anything that they were told."71 In that case, Section 93 may not even have even been necessary. But the Ministry was now too entrenched, and so Wavell continued to call for a "vigorous Section 93" in Bengal, despite the Governor's reservations.72

— Mukherjee, 2015

It is worth mentioning that given the recent history of Governorship in Bengal, Wavell's call for Governor's rule in the province was, to say the least, ironic. Sir John Herbert had caused Linlithgow considerable consternation and grief, and then just a few

— Mukherjee, 2015

Herbert died on December 11, 1943 and a memorial was given at St. John's Cathedral in Calcutta on the 19th. Wavell attended, and later that afternoon met with Mayne, Wakely and other senior civil servicemen, "none of them optimistic about the future of the food problem in Bengal."78 Not only was Rutherford complaining of ill- health and seemed to have "lost-heart," but "his senior officials such as Williams, Chief Secretary, and Stevens, the Food Commissioner, [were] lacking in energy, and there [were] signs that they [were] not cooperating with the Army."79 What was desperately needed, the Viceroy informed London, was a "first-class man who is ready to sacrifice his immediate prospects to do work of the highest importance to the prosecution of the

— Mukherjee, 2015

Hearing that he was getting a "first-class" man for Bengal at last, Wavell redoubled his efforts to get a "vigorous Section 93," turning to the Secretary of State to have emergency rule authorized by the War Cabinet in London. Amery sympathized with Wavell's desire to circumvent protocol. "Acts," he assured the Viceroy, "were meant to be evaded or overridden if necessity is great enough."83 The Secretary of State prepared an extensive brief for the War Cabinet. In it he included the possibility of forcing a resignation by onerous "directions" issued under Sections 52-(I) (a) and 126A. In the event that this tactic failed, the only option was "to throw overboard regard for Provincial autonomy and get rid - by dismissal - of a Ministry with a working majority."84 Amery argued that the "food problem" was an "all-India problem," and as such justified such extreme measures.

— Mukherjee, 2015

The War Cabinet met on the 11th of January 1943, and rejected the Viceroy's bid. Members worried that if Section 93 was introduced under such circumstances "the Hindus would be delighted," and Muslims might become "actively hostile."85 If the Government of India, moreover, became responsible for the momentous problems of Bengal, they themselves might be stranded on "very insecure ground."86 The use of 52- (I) (a) and 126A might be deployed and extra I.C.S. men lent to the province, but Section 93 was out of the question. The problem of food in Bengal, the War Cabinet concluded, would remain a provincial matter. Wavell was severely disappointed with the decision,

— Mukherjee, 2015

Following the death of Sir John the big bosses (Churchill, Amery, Wavell and Co.) spent much effort searching the forests and jungles of Australia and suddenly chanced upon a comparatively civilized animal by the name of Mr. Casey; in an announcement they broadcast their intention of making him the ruler of Bengal. There must be some secret reason why Churchill, Amery and Co. awarded the honor...to the land of the kangaroos...a certain class of animals...that are famous for their ability to jump considerable distances with the help of their tails and hind legs... Is it to be tolerated that we will be ruled by an inhabitant of Australia, where Indians cannot exercise any right'90

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell, himself, knew that the only remedy was to import large quantities of food grains, stabilize prices, and feed the population. The Viceroy wrote a sharp telegram to London in the last week of December, warning them that the import of 1.5 million tons of foodgrains into India was imperative to ward off even greater catastrophe in the coming year. Increased demand by Defence Services was further straining an already difficult situation to the breaking point. The Secretary of State responded that His Majesty's Government was still of the opinion, relayed in the earlier War Cabinet decision, that imports on the scale that Wavell was asking for were "out of the question." It had been agreed, however, that shipping might be provided for the import of 50,000 tons of grain to India in January and February.107 Amery realized that this was absurdly insufficient and promised to renew the case for 1.5 million tons, but requested a detailed brief from New Delhi outlining their demand.

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell responded to Amery's request for an elaborate brief testily, "it is of no use going on arguing from month to month on figures and details," he complained, "I think Cabinet must trust man on the spot. You can warn them from me that it is my considered judgment that unless we can be assured now of receiving one million (repeat one million) tons of food grains during 1944 we are heading for disaster."108 The Viceroy did, however, put together a comprehensive brief, with whatever numbers were available to him, and sent it off to London with further cautionary reminders. Pressing the government's only operative "famine code," he warned that "the present state of affairs in Bengal is a serious threat to the security of an operational base and to the health of troops."109 The Secretary of State relayed the Viceroy's warning to Lord Leathers, noting that imports were essential to "prevent the breakdown of the whole economic structure of the country and its ability to function as a base for military operations."110

— Mukherjee, 2015

When Wavell received news that his request had been denied, he was incensed. The Bengal Famine, he reminded London, "was one of the greatest disasters that [had] befallen any people under British rule and damage to our reputation...is incalculable."115 The statistics reported, he admitted, had been defective, but had been based on the best estimates available. A "rigid statistical approach," he added, was, in any case, "futile."116 He had personally discussed the supply situation with all provincial governors and had visited, in person, seven of the eleven provinces. The reality of shortage and the threat of impending nation-wide economic failure, leading to an even more massive famine, was manifest. He ended his telegram bluntly: "I warn His Majesty's Government with all seriousness that if they refuse our demands they are risking a catastrophe far greater than Bengal famine that will have irretrievable effect on their position both at home and abroad. They must either trust the opinion of the man they have appointed to advise them

— Mukherjee, 2015

The War Cabinet met again on the 14th of February to reconsider the Government of India's demands. The Prime Minister presented the Viceroy's urgent telegrams and expressed his own concerns - about a lack of shipping to meet Wavell's request. The Minister of War Transport, Lord Leathers, seconded Churchill's anxiety, reiterating his doubts about being able to even maintain current shipments of grain to India. He suggested that when and if India could prove itself to be in "acute shortage" he would make the necessary arrangements for the shipment of up to 25,000 tons a month of Iraqi barley to the sub-continent.119 The Cabinet agreed to send a telegram to the Viceroy informing him that they had very earnestly considered his request, but could not comply. The last sentence of the telegram, they suggested to the Secretary of State, "might be expressed...to make it clear that refusal of India's request was not due to our underrating India's needs, but because we could not take operational risks by cutting down the shipping required for vital operations."120

— Mukherjee, 2015

The War Cabinet met to consider the Viceroy's "counter-offensive" on the 21st of February.123 They had before them his series of forceful telegrams, together with those of Mountbatten and Auchinleck, and also the Food Grain Committee's anemic report. After short deliberation it was agreed that little could be done for India. The Minister of War Transport suggested that the 50,000 tons of Iraqi barley promised would be replaced by 50,000 tons of wheat - at some future date. The shipment of another 50,000 tons already en route to India from Australia, however, would have to be cancelled and redirected to the Balkans. The net gain was, therefore, zero. Instead a net loss of 100,000 tons - represented by the lost Iraqi barley and Australian wheat - was incurred. A telegram to the Viceroy was sent conveying these conclusions and also noting that the Minister of War Transport was "fully satisfied that United States have no shipping," and, as such, an approach to the Americans would be pointless. An appeal to U.N.R.R.A. Leathers added, was, likewise, pointless, as they had no shipping of their own. Churchill, in a separate telegram to Wavell, expressed his regrets and wished the Viceroy "every good wish amid [his] anxieties."124

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell cabled to London in dismay. "To expect me to hold the critical food situation here with empty hands," he wrote to the Secretary of State, "is stupid and shortsighted."125 Once again, the hand of Churchill's confident and chief council, Lord Cherwell, was deplored. "I see from your letter," Wavell added, "that that old menace and fraud the Professor was called in to advise against me. The fact is that the P.M. has calculated his war plans without any consideration at all of India's needs."126 The Viceroy sent telegrams to Auchinleck and Mountbatten with the request that they might arrange, on their own, for the replacement of military cargo with food grain imports for India. In the meantime, Wavell pressed on, admitting to Amery that he understood himself to be something of a "nuisance" to His Majesty's Government, but reiterating that

— Mukherjee, 2015

In London, however, the contention that India had enough, if not more than enough, was well entrenched. In a rather cynical rejoinder to the Government of India's request for wheat imports, a proposal was floated by the War Cabinet suggesting that India might be supplied with 300,000 tons of Australian wheat in exchange for 300,000 tons of rice from Bengal for Ceylon. The scheme involved the forward shipment of rice from India, backed by the promise of later imports of wheat.128 The Viceroy predictably bridled at the suggestion: "[this] proposal has no real bearing whatever on India's main food problem. It does not increase by one ton India's total food supply and in fact apparently proposes that India should lend Ceylon rice for period without return."129 Actual procurement in Bengal, he noted, was less than 15% of that which had been targeted, and the resumption of exports under such conditions would only lead to further panic. Moreover, he reminded Amery, "it is quite impossible for us to export rice at all: we have in fact publicly pledged not to do so."130 "It is clear," Wavell concluded, "that the War Cabinet have not begun to understand the nature of our problem, and apparently don't even care to try."131

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell categorically rejected the exchange scheme, noting that the import of 200,000 tons was a mere one-sixth of India's needs.133 Military requirements, alone, amounted to 724,000 tons per annum, and as such 524,000 tons were still being removed from civilian consumption even if the entire imported amount was allocated to Defense Services - which was, in fact, the plan. In a resort to more extreme methods, the Viceroy informed the War Cabinet that with this 200,000 tons he would be able to supply the military a total of 550,000 tons, leaving a 224,000 ton shortfall.134 To the Secretary of State, Wavell drove the point home still further. "It is not a matter of sentiment," he wrote, "on the one hand, it is impossible to ignore the needs of starving people, and on the other hand, an acute shortage of food at once reduces the efficiency of the factories and the civilian services of all kinds, on which a Military Commander must rely."135 Wavell's protestations had little effect. With 200,000 tons promised, the issue languished for several weeks.

— Mukherjee, 2015

In the third week of April, however, Wavell returned to the charge. Procurement in Bengal had continued to be moribund and crop damages were being reported from several other provinces which threatened to destabilize the nation-wide food supply still further. Given these contingencies, Wavell informed Amery: "the promised import of 200 [thousand tons] just balances civil position with nothing (repeat nothing) to meet defense requirements of 724 for 12 months from 1st May and whole amount must be imported if Army demands are to be met...I am informing Supreme Commander and Commander-in- Chief of inability to meet service requirement."136 The Viceroy's telegram came as a

— Mukherjee, 2015

A telegram, drafted with approval of the War Cabinet, was sent off to Washington on April 29, 1944. In it mention was made of Wavell's "gravest warnings," and also of the "grievous famine" of 1943. But mention was also made of the "good crop of rice" in Bengal, and no specific information of the extent of shortfall that the Viceroy anticipated was included. His Majesty's Government had done its honest best, Churchill assured his counterpart. "I have been able to arrange for 350,000 tons of wheat to be shipped to India from Australia during the first nine months of 1944. I cannot see how we could do more."141 When Wavell received a draft of the telegram he responded wryly to the Secretary of State, "I see that the Prime Minster speaks of having made 350,00 tons of wheat available which apparently means a promise to us of another 150,000 tons over what has already been promised."142 Amery assured the Viceroy that that was not the case; "Leathers put it that way in order to make it clear to the President that we had done our best."143 President Roosevelt, apparently, felt that that was good enough. On June 3rd he cabled back to express his "utmost sympathy," but reported that he would be unable to provide any assistance, being "unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping."144

— Mukherjee, 2015

Nearly six months had elapsed since Wavell had begun his campaign to contain famine in India by means of necessary imports, and nothing more than a promise of 200,000 tons against the Viceroy's estimate of 1.5 million necessary had been accomplished. Bengal, meanwhile, was entering into its lean months, which under even normal circumstances, meant acute hardship for the poor. Smallpox had reached its peak during the months of April and May,145 and with one hospital bed for every 100,000 residents of the province, had taken a very severe toll. In Calcutta, alone, the mortality rate was three times what it had been in 1943.146 But, as Governor Casey reported to the Prime Minister, "food [was still] the constant and most important problem."147 Conditions in Bengal, moreover, were destabilizing the food supply of the country as a whole. Receiving the news of Roosevelt's refusal, Wavell was despondent. "There has been dangerous, and as I think, deliberate procrastination," 148 he complained to Amery, "I have never believed that the tonnage required to enable me to deal properly with our food problem would make any real difference to [military] operations in the West or here."149

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell sent a second telegram to Churchill directly. He assured the Prime Minister that in the event of imminent nation-wide famine, "His Majesty's Government's attitude if maintained, can, and will, be represented with reason as both short-sighted and callous."150 No War Cabinet meeting was called. Instead, the Prime Minister, in direct consultation with his War Transport Minister, used the authority within his mandate and issued an executive order for arrangements to be made for the delivery of an additional 200,000 tons of food grains to India by September of 1944.151 On the 5th of July the Viceroy informed London that His Majesty's Government's decision had been "too little, too late."152 After six months of frustration and failure, he returned to his charge for imports in the months to come.

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Bengal. Field Marshall Wavell, however, remained upbeat. He had maintained his crusade for food imports and by the end of 1944 had managed to wrangle one million tons out of London. On New Year's Eve he sat at his desk and mused: "So ends 1944. On the whole not a bad year for India."

— Mukherjee, 2015

Wavell was able to convince Casey to remain, but only a few weeks later the Ministry in Bengal collapsed. The virulence of attacks by the opposition, together with the forces of division inside the Muslim League, had weakened Nazimuddin's regime to the breaking point. The end came on March 28, 1945, two years to the day after Fazlul Huq had been unceremoniously removed from power. Behind the scenes Nazimuddin had been attempting an alliance with Kiran Sankar Roy of the "orthodox" Congress. A partnership with Congress would have given Nazimuddin the leverage to remain in power despite routine defections by the Suhrawardy faction, who frequently crossed lines to vote with the opposition.196 Negotiations between the parties broke down, however, and on the 28th of March a trap was laid for the Nazimuddin by the opposition in concert with Suhrawardy loyalists. An almost incidental Agricultural Grant Bill came to the floor and was defeated when 18 members of the ruling party crossed over to the opposition. Failure to pass the Agricultural Grant tied up the budget bill, and the failure to pass the budget amounted to a no-confidence vote in the Ministry. The Bengal Ministry was disbanded on the 29th and Section 93 was declared in Bengal, with Governor Casey, a disillusioned and interim executive, gaining extensive emergency powers to govern the province without democratic interference.

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government in London would move in a 'liberal' direction on India policy was widespread. Wavell traveled to London towards the end of August, and though he found the leadership in the newly formulated India Office "obviously bent on handing over India to their Congress friends as soon as possible,"

— Mukherjee, 2015

The end of summer in Bengal was breeding other anxieties however. Once again the province was approaching its lean season, when local reserves from the previous harvest were perennially running low, prices were rising, and anticipation of the coming aman crop was all that kept many of the province's poor from absolute despair - even in a normal year. The monsoon rains in 1945, however, had failed; drought conditions were prevailing in most districts, and by August fears were rising that Bengal was facing imminent starvation on a large scale once again. It was predicted that the aman harvest in the province was likely to be just 65% of average.202 Wavell wrote to the new Secretary of State just a few days after he took office, to convey to him that the food situation was extremely worrying and a "serious scarcity of rice in Bengal" was anticipated.203 Predictions of the poor rice harvest, he informed London, suggested that the province would soon be facing a shortage of as much as 3.5 million tons. The Viceroy had received reports that there were considerable reserves in re-occupied Burma and Siam, which might be utilized if large scale famine was to be averted.

— Mukherjee, 2015

Victory over Japan, meanwhile, meant little in Bengal. Repressive wartime controls remained in effect,208 and Governor Casey hesitated to demobilize the Home or Civic Guards who had been instrumental in keeping "order" in Bengal for the last several years. Rice was now theoretically available through traditional import routes from Southeast Asia, but the geo-political landscape remained unforgiving to Bengal. A two million ton surplus of rice in Burma and Thailand had to go through the "tooth-comb of the Food Committee in Washington," Governor Casey worried, "and [the] U.S.A. [would] push for rice to China - their white-haired boy."209 Casey's apprehensions proved well founded. Despite the Governor's appeals, backed by Wavell's increasingly harsh warnings, the Secretary of State reported back to India that, as regards the possibility of getting imports from Southeast Asia, "the Americans have been making themselves very difficult in opposition to India's claims."210 What might be made available to Bengal, Pethwick-Lawrence warned was "certain to be immensely short of total requirement."211

— Mukherjee, 2015

The Viceroy informed London on the first of January 1946 that the food situation in India was deteriorating still further. If Congress called for a mass movement, Wavell warned, food shortage would surely intensify the response. 252 "To have another disastrous famine within the space of three years," he cautioned further, "would afflict the conscience of the world."253 He lobbied for immediate and substantial imports, but, yet again, received less than satisfactory replies. "India's need is unquestionable," the Labour Party's Secretary of State responded, "but...it would be foolish to raise false expectations of greatly increased imports."254 Perhaps, the Secretary of State added, a cut in rations could save the situation.255 Wavell found the suggestion that rations in India should be reduced to 12 oz. per day deplorable. He pointed out that a 12 oz. ration amounted to only 1200 calories, "which any health expert [would] admit is a hopelessly inadequate diet."256 He puzzled at the audacity of the India Office in London. "I cannot believe," he bristled, "that anyone will contemplate keeping such a large population on the edge of starvation for the whole of this critical year."257

— Mukherjee, 2015

With few other options, however, Wavell contemplated this exact course. He met with his Executive Council, and found them amenable to the idea of a ration cut. A few weeks later, he met with Congress President, Maulana Azad, and even more surprisingly, found Azad agreeable to a reduction of rations as well. In a press statement Azad explained that Congress was "essentially a political organization based on the will and aspirations of the people...fully alive to the urgency of the new spirit and to the impatience of the younger generation. But we are equally conscious of our heavy responsibility at this critical time."258 Part and parcel of that responsibility was to urge the public to co-operate with India's current colonial caretakers. Co-operation, as far as the food crisis went, meant accepting Government expediencies. In this context, he reasoned, the cut in rations was "a far-sighted measure for saving millions of lives."259

— Mukherjee, 2015

The Viceroy, for his part, felt that, "however absorbed [Government] may [have been] in the constitutional problems, the food situation [was] even more urgent."264 Promises of imports from the U.S. had proved hollow, and London had little more to suggest than that India might be able to work a deal for 60 large tractors which were for sale at the American Air Depot at Agra.265 Meanwhile, Wavell complained, the Muslim League and Congress were content to "pay lip service to the idea that the food crisis

— Mukherjee, 2015

London sent Herbert Morrison, leader of the House of Commons, to Washington to argue the case for imports to India, but the U.S. Government offered little help. Wavell discussed the possibility of cutting rations still further with his Executive Council, but it was concluded that any further cut might "create very serious labor trouble and by affecting confidence would probably doom the prospects of procurement so as to leave us even worse off than before."271 Towards the end of June there were demonstrations in Calcutta, orchestrated by provincial Kisan Sabhas, demanding immediate arrangements for the movement of at least 200,000 tons of rice to distressed districts and the immediate constitution of a Food Advisory Council.272 Government gave in to the latter demand, organizing an all-parties Council to advise Government on procurement, storage and distribution on food grains, but no measures were taken for the movement of food relief to deficit areas.273 While reports of starvation were filling the newspapers and famine was again becoming headline news, the Viceroy called on

— Mukherjee, 2015

19 On August 19th, Wavell wrote to Pethwick-Lawrence, "the present estimate is that appreciably more Muslims than Hindus were killed." (T.O.P. Vol. VIII, p. 274.) Vallabhbhai Patel, in a letter to Stanford Cripps in October also suggested that "in Calcutta the Hindus had the best of it. (T.O.P. Vol. VIII, p. 750.)

— Mukherjee, 2015

In October 1943, when Field Marshal Archibald Wavell arrived in India to assume the post of viceroy from Linlithgow, he faced a vociferous demand from Indian politicians for an inquiry into the ongoing famine in Bengal. Leopold Amery, the secretary of state for India, advised against yielding to such a demand, however My own view was and is that enquiry now would be disastrous and that enquiry at future date is undesirable' (Mansergh IV: 463). When it turned out that these voices would not be quieted, Amery suggested deflecting the inquiry into a Malthusian direction ' a broad study that would 'do no harm even if pursued now, prospect of investigation by one or two experts into relation between growth of population and available supplies of foodgrains' (ibid: 468). That is, Amery suggested linking the famine with food supply, not because he believed that was the real story, but as a purely political exercise designed to lead the discussion away from inflammatory matters such as infl ationary financing of India's war effort. Privately, Amery opined that the famine occurred because India had been forced to provide excessive resources toward the Allied prosecution of the second world war (ibid: 445).

— Mukerjee, 2014

(Not until Wavell took office as viceroy in October 1943 was meaningful famine relief organised in Bengal.)

— Mukerjee, 2014

What else did the commission blame the famine on' To understand that, one needs to look at Amery's further instruction ' that the government 'keep the political side of this business out of it as far as possible' by choosing the members of the inquiry committee carefully and by limiting its field of study to personnel and events within India (Mansergh IV: 663). In particular, Amery told Wavell that the Famine Commission should avoid looking into 'strategical and other circumstances as may have contributed to internal transportation diffi culties or affected HMG's decisions in regard to shipping of imports' (ibid: 468, 725). In other words, the commission would not look into the question of railways ' almost all the trains were employed in the war effort, and few had been made available to take wheat from Punjab to Bengal. More important, the commission would ignore the entire issue of shipping. Only massive imports of rice or wheat from outside India would have broken the famine, and the implicit assumption the commission made was that ships were not available.

— Mukerjee, 2014

So the commission examined local factors in a lot of detail, and avoided every lead that led to London. Apart from the food shortage, it blamed corrupt rice brokers, the Bengal administration, and to a lesser extent the Government of India for the famine. It did not interview Wavell, who had been commander-inchief of the Indian Army while it implemented a scorched-earth policy in Bengal, and therefore did not learn that the orders had originally come from London.6 The commission did interview Pinnell, who had been sent to Bengal by Linlithgow to help implement the scorched-earth policy, but although he was probably aware of the order's provenance, he was not asked about it. Nor did the commission seek testimonies from anyone who had since left India ' such as Linlithgow himself, an expert in Indian agriculture who had presided over the start of the famine and who, in July 1943, had estimated a death toll of up to one and a half million (Moon 1973: 32-34).

— Mukerjee, 2014

Among Indian civilians as well, the perceived importance of a particular class or region for the war effort made for distinctions in entitlement. The so- called 'privileged classes' of Calcutta, who were important to the war effort, were protected by rations and therefore had greater entitlements than villagers. During a war cabinet meeting, Churchill opined that only those Indians who were directly contributing to the war effort needed to be fed, and the policy actually carried out was an extension of this principle (Moon 1973: 19). At least until Wavell took over as viceroy and organised famine relief on a substantial scale, British officials in India ranked the entitlement of Indians to survival in order of their importance to the war effort.12

— Mukerjee, 2014

12 Unlike Linlithgow, Wavell was profoundly concerned about famine and his threat of resignation induced London to release ample shipments of wheat in 1944.

— Mukerjee, 2014

The civil authorities were overwhelmed at times by the challenge of this new and highly complex task of food supply and control. The collector, unable to control the black market, had relinquished control of the food supply in Dacca city to a voluntary committee, which was run by the district judge in a private capacity. The acting governor, Sir Thomas Rutherford, sensed a degree of lethargy in the administration, and wrote to the viceroy, Lord Wavell, on November 4: I got a copy of the report sent by the officer sent out on special duty to see what were the arrangementast destinationf or taking overa nd distributingf ood supplies sent both from Calcutta and Punjab to the districts, which suggested extreme mismanagement at Dacca and this has been followed up by a report from Wakely that 80 wagonso f foodgrainsh ad arriveda nd no arrangementms ade for their unloading until he intervened.D accai s the headquarterosf Larkin,C ommissionera, nd I have sent him a message which, I hope, will stir him up to take charge himself if the District Magistratei s not competent.( Mansergha nd Lumbey 1973:451) Major General Stuart, later responsible for district-based distribution in Bengal, made a similar point in his evidence to the FIC (Nanavati 1944:1164). Because there was no constant supervision of either the unloading situation in the city or the condition of the subdivisions, it is not surprising that the district suffered so badly in the famine. 15

— Brennan, 1988

In 1943 Bengal suffered from a famine that resulted in perhaps 1.5 million deaths from hunger and the same number of deaths in the epidemics that hit a population weakened by hunger. The Commission of Inquiry that was appointed on the famine produced two remarkably detailed reports on the famine, the efforts that were made to control it, and the measures needed to prevent further famines (Famine Inquiry Commission -referred in future as FIC -1945a, 1945b). The reports have been the main source of information for subsequent studies. They were highly critical of the Bengal Government, the Government of India, the Viceroy, the Imperial Government and the grain traders. Indeed only Wavell, who took over as Viceroy in October 1943, escaped with his reputation untarnished.

— Bowbrick, 1986

An indication of the quality of the report is that it accepted and documented nearly all the criticisms of the authorities made in the highly critical, highly political books on the famine written by Hindu and Muslim nationalists (e.g. Dutt, 1944; T.C.Ghosh, 1944; K.C.Ghosh, 1944; Rajan, 1944), and it added a good number of criticisms of its own. The Viceroy was only too well aware of the political embarrassment that would be caused by exposing the inefficiency of the administration (Wavell in Moon (1973) pp 36-7), and it was widely believed that the Indian Government tried to limit the damage by printing only a few copies on inferior paper (Aykroyd, 1974). The English editor of the Calcutta Statesman, who had done most to bring the famine to the notice of officialdom in Calcutta, Delhi, London and Washington (defying censorship and

— Bowbrick, 1986

In November 1943 the new Viceroy, Wavell, increased exports to Bengal and sent in the army to improve the physical and organizational distribution of the grain. The September crop helped, but the famine did not end until an exceptionally good,

— Bowbrick, 1986

Indeed, the main effect of Wavell.s intervention with the army was that four times as much per week was distributed (See FIC, Aykroyd, Wavell (in Moon 1973), and Mansergh 1973 p361).

— Bowbrick, 1986

Secondly, Rajan (1944 p44) gives quotations which suggest that both right-wing British officials in the Government of India, and right-wing politicians in Britain were predisposed to accept any evidence that suggested that an elected Indian government, be it only a provincial government, with Indian administrators, was so corrupt and incompetent, and that the Indian businessmen were so greedy, that they could create a famine in the midst of plenty. As a result, they observed the constitutional niceties, and did not check the facts on the ground or overrule the Bengal Government. (Even when Wavell did intervene, he first had to persuade the local politicians to let him give them the extra resources). It is forty years too late to confirm these hypotheses, but experience elsewhere shows that they are only too likely to be true.

— Bowbrick, 1986

As late as l9th October 1943, when the famine was at its peak, Wavell noted in his journal

— Bowbrick, 1986

4. after the September 1943 crop (Sen', Wavell, Mansergh), and 5. after the December 1943 crop.

— Bowbrick, 1986

The situation was allowed to deteriorate in rural areas to such an extent that in November 1943 Archibald Wavell, the Viceroy of India, ordered that the army be deployed to counter the effects of famine in the Bengalcountryside.v'":" The scale of the crisis in rural Bengal was considered so great that a number of Indian voluntary agencies were allowed to undertake relief measures,

— Bhattacharya, 2002b

Along with other sources, the (Not until Wavell took office as viceroy least available " gure for the shortage the Nanavati Papers demonstrate that the in October 1943 was meaningful famine " gure Sen used. It did not publish other Famine Commissions best efforts were relief organised in Bengal.) estimates of the grain shortage, which directed not towards explaining the Another reason for not invoking the were considerably higher, and therefore famine, but towards obscuring the role famine code was the inability of the could claim that the administration had played by His Majestys government in Bengal administration to access enough no reason to anticipate famine.

— The_Bengal_Famine_of_1943

the aman crop was " ve million tonnes, them as being largely conjectural (Das What else did the commission blame compared to a normal (" ve-year average) 1949: 100). Braund concurred, telling the famine on' To understand that, one yield of 6.2 million tonnes a non-trivial the Famine Commission that crop esti- needs to look at Amerys further instruc- shortage of 20% but an unexplained re- mates in Bengal were based on guess- tion that the government keep the duction from the directors own estimate work (Nanavati IV: 992). political side of this business out of it as of 30% (Woodhead 1945: 213). The Famine Commission nonetheless far as possible by choosing the members Note, moreover, that the published based its calculations on these forecasts, of the inquiry committee carefully and " gures were projections, not actual with certain adjustments. By changing by limiting its " eld of study to personnel measurements of the harvest, and sub- the estimated area and yields of the " elds and events within India (Mansergh IV: ject to grave uncertainties, given the col- under cultivation, adding in imports and 663). In particular, Amery told Wavell lapse of the rural administration in Ben- minor harvests later in the year, as well as that the Famine Commission should avoid gal since 1941. For reasons that are not after making other corrections, the com- looking into strategical and other cir- entirely clear, thousands of village mission estimated that the food supply in cumstances as may have contributed chowkidars, who along with many other 1943 was 8.896 million tonnes, compared to internal transportation dif" culties or duties were entrusted with gathering to a normal supply of 9.62 million tonnes affected HMGs decisions in regard to harvest data in permanent settlement (Woodhead 1945: 215). This apparently shipping of imports (ibid: 468, 725). In areas such as Bengal, had not been paid small shortfall of 7,24,000 tonnes (7%) other words, the commission would not since 1941 and many of them died during translated into a per capita availability look into the question of railways almost the famine (Srimanjari 1998: 41). From of grain that was higher in 1943 than in all the trains were employed in the war February 1942 onwards, British of" cials 1941, and led Sen to claim that the food effort, and few had been made available in India became fearful of a possible shortage was in itself too small to cause to take wheat from Punjab to Bengal.

— The_Bengal_Famine_of_1943

yields. Tauger (2009) notes, however, culated the of" cial " gures to " nd that So the commission examined local that these administrative personnel had there was little carry-over of rice from factors in a lot of detail, and avoided no expert knowledge of agriculture and the previous year, resulting in a signi" - every lead that led to London. Apart from could easily have missed the subtle signs cantly greater shortage in 1943 than in the food shortage, it blamed corrupt rice of infestation by helminthosporium oryzae 1941 (Goswami 1990). Other documents brokers, the Bengal administration, and that agronomists believe devastated the yield other numbers. The Transfer of to a lesser extent the Government of ultimate crop. Power volumes indicate that early in 1943 India for the famine. It did not interview the Government of India estimated a rice Wavell, who had been commander-in- Suspect Numbers shortfall in Bengal of 1.4 million tonnes chief of the Indian Army while it imple- Contemporary observers concur that the for the populace alone, and two million mented a scorched-earth policy in Bengal, of" cial " gures on Bengals harvest were tonnes including defence and export and therefore did not learn that the highly suspect even in normal years. The requirements (Mansergh III: 333-34, 357, orders had originally come from London. 6

— The_Bengal_Famine_of_1943

the famine a camps commander asked a Moon, Penderel, ed. (1973): Wavell: The Viceroys made more readily available to researchers.

— The_Bengal_Famine_of_1943

carried out was an extension of this based on farmers own assessments. Srimanjari (1998): Denial, Dissent and Hunger: principle (Moon 1973: 19). At least until 10 Devereux (2001). In this formulation, FAD be- War-time Bengal, 1942-44 in Biswamoy Pati, comes one of several ways in which famine can Turbulent Times: India 1940-44, Peoples Pub- Wavell took over as viceroy and organ- occur. Tauger holds, however, that FAD is a lishing House, Mumbai.

— The_Bengal_Famine_of_1943

ised famine relief on a substantial scale, prerequisite for famine. Sen, Amartya (2000): Wars and Famines: On Divi- 11 Cherwell Papers: H307/1. sions and Incentives, Peace Economics, Peace British of" cials in India ranked the enti- 12 Unlike Linlithgow, Wavell was profoundly con- Science and Public Policy, Vol 6, No 2.

— The_Bengal_Famine_of_1943

that these crises are more accurately described as the Indian famine crises of World War II rather than narrowly as the Bengal famine. Natural disaster caused crop failures, food shortages, and famine in several regions. Governments at all levels worked to alleviate these famines, although some regional authorities were more successful than others. The circumstances of World War II made relief difficult: the Viceroys Lord Linlithgow and Viscount Wavell repeatedly appealed to London to allocate shipping to transport food supplies to India, but London focused on war in 1942-1943, had limited shipping capacity because of continual losses to German and Japanese submarines, and could not provide much aid until later. Finally, in response to this crisis, which was at root a problem of production and shortage more than of markets, the British began efforts to increase food production with the "Grow More Food" campaign that led to development policies in independent India and Pakistan.

— tauger09

Famine relief was blocked by the combined intransigence of Cherwell and Churchill, deaf to urgent pleas from the viceroy (fi rst Linlithgow, then Wavell), as well as from Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India. The story of how this happened interweaves Churchill's personal hatred towards Gandhi with scrutiny of every link in the command chain that implemented this policy with a view to suppressing the rebellion by Congress.

— review_Structural_Violence2

During the course of the famine leadership changed at both Government of India and provincial levels. Linlithgow was succeeded as Viceroy by Wavell in October 1943 and the previous month, due to illness, Herbert, Governor of Bengal, was replaced by Rutherford as Acting-Governor until the appointment of Casey who took over in January 1944. Bengal had an elected government led by the Progressive Party until March when its leader Huq resigned followed, after a month of direct government, by a Muslim League Ministry. The manner and timing of Huq's resignation increased tension between Linlithgow and Herbert. 1 Herbert considered that both parties were reluctant to take any firm stand which might jeopardise their insecure majorities, making it easier for him to direct policy. 2 The contrast between the Government of India's approach to the food crisis in Bengal under Linlithgow who expected that Bengal would cope alone and Wavell who made assistance to Bengal his first priority, suggest that the findings of the Famine Commission which broadly concluded that the famine could have been prevented had the Bengal Government acted strongly at the right time, 3 were biased to protect the Government of India.

— Response_and_responsibility

The terms of reference for the Famine Commission evolved from negotiations between Wavell and Amery, the Secretary of State for India, over a seven month period and were published in the Gazette of India in June 1944. They were carefully crafted and reflected Amery's concern to "... keep the political side of this business out of it ...'. 4 To avoid any highlighting of the troubled relations between the Central and Provincial Governments over their respective responsibilities, Amery favoured an examination of food administration and management that looked at all provincial government which had, for the most part, successfully handled 1

— Response_and_responsibility

N. Mansergh et. al. (eds.), The Transfer of Power, 1942-47, vol. IV, 'The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty, 15 June 1943 - 31 Aug. 1944' (London, 1973) (hereafter TOPI), Amery to Wavell, 22 Jan. 1944, Document [hereafter Doc.] 339.

— Response_and_responsibility

their lesser food problems, suggesting mismanagement in Bengal. 5 Wavell's priority was to produce an interim report on Bengal before a larger all-India enquiry. 6 The advance Report on Bengal was published in 1945.

— Response_and_responsibility

The Government of India view of the importance of maintaining supply was unmistakable and Herbert, already at odds with Linlithgow over Huq's resignation in March, felt he had no choice. Nanavati, the member of the Famine Commission who retained his copy of the collected evidence said that '... consciously or unconsciously, the Bengal Government allowed the need of the rural areas to be outweighed by those of Calcutta ...'. 72 Pinnell in his evidence said that if Calcutta was not adequately supplied, war production would break down and for this reason stocks were accumulated in the city. 'It meant... death of a large number of people in the rural area or ... chaos in the city. There was danger either way . The first choice was taken.' 73 The Central Government's determination not to use the India Act or Defence of India Rules to remove Bengal's responsibility for feeding Calcutta implicates it again with the causes of the famine. In contrast to Linlithgow's approach, Wavell, who became Viceroy in October, made famine relief his first priority and acted immediately to secure Calcutta's supply from outside Bengal.

— Response_and_responsibility

war effort. In a letter to the incoming Viceroy, Lord Wavell, Amery

— ograda_2009_shorthist

supply more grain in early 1944, Wavell warned that the famine was one of

— ograda_2009_shorthist

all centers, for an hour at noon. When a new viceroy, Lord Wavell, arrived in Bengal in

— ograda_2009_shorthist

Moon, Penderl. 1973. Wavell: Viceroys Journal. Oxford: OUP.

— ograda_2009_shorthist

Mahalanobis, Recent experiments; Bowbrick, Causes of famines; Tauger, Entitlement, pp. 603; Islam, Great Bengal Famine. Mahalanobis (Recent experiments, p. 333) cryptically noted: Although by [1942], owing to Japans entry into the war, the food situation in Bengal had already become dif"cult, I failed completely to persuade the government to extend the sample survey to cover the paddy crop in Bengal.The Bengal famine occurred in 1943. Early in 1944, Lord Wavell warned in private against attempts at proving on the basis of admittedly defective statistics that no help was needed, and that experience on the ground gave the lie to a rigid statistical approach (Moon, Wavell, p. 55, entry for 9 Feb. 1944). Others, both at the time and later, acknowl- edged the supply problem. Pinnell (With the sanction of government, pp. 94, 97), a key "gure, noted the failure of the aman crop and reports of widespread disease in the incoming crop, although one was inclined to suspect that the reports might be exaggerated by speculators, and Binjay Ranjan Sen, the of"cial responsible for emergency relief in Bengal at the time and later head of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, would refer in his memoir to the total failure of a ripening rice crop and the aman crop failure (Sen, Towards a newer world, pp. 47, 49). See also Greenough, Prosperity and misery, p. 160.

— ograda_2008_ripple

famine in Greece has been, I imagine, even worse than in Bengal and one of the most urgent needs of the immediate future will be the shipping of food into Greece to help the insurgents, of whom something like 50,000 are under arms today and playing a really important role in the whole war effort. 118 In a letter to the incomingViceroy, LordWavell, Amery recognized the natural and widespread feeling here that somehow or other the ultimate responsibility rests with us and that this country could or should have done more. But he continued:

— ograda_2008_ripple

convincing thateverything has been done within India to extract hoarded supplies and get them to the starving districts. 120 So furious was Wavell, a conscientious

— ograda_2008_ripple

influence of the Commander-in-Chief for South and Southeast Asia, Field Marshall Archibald Wavell, who agreed that the situation was grave. Military rations, Wavell informed the War Cabinet, were already being cut for both men and draught animals. 44

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Leathers was unmoved by Amery's urgent appeal: the necessary shipping space simply could not be arranged. With Field Marshall Wavell as the incoming Viceroy, however, efforts were made to enlist high ranking military officers to back the demand for imports.

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

The Statesman, "Lord Wavell Sees Plight of Destitutes in Calcutta," October 27, 1943 166

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Wavell found him to be "second rate, at best" and told the Secretary of State, "I do not think he is really trying very hard in Bengal .. and the impression he left on me was very poor."196

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Linlithgow himself, in his discussions with Wavell before turning over authority, had predicted that as many as one and a half million were likely to die of famine in Bengal before the end of 1943, which, he admitted, "would be getting off better than [I] had thought was possible." 199

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

In the end, there is no question that Wavell's prompt and comprehensive engagement saved an inestimable n umber of lives, but the situation in Bengal had been allowed to deteriorate to such a degree that the relief initiated in November of 1943, for many, was far too little and far too late. And the cards were still stacked against Wavell's own initiative.

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

was fast ripening and it looked to be a healthy and abundant harvest. Amery reported to Wavell that his efforts had made an excellent impression in England. 208 To the Viceroy's

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

The Statesman, "Lord Wavell's Assurance," December 21, 1943 7

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

What Bengal needed, Wavell thought, was "inspiring leadership" with a broad mandate. The only way to realize this necessity, the Viceroy concluded, was - once again - to enact Section 93, in order to abolish the provincial government and grant the Governor, under direct authority of the Viceroy himself, emergency rule in Bengal. The procedure of superceding provincial autonomy and enforcing autocratic white-rule in

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Governor, Thomas Rutherford, however, questioned the constitutionality of the scheme, unwilling as he was to take on such responsibility. Wavell disappointed in the Acting Governor's refusal, wished for a permanent Governor "who [did] not worry too much about constitutional form and [was] determined to get things done." 70 He also wished

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Section 93 may not even have even been necessary. But the Ministry was now too entrenched, and so Wavell continued to call for a "vigorous Section 93" in Bengal, despite the Governor's reservations.72

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Sir Thomas Rutherford had reluctantly agreed to serve as Acting Governor until a permanent replacement could be found, but himself had made anything but a firm stand. After his first meeting with the Acting Governor, Wavell confided to Amery that he found Sir Thomas "second-class" and without "fire in his belly." 74 Major -General

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Mayne also expressed his "gravest doubts" to Wavell about Rutherford's competence.

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Rutherford, Wavell wrote, "expressed surprise at Mayne's anxiety about the general situation, and said he thought much too much was being made of [the famine.] He then retired to Darjeeling for rest."75

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

(I) (a) and 126A might be deployed and extra I.C.S. men lent to the province, but Section 93 was out of the question. The problem of food in Bengal, the War Cabinet concluded, would remain a provincial matter. Wavell was severely disappointed with the decision,

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Amery sought to hearten Wavell, noting that at least a "man of Casey's experience and personality had been appointed [Governor.]" 89

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Churchill seemed softened by the Viceroy's threat of resignation. He wrote to Wavell and assured him that he would give him all the help he could, but India should "not ask the impossible."118

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Leathers added, was, likewise, pointless, as they had no shipping of their own. Churchill, in a separate telegram to Wavell, expressed his regrets and wished the Viceroy "every good wish amid [his] anxieties." 124

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Once again, the hand of Churchill's confident and chief council, Lord Cherwell, was deplored. "I see from your letter," Wavell added, "that that old menace and fraud the Professor was called in to advise against me. The fact is that the P.M. has calculated his war plans without any consideration at all of India's needs."126 The

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Viceroy sent telegrams to Auchinleck and Mountbatten with the request that they might arrange, on their own, for the replacement of military cargo with food grain imports for India. In the meantime, Wavell pressed on, admitting to Amery that he understood himself to be something of a "nuisance" to His Majesty's Government, but reiterating that

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Actual procurement in Bengal, he noted, was less than 15% of that which had been targeted, and the resumption of exports under such conditions would only lead to further panic. Moreover, he reminded Amery, "it is quite impossible for us to export rice at all: we have in fact publicly pledged not to do so."130 "It is clear," Wavell concluded, "that

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

State, Wavell drove the point home still further. "It is not a matter of sentiment," he wrote, "on the one hand, it is impossible to ignore the needs of starving people, and on the other hand, an acute shortage of food at once reduces the efficiency of the factories and the civilian services of all kinds, on which a Military Commander must rely." 135

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Wavell's protestations had little effect. With 200,000 tons promised, the issue languished for several weeks.

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

When Wavell received a draft of the telegram he responded wryly to the Secretary of State, "I see that the Prime Minster speaks of having made 350,00 tons of wheat available which apparently means a promise to us of another 150,000 tons over what has already been promised." 142

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Receiving the news of Roosevelt's refusal, Wavell was despondent. "There has been dangerous, and as I think, deliberate procrastination," 148 he complained to Amery, "I

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

well founded. Despite the Governor's appeals, backed by Wavell's increasingly harsh warnings, the Secretary of State reported back to India that , as regards the possibility of getting imports from Southeast Asia, "the Americans have been making themselves very difficult in opposition to India's claims."210 What might be made available to Bengal, Pethwick-Lawrence warned was "certain to be immensely short of total requirement." 211

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Wavell found the suggestion that rations in India should be reduced to 12 oz. per day deplorable. He pointed out that a 12 oz. ration amounted to only 1200 calories, "which any health expert [would] admit is a hopelessly inadequate diet." 256

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

did little to curtail the enthusiasm with which each party now claimed broad and sweeping representation. The election results also served to reify the rivalry between the League and Congress, centralizing the over- determining issue of contention between them, namely: Pakistan. A high level Cabinet Mission was organized by Wavell in conjunction with the India Office in London to bring the parties to the table in order to hammer out a final resolution that would determine the terms of a transfer of power. The "Cabinet Mission" commenced its work in March of 1946, and by May 16th had come up with a plan that one tentative agreement from both parties.

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Promises of imports from the U.S. had proved hollow, and London had little more to suggest than that India might be able to work a deal for 60 large tractors which were for sale at the American Air Depot at Agra. 265 Meanwhile, Wavell complained, the Muslim League and Congress were content to "pay lip service to the idea that the food crisis

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

Wavell discussed the possibility of cutting rations still further with his Executive Council, but it was concluded that any further cut might "create very serious labor trouble and by affecting confidence would probably doom the prospects of procurement so as to leave us even worse off than before." 271 Towards the end of June there were

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

On August 19th, Wavell wrote to Pethwick-Lawrence, "the present estimate is that appreciably more Muslims than Hindus were killed." (T.O.P. Vol. VIII, p. 274.) Vallabhbhai Patel, in a letter to Stanford Cripps in October also suggested that "in Calcutta the Hindus had the best of it. (T.O.P. Vol. VIII, p. 750.)

— Mukherjee_hungry_2015

an extent that in November 1943 Archibald Wavell, the Viceroy

— medicine-and-history

Wavell, Viceroy, Governmentofindia, 2 October 1943, Rl3/2/49, FileNo.2, CoIl. IX,

— medicine-and-history

In November His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, brought in the Army f,o ,the . rescue of the proyince and in December a bumper crop was harvest.ed.

— IARIHDD8-001362

By August 1"943, it was clear that the Provincial Administration in Bengal was failing to, control the famine. Deaths and mass migration on a large scalt} were occurring. In such circumstances, the Government of India, whatever the constitutional position, must share with the Provincial Government the responsibility for saving lives. The Government of India sent large supplies of wheat and rice to Bengal during the last five months of 1943, but it was not till the end of October, when His Excellency the 'Viceroy, Lord Wavell, visited Bengal, as his :first duty on taking office, that adequate arrangements were made to ensure that these supplies were properly distributed. After his visit, the whole situation took an immediate turn for the better.

— IARIHDD8-001362

"In Murshidabad the average outturn in ordinary good years of an acre of rice land is 15 maunds husked grain. The Collector~ Mr. Wavell, says that in good years some rice lands yield 60 maunds of dhan or 37 maunds of husked rice." (Page 262.)

— GIPE-011930

outgoing and incoming Viceroys, Linlithgow and Wavell, and the records

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

Linlithgow and Wavell in turn stressed the urgency of their demands to

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

the Cabinet. To Wavell the Cabinet, making its global calculations of

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

filling in the background to the official record with evidence of Wavell's

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

Wavell felt his curbing hand at every step, whether it was the instructions

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

of the reply to Gandhi's request to see Wavell after he had been released

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

from gaol on medical grounds. Wavell embarked on his Viceroyalty with

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

Churchillian rebuffs, Wavell was convinced that he should not try to sit

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

be made of Wavell's role in the transfer of power.

— English Historical Review-1975-Brown-694-5

\ MW FAMlNE l.\' BENGAL 4. In 1943 the mortality rate in certain districts in which starvation was most acute and widespread was higher than in the rest of Bengal, but nearly all parts of the province were affected in greater or lesser degree. While there were variations in the extent of local scarcity, the phenomenal rise in the price of rice which placed it beyond the means of the poor occurred everywhere In Bengal and the.poor were nowhere immune from starvation. "During the 'rst half of 1944 there was little difference between various parts of Bengal in respect of disease and mortality. Disease associated with the famine became prevalent throughout the province. The famine therefore affected the whole of Bengal and was not con'ned to certain districts. b 5. Only one section of classes in the rural areas. Calcutta and elsewhere did the community suffered from starvation':heepoorer Well~to~do people, and industrial workers in Greater > not go short of food in 1943. We have estimated wow report that perhaps one-tenth of the population-T million people'were seriously affected by the famine. As the price of rice rose during t e rst a of 1943, the poor in the villages without sut'cient stocks of grain in their . possession found themselves unable to buy food. After an interval during which they attempted to live on their scanty reserves of food, or to obtain Others wandered away from their villages in search of food, and the mass migration of starving and sick destitute people was one of the most distressing features of the faminev Thousands 'ocked into towns and cities; the number in Calcutta in October 1943 was estimated to be at least 100,000. The migra' tion of disorganized masses often occurred in the great famines of bygone ages, but during more recent famines it has been prevented or greatly limited. Its appearance during a famine shows that the famine is out of control. 6.' The wandering famine victims readily fell a prey to disease and spread disease in theirwanderings. Families were broken up and moral sense lost. In their distress they often sank to sub-human levels and became helpless and hopeless automate. guided only by an instinctive craving for food. We shall refer in our report to the problems to which the large scale migration of destitutes gave rise.1 Here we are simply outlining the general features of the famine and it is suf'cient to say that, by degrees, after the height of the famine was passed, the destitutes throughout the province returned to their villages and homes. By the end of November 1943 Calcutta was more or less free from tarnished wanderers. A residue of homeless and indigent famine victims remained to be cared for in relief institutions in Calcutta and the districts. point of the famine was reached in the closing months of 1943. Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, brought in the Army to province and in December a bumper amp was harvested. During 1944 recovery took place slowly. But so serious a famine must neces- sarily have its after-effects on the .life of the community. Even when food became available much remained, and still remains, to be done to heal the wounds which it in'icted on Bengal. 8. Such. brie'y and harelv described. upon to investigate. We shall 'll in the details of the picture in our report ' and give our viewa as to the causes of the famine. It is as regards the latter that our responsibilities differ from those of previou ' ' India, which had the to drought with consequent failure of crops over wid forward measures necessary to relieve such famines. 7v The turning In November His is the tragedy which we are called e areas, and the straight- The causes of the Bengal 1 The word " destitute " was victims. However obiectionable as :avoided in this report. zenarallv us E ed in Bengal as a, noun to describe famine nglish. the word is convenient and' its use has not been

— comm1

106 FAMINE 1x arson. a fraction of normal requirements. If adequate supplies had been available in these months, the pressure on the Calcutta rice market, in so far as it arose out of the shortage of wheat, would have been reduced. Again, if the Basic Plan 'in regard to rice had come into operation in the beginning of 1948, it would have been possible to provide Bengal at an earlier date with supplies of rice in approximately those quantities which were obtained later in the year- from other provinces and states. The Government of India must share with the Bengal Government respon- sibility for the decision to de-control in March 1943. That decision was taken in agreement with the Government of India and was in accordance with their policy at the time. By March the position had so deteriorated that some mea- sure of external assistance was.indispensable if a disaster was to be avoided. The correct course at the time was for the Government of India to have announced that they would provide, month by month, 'rst, the full quantity of wheat required by Greater Calcutta, and secondly, a certain quantity of rice. It would, then have been possible for the Government of Bengal to have main- tained controlled procurement, and secured control over supply and distribution in Greater Calcutta. The Government of India erred in deciding to introduce 'unrestricted free trade" in the Eastern Region in 1943 in preference to 'modi'ed free trade'. The subsequent proposal of the Government of India to introduce free trade throughout the greater part of India was quite unjusti'ed and should not have been put forward. Its application, successfully resisted by many of the provinces and states, particularly by the Governments of Bombay and Madras, might have led to serious catastrophe in various parts of India. By August 1943, it was clear that the Provincial Administration in Bengal was failing to control the famine. Deaths and mass migration on a large scale were occurring. In such circumstances, the Government of India, whatever the constitutional position, must share with the Provincial Government the responsibility for saving lives. The Government of India sent large supplies of wheat and rice to Bengal during the last 've months of 1943, but it was not till the end of October, when His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Wavell. visited Bengal, as his 'rst duty on taking office. that adequate arrangements were made to ensure that these supplies were properly distributed. After his visit. the whole situation took an immediate turn for the better. We feel it necessary to draw attention to the numerous changes in the individuals in charge of food administration of the Government of India during the crucial year of the famine. Mr. N. R. Sarker, the Food Member, resigned in February 1943, and His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, held the food portfolio without a Member to assist him until May. The Secretary of the Food Department, Mr. Holdsworth, fell ill during this period and died. His place was taken by the Additional Secretary, Major-General Wood, a Military Of'cer new to the problems of civil administration. Sir Azizul Haque became Member in charge of the Food Department in May. . He was succeeded by Sir J. P. Srivastava in August and a new Secretary of the Department, Mr. Hutchings, was appointed in September. In Bengal, the new Ministry took of'ce towards the end of April and Sir Thomas Rutherford became Governor in September 1943, replacing the late Sir John Herbert, then suffering from the illness of which he subsequently died. Thus, during the various critical stages in the famine, heavy responsibility fell on individuals who were new to their posts. 5. The people and the faminm'Wa have criticized the Government of Bengal for their failure to control the famine. It is the responsibility of the Government to lead the people and take effective steps to prevent avoidable catastrophe. But the public in Bengal, or at least certain sections of it, have

— comm-92ff

" Wavell (Viceroy), Leo Amery (Secretary of State for India) were critical of the Churchill government's failure to send enough relief.

— churchill_and_india

emergency measure to tackle the famine, was severely criticised.! Lord Wavell, who

— Camb. J. Econ.-1977-Sen-33-59

— Wavell quoting Linlithgow, in Wavell (1973), p. 34., Camb. J. Econ.-1977-Sen-33-59

There was panic purchasing and hoarding among those consumers with the resources to meet the costs: there was a reluctance to sell by those producers who could afford not to part with all their crop. As the Famine Inquiry Commission (1945: 107) put it: "a large part of the community lived in plenty while others starved ... corruption was widespread throughout the province and in many classes of society." To a large extent the causation of the 1943 famine in Bengal lay at the provincial level, but there were also factors evident at the national level because the Government of India moved only slowly to assist Bengal with alternative grains and transport and logistical facilities. The rapid impact of army support on food supplies after Lord Wavell had ordered it to assist the provincial government in October 1943, pointed up what could have been done some two months before when wheat finally became available from the Punjab only to be held up in the Calcutta goods yards.

— Brennan1984