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Miscellaneous

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  • Peer, Basharat (2010), Curfewed Night: One Kashmiri Journalist's Frontline Account of Life, Love and War in his Homeland, Simon and Schuster, ISBN 978-1439123522
  • p. 61 for saffron headband karsevaks
  • Sokefeld, Martin (2012), "Secularism and the Kashmir Dispute", in Nils Ole Bubandt; Martijn Van Beek (eds.), Varieties of Secularism in Asia: Anthropological Explorations of Religion, Politics and the Spiritual Anthropology of Asia, Routledge, pp. 101–120, ISBN 978-1136668647

Kashmiri language

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  • p.283: There has been a considerable debate over the classification of Dardic languages in terms of whether they are a third branch of Indo-Iranian language family or are of pure Indo-Aryan origin. Dardic languages have preserved many archaic Indo-Iranian features otherwise lost in the modern Indo-Aryan languages. A defining feature of Dardic language is that they have undergone only some of the MIA phonological and morphological changes. They have also developed certain areal features neither found in other Indo-Aryan (IA) nor in Iranian languages.
  • p.283: Dardic languges have descended from the northwestern group of the MIA languages. Non-Dardic members of the same group include Punjabi, Sindhi and Lahnda.
  • p.582: Kashmiri has been classified along iwth a number of languages grouped under the title `Dardic.' Dardic languages are spoken in the extreme north of India and northwestern pakistan, extending into Afghanistan. There has been considerable debate... Nevertheless, the term `Dardic' constitutes a geographical convention rather than a linguistic expression. Like other Dardic languages, Kashmiri has similarities with both Indo-Aryan as well as Iranian. After continuing debates over a long period of time, many linguists have agreed upon an Indo-Aryan origin for Kashmiri. The term `Dardic,' however has gained much popularity, and is still used in view of the regional peculiarities shared by Kashmiri and other languages of the group.
  • p.582: Kashmiri belongs to the North-Western group of the Middle Indi-Aryan (MIA) languages/dialects which includes several Dardic languages.
  • p.898: There is a general consensus amongst historical linguists that Kashmiri belongs to the Dardic branch of the Indo-Aryan family. Grierson (1919), Morgenstierne (1961) and Fussman (1972) classify Kashmiri under the Dardic group of Indo-Aryan languages. The term Dardic is stated to be only a geographical convention and not a linguistic expression.
  • p.898: Kashmiri is closely related to Shina and some other langugaes of the Northwest frontier. It also shares some morphological features such as pronomial suffixes with Sindhi and Lahnda. However, Kashmiri is different from all other IA languages in certain phonological, morphological and syntactic features....
  • Koul, Omkar N. (2008), "Dardic Languages", in Vennelakanti Prakāśam (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Linguistic Sciences: Issues and Theories, Allied Publishers, pp. 142–147, ISBN 978-81-8424-279-9
  • p.142: Morgenstierne (1961) presents a reclassification of these languages. He distinguishes between the Dardic and the Kafir groups. Accordong to him, "Dardic languages contain absolutely no features which cannot be derived frm old IA. They have simply retained a number of striking archasisms, which had already disappeared in most Prakrit dialects... There is not a single common feature distinguishing Dardic, as a whole, from the rest of the IA languages, and the Dardic area itslef is intersected by a a network of isoglosses, often of historical interest as indicating ancient lines of communication as well as barriers. Dardic is simply a convenient term to denote a bundle of aberrant IA hill-languages which, in their relative isolation, accented in many cases by the invasion of Pathan tribes, have been in varying degrees sheltered against the expand influence of IA Midland (Madhyadesha) innovations, being left free to develop on their own." (1961:138).
  • p.143: According to Morgenstierne, the situation of the Kafir group is comletely diffrerent: "Although very heavily overlaid by IA (Dardic) words and forms, these dialects have retained se3veral decidedly un-Indian features." (1961:139)
  • p.143: Morgenstierne's classifcations of the Dardic group of languages is presented here in an abbreviated form:
  • I. The Kafir group of languages
  • II. Kalasha, Khowar (Dardic)
  • III: Dameli, Gawar-Bati (Dardic)
  • IV: Pashai
  • V: Basharik, Torwali, Maiya, Wotapuri and Katarkalai, Tirahi
  • VI: Shina, Phatura, Dumaki
  • VII: Kashmiri, with Kashtawari as a true dialect and other dialects strongly influenced by Dogri.
  • p.143: Fussman (1972:11) reiterates the fact that Dardic is a geographic, not a linguistic expression. "Taken, literally, it allows one to believe that all the languages spoken in Dardistan are Dardic. Now the Burushaski of Hunza, having no more than a few IA words borrowed from Shina, is not a Dardic language. Inversely, strictly speaking, the name "Dardic language: ought not to be applied to Kashmiri." (1972:11)
  • p.143: The languages designated by this label do not necessarily form a genetically homogeneous group.
  • p.146: Shina. Various scholars have distinguished six or more dialects of Shina. Bailey (1924) divides it into three main dialects — Gilgiti, Astori and Kohistani.... Grierson (1906) has mentioned seven dialects: Gilgiti, Astori, Chilasi, Gurezi, Brokpa and a "Nort-Western dialect without a name."
  • p.146: Out of all the dialects, Gilgiti is the prominent one with a standardizing influence.
  • p.461: Even less should Grierson's tentative classification be taken as the last word on the "Dardic" question. These languges of the difficult mountain country between Kashmir and Afghanistan were very imperfectly known in Grierson' stime, and much has been learned about them since.
  • p.461: Grierson's view (now definitely obsolete, and incorrect also in its details, but unfortunately often still given in works of reference) was that the group as a whole was something else, namely an independent branch of Indo-Iranian (if anything, slightly inclined toward Iranian).
  • Schwartzberg, Joseph E. (1997), "Who are the Kashmiri people? Self-identification as a vehicle for self-determination", Environment and Planning A, 29 (12): 2237–2256, doi:10.1068/a292237, S2CID 144920554 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • Kashmiri, Ethnologue—Languages of the World.
  • Population 5,360,000 in India (2001 census).
  • Total users in all countries: 5,484,830
  • Kashmiri is limited to a very small pocket at the border between Indian an Pakistani-administered regions. Probably in a borough of Poonch.
  • Kashmiri: Azad Kashmir Province, south of Shina. 124,000 in Pakistan (2004 J. Leclerc). Status: 5 (Dispersed)
  • Purik, Ethnologue—Languages of the World.

very interesting book, covers Kashmir in a fundamental way.

  • Madan, T. N. (1998), "Coping with ethnicity in South Asia: Bangladesh, Punjab and Kashmir compared", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21 (5): 969–989, doi:10.1080/014198798329757 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)

Kashmir history

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  • p.219: Baltistan spreads upwards from the Indus river and is separated from Ladakh by the Siachen glacier. The river makes a great lake around the city of Skardu, the headquarters of Baltistan district. Three ruling families were important: the Makpons of Skardu, the Amachas of Shigar and the Yabghus of Khaplu.
  • p.317: Kashmir, Punjab and Sind under the Mughals and their successors
  • p.235: Covers Gilgit-Baltastan
  • p.628: The first was the arrival of Shah Mir in 1313. He was a Muslim condottiere from the border of Panchagahvara, an area situation to the south of the Divasar pargana in the valley of the [Swat?].[88]
  • p.628: [88] Jonaraja traces the descent of Shah Mir from one Partha who is compared with the Mahabharata hero Arjuna. His son was...
  • p.629: The second was the Mongol invasion of Kashmir under Dulacha,[89] who cam ewith an army of 60,000 horses. Suhadeva was too weak to face the ruthless invader and tried to buy him off. In order to raise money he imposed a special tax on all his subjects. This was bitterly resented by the brahmans and in protest they started fasts unto death.
  • p.629: [92] This is the same as Nilashva of Kalhana's Raj, VII, 1631 and can be identified with the modern village of Nilab in Lar pargana.
  • p.630: ... in Divasar pargana. He took 50,000 prisoners who were subjects to most inhuman torture. But most of the invading army along with the unfortunate prisoners perished in a snow storm. Dulacha had by his atrocities reduced Kashmir to a wretched and pitiable state which is thus described by Jonaraja: "The land of Kashmir became sparse in population, uncultivated, denuded of all foodstuff, full of weeds, it looked as in primeval age".[95]
  • p.633: a man of the name of[1] Shah Mir, who described his ancestry as follows: Shah Mir, sone of Tahir Al, son of[2] Karshashab, sone of Nekruz, and referred the end (or rather the beginning) of ancestry to Arjun...
  • p.633: I cannot find anything distinct about his being a descendant of Arjuna, but one of his ancestors is called (1,132) Partha who was like another Partha (a name of Arjuna).
  • p.33: AD 907 (61.) Partha, up to Paush. kr. 1 of 97, reigned for 19 years, 9 mas, 23 days, less by 4 ys, 0ms, 10 days.
  • p.36: ... Gonanda II while yet an infant. The Mahabharat was occurred soon after; but as the king of Kashmir was yet an infant, his alliance was sought for neither by the Kurus nor by the Pandus.
  • p.39: The pond in which the temple of Pandrethan was erected has now been drained an dth eplinth excavated. The doomed roof is a fine piece of sculpture. The temple is about 18 feet square with projecting porticos. It was erected in 921 AC by King Partha whom we shall...
  • p.66: Partha (906-921 AC) ... or Anantnag.
  • p.130... Shah Mir who naturally raised the standard of revolt. Kota ruled the country for about five months.
  • p.130: The revolt of Shah Mir needs a little explanation. It is evident from the foregoing account that Udayandeva was not capable of maintaining himself on his tottering throne without the strong and active support of Shah Mir who had...
  • p.61: ... of the dowager queen provoked universal hatred and hostility. The Tantrins revolted and overpowered her. They offered the crown to Partha (960-21) who was a member of the royal family. The decision would not satisfy her.
  • p.62: Ummattavanti (937-39), son of Partha, on the throne. The new king proved to be the worst of the lot. This parricide got his father murdered, starved to death his half-brothers, and then took fiendish delight in killing men and women.
  • p.22: Srikanth Koul's scholarly discourse when summarised runs thus: According to Jonaraja, Shah Mir's ancestors were Partha, his son Babhruvahana, his scion Kurusaha, his son Taharala, his son Shahmira.
  • p.6: According to one version, he descended from the Pandavas of the Mahabharata fame.[58] This theory seems to have originated in two ways. First, it is due to the wrong understanding of Jonaraja's chronicle which describes the remote ancestor of Shah Mir as "like the second Arjuna."[59] Secondly, the Kuther Sarada inscription attributes the ancestry of Sultan Shihab-ud-din, a lineal descendant of Shah Mir, to the Pandavas.[60] One can hardly expect records to trace his lineage to the heroes of doubtful historical authenticity. This inscription merely embodied a flattering attempt to give Shihab-ud-din an exalted pedigree commensurate...

Colonial history

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  • Purchased, Kindle, 2016-05-29, 5.99
  • Ahmad, Zahiruddin. "The ancient frontier of Ladakh." The World Today 16.7 (1960): 313-318.
  • Huttenback, Robert A. (1968), "Kashmir as an Imperial Factor during the Reign of Gulab Singh (1846—1857)", Journal of Asian History, 2 (2): 77–108, JSTOR 41929891
  • p.32: The British Commissioner did not find the conditions in the State worse than those prevailing in any other princely State of India or in any of the British Indian provinces....[60: Teng, Kaul & Kaul, Kashmir Constitutional History and Documents, p.86]

districts

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  • pp.210- for the Doda district
  • The new districts announced are Ganderbal (to be carved out of Srinagar), Bandipore (to be carved out of Baramulla), Kulgam (from Anantnag) and the Shopian hill district (from Pulwama).
  • In the Jammu region, the new districts that would come into being are Samba, Kishtwar, Reasi and the hill district of Ramban.

Walter Lawrence

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Robert Thorp

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  • Thorp, Robert (1973), "Kashmir Misgovernment" (PDF), in S. N. Gadru (ed.), Kashmir Papers: British Intervention in Kashmir, Srinagar: Freethougth Literature Company, pp. 47–96

National Conference

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  • The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference for some years observed June 11, with all gusto and enthusiasm. It was on this day that the party was born day in 1939 when the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference after a resolution was presented by Maulvi Muhammad Syed Masoodi at a party convention. Notwithstanding the resolution getting majority support it was vehemently opposed by chaudarhy Hamidullah Khan, Malvi Rafi-U-Din, Ghulam Haider Gori and Abdul Sattar Gujree in the convention. The Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference besides other dates similarly observed 9 July as an important day in its history. It was on this day in 1947 that the party adopted a resolution on the lawns of the Muslim Park, Jamia Masjid, and Srinagar calling for accession of the state with Pakistan.
  • The Praja Sabha which [was] earlier declared as recommendatory body was consisted upon 75 members- 12 government officials, 16 state councilors, and 14 nominated and 33 elected members. The last were named categorically including with 21 Muslims, 10 Hindus and 2 Sikhs.
  • The Muslim Conference won 14 seats out of 21 reserved for the Muslim In the first elections to the Praja Sabha, in 1934 covering 3 to 6 per cent of the population.
  • In the next election of 1936, it was able to raise its strength to 19. This established the claim of the Conference to be called the major political party in the State.
  • In June, 1939, however Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah dissociated himself from the Muslim Conference and established a new party, the National Conference, which succeeded in securing a large following. It demanded that the Praja Sabha be given more powers, and that it be composed entirely of members elected by adult pollution based on a joint electorate, with some seats reserved for the minorities.
  • Respecting popular demand, the number of elected seats of the Praja Sabha was increased from 33 to 40 in 1939. Its powers were also enhanced and non-official members were more closely associated with the state administration to work as undersecretaries. Praja Sabha was empowered to make laws for the state subjects, pass all legislation pertaining to the taxes as distinguished from fees and penalties, and to vote on the demands made by the government for budgetary allocations with the exceptions of a few non-voted bills.
  • A noteworthy step towards the establishment of a popular government was, however, taken in 1944. On October 2, that year, Maharaja Hari Singh sent the following message to the Praja Sabha: "I have after careful consideration decided to call upon the Praia Sabha to nominate a panel of six (three to be Muslims) of its members, three from Jammu and three from Kashmir (including the Frontier District). The Assembly will determine its own procedure for nominating the panel, official members taken no part in the proceedings. Out of the panel so nominated I shall appoint two (one of whom will be a Muslim) as my Ministers. These Ministers will hold charge of portfolios to be determined by me. They will draw the usual salary of Ministers unless the Praja Sabha desires to vary it, in which case the Sabha may submit its recommendations to me through the usual channels. The Ministers so appointed by me, while if they still continue to be members of the Sabha, they will be eligible for re-appointment".
  • This message was welcomed with great enthusiasms by all of political groups in the Assembly and led to the appointment of Mirza Afzel Beg from National Conference and Ganga Ram, a Dogra politician as the Ministers. Changes were introduced in the constitution of the municipal committees as well by establishing same criteria of the voter eligibility as set it for the Praja Sabha elections.

Sheikh Abdullah

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  • Abdullah, Sheikh; Taing, M. Y. (1985), Atish-e-Chinar (in Urdu), Srinagar: Shaukat Publications{{citation}}: CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link)
  • Often referred to as his autobiography. It has not been copyrighted in deference to Sheikh Abdullah's wishes.
  • An opinionated piece, apparently a study of Aatish-e-Chinar.

Budh Singh

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  • Says that Sardar Budh Singh was the president of NC when the flag was adopted.

Kashmir conflict: Timelines

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Kashmir conflict: Poonch uprising

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Kashmir conflict: Geography

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  • Covers Mendhar river and valley a little.

Kashmir conflict: pre-Independence

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Kashmir conflict: accession

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  • Udayanan, B. (2005), "Appendices" (PDF), Bilateral relations as a factor hampering regional cooperation in South Asia, Mahatma Gandhi University/Shodhganga
  • Contains the text of the Standstill agreement telegrams.
  • p.66: The Viceroy even suggested that the Maharaja should sign 'standstill' agreement with both India and Pakistan before arriving at any concrete conclusion on the future of Jammu and Kashmir.
  • p.67: On 12 August 1947, Hari singh made a 'standstill' agreement with Pakistan, which provided for trade, travel and communication between the state and Pakistan. India did not sign any such agreement due to its desire to carefully analyse future events of the state before finalising any policy on the issue.
  • p.328: contains the text of telegrams sent to India and Pakistan for standstill agreement.
  • At the time of this invasion, the ruler of Kashmir, Mahajara Hari Singh, had not declared whether Kashmir would join Pakistan or India as part of the partition of Brisith India. Pakistan anticipated that the majority Muslim population of Kashmir would embrace annexation to Pakistan and not follow the wishes of Kashmir's Hindu ruler. The Pakistani-sponsored attack led the Maharaja to sign the instrument of accession with India, providint the basis on which the Indian Army entered Kashmir to fight the invading forces. The Muslim population of Kashmir did not rebel against the Indian Aramy's involvement, providing evidence for the first of many Pakistani miscalculations over Kashmir.
  • p.207: Unlike Hyderabad and Junagadh, the Princely State of Kashmir had territorial links with both India and Pakistan. A multi-ethnic state, with an overwhelming majority of Muslims (slightly above 71 per cent, according to the 1941 census), it was ruled by a a Dogra Rajput, Maharaja Hari Singh. Because of its over all Muslim majoirty, and, closer communication links with areas that were to be part of Pakistan, the Muslim League expected the State to join Pakistan and even offered some inducements to the Maharaja to influence his decision. The Congress was not a disinterested observer either. A section of the Congress leadership - the `secular socialists' - had developed close ideological links with the like-minded National Conference Party (NC) in Kashmir. Morover, Nehru, himself of Kashmiri origin, had developed friendship with Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the NC< and took personal interest in the ongoing movement for the democratization of Kashmir's polity. Despite these, had the Maharaja decided to join either India or pakistan, before 15 August, both the parties would, perhaps, have accepted that. Indeed, such an assurance was given to the Maharaja by Lord Mountbatten, during the meeting with Hari Singh in June 1947. Mountbatten went a step further and told the Maharaja that if he acceded to Pakistan, India would not take it amiss, as he had the assurance of Sardar patel on this.
  • Covers the pre-invasion developments in Kashmir. See notes.
  • Purchased 2016-04-17, Kindle 6.49
  • p.394: Says that the "British government" stepped in to help Indian forces and halt the Pakistani advance. Supposedly Mountbatten agreed to provide transport aircraft. General Gracey refused to deploy Pakistani forces.
  • p.1005: Steve Martin is affiliated to "Victor Valley College"
  • Pakistan naturally expected Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, to join it. India thought that the religious factor was irrelevant, especially since the leading political party, the National Conference, was known to be non-sectarian. By early October, as Patel wrote to Nehru, there was no ‘difference between you and me on matters of policy relating to Kashmir’: both wanted accession.[20]
  • p.174: By mid-September, the maharaja was discussing accession with Indian leaders, but Nehru was reluctant to accept without political reforms in Kashmir. The prime minister argued in particular that the maharaja should empower his Muslim rival Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the state's largest political party, the National Conference. Nehru believed such reforms woul dhelp stiffen popular resistance to a looming Pakistani incursion into the state.
  • p.174: On Nehru's perceptions of a looming Pakistani incursion, see Jawaharlal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel, september 27, 1947, in Gopal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series. vol. 4, 263.
  • Purchased, Kindle, 2016-04-17, 12.99
  • p.xvii: Notably, while Nehru always wanted Kashmir to be part of India, Patel was at one time inclined to allow the state to join Pakistan. His mind changed on 13 September, the day the Pakistan government accepted the accession of Junagadh. For `if Jinnah could take hold of a Hindu-majority State with a Muslim ruler, why should the Sardar not be interested in a Muslim-majority State with a Hindu ruler?'[17]
  • Look here for Jinnah's statement that he would not mind if it did not accede to Pakistan, provided it did not accede to India.
  • Ankit, Rakesh (November 2010). "October 1947". Epilogue. 4 (11): 9–.
  • Reviews Rakesh Ankit
  • A BBC journalist travelled to Kashmir to hear first-hand stories of 1947
  • p.118 (on Google Books) has a very interesting account of talks between Mountbatten and the Maharaja.
  • p.61: pre-invasion developments
  • pp.67–72: Talks in detail about Golwalkar's visit to the Maharaja on 17 October "on the invitation of Mehar Chand Mahajan." Mahajan was also present in the meeting that took place. Returned to Delhi on October 19 and apprised Sardar Patel.
  • pp.73-: Sangh in Kashmir Valley
  • pp.77-: Sangh on the War Front
  • p.115: nor was he [Patel?] prepared to do so on Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, who had recently become Prime Minister. He had even gone to the extent of declining to conclude a standstill agreement though offered by the Prime Minister, Sir Janak Singh, feeling that until a road link had been established he would not be able to effectively implement such an arrangement. He, however, did authorise, on his own, the then Chief Engineer, B. S. Puri, to improve the condition of Madhopur-Kathua road so as to provide such a link. The work was taken in hand and substantial progress had been made by the time we were overtaken by the events of October 1947, for which responsibility rests squarely on Pakistan.
  • p.127: Since this meant control over its communications, supplies and trade for which the inlets and outlets were through Pakistan, it gave the latter an opportunity to paralyse its economic life. The pressure began to be felt here long and the Stae began to reel under that pressure.
  • p.127: I have already indicated that Sardar was content to leave the decision of accession to the Ruler and went so far as to say that if the Ruler felt...
  • p.127: ...of Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover, neither Junagadh nor Hyderabad, which had Muslim Rulers, was situated on a location which could be described as affording an alternative. In the case of J&K, however, an alternative did exist and had to be taken note of. The composition of J&K State itself made this attitude necessary.
  • p.39: He, therefore, did authorise on his own, the then Chief Engineer, B. S. Puri to improve the condition of Madhopur-Kathua Road so as to provide the road link. Substantial progress had been made by the time we wee overtaken by the events.
  • p.90: The only road link to India was through Gurdaspur district. A fair-weather dirt and gravel track started in the sleepy little town of Pathankot and extended for 64 miles via Madhopur, Kathua and Samba. Numerous rivers and creeks crossed this road with the Ravi, Ujh and Basantar rivers being the major obstacles. None of the rivers was bridged. Most were fordable especially during the dry months. Howver, the Ravi required a ferry from October through June. Under such conditions the trip from Pathankot to Jammu would take at
  • p.197: pending completion of Telegraph and Telephone lines. On 12 October 1947, Patel wrote to Batra, Dy. Prime Minister of Hari Singh's Government to make arrangements as he was sending his officers of Telegraph,Telephone and Roads to Madhopur (in Jammu province) for a meeting on 19 October.
  • p.124: Afzal Mirza, published in Dawn on 2 January 1951, states that Muslim refugees started entering Pakistan at the end of September 1947 in "small unnoticeable batches every day." It continued during October-November 1947. A total of 200,000 Muslims took refuge in Pakistan. This is called the "first wave."
  • p.124: A second wave of 200,000 refugees arrived after Indian Army's April-July 1948 operations in the western districts.
  • p.124: A "third wave" of about 100,000 refugees arrived following the Indian Army's November 1948 offensive.
  • p.124: By early 1949, a total of some five hundred thousand people had fled Jammu and Kashmir to areas under Pakistani control.
  • p.124: Almost all these Muslims came from the Jammu province. In Kashmir proince, there was almost no religous violence. However, some Muslims left because they favoured Pakistan. A few were `encouraged' to leave by their political opponents in the NC.
  • p.124-125: Most refugees came from areas close to either Pakistan or Azad Kashmir. Jammu, Kathua, Reasi and Udhampur tehsils. Almost all the refugees of the third wave cam efrom the Mendhar Tehsil of Poonch Jagir, and Rajouri Tehsil.
  • p.124: Six months after the arrival of the third wave, an unidentified organisation counted refugees in Pakistan came up with the number of 354,540 regisered refugees. Of these 333,964 from Indian-held Kashmir and 20,576 from the Azad Kashmir areas.
  • This article has a nice picture of Hindustan Times from 26 October 1947.
  • The Headline "Kashmir accedes to India"
  • Subheading "Plebiscite soon on Ruler's decision"

Kashmir conflict: Operation Gulmarg

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  • Purchased, Kindle, 2016-06-10, 6.44
  • p.83: Nehru was very upset that Kalkat's informaion was not acted upon.
  • p.151: A few weeks later on 17 July, in the Pakistani capital of Karachi under the aegis of the UNCIP, the first major conference of the two warring nations was held. At the special aircraft carrying the Indian delegation led by Lt. Gen. SM Srinagesh with Mr. HM Patel the Defence Secreatary, Mr Vishu Sahay the Secretary for Kashmir Affairs, Maj. Gen. K. S. Thimaiyya, Brig. Sam Maneckshaw, Maj. SK Sinha landed at Karachi. They were given a warm welcome by Lt. Gen. Walter Joseph Cawthorn the Chief of Staff of Pakistan Army, Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmed and Brig. Sher Khan.
  • p.12 for Operation Gulmarg.
  • p.2: the British had raised the 600 strong Gilgit Scouts for the maintenance of internal security.
  • p.2: Gilgit Scouts launched a recruitment drive, which resulted in the enlistment of about 2,000 local inhabitants, later known as raiders. They were armed, equipped and trained upon the arrival of small arms and other military equipment from Pakistan.
  • The author worked in The Corps of Signals. He is the father of Manny Cohen. The book contains a foreword by Lt.Gen. K. S. Thimayya.
  • Cited in Guha's India after Gandhi.
  • p.15: At first there had been confusion withing the walls of Poonch city. Forty thousand men, women and children were crowded into the small area of ten square miles, which had never held before more than eight thousand inhabitants. Many had arrived there in panic, fleeing before the oncoming invaders whose presence in the area was made evident from miles away by the smoke of burning villages. No one can say why these refugees had poured in Poonch city, for it was very obvious that there could not be enough food to feed even half of them.
  • p.16: In Sringar, and in more fortunate places of Kashmir, Poonch would be talked abotu in those days in a hushed voice. It was thought of as a doomed city and those who spoke of it felt in their hearts that they had seen for the last time their friends and relatives who were among thos forty thousand.
  • p.16: When the siege began there were two depleted battalions of the Kashmir State Forces—a total of scarcely 1200 men—to defend the city. These troops, mustering all the arms and ammunition they could, spent the early days of the battle rushing from hill to hill and from summit to summit in a semi-exhausted stupor, defending wherever the enemy attacked with whatever energy they had left; and they just managed to hold out.
  • p.16: These men had no contact with the outside world for they lacked radio equipment.
  • p.17: Indian army vehicles crossed high mountain ranges through the Haji Pir pass, 8000 ft. high. The troops alloted for this push formed part of the 161 Infantry Brigade under the leadership of Brig. L. P. Sen, DSO, and included the battalions of the well-known Dogra and Sikh regiments.
  • p.17: Even this relieving column had no communication wiht the beleaguered garrison of Poonch. The defenders, sighting a column of troops, brew up the bridge at Kahuta, eight miles from Poonch, thus cutting themselves off completely from the only land link with Uri and Srinagar.
  • pp.43-44: On road links to Kashmir.
  • p.43: One such road of importance was the fair weather road from Pathankot to Jammu, through Madhopur, Kathua and Samba. It had to negotiate the Ravi river at Madhopur and cross two other rivers the Ujh and Basantar, apart from many other streams. Being a card road in a bad state of maintenance, it used to take three days for a round trip from Pathankot to Jammu and back, although th edistance between these places was only about 96 km. Further, this road ran parallel to th eborder of the State with Pakistan, in may areas very close to it. Beyond Jammu, this cart road continued on to Akhnur, Beripattan, Nowshera nd on to Rajouri. At Akhnur, this road went over the Chenab river, where only a weak bridge was available.
  • p.37?: India won, and gained two-thirds of Kashmir, which it successfully held against another Pakistani invasion in 1965.

Kashmir conflict: 1965

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  • Excellent summary of the 1965 war.

Kashmir conflict: Kargil

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Kashmir conflict: books

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  • p.112: Symbolic of the lapse of British Paramountcy in J&K was the question of the Standstill Agreement which, we have seen...
  • p.125 ... Power) accepted a Standstill Agreement with the State. India, incidentally, had effectively declined a similar proposal. (Chitralekha Zutshi paraphrases this as "India rejected it"!)
  • p.126: ...Agreements, emerging from the practical mechanics of the Transfer of Power, provided for the continuation of essential relations, in communications, posts, trade and the like, between a Princely State yet to be decided on its future status and one, or both, of the two new Dominions. The official view in Karachi was that so long as this Standstill Agreement was in existence, the Maharaja of
  • p.128: The Government of J&K did not fail to react to the Poonch revolt and its extension southwards into Kotli, Mirpur, Bhimber and elsewhere. It tried to confiscate all arms and ammunition from the local Muslim population in such areas as it could control. It permitted armed bands of Hindus and Sikhs, including members of extremist organisations like the RSS...
  • p.130: From this date onwards we have evidence of all sorts of Indian military aid being provided with Patel's express approbation for Jammu & Kashmir, of which the following are examples. On 28 September, at the urgent request of Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, Patel arranged for the provision of one civilian aircraft (from Dalmia Jain Airways, presumably a DC3) to run a special service between... effective telegraphic communications between India and Jammu and Srinagar; and the road from the Indian Punjab border near Madhopur to Jammu was now being greatly improved by construction by Indian Army Engineers of a pontoon bridge over the Ravi leading to Kathua.
  • Seems like an excellent book!
  • p.89 [footnote 88]: Any citizen could be imprisoned for five years without any show of cause; the press was heavily censored; public rallies could hardly be held. See, P. N. Bazas, The Shape.
  • p.89: [footnote 89]: Balraj Puri substantiates this by an opinion poll conducted on the implications of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah. See his Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy, pp.132-3
  • p.89: [foot 91]: See G. Rizvi, 'India Pakistan and Kashmir Problem 1947-1972' in R. G. C. Thomas (ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir. Rizvi also believes that Nehru's commitment to the Plebiscite was genuine. But he argues that the 'dispute was complicated by ... domestic politics in both Pakistan and India, and... by the extension of the Cold War rivalry in South Asia'. See his Rizvi (1995) harvtxt error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRizvi1995 (help)
  • Purchased Amazon reseller, 2016-08-04, 4.24
  • p.60: The outcome of the 1971 war had significant consequences for the Kashmir dispute. After the war, India emerged as the dominant power on the subcontinent, now populated by an additional state, the newly created Bangladesh.
  • Languages of Belonging
  • Purchased, 2016-05-21, Kindle, 5.15
  • Banerjee, Dipankar; Hussain, Touqir (2015), "Kashmir", in Judy Carter; George Irani; Vamik D. Volkan (eds.), Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines, Routledge, pp. 30–56, ISBN 978-1-317-34466-7
  • Safdar Mahmood (2000) [first published 1990], Pakistan: political roots and development, 1947–1999, Karachi: Oxford Universy Press
  • p.142: ...problem was best explained by Chagla, the Indian representative, who declared in the Security Council on 5 February 1964: "I wish to make ti clear on behalf of my Government that under no circumstances can we agree to holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir." Why India has persistently refused to hold plebiscite in Kashmir was explained by the ...
  • [M. K. Akbar] former Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, who said “Kashmir would vote to join Pakistan and no Indian government responsible for agreeing to plebiscite would survive.” It si evident from the above-quoted statement thta the people of Kashmir are in favour of joining Pakistan, and India has established its rule against the wishes of the people.
  • James Wynbrandt quotes: A former Indian defense minister, Krishna Menon, once candidly explained why: “Kashmir would vote to join Pakistan and no Indian government responsible for agreeing to plebiscite would survive” (Mahmood 2000, 191).
  • Purchased, Abe Books, 2016-04-04, 16.78
  • Purchased, Amazon reseller, 2016-07-09, 6.19
  • Bagchi, Sanjoy (6 July 2002), "The First War with Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly, 37 (27): 2709–2712, JSTOR 4412323
  • p.2710: Another peculiar feature was that, besides Mountbatten, British officers occupied the top echelons of the defence forces on both sides. Auchinleck was the supreme commander of the sub-continent and the chiefs of the army, navy and air force in India and Pakistan were all British. In addition, the governors of the Punjab and Frontier Provinces in Pakistan were also British ICS officers. Although technically they were servants of the governments, they were serving but their loyalties were unambiguously with Britain. Bypassing their political superiors, they communicated among themselves and with the British High Commissioners in the two capitals, who were conduits for passing on information to Whitehall in London.
  • p.2710: Mountbatten continued to correspond regularly with King George VI, even after he became a titular governor-general and his understanding of the prevailing situation were always available to the British government. This cabal, acting in concert, often frustrated the directions of the Indian government. There was the infamous incident of an advance warning of the tribal invasion received from the governor of the Frontier Province by the army chief in Delhi, which was suppressed and hidden from the Indian government.
  • pp.77-78: excellent discussion of Jinnah's attitude towards princely states.
  • Pearson Education says: Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta is former Professor and Head of Department of International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
  • Purchased, 2016-05-16, dolandaka, 21.80
  • P.52: Says Mahajan was the Prime Minister from 15 October to 5 March 1948.
  • p.108: Cawthorn memorandum submitted to UNCIP in Marc 1949 states that the Azad forces were under the command of Pakistan High Command.


In return for promised referendum:

  • Rekha Datta, p. 33 - mentions military assistance
  • Chitkara, p. 146 - mentions military assistance. Nehru wanted ratification.
  • Ganguly, p. 10 - says Mountbatten decided that the Indian troops could be sent only after the Maharaja signed accession. He inserted a caveat, about people ratifying accession.
  • Good coverage of India's compulsions on going back on referendum
  • p.216: Independent observers could get no evidence of it. The New York Tiems found that "most of the prisoners captured thus far do not speak the Kashmiri dialect. They speak... Punjabi and other dialects."... The Washington Post remarked: "The Moslem Pakistanis, led by President Ayub, had expected the infiltrators to be able to produce a general uprising and this is Ayub's first disappointment."... Once again, it seemed clear that whatever the state of their relationship with India, Kashmiris did not wish to embrace Pakistan.
  • purchased 2015-09-14, 10.00
  • By Sheikh Abdullah's grand daughter.
  • Review in EPW didn't like it that much.
  • p. 175: Appendix A for correspondence between Sheikh Abdullah and Mountbatten
  • Kaul, Shyam; Kachru, Onkar, eds. (1998), Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh: Ringside Views, Khama Publisers, Atlantic Publishers & Dist, ISBN 8185495513
  • "Shyam Kaul" is a veteran journalist, based in Jammu [1]
  • Agarwalla, S. S. (1994), Contemporary India and its Burning Problems, Mittal Publications, ISBN 8170995752
  • pp.11-15 for Kashmir accession and the UN etc.
  • Cohen, Stephen P. (2004), India: Emerging Power, Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 0815798393
  • p. 212 for terminology of AJK etc.
  • Purchased 2016-04-22, Amazon reseller, 8.39
  • An excellent book published by Brookings Institution!
  • p. 66 for Pakistan-controlled Kashmir
  • p. 33 for Azad Kashmir declarationon 3 October
  • p. 193 for Pakistani-controlled
  • eBrary
  • Tikoo, Colonel Tej K. (2013), "Genesis of Kashmir Problem and how it got Complicated: Events between 1931 and 1947 AD", Kashmir: Its Aborigines and their Exodus, New Delhi, Atlanta: Lancer Publishers, ISBN 978-1935501589
  • Mansergh, Nicholas; Lumby, Esmond Walter Rawson; Moon, Penderel, eds. (1983), The Transfer of Power 1942-7: The Mountbatten Viceroyalty, princes, partition, and independence, 8 July-15 August 1947 (Volume 12 of Constitutional relations between British and India), H.M. Stationery Office, ISBN 0115800875
  • Mathur, Shubh (2008), "Srinagar-Muzaffarabad-New York: A Kashmiri Family's Exile", in Roy, Anjali Gera; Bhatia, Nandi (eds.), Partitioned Lives: Narratives of Home, Displacement and Resettlement, Pearson Education India, pp. 240–254, ISBN 978-9332506206
  • p.103: Mentions the letter of accession carried to Delhi by R. L. Batra on 24 October.
    • Requests terms to be the same as those for Hyderabad.
    • Nehru confirms that a request was received on the 24th
  • p.110: Says Menon could not have reached Jammu on 26 October.
  • p.111: Mentions Jha's theory that the IoA was signed on the 25th, but Menon did not present it to the Defence Committee on that day because Nehru and Patel had differences of opinion on the acceptability.
  • The following papers review and debate the book
  • Brobst, Peter John (March 1998), "Kashmir 1947: Sir Olaf Caroe and the question of British 'Grand Design'", Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 36 (1): 93–100, doi:10.1080/14662049808447762 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • Pasha, Mustapha Kamal (March 1998), "The paradoxes of History: Partition, independence and Kashmir (Kashmir 1947)", Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 36 (1): 100–106, doi:10.1080/14662049808447762 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • Ganguly, Sumit (March 1998), "Options for Resolving the Crisis in Kashmir", Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 36 (1): 106–112, doi:10.1080/14662049808447762 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • p.76: The ancestors of many important Punjabis, including Sharif and Iqbal, were Kashmiris, and many Kashmiris are recruited into the military.[62] While there had always been Kashmiris in Punjab, there was a mass migration during the late 19th century due to natural disasters and oppression at the hands of the Hindu Dogra rulers.[63]
  • [62] Mehtab Ali Shah, The Kashmir Problem: A View from the Four Provinces of Pakistan, Contemporary South Asia 4, 1995.

Kashmir conflict: articles

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  • A good summary of the reasons behind the dispute
  • p.171: Thus, the present tensions in the Valley can be marked to this turn of events in the 1970s. As Kaur observes:

  • Many Kashmiris in IJK lost faith in their political leaders as champions of their interests ater a number of opportuniistic deals with New Delhi governments. These include the 1974-1975 accord between Kashmiri leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Indira Gandi, and the connnivances of the Sheikh's son Farooq with Rajiv Gandhi's government to rig the 1987 IJK state assembly elections. This political background inspired separatists in the Kashmiri Valley to resort to the gun in 1989, fighting variously for a plebiscite, outright independence,or accession to Pakistan. (Kaur 2006:13-14)

  • p.171: The Kashmiri intifada
  • p.171: The immediate antecedents to civil strife within the Valley find their origins in widespread Hindu-Muslim communal strife in late February 1985, leading to the imposition of emergency rule and a growing secessionist struggle among the majority Muslims (especially in Srinagar).[6] The precipitant of further escalation, marking the advent of the so-called Kashmiri intifada, was the strikes and occasional attacks carried out by the JKLF in late 1988 and 1989 (following the disputed state elections of 1987 in which pro-Delhi parties prevailed).[7] The exact origins of the escalation are well described by Asia Watch in a 1993 report:

  • After the elections [of 1987], militants of the JKLF and other groups - many of whom openly admitted that they received arms and training in Pakistan - grew bolder, detonating boms at government buildings, buses and the houses of rpesent and former state government officials, and enforcing a boycott of the November 1989 national parliamentary elections. One month later, JKLF militants abducted the daughter of Home Miniser Mufti Mohammed Sayeed then freed her when the government gave in to demands for the release of five detained militants. That event, together with a huge in popular protests against the state and central governments, led New Delhi to launch a massive crackdown on the militants. (Asia Watch 1993:21)

  • Kaur, Inpreet (2000), "Warring over peace in Kashmir", in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu; Bushra Asif; Cyrus Samii (eds.), Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, ISBN 1588264084
  • Sisk, Timothy D. (2009), International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-13-402237-3
  • Covers Simla agreement with India's interpretation
  • p.897: The formerly quasi-independent Indian states, some six hundred of them including Kashmir, would accede either to India or Pakistan. It was expected that Kashmir, because of its overwhelming Muslim population, would join Pakistan.
  • p.897: To delineate the border between India and Pakistan, Boundary Commissions for the Punjab and Bengal were appointed and chaired by British judge, Cyril Radcliffe (1899-1977). If Kashmir was to be connected with India the territory south of Kashmir, especially the districts of Gurdaspur and Batala, would need to become part of Indian territory. Radcliffe initially awarded them to Pakistan but then Mountbatten intervened with Radcliffe who reversed himself and awarded them, as well as four other Muslim-majority districts, to India. Thsi gave India access by land to Kashmir.
  • p.897: The Maharaja of Kashmir, however, delayed acceding to either India or Pakistan until Pakistani tribesmen from the northwest frontier spontaneously invaded Kashmir on October 22, 1947, to seize the territory for Pakistan, although Indian troops had been infiltrted into Kashmir long prior to this date. This unorganized foray into Kashmir by Pakistani tribesmen was supported by independent action by officers of the regular Pakistan Army. Accession to India on October 26 by the Maharaja, led to military intervention by India, organized by Mountbatten, who had been appointed the first Governor-General of India, and India was able to secure Kashmir for India with its capital at Srinagar. Pakistan, however, was able to keep the western part of Kashmir, Azad (Free) Kashmir, with its capital at Muzaffarabad.
  • p.898: It was not until March 1965, however, when a skirmish developed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch on the Arabian sea, that the Pakistan Army believed it was ready to defeat the Indian Army. Demonstrations iN Kashmir against the Indian government led to unrest in Pakistani cities and a war atmosphere developed in Pakistan. This was led by Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1926-1979) and his Kashmir Committee. On August 8, 1965, Pakistan launched the clandestine "Operation Gibraltar" against the Indian Army in Kashmir. Four Pakistani soldiers were captured and the operation failed almost immediately. To save Pakistani forces in the area that Pakistan Army then initiated "Operation Grand Slam," which was launched on August 30, 1965, met heavy Indian resistance, and collapsed in three days. In response, India, on September 6, attacked all along the Pakistani border with the city of Lahore as its main target. India could not break through but it was a debacle for Pakistan as the US withheld provisions and by September 15, Pakistan had almost completely run out of military supplies. The UN Security Council became involved and a ceasefire was signed, the Tashkent Agreement,...
  • Cites Birdwood, Becher, Pakistani government white paper etc. Also MJ Akbar and Prem Shankar Jha.
  • Indurthy, Rathnam; Haque, Muhammad (March 2010), "The Kashmir Conflict: Why it Defies Solution", International Journal on World Peace, 27 (1): 9–44, JSTOR 20752914

Kashmir conflict (Hindutva versions)

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Kashmir conflict (Pakistani versions)

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  • staff writers (1 June 2003). "Jinnah – Mountbatten Talks". Story of Pakistan, Nazaria-e-Pakistan Trust. Story of Pakistan, Nazaria-e-Pakistan Trust. Retrieved 21 March 2014.

Britain's role

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  • The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition
  • Purchased, Amazon reseller, 2016-05-26, 11.78
  • p.43: In September-October 1947 when crisis erupted in Kashmir, there were almost 800 senior British civil and police officials in the Indian subcontinent.2 India’s defence forces had more than 500 senior British officers, Pakistan’s over a thousand. Britons also held influential political, bureaucratic and diplomatic positions in the two dominions thereby providing London with a unique insight and influence in their attitudes towards Kashmir. Their cast included: Lord Mountbatten (Governor-General, India), Claude Auchinleck (Supreme Commander, India and Pakistan Army), George Cunningham (Governor of NWFP, Pakistan), Francis Mudie (Governor of West Punjab, Pakistan), Frank Messervy and Douglas Gracey (first two C-in-Cs of the Pakistan army), Rob Lockhart and Roy Bucher (their Indian counterparts) and the British High-Commissioners.
  • p.54: In March 1947, there had been five thousand more British (13,500) than Indian officers in the Indian army.
  • p.54: `‘It turned out to be a war unlike all others in that the respective Commanders communicated daily by telephones between Rawalpindi and New Delhi’ [94: Henry Devereux, My Tour with the Pakistan Artillery, ACC 197, IOR, p. 7]
  • p.55-56: In January 1948, Graffety-Smith forewarned the CRO that ‘Gracey and other British officers cannot be expected to obey “stand down”’. This was because, while the British would be restricted to an advisory role in India from 31 March, in Pakistan, they were in operational command.107 The CRO assured him that they were aware that “stand down” ‘would be a far greater blow to Pakistan’ and were ‘not in the least likely to issue such an order save in the very last resort…’[108]
  • p.56(48): The advantages of having British generals at the helm of warring sides now becam eclear as Bucher and Gracey, in rather `Gilbertian negotiations', mutually sought to employ defensive positions.
  • p.56(48): As Lt. Gen. Loftus Tottenham, commanding a division of the Pakistan Army, later remembered: `The Kashmir war was queer in that it was fought under certain restrictions. The attitude was and had to be, you can hit them so hard but not too hard, otherwise there will be all kinds of repercussions.'
  • p.56(48): Over 4/5 May 1948, Graffety-Smith informed the CRO of the presence of Pakistan army troops in Kashmir.[113] More worryingly, he also mentioned that two British officers, Lt Col Milne and Captain Skellon, were in Kashmir with Gracey’s concurrence. Soon, he reported that three Pakistani battalions were present in Kashmir with Indian commanders aware of this and ‘manoeuvring so as to avoid any clash’.[114] Gracey had personally informed Bucher about their presence ‘for “defensive purposes”’.115 Quite naturally, the CRO’s bigger worry was the presence of British officers in Kashmir: ‘a prospect of embarrassment’.[116]
  • p.57: In July 1948, London was shocked to know that ‘8-12 British officers were serving in Kashmir’.[124] The silver lining in this darkening cloud was Bucher’s restraint in India. He was anxious ‘to avoid a head-on clash with Pakistan’ and used his influence to stop ‘any precipitate action on the part of an Indian commander’.[125]
  • p.57: What forced the CRO’s hand was the inevitable death of one of the British officers in Kashmir. Major RE Sloan (No. 352677 A) was killed on Saturday 10 July at 0915 hours in Tithwal sector while commanding 71 Field Company, Royal Pakistan Engineers.[128] It could not agree to this,[129] but was also anxious to ensure that ‘circumstances of Sloan’s death should [not] become public’.[130]
  • p.58: Meanwhile, there was no let-up in British officers going into Kashmir. Archibald Carter at the CRO blamed the ‘wrong, unwise or weak’ Gracey for this and called him ‘a servant of the Pakistan government…more than a 100% Pakistani’, who did not ‘realise the danger of having British officers in Kashmir’.[134]
  • p.216: Symonds had a good deal more difficulty in getting access to western Kashmir, since the Pakistani authorities denied that they had any control over the area. His diplomatic skills eventually secured him an introduction to representatives of the Azad kashmir government he then embarded on a hazardous and exhausting expedition, of which he has left a vivid account.[87] Whil ehis main concern was to report on the condition of non-Muslim refugees, he was also regaled with first-hand accounts of risings against oppressive measures by Hari Singh's regime. He returned to Lahore early in December, and with Alexander saw Pakinstan's PM Liaquat Ali Khan, who made a number of proposals abotu Kashmir, in particular suggesting that the UN might set up an interim neutral administration, pending a plebiscite. The two men then returned to Delhi, but found that Nehru was in no mood to listen to any proposals from Liaquat Ali. By this time Symonds was feeling very ill, and it turned that he was suffereing from typhoid....
  • p.216:Alexander's visits to Jammu and the Kashmir valley, were less strenuous but were fairly hazardous too. His first visit confirmed the truth of reports of massacres of Muslims in Jammu, and Nehru sent him back to investigate further with the full cooperation of Sheikh Abdullah's administration. This second visit, in December, included travel into a border area in an armoured car, and when fighting was reported, the officer in charge of Alexander went forward leaving him under a tree hoping no stray bullet would come his way.
  • p.219: His old friend Philip Noel-Baker was now Commonwealth Secretary in the Labou Government, and was thus directly involved in discussions of Kashmir. Writing to him befor ehe left India, Alexander expressed his understanding of the awkwardness of his position. 'It is difficult not to become unwittingly a partisan of one side agaisnt the other'.[100] When he late saw Noel-Baker in London, he had just been withdrawn from the complex negotiations at the UN in New York over Kashmir, apparently because Nehru had complained to PM Attlee that he was insufficiently sympathetic to India's position.[101] Attlee did not just take Nehru's word for this. According to Symonds, Agatha Harrison had arranged for Alexander, soon after his return, to see the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, about Kashmir. She and Symonds went too. When they arrived at the House of Commons, it was not Bevin that they saw but Attlee himself, 'who, as he puffed his pipe, asked searching questions as to what we had seen and heard in Kashmir'.[102]
  • p.226: He was particularly troubled by attitudes towards Pakistan. An opportunity for better relations was being lost, for although governments were never willing to admit that they had done wrong, 'sometimes they show that they would like to begin a new chapter. I believe that is the mood of all the wiser men in Pakistan today'. This feeling was not being reciprocated. 'Here, even amongst those I most love and respect, the underlying attitude is one of impatient resentment at the continued existence of Pakistan'. Things would have been better if Gandhi had lived. He would, for one thing, have found a way to true reconciliation over Kashmir. Not, Alexander conceded, that India didn't ahve noble and selfless men and women to guide its destinies - people like Vinoba Bhae and Rajagopalachari. But it was a terribly thin line.
  • p.235: It was Philip Noel-Baker who presented Alexander with his first challenge on returning to Britain. In a letter of 15 April 1954 he told Alexander that Nehru's reputation had suffered badly over the previous two years. Ninety nine percent of the population (he claimed) supported the NATO, and were disturbed by Nehru's neutralism - a policy that was not only unwise but immoral. As for Kashmir, only Kingsley Martin in The New Statesman supported India's line in that dispute. Nehru's recent outburst on US aid to Pakistan was the last straw. Even the well-disposed Clement Attlee could not agree with him there.
  • He [Alexander] had no radical objection to NATO, since it was genuinely supported by the people in member countries. Such support for a similar organisation did not exist in Asia. Those who said they wanted it did so because they thought it would help them get the aid they wanted — in Pakistan against India. Nehru's 'dynamic neutralism' deserved to be better understood. He hadn his colleagues were thorough democrats, and had no illusions abotu the difficulty of negotiating with the USSR.
  • p.249: Alexander told John Linton that Nehru resented any non-Indian intervention on Kashmir, such as Alexander's idea of a condominium.
  • p.249: There was a characteristic series of letters on Kashmir in The Friend in the winter of 1956-57. A correspondent had argued that Nehru's claim to moral leadership was undermined by India's defiance of a UN order to decide the future of Kashmir through a free plebiscite. Alexander responded by pointing out that the correspondent had reproduced the Pakistani case, and that there was also an Indian case. 'For some reason', he continued, 'the Indian case on Kashmir is never given i nthe British press, or scarcely ever. So here it is.' There followed a summary of India's view that Pakistani troops must be withdrawn from Kashmir before a plebiscite could be held, and so on - Alexander emphasising that this was the Indian case. He added that in visits to Kashmir he had forme dhte impression that in a straight choice between India and Pakistan, a plebiscite would favour Pakistan, though other observers believed that in the Kashmir valley, at least, India would gain a majority. He conceded that Nehru's determination to accept the effective partition of the state and stop renewing legal claims and counterclaims, while not wholly unreasonable, was perhaps 'a serious blind spot'. That, however, did not disqualify him from playig a useful rule in the international scene.
  • p.249: One might have supposed that this letter would have given more satisfaction to partisans of Pakistan than of India, but evidently the mere rehearsal of the Indian case was too much for some. Philip Noel-Baker wrote to Alexander saying that he was 'horrified' by the letter: had not Nehru gone back on undertakings to hold a plebiscite six times? And S. M. Haq, the Press Attaché at the Pakistani High Commission in London, wrote a long letter to The Friend giving a detailed account of moves made at the UN in the early stages of the conflict to show that India had not cooperated with them. In a further letter Alexander corrected a couple of details in Haq's letter, and then added the following paragraph:

US role

[edit]
  • Subtitle: “If Ignorance About India in This Country is Deep, Ignorance About the [Princely] States is Abysmal”
  • p.21: The intervention of Indian troops infuritated Pakistani Governor-General Mohammed Ali Jinnah. He suspected India of using tribal invasion to justify accession. Finding evidence for a well-planned conspiracy, Jinnah sanctioned the transfer of military supplies to the invaders while also Pakistani troops to join their effort as "volunteers". (***)
  • p.21: In early November Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru publicly called for a free plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Kashmir. As a precondition for the plebiscite, however, he demanded the removal of all invading forces and the restoraion of peaceful conditions. Pakistan, for its part, agreed to the plebiscite but spelled out several conditions of its own, such as the withdrawal of all Indian troops, that New Delhi found unacceptable.
  • p.22: For different reasons, both Indian and Pakistani leaders saw the ultimate dispotition of the Kashmir question as crucial to the future of their respective states and societies. For Pakistan, a nation carved uneasily out of the Muslim majority areas of British India, Kashmir belonged to the new nation as organically as didi East Bengal or Send. To allow the self-interested scheming of that state's Hindu ruler to subvert the democratic process was to strike at the principle of Muslim solidarity that formed Pakistan's raison d'etre. For India, a nation that hoped to forge unity out of a diverse congeries of ethnic, religious, linguistic and caste groups, the principle of secular was sacrosanct. To allow Kashmir's accession to India tobe invalidated ismply because the state contained a Muslim majority was to challenge the secularism that its rulers considered essential to th emaintenance of communal harmony.
  • p.22: Senior American officials did not at first grasp the grave regional-and international-implications of the Kashmir fighting... they devoted relatively little attention to what seemed initially a mere legal controversy in one of the world's most remote areas. Nehru's decision to call for Security Council intervention, however, placed the matter in an entirely different light.
  • p.23: Great Britain urged the US to play an active role in helping to resolve the Kashmir dispute throughout late 1947 and early 1948, but to no avail. On January 10, 1948, a delegationof top British diplomats, led by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relationships Philip Noel-Baker, spelled out their government's thinking during a meeting at the State Department.
  • p.23: The US thus consciously rejected any activist or leadership role in the scheduled Security Council debates. It opted, instead, to exert its influence with the two parties in a quiet, low-key fashion. ... In addition, American diplomats genuinely felt out of their depth in th eintricacies of south Asia's political and religious conflicts. Consequently, they welcomed British analyses and guidance.
  • p.24: Anxious to avoid open differences with Great Britain for fear that they might be exploited by either India or Pakistan, and eager to defer to British expertise, Washington developed its policy position in close consultation with London.
  • p.24: ... Washington developed its policy position in close consultation with London. The two allies found themselves in essential agreement. Both feared that an independent Kashmir might set an unfortunate precedent; a Balkanized subcontinent, they concurred, would create unstable political and economic ocnditions that could be exploited by the Soviet Union. They also agreed that there was but one realistic solution to the conflict: a cease-fire must be obtained and provisions made at the earliest possible date for a fair and free plebiscite, supervised impartially by the United Nations, to determine Kashmir's ultimate accession. The US and Great Britain held fast to that position throughout the tempestuous Security Council debates of early 1948.
  • But their determined even-handedness did little to win friends with either side. Nehru charged the two Western powers with partiality in the Security Council debates, privately complaining that Washington and London were seeking to bolster Pakistan's position for strategic reasons. Pakistan's leaders also saw conspiratorial overtones in Anglo-American behavior.
  • online
  • pp.122-123: Simla agreement
  • p.434: India's willingness to accept US intervention [in the Kargil conflict?] was in itself a marked departure from past practice.
  • p.434: Gates and Kelly also made clear that Washington no longer backed a UN plebiscite as the preferred way to solve the Kashmir dispute, but instead supported bilateral India-Pakistan tallks in accord with the 1972 Simla agreement between the two countries. US Kashmir policy thus corresponded with India's own strongly held preference for bilateral negotiations and was at odds with Pakistan's traditional desire to involve outsiders in settling the dispute. The United States had, in fact, favored this approach ever since the 1972 Simla accord. Because the Kashmir dispute remained quiet until the 1990 flare-up, the shift in the US position had attracted little attention.
  • p.140: On New Year's Day, 1948, India brought the Kashmir problem to the UN Security Council, claiming that a peaceful resolution had been thwarted by Pakistani aggression. Pakistan responded in kind, then sent troops into western Kashmir without informing the Council. The UN created a commission to handle th edispute... which obtained a ceasefire, effective January 1, 1949, urged the withdrawal first of Pakistani then of Indian forces from Kashmir, and recommended a plebiscite for the territory. The cease-fire for the most part held, but the two countries failed to agree on a timetable for withdrawing troops and thereby demilitarizing Kashmir.
  • p.140: The Seucirty Council went ahead and selected the American admiral Chester W. Nimitz to serve as plebiscite administrator. This step proved unavailing. Nehru refused to consider a plebiscite unless the Pakistanis first withdrew their regular forces and tribal allies and then disbanded the Azad government. And he insisted that the Security Council, for its part, abandon its unfairly balanced assessment of the conflict and acknowledge that India had the superior moral claim.
  • p.140: UNCIP suggested that Nimitz arbitrate the military withdrawal issue, but Nehru turned the idea down. The Security Council president, the Canadian general A. G. L. McNaughton, proposed a phased demilitarization overseen by a UN Representative. Nehru said no. The Commission dissolved itself in March 1950 and was replaced by a single mediator: Sir Owen Dixon, an Australian jurist with diplomatic experience. Dixon arrived in South Asia in late May, spent two months assessing the situation and talking with the principals involved, then arranged a meeting between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan in New Delhi. The result was no improvement on previous efforts, whereupon Dixon proposed the partition of Kashmir, with a plebiscite confined to the coveted Vale. This suggestion was hedged about by Nehru with conditions so numerous that Dixon gave up in exasperation, saying he was "irritated and indeed disgusted by what he regarded as the short-sightedness of the Pakistani representatives and the tortuous chicanery of Pandit Nehru."
  • p.140: Frank Graham, a former congressman from North Carolina, took up where Dixon had left off in the spring of 1951. Two frustrating years alter, he too abandoned the quest.
  • p.141: Unto his death, Nehru insisted that a plebiscite could take place in Kashmir, but conditions there were somehow never suitable. In 1965, Nehru's longtime confidant Krishna Menon explained that there had never been a plebiscite because "Kashmir would vote to join Pakistan and we would lose it." The Pakinstanis never acknowledged their role in compromising Kashmir's fragile state of detachment in 1947.[35]
  • p.321: [35] Krishnalal Shridharani, The Philosophic Bases of India's Foreign Policy, India Quarterly 14, 2 (1958), 196-202; S. Natarajan, "India's Foreign Policy," TOI (Bombay) December 2, 1953.
  • p.141: As the years passed, British and U.S. policymakers viewed the struggle over Kashmir with a sensing of mounting frustration. Of all the South Asian disputes that threatened U.S. policy objectives in the region, Robert J. McMahon has written, "Kashmir proved by far the most emotional---and intractable." The Americans tried to push the British forward as negotiators, arguing that they knew the adversaries better and understood the issues involved. Reversing that logic, the British ruged the American sto intercede: the relative historical detachment of the United States from South Asia would enable American mediators to approach the situation objectively.
  • p.141: The British won a victory when the United States reluctantly accepted membership of UNCIP, but this proved a passage to Wonderland. "So far as I know," recalled J. Wesley Adams, the adivser to the American representative on the commission, "the American delegate was completely uninstructed, because there was nothing to instruct. This was virgin ground---there was no knowledge on the part of the American Government as to what would be possible." The Americans found their early sympathy for the Indian position diminishing. In March 1948, the United States suspended shipments of military materiel to India and Pakistan; Nehru objected loudly. (The suspenstion ended in March 1949.)
  • p.141: When Nehru resisted the conciliation efforts of Nimitz and McNaughton, Acheson and the UN represenatitive Warren Austin gave Indian diplomats a thorough dressing down, and Britain's High Commissioner in New Delhi, Sir Archibald Nye, spoke to Nehru about Kashmir using "language so strong that he [Nye] had not ventured to make any record of it." At various times thereafter, the Americans tried to restore good relations with Indi and end the conflict in Kashmir. In May 1958, President Eisenhower offered his "friendly assistance" to help solve the dispute, but Nehru's cool response left Ambassado rEllsworth Bunker "frankly disappointed." Bunker's successor, John Kenneth Galbraith, found to his surprise in September 1961 that Nehru seemed eager to discuss Kashmir, which he did "in a relaxed and, indeed, rather amusing fashion." Encouraged thus to think that the prime minister might be softening, the Kennedy administration pressed for a settlement. But Nehru scotched that effort with a stinging attack on mediation in India's Parliament in August 1963. Kennedy himself was prompted to write the prime minister that the statement would "certainly complicate our efforts to help India."
  • p.25-: Kashmir issue

UN mediation

[edit]
  • p.279: Both India and Pakistan raised voices against the April 1948 resolution.
  • p.280: The Commission held its first meeting on 16 June 1948. "Argentina was represented by Ricardo Siri; Belgium by Egbert Graeffe; Colombia by Alfredo Lozano; Czechoslovakia by Josef Korbel; and the United States by J. Klahr Huddle."
  • p.280: Commission arrived at Karachi on 7 July. "it learned that the Pakistani government had sent to Kashmir three brigades of its army."... "This unexpected development came as a surprise ot th eCommission, since the SC resolution did not reflect the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir and it influenced greatly the Commission's subsequent work."
  • p.280: Indian Government strongly resented the action of the Security Council. Flatly refused to consider an unconditional cessation of hostilities, etc.
  • p.281: Pakistan, though ready to withdraw its forces from Kashmir, asked for a simultaneous withdrawal of the Indian army. ... Azad Kashmir element had its own military units operating under the command of the Pakistani commander-in-chief and controlled an extensive area with some one and a half million inhabitants.
  • p.281: Unanimously adopted on 13 August a resolution in three parts.
  • p.282: India accepted. Pakistan attached the condition that India had to agree to a plebiscite held under the conditions laid down by the Security Council.
  • p.283: The condition attached by Pakistan was actually tantamount to rejection, because India strongly objected to SC's provisions for a plebiscite.
  • p.283: Commission returned to Europe [Geneva] to complete its first report.
  • p.283: In November, Commission transferred its seat to Paris and began a new negotations.... Pakistan send a message that Indian troops were increasing military activities. India denied.
  • p.283: India helped to break the impasse by agreeing, in principle, to discuss the arrangements for Plebiscite.
  • p.284: Differing approach from the SC, the Commission took the approach of Plebiscite administrator as great and as independent as possible, and abandoned the SC suggestion to form a new coalition government. Pakistan wanted maximum guarantee of freedom of the plebiscite. India was concerned with the security and the principle of the state's sovereignty.
  • p.284-5: 11 December, final proposal. reaffirmed the 13 August resolution, and asked both the governments to accept the principle of plebiscite, Plebiscite Administator, Commission to determine the final disposition of the armed forces, supervise the return of refugees. It did not ask India to change the local government in Kashmir, but took into accoun the authority of Azad Kashmir movement over its territories.
  • p.285: Both the governments accepted.
  • Purchased, Amazon reseller, 2015-11-17, 3.22
  • Subramaniam (2015) says (footnote 17 of Ch. 8): The book mainly articulates a Pakistani viewpoint of the whole crisis and sensationalizes the persecution of Muslims by Hindus without sufficient evidence of first-hand narratives or eyewitness accounts. The pro-Pakistan tilt interspersed with impeccable research can be attributed to geopolitics at the time the book was written (1966) considering that the US was wooing Pakistan as a front-line ally against the Soviet Union.
  • Korbel, Josef (4 March 1957), "Nehru, the UN and Kashmir", New Leader, 40 (9): 5–6
  • Kondapi, C. (1951), "Indian Opinion of the United Nations", International Organization, 5 (4): 709–721, doi:10.1017/S0020818300015757 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • Excellent overview of the UN efforts and other proposed peace plans.
  • Ankit, Rakesh (13 March 2010), "1948: The Crucial Year in the History of Jammu and Kashmir", Economic and Political Weekly, 45 (11): 49–58, JSTOR 25664224
  • p.104: (footnote 30) Pakistan had not yet appointed her nominee to the Commission, which took place only on April 30, 1948. This was one of the reasons for the delay in sending out UNCIP, which was severely criticized by Korbel.
  • p.106: Besides Korbel, representing Czechoslovakia, and nominated by India, the remaining members of UNCIP came from the following countries: USA, Belgium, Columbia, and Argentina (the latter chosen by Pakistan) which were all members of the Security Council. The atomosphere in both India and Pakistan was rather hostile to the UNCIP, reflecting their...
  • Has nice detail about the resolutions and UNMOGIP etc.
  • Excellent quotes from Auchinleck, demonstrating his fears of Congress "Hindu Raj".
  • U Thant flying to Karachi and Delhi to see if quiet personal diplomacy canachieve what 127 Security Council meetings on Kashmir have failed to do in 17 years.
  • Last week battlefield.
  • Pakistan will have proven its point that both India and the UN would act only if the situation threatens a large-scale military conflagaration.
  • The dispute centres around the right of self-determination of four million Kashmiris within a former princely state in the heart of Asia.
  • Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Bhutto looks at it this way: "The purpose of the UN is not give Kashmir as a prize to the better society, but merely to ask the Kashmiris whom they want to join."
  • Most legal experts and political practitioners at the UN privately agree that Pakistan's moral claim to a plebiscite cannot be disputed. Many agree in India that, with Kashmir gone, the cohesiveness of the federal system would be undermined and Delhi's authority threatened elsewhere.
  • India has proceeded on the legal assumption that the Kashmir case was "closed", It treats it as Indian territory.

UN resolutions

[edit]

Withdrawal of plebiscite

[edit]
  • p.401: American policy assigned a clear priority to relations with Pakistan by providing a total of $3.8 billion in military aid to Pakistani military rulers that was nominally directed against the communist powers but was in practice used to strengthen Pakistan relative to India.
  • p.401: As Keith Callard observed in his 1959 book, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Pakistan hadn "no strong convictions about the balance of righteousness between the West and the Communist powers and shared many of the preconceptions of those areas of Asia and Afrid that have recently secured independence," notably a general acceptance of the Leninist theory of imperialism and the sentiment of "Asian, or perhaps non-white solidarity."
  • p.401: With this mind-set, most of Pakistan's politically conscious elements looked on the alliance with the United States as a distasteful marriage of convenience and would have been more comfortable with a neutralist policy. But Pakistan swallowed its pride and entered the alliance in order to use the Defense Department to outflank India. Thus, when the US cut off petroleum and spare parts to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, and when it gave high levels of economic aid to India, especially during the Kennedy years, Pakistan felt a strong sense of betrayal that continues to shape its attitudes toward the US.
  • p.402: Partition and the Cold War
  • p.402: In Indian and Pakistani eyes, however, partition had settled nothing. It was only one episode in a continuing rivalry over the terms of a viable regional power relationship between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minirity in South Asia.
  • p.402: Among the Hindu conservatives in the ruling Congress Party, however, there was a more complicated attitude that reflected humiliating memories of the 700-year Moghul imperium. Nehru had never been able to make secularism more than a thin overlay on the vast Congress organization. Hindu conservatives such as Sardar Vallabbhai Patel were outrage by the threat of a separate Pakistan. Ironically, it was Patel who clinched the creation of Pakistan by taking the position in Congress councils that the new stae would never be viable. It would be good riddance to at least some of the Muslims, if only temporarily, and would teach them a lesson.
  • p.402: The saving grace, it was assumed, was that even if partition endured, a strategically vulnerable Pakistan, divided into two widely separated wings and economically weak relative to India, would ultimately be compelled to accept India's regional primacy. India was thus totally unprepared emotionally for the influx of Ameerican military aid that was to give Pakistan such an inflated power position.
  • p.402: Pakistan, for its part, needed the specter of India to hold together a spiritless body politic. The nationalism espoused by the ruling Muslim League rested almost entirely on an anti-Hindu raison d'etre, and largely lacked the underpinnings of a positive economic and social ideology.
  • p.402: The indeterminate characte of Pakistani nationalism led to an India-obsessed foreign policy and a search for American military support that would enable the new state to restore some of th eglory of hte Moghul centuries.
  • p.402: The geopolitical thinking that persuaded the US to provide this support to Pakistan was a strange compound of the British Tory worldview in the aftermath of partition and the emerging cold war collective security concepts of the late Truman and early Eisenhower years.
  • p.402-3: Sir Olaf Caroe said to be the key "author" of the US military aid. In March 1949, Sir Olaf published an article in Round Table that was to mark the birth of the concept of United State smilitary aid to Pakistan within the framework of the Baghdad Pact (a now defunct security alliance of Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan). "The strategic movement so fthe allies in Iraq and Persia in the Second World War," he wrote, "were made possible from the Indian base... In this quarter, as on the Northwest Frontier, Pakistan has succeeded to much of Indias responsibility, for the [Persian] gulf opens directly on Karachi.... It stability can be assured only by the closest accord between the states which surround this Muslim lake, an accord underwritten by the great powers whose interests are engaged."
  • p.403: "India," he wrote that year in The Wells of Power, elaborating on his earlier article, "is no longer an obvious base for Middle Eastern defense. It stands on the fringe of the defense periphery. Pakistan on the other hand lies well within the grouping of Southwestern Asia as seen from the air."
  • p.403: In Washington, the Caroe message came at an impressionable moment and had a powerful impact, providing a clear rationale for advocates of a policy "choosing" between India and Pakistan. The diverge between India's emerging foreign policy of neutralism and Pakistan's eagerness for an alliance had already become increasingly clear to American leaders...
  • p.403: Nehru's open protests led to a last-minute quest for a formula to mollify India, but by February 1954 the alliance had been formally concluded. Initially projected as a program of only $25 million, the first phase of US military aid to Pakistan reached a cumulative total of $1.5 billion in weaponry and defense-related economic aid before it ended a decade later. This was followed by a second phase during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that totaled another $2.3 billion between 1979 and 1988.

Simla Agreement

[edit]
  • Subrahmanyam, K. (2005) [first published in Strategic Analysis, May 1990, pp.111-198], "Kashmir", in N. S. Sisodia; Sujit Dutta (eds.), India and the World: Selected Articles from IDSA Journals, Bibliophile South Asia, pp. 457–, ISBN 978-81-86019-50-4
  • Apparently based on a fictitious "Operation Topac". See Behera, p.306 and Ganguly, p.15
  • p.440: Operation Topac stuff
  • Robert Trumbull, The World, The New York Times, 9 July 1972.
  • p.308: Deepak Lal is James S. Coleman Professor of International Development at UCLA. His most recent work on The Invisible Hand will be published next year by Princeton University Press.
  • p.305: The Simla Agreement is a beginning. I won't call it more than that. But a beginning is also very important, considering what has gone before it. [12 July 1972]
  • p.305: I have made no tall claims for the Simla Agreement; I make no tall claims now. All I say is that it is beginning; it is a small beginning perhaps, but it is a good beginning. [31 July 1972]
  • p.305: Nobody ha smade the claim for the Simla Agreement that all problems are solved. In fact I would that this is simply not possible at any time anywhere in the world. Problems will always remain. Our endeavour is to take each step so as to be in a better position to face th enew problems that must arise. [2 August 1972]
  • p.305-306: With the Simla Agreement India is in a better position to face the future. In fact I would say that the Simla Agreement is in pursuance of the domestic and the international policy which India has followed all these years. [2 August 1972]
  • p.70: discusses Bhutto's interpretation
  • When determining India's motivation and level of toleration vis-a-vis Pakistan we have also to look back at Simla, when India, only ten years after its humiliating defeat by China, had inflicted a crushing defeat on Pakistan over Bangladesh. Had Indira Gandhi insisted that the then President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, openly recognise the line of control as the international border, the issue between India and Pakistan (although not necessarily for the Kashmiris) might have been resolved. That India did not do so has been regretted by subsequent Indian commentators. Yet, in what appears to have been a generous gesture towards Pakistan, Gandhi chose not to force the issue, instead leaving future historians to analyse whether or not she and Bhutto had reached some secret agreement or understanding over Kashmir, which could be denied by future Pakistanis once the country had regained its strength.
  • Simla does, however, provide a turning point in terms of India's attitude. From 1972 onwards India and Pakistan agreed to discuss the Kashmir issue bilaterally rather than in any international forum. Whereas Pakistan, although a signatory to Simla, has never lost sight of the UN resolutions as providing the ultimate answer to solving the Kashmir issue, from the Indian perspective, Simla marked a departure from the UN resolutions.

Musharraf formulas

[edit]
  • p.94: Musharraf formula (5 December 2006). Soft or porous borders in Kashmir, autonomy or `self-governance' within each region of Kashmir, phased demilitarization of a lregions; and finally a `joint supervisory mechanism', with rerpesentatives from India, Pakistand and all parts ofKashmir, to oversee the plan's implementation.
  • Ziring, Lawrence (July 1978), "Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policy", Asian Survey, 18 (7): 706–730, doi:10.2307/2643527, JSTOR 2643527

Internal conflict

[edit]
  • Korbel, Josef (1954), "The National Conference Administration of Kashmir 1949-1954", Middle East Journal, 8 (3): 283–294, JSTOR 4322613
  • Seems like an excellent book!
  • p.35: The Nehru Years
  • p.35: In the content of the Indian discourse on Kashmir outlined above, it was not unnatural for New Delhi to adopt a centralizing posture towards Kashmir. Once the Maharaja acceded to India, he was made to abdicate in favour of Sheikh Abdullah.
  • p.35: The November 1951 elections for the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly returned the Sheikh's NC with a massive majority. [Huh?] But it was this election which betrayed the seeds of present discord in Kashmir. First, the 'election' itself was dubious. Most of the Assembly emmbers were elected unopposed, not due to a dearth of opposition candidates but either because the nomination papers of the opponents of the National Conference were rejected on 'technical' grounds, or because the opposition groups boycotted the poll. Such electorcal incongruities certainly created ripples of political discored in Jammu and Kashmir. secondly, Abdullah's ministry suffered from a narrow localist basis, four out of five members coming from the Muslim-domianted Kashmir Valley and the remaining belonging to the Hindu-majority Jammu. This had a communal implication.
  • Thirdly, Sheikh Abdullah's program to build a Naya Duniya (New Kashmir)[64] - admirable as it was - which aimed to undo the feudal relations of production unfortunately generaed dissensions along communal lines. Land Ceiling Laws were imposed; surplus land was distributed amongst the landless; a moratorium on peasants' debt was introduced.[65] According to a Kashmir government estimate 188.775 acres of land were 'transferred' to 153,399 tillers by March 1953.[66] Sheikh Abdullah also proposed schemes for nationalizing the core sectors in the economy. But this radical bluepring for socio-economic reconstruction provoked a covnergence of conservative and Hindu reaction. Most of the landlords in Kashmir were Hindus who usually operated as absentee zamindars from Jammu, and Abdullah's land reforms meant their expropriation in favour of Muslim smallholders. Again, the policy of nationalization primarily hurt the trading class, still predominantly Hindu. The Kashmir Chamber of Commerce thus submtitted a memorandum to the Sheikh in 1953 urging abolition of state trading, introduction of free competition in trade an dabolition of restrictions on private transport.[67] A class antagonism thus came to be overlaid with communal overtones.[68]
  • p.36: The Hindu outburst naturlaly unnerved the Kashmiri Muslim mind, which was now haunted by a fear of Hindu domination. An enraged Sheikh Abdullah exclaimed: '[the Praja Parishad agitation] literally poured cold water on the efforts of the National Conference to rally Muslim support for India all these years.'[72] In his address to a National Conference rally Sheikh Abdullh regretted in no uncertain terms: 'The confidence created by the NC in the people here (concerning Accession to India) has been shaken by Jana Sangh and other communal organizations in India'.[73] Consequently, Abdullah reportedly became increasingly disillusioned about J&K's integration with the Indian federation and allegedly toyed with the idea of Jammu and Kashmir as an independent state.[74] The Indian authorities even suspected 'secret negotiations' between the Sheikh and US officials in support of this move.[75]
  • p.36: Faced with the growing independent stance of Abdullah and confronted by a Hindu affront, Nehru reconsidered his earlier premise that 'No satisfactory way can be found in Kashmir except through him [Abdullah].'[76] Nehru now felt that a total union between J&K and the Indian state was the only option left to him. B. N. Mullik, who worked closely with Nehru during those years, remarked: 'If anything accelerated the final break between Sheikh Abdullah and India it was the Praja Parishad agitation'.[77]
  • p.37: Fortunately for Jawaharlal, his integrationist moves in Kashmir were facilitated by dissensions within the National Conference itself. Led by Bakshi, three of his own cabinet colelagues charged Abdullah with having 'lost the confidence of the people' by intentionally delaying the 'implementation of the [New Delhi]] Agreement'.[78] Abdullah, however, refused to resign. But in August 1953 his ministry was dissolved and he was put behind bars. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, a keen supporter of Kashmir's complete union with India, assumed power.[79] These moves certainly could not have been undertaken without Nehru's tacit approval. Besides, they indicated the assertion of conservatives within the Congress who had been always suspicious of Sheikh Abdullah.[80]
  • p.37: Henceforth, the story of Indian state's relations with Jammu and Kashmir became one of steady intrusion of New Delhi's authority. A Presidential proclamation of 1954 substantially curtailed the functions of the Kashmir legislature and the Indian President Rajendra Prasad during his visit to Kashmir in April of that year proclaimed: `...history and mutual understanding had cememnted the ancient ties between Kashmir and India to such an extent that any break in the relationship was inconceivable.'[82]
  • p.37: In early 1956 the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly ratified the state's merger with India. On 29 March Nehru formally abandoned his earlier proposal of a plebiscite in Kashmir[82] and veered around to the idea that 'facts [about Kashmir] had to be recognized as they are'.[83] Speaking before the Security Council on 3 May 1962, V. K. Krishna Menon explained the Indian position:
  • ... we are not prepared to do anything in any part of India that will shake the stability of our country, undermine our econommy or create conditions of trouble in South-east Asia. There is no provision in our Constitution for the secession of any state.[84]
  • p.37-38: By 1963 the offices of the Sadar-i-riyasat and Prime Minister in Kashmir were redesignated in conformity with the Indian constitution respectively as the Governor and Chief Minister. The jurisdiction of such crucial agencies of the Indian state as the Audit, Customs and Finance departments, the Supreme Court and the Election Commission were also extended to Jammu and Kashmir. On 27 November 1963 Nehru informed Parliament about the progress in 'the gradual erosion of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir'.[85] In December 1964 the terrotorial limits of Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian constitution were expanded to enable the central government to proclaim Presidential rule[86] in Kashmir and allow the Indian parliament to legislate laws for Kashmir.[87]
  • p.38: The authority of the Indina state was thus firmly clamped on Jammu and Kashmir. this process was buttressed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's coercive regime.[88] Public order apparently prevailed. But it was deceptive normalcy. Kashmiriyat had been insulted and th edissolution of Sheikh Abdullah's ministry in August 1953 marked the first turning point in the emotional rupture between a predominant section of Kashmiri uslims and the Indian state.[89] Sheikh Abdullah could justly recall: 'Since 1953, I have felt that the people of Kashmir do not enjoy the confidence of Indian leaders.'[90]
  • p.89 [footnote 88]: Any citizen could be imprisoned for five years without any show of cause; the press was heavily censored; public rallies could hardly be held. See, P. N. Bazas, The Shape.
  • p.89: [footnote 89]: Balraj Puri substantiates this by an opinion poll conducted on the implications of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah. See his Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy, pp.132-3
  • p.89: [foot 91]: See G. Rizvi, 'India Pakistan and Kashmir Problem 1947-1972' in R. G. C. Thomas (ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir. Rizvi also believes that Nehru's commitment to the Plebiscite was genuine. But he argues that the 'dispute was complicated by ... domestic politics in both Pakistan and India, and... by the extension of the Cold War rivalry in South Asia'. See his Rizvi, G. (1995), "Nehru and the Indo-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir 1947–64", Contemporary South Asia, 4 (1): 17–37, doi:10.1080/09584939508719749 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • Dasgupta, Chandrashekhar (2005), "Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union: The Politics of Autonomy", in Rafiq Dossani; Henry S. Rowen (eds.), Prospects for Peace in South Asia, Stanford University Press, pp. 239–260, ISBN 0-8047-5085-8
  • Jaffrelot (1996, p. 129) for Jammu Praja Parishad
  • As a deterrent to rigging, 40 to 50 impartial observers, not necessarily from abroad, have also been suggested. But Jammu-based activist Balraj Puri says, "Rigging is not the only problem. It is also the perception that any government in Srinagar is dependent on the largesse of the Centre to survive. That strikes at the roots of federalism and leads to secessionist movements." Also, according to him, the monopoly status enjoyed by Abdullah has to be challenged.

Opinion polls

[edit]
Summy by Janab-e-Ali [2]

1995 Outlook India "Kashmir Opinion Poll" (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?200005):

72% Independence
19% Pakistan
7% India

2002 MORI (Market & Opinion Research International) Survey (http://home.comcast.net/%7Eraman_akhila/akhilamori-links.htm):

78% Neither India nor Pakistan (independence was not an option in the study)
13% Pakistan
9% India

2007 Indian Express/Centre for the Study of Developing Societies Survey (http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKDEL291796._CH_.242020070813):

87% Independence
7% India
3% Pakistan

And the current study which shows:

82% Independence
10% India
4% Pakistan
1995
2000
2002-2003
2007
2008
2010
  • Talks about a survey conducted by Team CVoter for "Sunday Hindustan Times".
  • Only 6% wanted the predominantly Muslim area to merge with Pakistan, according to the survey conducted for the Hindustan Times newspaper.
  • Analyzing, “What Kashmiris Want”
  • Hindustan Times, 2010
  • This study was conducted simultaneously in Kashmir, Leh and Laddakh and the Kashmiri refugee camps. The aim was to understand what a Kashmiri youth thinks about his/her future, state of Kashmir and what do they see as the best option for Kashmir crisis. The sample size for this study was 1000+.

Prem Shankar Jha columns

[edit]

1983 cricket match

[edit]
  • When Pakistan will be playing against India, in the world cup contest on Sunday tensions will run high. “It is an almost war-like situation, minus bullets and bombs,” said a cricket fan.
  • Showkat Ahmad a young cricket lover in his excited voice said, “I don’t support only Pakistan for winning the world cup especially the match against India but I support every Nation playing against India.”
  • “Kashmiris extend their support to any team that is playing against India, be it Australia, West Indies or even Zimbabwe,” Showkat elaborated.
  • Kashmiri time and fate has changed from time to time but the support towards the green shirts has never decreased. The two one-day internationals played in Srinagar’s Sher-e-Kashmir Stadium in 1983 and 1986 will be coming in the minds of Indian cricket lovers even today.
  • The Indian team lost both games and faced hostile crowds in the stadium who raised anti-India slogans and cheered for the opponents.
  • In the match against the visiting Caribbean side in 1983, the incredible support for Clive Lloyd’s boys made him wonder if it was a home game.

Zubin Mehta concert

[edit]

Elections

[edit]
  • p.xvi: For TN Seshan
  • p.101: The first two elections of 1952 and 1957 in J&K were conducted under the control of State election and franchise commissioner. Later, the elections of 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1983 and 1987 were supervised and controlled by the Election Commission of India.
  • p.101: Before 1967, nominated members were sent to the Lok Sabha from the State of J&K.
  • P.101: The Delimiation Commission carved out the territory of constituencies. Reorganisation of districts in 1979 and delimination of Assembly segments raised their number to 87.
  • Widmalm, Sten (November 1997), "The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir", Asian Survey, 37 (11): 1005–1030, doi:10.2307/2645738, JSTOR 2645738

1987 elections

[edit]
  • (Kindle Locations 11017-11022) In 1987 fresh elections were held to the Jammu and Kashmir assembly. To fight them, Kashmiri politicians seeking autonomy from the centre – rather than dependence or subservience – formed an umbrella grouping named the Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF workers were harassed by the administration; and the polls themselves were anything but free and fair. Although the National Conference–Congress alliance would probably have won anyway, their margin of victory was made much greater by the rigging of votes in their favour. Even the Intelligence Bureau conceded that as many as thirteen seats were lost by the MUF owing to ‘electoral malpractice’.[57]
  • India's efforts to manipulate elections in Kashmir and suppress dissent have marked Kashmir's history since 1948, but it was not until 1986 that discontent within the state found wider popular support. In that year the state's ruling National Conference (NC) party, widely accused of corruption, struck a deal with India's Congress Party administration that many in Kashmir saw as a betrayal of Kashmir's autonomy. A new party, the Muslim United Front (MUF), attracted the support of a broad range of Kashmiris, including pro-independence activists, disenchanted Kashmiri youth and the pro-Pakistan Jama'at-i Islami, an Islamic political organization, and appeared poised to do well in state elections in 1987. Blatant rigging assured a National Conference victory, which was followed by the arrests of hundreds of MUF leaders and supporters. In the aftermath, young MUF supporters swelled the ranks of agrowing number of militant groups who increasingly crossed over to Pakistan for arms and training. The major militant organizations were divided between those advocating an independent Kashmir and those supporting accession to Pakistan. In the late 1980s, the groups began assassinating NC leaders and engaging in other acts of violence. Some groups also targeted Hindu families, and a slow exodus of Hindus from the valley began.
  • Within Jammu and Kashmir, there was growing dissatisfaction throughout the 1980s with what was seen as increased corruption in the local government and interference by the central government (Kadian 1992, 16-17). This dissatisfaction was brought to a head after the 1987 state elections which were widely viewed as having been rigged in favour of the central government (Congress-I)-backed Kashmir National Conference and against the popular Muslim United Front (MUF) (AI Dec. 1993, 9; Kadian 1992, 19; Current History Dec. 1993, 428; HRWAP Sept. 1994, 40). Growing incidents of violence in Kashmir coincided with the more militant insurgency in nearby Punjab; the resulting drop in tourism hurt the Kashmir economy and left many young men unemployed, and thus "increasingly available to the militants" (Kadian 1992, 16; see also The Economist 27 Mar. 1993).
  • But when Farooq Abdullah later agreed to an alliance with Congress, it turned many of supporters against him. It is widely believed that the elections of 1987 were rigged in favour of Mr Abdullah's party.
  • Farooq Abdullah: Said to have benefited from poll rigging
  • A leader of the Congress Party at the time, Khem Lata Wukhloo, recalls: "I remember that there was a massive rigging in 1987 elections. The losing candidates were declared winners. It shook the ordinary people's faith in the elections and the democratic process."
  • Many believe that these elections were a turning point in the history of Kashmir.
  • Many parties - like the Jamaat-e-Islami, the People's Conference and the Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen which were on the losing side - are now part of the main separatist alliance, the All Party Hurriyat Conference, campaigning for self-determination of the Kashmiri people.
  • The APHC Chairman, Abdul Gani Bhat says the outcome seriously disillusioned many Kashmiris.
  • "Kashmiri youths participated in the 1987 elections with great enthusiasm and seriousness and after due thought. But the poll results fired them with anger. They decided to fight violence with violence."
  • Taj Mohiuddin, a senior Congress leader, who was initially part of the MUF, told me, “The elections weren’t rigged by the NC but by the government of India.” Even Farooq, though he initially denied allegations of rigging, came to accept that it happened—even if he deflected the blame away from himself. In 1993, while the state was in the grip of militancy, Harinder Baweja of India Today asked him, “Didn’t the problem start largely because you rigged the elections?” “I am not saying the elections weren’t rigged,” Farooq said. “But I didn’t rig them.”
  • Q. Didn't the problem start largely because you rigged the elections?
  • A. I am not saying the elections weren't rigged, but I didn't rig them. Or else, would my law minister have lost from Sopore? The Muslim United Front which got 10 seats would have got 20. Would that have made a difference? And the Election Commission could have gone to court.

1996 elections

[edit]
  • PT113: has details of Harinder Baweja reporting on the 1996 elections, people being herded into polling booths to show high voter turnout.

Muslim United Front

[edit]

Amirakadal constituency

[edit]

Hurriyat

[edit]

Article 370

[edit]
  • p.66 for Mysore Constituent Assembly

2015 Article 370 ruling

[edit]

Militants/Insurgency

[edit]
  • pt.10x?: The present turbulence in Kashmir is attributable partly to the inept handling of the political situation by the Central Government in Delhi. The Kashmir accord of 1975 had set seal on the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India as final. And despite murmeers of dissent Abdullah was still the lion of Kashmir ensuring peace and tranquillity and keepin gthe Pakistani interference at bay. The elections of 1977 which Abdullah won and of 1983 which Farooq Abdullah won were both considered fair and the machinations of Pakistan did not disturb the equilibrium maintained assiduously by the regional government.
  • But Farooq's refusal to aligh with the Congress in 1983 cost him dearly. In particular, Farooq's overtures to Awami Action Committee facilitated the intrusion of fundamentalism in the governmental set up in Kashmir. Farooq's eventual ouster and installation of G. M. Shah's government aggravatged discontent of the Kashmiris and when in 1987 election Farooq joined hands with the Congress party to fight the election the popular anger against Farooq mounted massively. The people had not forgotten Farooq's dismissal in July 1984 which had decisively sent a signal that Kashmiris could choose a government but its tenure was dependent on Delhi's pleasure. On top of it the stories of widespread rigging circulated widely sapping public confidence in the elective machinery of the state. Self respect and self determination both appeared to be firm casualties and this psychological inhibition provided the background for the rise of fundamentalism in the State.
  • The 1987 election saw a coalition of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Awami Action Committee and some othe rsmall Muslim fundamentalist outfits under the umbrella of Muslim United Front, MUF, to fight the elections agains the National Conference. They eepxected to win at least ten seats out of forty four contested but were appalled to find only four winners. Known for its reputation for rigging since the beginnign of democracy in Kashmir under the stewardship of Sheikh Abdullah in the early fifties of the last century the regime lost whatever legitimacy it could claim, with the rebels stamping the election as a thoroughly made one. With avenues of constitutional redress totally blocked the rebels took to arms, so runs the report, heralding the era of sabotage, subversion and armed insurrection in the hitherto peaceful Vale of Kashmir.
  • pt.130?: [In 1987] The political vacuum was filled by a team of disgruntled leaders who were aghast at Farooq's climbdown. In September 1986, they formed a Muslim United Front. The National Conference, because of the split between Farooq and G. M. Shah's groups, had lost its former preeminence and the newly formed MUF had considerable political space to manoeuver. A leading member of the group was Jamaat-i-Islami led by Maulavi Abbas Ansari and founded in 1942. Although it had participated in 1972 and 1977 elections, its main focus was religious, madrassas and mosques were its happy grounds. Now, the genuine appeal which the party was beginning to have, caused serious concern to secular minded political activists of the state. Ten other smaller Islamic parties joined the MUF.
  • A notable one was Islamic Students League (ISL) whose general secretary was Yasin Malik. Malik was instrumental in founding later the JKLF. Yasim Malik became a rebel against the system on 26 July 1980 when he witnessed an altercation between the army and taxi drivers : he was only a thirteen-year old then. In mid-1980s he formed a party, Tala Party, and soon after formed a Revolutionary Front printing out and distributing some political materials in Delhi. Malik was detained for four months. In 1986, the Islamic Students League was formed with Malik as the general secretary and Shakeel Bakshi its president. When the Muslim
  • pt.132?: Malik's Role
  • Malik was ruthlessly spearheading the terrorist movement in Kashmir... (Loads of examples)
  • This book has chapters on all the insurgent groups.
  • p.20: Introduction: The Jihadi Movement in J&K and Terrorist Developments after 1989
  • Background
  • Pakistan's ceaseless attempts to seize the state of J&K from the Indian Union and the pattern of terrorist acts discernible after 1989 arise from the interplay of two main perceptions:
  • As a Muslim majority area contiguous with its territory, J&K should be part of Pakistan and not India.
  • Post-1989, the belief that the confidence and capabilities derived from the `successful' Afghan jihad can be used to capture J&K.
  • p.21: The wars of 1947-49 and 1965 failed to get J&K for Pakistan. Both times Pakistan used aggression with regular soldiers in the garb of `irregulars/freedom fighters'. Participation of the people of J&K was minimal. (It is interesting to note that Babab Badar, Chief of the Muslim Janbaaz force was captured by Indian security forces in 1996. He disclosed that Major Assad of the ISI briefed him [1984] in these words: `In 1965, we should have taken Kashmiris into confidence. The infiltrators were actually outsiders and the massed had been taken by surprise'.)
  • p.22: The 10 years from 1980 to 1990 witnessed Pakistan's adoption of `proxy war' strategies and a spurt in the frequency and magnitude of terrorist and violent incidents.
  • p.22: From 1985 Pakistan has tried vigorously to cultivate Kashmiri leaders an dprepare the ground for another attempt at invading and seizing Jammu and Kashmir. Initially Shabir Shah and his faction of the J&K People's League were perceived as having the necessary base and potential. There were reports that Pakistan failed twice in calling him to Pakistan.
  • p.22: In the late 1980s, Pakistan was strongly convinced that a superpower like the USSR was defeated through jihadi strategies and tactics, and that this `success' could easily be repeated in J&K.
  • p.22: The JKLF was reorganised by installing Amanullah Khan as its Chairman. He was deported to Pakistan from the UK in late 1987. In February 1988, the Srinagar unit of the JKLF was established by Ishaq Majid Wani, Yasin Malik, Hamid Sheikh and Javed Mir.
  • p.22: Meanwhile, India did commit some political `errors', though their political context from circumstances, maturity, compulsions or calculations need to be understood. There were strong allegations of `electoral fraud' by the ruling NC in the 1987 elections. This created resentment among the people of J&K, especially the yough. Cadres of the Islamic Student League (ISL) were also disappointed with the poor performance of the MUF in the elections. However, they attributed it wholly to electoral fraud and launched an agitation. The State administration responded with the arrest and imprisonment of many young persons. This gave Pakistan its much-needed, much-awaited opening. ISI operatives promised arms and training to these `boys' to launch armed struggles against India.
  • p.23: During 1988-89, the JKLF and the Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF) became fully operational. They were Valley-based and the ISI wanted to form a new tanzeem to operate in and from Jammu as well. ISI's Brig. Farooq chose Babar Badar, MJF Chief who hailed from Jammu and was in Pakistan for training to launch his own Jammu-based tanzeem. It was Al Madad. The final name became Al Madad Algar Ali. Its main task was to participate in harassing actions to reduce the mobility of the Indina Army as part of Pakistan's war plans and preparedness.
  • Behera, Navnita Chadha (2008), "The Rhetorics of the Kashmiri Militant Movement: Azadi or Jihad", in Aparna Rao (ed.), The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture?, Manohar Publishers
  • Bloeria, S. S. (2012), "Conflcit overview", in V. R. Raghavan (ed.), Conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir: Impact on Polity, Society and Economy, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, pp. 15–56, ISBN 978-93-82573-33-3
  • Behera, Navnita Chadha (2008), "The Rhetorics of the Kashmiri Militant Movement: Azadi or Jihad"", in Aparna Rao (ed.), The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture?, Manohar Publishers
  • online
  • Excellent book for the Pakistani sponsorship of the insurgency
  • The roots of this insurgency are indigenous, but Pakistani involvement has expanded its scope and increased its ferocity.
  • But on the matter of Kashmir, the underlying source of continued Indo-Pakistani hostility, the scope of international leverage is limited. The past is strewn with the wreckage of failed multilateral proposals for settling the dispute. Moreover, given its nettlesome quality, no major state is willing to invest significant resources in resolving this conflict.
  • The U.S. economic sanctions have already taken a devastating toll on Pakistan's sagging economy. Even if Pakistan successfully avoids international financial default, the structural problems facing its economy will persist. Pakistan can ill afford to spend close to 38% of its national budget on defence, which will over time bankrupt the economy. The only way that Pakistan can reduce its onerous defence burden is to improve relations with India.
  • India's problems in Kashmir have stemmed from the misgivings of various governments about the disputed status of the state. A binding legal agreement with Pakistan would enable India to deal with the residents of its portion of Kashmir on more equitable terms. No longer would Indian governments have to counter Pakistani efforts to foment discord or be troubled by the threat of secession.
  • The origins of the dispute precede the creation of India and Pakistan. They can be traced to the profoundly divergent conceptions of nation building that underlie the Indian and Pakistani nationalist movements
  • During the first week of October 1947, a tribal rebellion broke out in the region of Poonch, on the northwestern reaches of Kashmir. Pakistani troops, disguised as local tribesmen, quickly joined the rebels.[9: Akbar Khan, Hodson] On the morning of 22 October, the invading column composed of Pathan tribals and regular Pakistani army personnel in mufti captured the town of Muzaffarbad. The majority of the Muslim troops in the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces stationed in Muzzafarbad joined the raiders and massacred their Dogra (Hindu) counterparts.[10: L.P.Sen]
  • Caught in a panic, Hari Singh initially appealed to the neighboring princely state of Patiala for assistance. The maharaja of Patiala sent him an infantry battalion from the Patiala State Forces, but this unit proved inadequate to the task at hand.[11: L. P. Sen]
  • This Indian unit was largely suc- cessful in hobbling the advance of the invaders. In fact, in early November 1947, it successfully counterattacked and broke through the tribal de- fenses. Despite this early success, the Indian Army suffered a setback in December. This enabled the forces of the Azad Kashmir (literally "free Kashmir," as the Pakistani-assisted tribal army styled itself) to push the Indian troops from the border areas. In the spring of 1948, the Indian side mounted another offensive to regain some of this ground.
  • Layton, Kimberley (2009), "Still seeking Azadi: Responses of the youth of Jammu and Kashmir to the Kashmir conflict", in Melissa H. Conley Tyler; Goeff Miller AO; Chad J. Mitcham; Emma White (eds.), Emerging Scholars 2008-2009 (PDF), Australian Institute of Internationanl Affairs, pp. 94–109
  • Vajpeyi, Ananya. "Resenting the Indian state: for a new political practice in the northeast." (2009).

Pakistani support

[edit]

Training camps

[edit]
  • p.137: The LeT now operates five training centres: four are located in the mountains of Azad Kashmir - Muaskar-e Taiba, Muaskar-e Aqsa, Um al Qura and Abdullah bin Masood; the firth one - Markaz Muhammad bin Qasim - in in Sanghar district (Sind), where thousands of mujahidin, among them British Pakistanis and other foreign nationals, have received religious and military training.
  • Rana, Muhammad Amir (2004), A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, Lahore: Mashal
  • Lists five training camps, Muaskar-e-Taiba, the Muaskar-e-Aqsa, Muaskar Umm-al-Qura and Muaskar Abdullah bin Masood are in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Markaz Mohammed bin Qasim training camp in is in Sanghar District of Sindh.

Dulai camp

[edit]

Financing - hawala

[edit]
  • N.S. Jamwal (2002) Terrorist financing and support structures in Jammu and

Kashmir, Strategic Analysis, 26:1, 140-150, DOI: 10.1080/09700160208450030

  • N.S. Jamwal (2002) Hawala‐the invisible financing system of terrorism,

Strategic Analysis, 26:2, 181-198, DOI: 10.1080/09700160208450038

Azam Inqalabi

[edit]

Human rights

[edit]
  • Excellent source on Afzal Guru

Afzal Guru

[edit]
  • P.310 describes how Afzal Guru was hanged in a hurry
  • Seems to describe the official version of the events
  • p.29: Says that the Home Ministry didn't make a decision on the clemency petition.
  • Gonsalves, Colin (2011), "In Defence of Afzal", in Harsh Dobhal (ed.), Writings on Human Rights, Law, and Society in India: A Combat Law Anthology : Selections from Combat Law, 2002-2010, Socio Legal Information Centre, pp. 672–673, ISBN 978-81-89479-78-7

NLF

[edit]

1990, Pandits

[edit]
  • Arif Jamal notes that even before the rigged elections, in 1986, a rumor about Hindus killing Muslims in Jammu led "Muslim rioters" in Kashmir to attack Hindus. He describes looting and destruction of Hindu homes and temples, then in subsequent years the assassination of highly visible Hindus (172-173). Though the details in Jamal may be overstated,[8] the basic points are supported by Harinder Baweja, who explains that "Kashmir saw" an "eruption of communal violence in 1986 when scores of homes and shops were burnt and looted. It was in the midst of this frenzy, inwhich close to 350 houses were damaged, that the organised mobs also attacked and looted temples."

Bitta Karate

[edit]
  • But the ripples of what Ms. Kavitha spoke about will be felt in the Kashmir Valley. She demanded a retrial in the case of terrorist Farooq Ahmed Dar alias Bitta Karate, who is accused of killing at least 20 people, most of them Kashmiri Pandits. His first victim, as per his own admission, was a young businessman, Satish Kumar Tickoo. He was murdered on February 2, 1990, outside his home in Srinagar.

JKLF

[edit]
Puchased 2016-04-27, Kindle, 16.62
  • p.174: Discusses JKLF in UK and USA
  • p.303: Discusses JKLF in UK and USA
  • An excellent source covering a lot of history
  • Calls Maqbool Bhat a terrorist
  • Excellent summary
  • Covers Kashmir insurgency, see Kashmir-notes
  • Handoo, Bilal (6 January 2014), "The Witness", Kashmir Life, retrieved 30 October 2016
  • Details an interview with Abdul Ahad Waza, and early history of JKLF insurgency in the valley.

JKLF(R)

[edit]
  • JKLF (Rajbagh)
  • Chairman Farooq Ahmad Dar (Bita Karate), General Secretary Wajahat Bashir Qureshi, another lader Haroon Kashmiri

JKLF(H)

[edit]
  • Chairman: Javaid Ahmad Mir

Amanullah Khan

[edit]
  • Sajjad Lone is Amanullah Khan's son-in-law

Sajjad Lone & Asma Lone

[edit]

Maqbool Butt

[edit]

Yasin Malik

[edit]

UKPNP: United Kashmir People's National party

[edit]

Hizbul Mujahideen

[edit]

Syed Salahuddin

[edit]
  • It is absolutely wrong that I picked up arms because the elections were rigged. Muftis are giving the election results a wrong twist. I was a freedom fighter long before I fought elections.
  • The story of Noor M. Katjoo, who tried to join Salahuddin's gang, and got caught on the way back.

Hashim Qureshi

[edit]

Mohammad Ahsan Dar

[edit]
  • close associate of syed Salahuddin.
  • DIG claims he was coordinating LeT, Hizb, JeM and HuM.
  • fell out with Hiz top brass, and founded Muslim Mujahideen in 1992. However, he remained close to Salahuddin.
  • first crossed over to PoK in 1984 to get arms training. Failed in his mission and again went there in 1988.
  • He returned the same year, was arrested in 1988, but escaped from a hospital.
  • Went across the LoC in 1989 and returned to found the Hizbul Mujahideen.
  • Dar was arrested in 1993 and released in 1999 (?). He was in close contact with ISI and receiving funds from them.
  • Infiltrated back into the valley a year ago, and trying to give fresh impetus to terrorist activities.
  • Says Dar left HM in 1992, launched Muslim Mujahideen. He was then kidnapped by Hizb and lost his influence and so also his outfit.
  • Says that the July 1988 that trigered militancy were conducted by a separate group of JKLF under the command of Amanullah Khan. Yasin Malik and Javed Ahmad Mir had nothing to do with it.
  • Names the group consisting of Abdul Qadir Rather, Sabir Ahmad Guru, Engineer Arshad Kaloo, Javed Jehangier, Humayou Azad, Mohammad Anwar Bhat and Bilal Siddiqi.
  • The attacks were first planned for 13 July but had to be postponed.
  • Bilal Siddiqi was charged with the blasts (for the past 20 years?)
  • Claims to be wrting a history of militancy tentatively titled "Crisis in Command".

United Jihad Council

[edit]

Friendly militants

[edit]

Burhan Wani

[edit]

Burhan Wani: News

[edit]

2015

[edit]

2016

[edit]

8–11 July 2016

[edit]

12–15 July 2016

[edit]
  • District magistrates of Srinagar, Anantnag, Ganderbal and Baramulla announced the imposition as the death toll from protests notched up to 37 on Thursday.
  • “The decision has been taken in view of intelligence reports that Pakistan has pumped huge Hawala money to flare up violent street protests in Kashmir, which could be exploited by the militants by staging attacks on security forces,” a home department source added.
  • After a day of relative lull, violent protests erupted in Kashmir again on Friday when people defied curfew in various districts and attacked police stations and security personnel, leaving two civilians and a policeman dead.
  • After a day of relative lull, violent protests erupted in Kashmir again on Friday when people defied curfew in various districts and attacked police stations and security personnel, leaving two civilians and a policeman dead.
  • The Congress blamed the Central and State governments for the loss of precious lives in the Valley. “ Civilian casualties could have been prevented had the forces showed restraint” alleged JKPCC chief G.A. Mir.

16–31 July 2016

[edit]
  • Having failed to quell the mass protests following the killing of Kashmiri militant Burhan Wani, even police, paramilitary and Army have been withdrawn, to lessen the chances of a confrontation.
  • Death toll reaches 49, with one policeman and one civilian. (Two policemen total?)

August 2016

[edit]

September 2016

[edit]

November 2016

[edit]

Burhan Wani: encounter

[edit]

Burhan Wani: news blackout

[edit]
  • According to Venkaiah Naidu, Mehbooba Mufti assured him that no decision was ever taken to ban the newspapers.

Burhan Wani: human rights

[edit]
  • “Curfew is in force in five South Kashmir districts – Anantnag, Kulgam, Kupwara, Pulwama and Shopian and eight police station areas of Srinagar city as a precautionary measure,” a police official said.
  • Although curfew has already been lifted from four districts – Bandipora, Baramulla, Budgam and Ganderbal – but restrictions on the assembly of four or more persons continue in these areas, according to a police official. Curfew remains in force in Anantnag, Kulgam, Kupwara, Pulwama and Shopian, and eight police station areas in Srinagar city as a precautionary measure, the official added.


  • The use of pellet guns has caused the death of at least four people and has blinded more than 100 according to local officials and doctors in the region.
  • Chili-shells, known as PAVA shells, are instead said to severely irritate and temporarily immobilise people without risking their lives.
  • “I understand that no one will lose their life due to the use of PAVA,” Home minister Rajnath Singh said.
  • At publication, the home ministry had not replied to requests for comment, but there is no evidence that the pellet guns will be taken out of action any time soon. A volunteer helping injured protestors at the hospital said up to two dozen people still show up every day with pellet wounds.
  • In a 21 September ruling, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court declined to prohibit the use of pellet guns.

Burhan Wani: Tengpora killing

[edit]

Burhan Wani: Pakistan involvement

[edit]
2011
2015
2016
July 2016
August 2016

Burhan Wani: commentary

[edit]
2010
2014
2015
  • Has a brief bio of Burhan Wani
2016
  • Talks about Mehbooba Mufti and the problems with PDP-BJP alliance
July 2016
  • An Excellent commentary summarising the various Islamist colours of the protests.
  • Modi's concerns about CPEC, China-Pakistan axis and links to Balochistan and Kashmir.
  • CPEC also connects with the sea in Balochistan, Mohan pointed out. "The prospect of a Chinese military base in Balochistan links India's problems with Beijing in the Himalayas with the challenge of PLA's [China's People's Liberation Army] rising maritime profile in the Indian Ocean. Throw in a fresh bout of turmoil in Srinagar into the mix, you have the explosive cocktail that is blowing up the traditional frameworks of India's engagement with Pakistan and China."

Burhan Wani: Omar Abdullah

[edit]


Burhan Wani: Domestic reactions

[edit]

Burhan Wani: Congress yields

[edit]

Burhan Wani: Discussions

[edit]
  • Party leaders literally went over to Gilani's house and the prison cells of the other leaders. They were rebuffed.
  • They did meet Mirwaiz.
  • Belatedly, PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti, sent invitation letters to the Kashmiri leaders. But they did not repons.

Burhan Wani: Balochistan reference

[edit]
  • Let that sink in for a moment. A serving Indian prime minister has attacked Pakistan over Pakistan's control of a sovereign part of its territory, the very territory that Pakistan alleges India is interfering in.
  • Perhaps Mr Modi should have considered the dismal path he has ventured down. When Balochistan is raised by India, Pakistan can counter with the instability and state-inflicted violence in northeast India. It is a path of senseless accusations and recriminations. India and Pakistan surely deserve better.
  • While Islamabad does have a great deal of influence in AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, the very idea that there is mass political rejection of the prevailing system is preposterous.
  • Thursday’s protests in Balochistan, believed to have been orchestrated by the local government, were held in all major towns of the province. Chief Minister Zehri said the demonstrations and rallies were evidence that Balochistan’s people did not like what Modi had said about rights violations in the province.

Doval doctrine

[edit]

Burhan Wani: Heat on Mehbooba Mufti

[edit]

Burhan Wani: JNU

[edit]

Burhan Wani: International

[edit]

Burhan Wani: Pakistani reactions

[edit]
  • The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.
  • Nominated by Sharif, 22 MPs are engaged in the diplomatic exercise

Burhan Wani: negotiations

[edit]

Jammu massacres

[edit]
  • p.263: Contains gory details of massacre in Jammu on 4th November, after accession.
  • Chattha, Ilyas (2011), Partition and Locality: Violence, Migration and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot 1947-1961, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199061723
  • purchased 2014-11-11, Abe books, 5.56 and 2014-11-01, 5.51
  • Add 1890 to get the page numbers on Google books.
  • pp=1930-1931 (for what?)
  • p.13o (PT181): Mirpuris calling themselves Kashmiri
  • p.176 for languages spoken in AJK
  • Although Jinnah (falsely) believed that J&K would fall into Pakistan's `lap like a ripe fruit' once the Maharaja realized his and the people's interests and acceded to Pakistan,[123] and although he was prepared to allow the Maharaja's `autocratic government' to continue,[124] support for independence enabled pro-Pakistan forces to woo the decision maker rather than the people... Also, by allowing the ruler to decide the issue, the Muslim Conference enabled its National Conference rival to advance the populist-and eminently more `sellable'-view that the people should given self-government so that, `armed with auhority and responsibility, [they] could decide for theselves where their interests lay'.[127] Apart from advancing its own popularity, the National Conference's stance also served to reveal the Muslim Conference as simply an appendage or surrogate of the Muslim League-as it was.
  • According to chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Jinnah used to say, "Kashmir will fall into our laps like a ripe fruit."
  • Ved Bhasin, Jammu 1947, Kashmir Life, 17 November 2015.
  • at the age of 17 when Jammu, his home town, witnessed the worst in November 1947.
  • In September 2003, he felt compelled to tell his story of those dark days in the Jammu University at an event organized by SAFHR-Other Media.
  • Sheikh Abdullah campaigned for accession, obviously on the conditions that ultimately people would ratify it, and it would be confined to three subjects, foreign affairs, communications, and defence.
  • Until his arrest, Sheikh was in favour of accession to Indian union but with greater power to state. His struggle was for greater autonomy, maximum powers which he tried to concentrate in his own hands.
  • VB: The communal riots took place in Jammu after instrument of accession was signed, after Sheikh Abdullah took over as head of administration – that is November.
  • Some riots were taking place earlier also, but mass killings, when the convoys went to Pakistan and were butchered, happened when Sheikh Abdullah was head of the administration. He didn’t intervene or could not. I don’t know the reasons but perhaps his feeling was that the Muslims in Jammu were not his supporters.
  • KL: Were the 1947 riots spontaneous?
  • VB: Those were organised and planned by the rulers with the support of the RSS and other organisations.
  • KL: Rulers, you mean the Maharaja?
  • VB: Maharaja obviously was there. Maharaja’s Diwan was there. Once Mir Chand Mahajan (PM) came to Jammu, when communal riots were taking place. He invited some minority leaders, including from communal parties and National Conference. Trilok Chand Dutt was there, Girdhari Lal Dogra was there, Om Saraf was there. I was also there as a students representative. At the Maharaja’s Palace, he said the power is being transferred to people of J&K state so why don’t you Hindus and Sikhs demand parity. Parity means, equal representation to Hindus and Muslims as the Muslim League at some time in India had said. No one replied except Om Saraf. Om Saraf said that how can we demand parity. There is so much difference in the population of Hindus and Muslims. Muslims are a vast majority, Hindus are a small minority. How is it practical and possible? At this Mir Chand Mahajan pointed to a forest area down the Maharaja Palace, where there were some Gujjar bodies, who had been recently killed. He said that the population can also change.
  • KL: So what did he mean by that?
  • VB: I am an eye witness to what happened in Jammu. When Jammu city was placed under curfew, Muslims were not allowed to come out of their houses, Hindus were moving freely. And convoys of RSS men would start from Prem Nath Dogra’s House, the Praja Parishad chief, in Kacchi Chawni. They were armed, some Sikh refugees who had come also joined them. They were moving freely from lane to lane massacring people.
  • I told my colleagues about it. Balraj Puri said, ok let’s us send one boy. We send one, who saw that RSS men and many other young men were trained to use .303 rifles.
  • KL: How did that massacre change the politics of Jammu?
  • VB: It did change the politics of Jammu. It did communalise the politics of Jammu. If Muslims had been there, perhaps the situation would have been different. Like the land row agitation, the blockade, perhaps this would not have happened. Now the Muslims have either to be silent, or be part of the process.
  • KL: So can we say that these riots were responsible for alienation of

Jammu from Kashmir?

  • VB: Not only these riots, there were other things too. For example let us take Azad Kashmir. Except some parts of Muzaffarabad all areas of Azad Kashmir were part of Jammu province. So when Indian army was advancing even Sheikh Abdullah supported ceasefire. When somebody asked him later, he said those people have never accepted him as the leader.

Jammu massacres: news

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Jammu massacres: blogs

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Non-Muslims

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  • 26319 families from Pak occupied Kashmir settled in various Districts of Jammu province. For sustenance they were provided some facilities during mid 1950s by the Government. Out of the families who opted to settle within the State, 22719 families settled in Rural areas and remaining 3600 in urban areas. The families who settled in rural were provided land ranging from 4 acres to 12 acres per family and cash compensation of approximately Rs 1000 was paid to each family.

Kashmiri Pandits

[edit]
  • Duschinski, Haley (2008), ""Survival Is Now Our Politics": Kashmiri Hindu Community Identity and the Politics of Homeland", International Journal of Hindu Studies, 12 (1): 41–64, doi:10.1007/s11407-008-9054-z, S2CID 143490357
  • Trisal, Nishita (2007), "Those Who Remain: The Survival and Continued Struggle of the Kashmiri Pandit "Non-Migrants"", Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 5 (3): 99–114, doi:10.1300/J500v05n03_06 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)

Tej K. Tikoo

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  • pt.280-281?: To the gullible people of Kashmir, the abolitionof Article 370 is projected as a catastrophic event that will sound the death knell of Kashmiri Muslim culture, in actual fact, this argument is a ploy to prevent assimilation of Kashmiris into the national mainstream. That way, these power brokers continue to expand their fiefdom, perpetuate their hold on political and economic power and build a communal and obscurantist mindset, which in due course, serves as a breeding ground for creating a separatist mentality. The bogye of threat to the Kashmiri identity that the abolition of Article 370 will pose is merely a ploy to camouflage the political ambitions of the leaders. Actually, these very people cause great damage to Kashmiri culture, as no culture can survive without the stimulus of outside contact and opportunity cross-fertilise. It was this mindset that has been responsible for creating the violent communal upsruge of 1989, which finally led to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. One of the main reasons for the failure of the state administration to respond to the anguished cries fo the Kashmiri Pandits to provide them with adequate security in 1998–90, was that the state administration had been completely subverted from within by the radical anti-national elements, who had infilrated into the system over a period fo time. This infiltration had been made possible by the existence of Article 370. "Within the broad framework of the special status envisaged by Article 370, which isolated the state from the rest of India, it was far easy for secessionist elements to infiltrate into the administrative cadres of the goernment."[12]
  • pt.281?: One of the worst human tragedies the state faces is the denial of basic democratic and citizenship rights to nearly 600,000 refugees from Pakistan who entered the state at the time of partition or as a result of wars between India and Pakistan, thereafter. These refugees have made the state their home for the last over six decades, yet neither they nor their children can get citizenship rights in the state, as reulst of the applicability of Article 370. They can neither vote nor fight election; they cannot get loans from the state nor seek admissions into various professional colleges of the state.
  • pt.281?: Article 370 has also been misuded by political oligarchs to perpetuate their hold on power by preventing various democratic legislations from being applied to the state. Take the case of 'anti-defection law', which is a useful provision for preventing defections. This legislation vests the powers of deciding whether a legislator has defected or not, with the Speaker. However, in J&K, the power has been vested with a party chief, thus turning the leader into a virtual dictator. Article 370 has also been used to deny a fair shae of economic pie to both Ladakh and Jammu region (see chapter 18). Violent agitations that rocked Ladakh in July–September 1989, were the result of th eresentment felt by Ladakhis at being treated unfairly by Kashmiri Muslims, who have a stranglehold on political power in the state. It is ironic that whereas Article 370 provides all the political economic, cultural and other safeguards to Kashmiris, the same provision is misused by Kashmiris to deny thse very safeguards to the people of other regions of the state.
  • pt.282?: The citizens of J&K become citizens of India automatically; whereas the citizens of India hvae no such right when it comes to their claiming a similar right in the state. Consequently, the citizens of J&K can own property and settle anywhere in India. On the other hand, Article 370 prevents any Indian from claiming any such right. As early as 1932, Bertrand Glancy, chairman of the grievances committee was compelled to write in his report: "The present definition of State Subject appears to be unduly rigid; domiciles in a state for a thousand years cannot, according to this definition, qualify a man. It would seem both unfair and inexpedient to deny the right to franchise to a man who has so for identified himself with local interests as to make his domicile in the stat eover a consecutive period of five years."[13] Dr BR Ambedkar had forewarned the country on this score in reply to Sheikh Abdullah's demand for a special status in the Constituent Assembly of India. He had said, "YOu want India to defend Kashmir, give Kashmir equal rights over India, but you deny India and Indians all rights in Kashmir. I am Law Minister of India, I cannot be a party to such betrayal of national interests."[14]

Current affairs

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  • Praveen Swami (20 July 2002). "The RSS game plan". Frontline. Vol. 19, no. 15. Retrieved 2014-11-01.

Jammu province

[edit]
  • Excellent article, available locally
  • p.129: Recently, Jammu was in the spotlight for its anti-Kashmir agitation (Amarnath row of 2008) and the agaitation's Hindutva-dominated face on TV gave an impression that Jammu is a very rigidly 'Hindu', conservative society. But beyong this level of having an 'impression' formed, very few are actually informed baout, or curious about how the Hindu society of Jammu is, or has been - and this is precisely the question that this chatper seeks to answer.
  • History, Rajouri District web site, retrieved 25 November 2016.

Punjab Hill States

[edit]
  • p.178: The earliest historical reference about the Dogra, as a name of kingdom, is found in two Chamba copper-plate inscriptions of the 11th century A.D. These inscriptiosn refer to an event belonging to the early 10th century A.D. In these inscriptions, the name of kingdom is mentioned as `Durgara', affirming the fact that the Durgara kingdom had already been in existence prior to that date. But how much prior is a quesiton which remains unresolved. Surprisingly, in Kalhan's Rajatarangini, belonging to the 12th century A.D., no kingdom by that name is mentioned, despite the fact that Kalhan has stated the names of other neighbouring kingdoms, i.e., Chamba, Vallalpura, Trigrata etc.
  • p.178-179: the name `Durgara' of the fore-cited inscription may be considered a racial identity, analogous to the `Gurjara' - the present day Gujjars. The term `Durgara' may, however, indicate that these people migh thave remained a warrier race, who lived in the fortified settlements - the durgs - in Rajasthan, from where they were uprooted and forced to follow a wandering life, like the nomadic Gurjaras, until they could settle in the Himalayan terai belt. While the Gurjaras lost their martial traits, having remained homeless nomadic for generations, the Durgaras coul dkeep up their mettle, possibly for the reason that the intervening gap, between their displacement and the subsequent establishment of a new kingdom in the hills, was not logn enough to dilute their martial and ruling qualities. This may explain their rise in the Jammu region as the powerful and dominating rulers.
  • p.179: The strains of Rajasthani roots are still reflected, not only in the Dogra constumes and ornaments but in their customs and numerous sacraments also. In this context, I am inspired to find a significant ethnic similarity between the Dogras of terai belt and the Dogras or Durgars of Ferozepur, mentioned by Henry Lawrence.
  • p.179: Having remained an ethnic title in the early period, Dogra today is a generic identity. It may even be said that all those who speak Dogri, may they be Hindus, Sikhs or Muslims, they are the Dogras.
  • p.180: Since we do not find any meniton of the Durgaras or any other kingdom around Jammuy area in the early period, it may be reasonably assumed that this country formed a part of larger kingdom Takkadesha during the days of Hiuen-Tsang. It were these Takkas, who are known to have evolved the Takari alphabet. In Rajatarangini, it was considered a part of Gurjara kingdom, which Raja Alakhana was obliged to cede to Kashmir between years 883 and 901 A.D. It is the probable period, to which the fore-mentioned copper-plates make reference, and state about the confederated effort of the Raja of Durgara with the Saumatikas and the Kiras of the Chamba kingdom.
  • p.180: Having remained dormand during the early centuries, the Dogras dominated over the entire terai belt between the Chenab and the Satluj by asserting their muscular power, and establishing their rul eon a larger tract between the Chenab and the Ravi, which came to be known as the Dogra kingdom of Jammu.
  • p.180: The Dogra kingdom of Jamu has been the most powerful state in the terai belt, which coul dassert its superiority over the adjoining kingdoms in military power, art, culture and socio-economic spheres. Thus, the entire terai belt upto the Satluj on the east, and th emountainous interior regions, deeper in the Ravi and the Beas valleys, were galvanized into the Dogra culture. While their socio-cultural influence is profound in the terai belt, it is confined to the capital towns of the erstwhile princely states of Chamba and Mandi.
  • p.180: The name `Dogra' is now applied ot the whole area in the outer hills, between the Ravi and the Chenab, but this use is probably of the recent origin, and dates only from the time, when this tract cam eunder the supremacy of Jammu.
  • p.432: To the west of Camba and south of Bhadravakasa lay th eold chiefship of Vallapura, the modern Ballavar. Its rulers are repeatedly referred to in Kalhana's narrative. They retained their independence as petty hill-chiefs till the rise of the Jammu family early in this century. Ballavar was known also to Alberuni.
  • Of the political organization of the hill territories between Vallapura in the south-east and Rajapuri in the nor-west we have no distinct information. The Hindu inhabitants of this tract including Ballavar call themselves now Dogras and their country Dugar. Thi sname is traditionally derived from Skr. *Dvigarta. But this term is nowhere to be found in our historical texts an dha sprobably been concocted in analogy of the ancient name Trigarta. The original form of th ename seems to be Durgara.
  • It is very probable that th eregion of the lower and middle hills between the limits indicated was already in old times divided into a number of small chiefships. Of these som eeleven seem to have existed up to the extension of the Skikh power into the Panjab Kohistan. They were all absorbed in the growing state of Jammu which was originally one of them.
  • p.55ff for Jammu/Durgara historical references
  • Jammu was well-connected with the Punjab, Kashmir, Delhi and other parts of north India from ancient period onwards. It was a sharer of the Harappan Culture, th efirst historical civilization of the Indian subcontinent. The history of ancient Jammu is not very much highlighted because of the non-availability of both the literary and archaelogical sources. But some important aspects of th ehsitory of Jammu hill states are traced from the 15th century onwards.
  • It is a well-established historical fact that the first time the nomenclature Jammu has been used by the Mangol invader Timur Lung in his autobiography entitled Malfuzat-i-Timuri. It was written by Timur during the early 15 centur A.D. It is known that Timur invaded India from Punjab to Delhi in 1398 and went back to his native country Samarqand via Jammu. However, when Mughal rule was established in th enorth India by Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur during the early 16th century, the historical sources of the Mughal empire recovnized Jammu as one of the powerful states of the Punjab hills. Abul Fazl's Ain-i-Akbari depicts Jammu as a state ruled by the Manhas Rajputs.
  • The genealogical history of Jammu shows that it was the Dev Rajput dynasty which made Jammu as one of the most active and leading states of the hills. Though the Rajput ruler of Jammu state accepted the sovereignty to the Mugal emperor Jalauddin Muhammad Akbar (1555-1605), the political autonomy of the Jammu state was well-maintained. It is important to mention that during the ancient and medieval periods the modern Jammu region or Jammu hills had no political uniformity or unity. There were several indpenedent or autonomous political entities. The first important work on the Jammu hill states is produce by J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel... Hutchison and Gogel deal with the history of the Jammu hills associating with the Punjab. For Hutchison and Vogel, the major states of Jammu hills were Jammu, Mankot, Jasrota, Lakhanpur, Samba, Bhau,Bhoti, Chenehni, Bandratta, Basohli, Bhdadrawah, Bhadu, Kashtwar, Rajouri, Punch, Bhimbhar and Khari-Khariyali.
  • Before the formation of the Jammu and Kashmir state in 1846 by Maharaja Gulah Singh, the Jammu hill states either functioned as the independent or autonomous political units. The Persian and other sources of the Mughal empire show that the Rajput kings of Jammu hill states had accepted the Mughal sovereignty and enjoyed political autonomy.

Hutchison & Vogel, Vol. 1

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p. 3 Huen Tsang mentions: - Urasha (Hazara) - Parnotsa (Punch) - Rajapuri (Rajauri) - Trigarta or Jalandhara (Kangra) - Kuluta (Kulu) of which the first three were then subject to Kashmir.

p. 7 Rajatarangini mentions - Chamba - Trigarta (Kangra) - Valapura (Balor) - Babbapura (Babor) - Kashtavata (Kashtwar) - Rajapuri (Rajauri) - Parnotsa (Punch) - Urasha (Hazara) Dugar and Kangra had not yet been founded. Kulu, Bilaspur and Suket were too far away to be under the political influence of Kashmir.

p. 41 According to Cunningham, the states of the Kashmir region are divided into three groups: Kashmir, Dugar (Durgara, Dogra) and Trigarta (Kangra), from before the 7th century. - Kashmir group consisted of states between the Indus and Jhelam - Dugar group between Hehlam and the Ravi - Trigarta group between the Ravi and Satluj. An additional 4th group of Simla Hill states were between the Satluj and the Jamna.

p. 41 Kashmir group had the following states (Muhammadan) 1. Kashmir 2. Gingal 3. Muzaffarabad 4. Khagan 5. Garhi 6. Rash 7. Dhantawar 8. Gandgarh 9. Darband 10. Tarbela 11. Pharwala 12. Sultanpur 18. Khanpur

p. 45 Dugar group had the following states Hindu: 1. Jammu (Jamwal) 2. Mankot (Mankotia) 3. Jasrota (Jasrotia) 4. Lakhanpur (Lakhanpuria) 5. Samba (Sambial) 6. Tirikot (Tirikotia) 7. Akhnur (Akhnuria) 8. Riasi (Riasial) 9, Dalatpur (Dalpatia) 10. Bhau (Bhauwal) 11. Bhoti (Bhatial) 12. Chanehni (Hantal) 18. Bandralta (Bandral) 14. Basohli (Balauria) 15. Bhadrawah (Bhadrawahia) 16. Bhadu (Bhadwal) Muhammadan: 17. Kashtwar (Kashtwaria) 18. Punch (Mangral) 19. Kotli (Mangral) 20. Rajauri (Jaral) 21. Bhimbar (Chibh) 22. Khari-Khariyali (Chibh)

p. 46 The ancient capital of the Dugar was at Bahu (Babbapura, Babor), 17 miles east of the Jammu town. Rajatarangini mentions 2-3 dynasties of Bahu as being subject to Kashmir in the 11th and 12th centuries. Jammu became the capital in the 13th or 14th century. It was captured by Timur in 1398. It was subject to the Mughals till 1752, when it came under the control of the Durani kings of Kabul. In 1810-12, it was subjected to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. in 1820, it was confered as a fied to Raja Gulab Singh.

p. 47 The Dugar group consisted of 22 states: - Jammu, Bhau, Dalpatpur, Samba, Jasrota, Tirikot, Lakhanpur, Mankot (Ramkot), Bhoti and Akhnur, were under the same family of Dugars. - Balor (Basohli), Bhadu (Padoo) and Bhadrawah (Badrawar) were ruled by a family that came originally from Mayapuri (Hardwar).

p. 50 The Trigarta group had the following states: 1. Kangra (Katoch) 2. Guler (Guleria) 3. Kotla (Guleria) 4. Jaswan (Jaswal) 5. Siba (Sibaia) 6. Datarpur (Dadwal) 7. Nurpur (Pathania) 8. Chamba (Chambial) 9. Suket (Suketia) 10. Mandi (Mandial) 11. Kulu (Kaulus) 12. Kutlehr (Kutlehria) 13. Bangahal (Bangahalia) Mohammaden: 14. Shahpur (Pathania)

Hutchison & Vogel, Vol. 2

[edit]
  • p.517: That Babbapura was the original capital seems doubtful as Bahu is so regarded by ancient tradition. After the Muhammadan invasion began, both Bahu and Jammu must have been specially open to attack, being so near the plains; and it thus seems not improbable that, for a time, the Rajas withdrew further into the interior of the hills, and fixed their residence at Babbapura, probably in the early part of the eleventh century.
  • p.518: Further evidence of the great antiquity of the State is furnished by the extensive ramifications of the royal clan. There are ten in number, each of which ruled ove ra separate principality, viz., Jammu, Jasrota, Samba, Mankot, Lakhanpur, Tirikot, Dalpatpur, Riasi, Aknur, and probably Bhau and Bhoti. Some of these, as Riasi, Dalpatpur and Aknur, were probably only fiefs of the parent State, and always dependent upon it, while others enjoyed complete autonomy.
  • p.518: the ancient name of the State was Durgara, as found on two Chamba copper-plate deeds, and of this name the terms Dugar and Dogra, common in present time, are derivations.
  • p.518: The chronology of Jammu State is a blank down to the early part of the tenth century, when it is referred to under th ename of Durgara. This reference establishes the fact that the State then existed and was ruled by its own Chief, called the "lord of Durgara." At a considerably later date the references in the Rajatarangini to two Rajas of Babbapura, if accepted as applying to Jammu, enable us to fix approximately the subsequent reigns. We may assume that Vajradhara, who was in power in A.D. 1114-18, succeeded about A.D. 1110, and the earliest authentic date after this is that of Raja Parasram-Dev (A.D. 1589). Between these daes twenty Rajas ruled the State, giving an average reign of about twenty-five years.
  • p.519: As in other parts of the hills, Jammu State was probably preceded by a long period of government by petty Chiefs, called Ranas and Thakurs.
  • p.519: The Dogra royal line trace their descent from Kus, the elder son of Rama, and came originally, it is said, from Ayudhya.
  • p.519: The Manhas Rajputs, a large agricultural tribe found along the foot of the outer hills, between the Ravi and the Jhelam, claim to be descended from the same ancestor as the Jammu royal clan.

Azad Kashmir

[edit]
  • online
  • p.23 Poonch had four administrative units [tehsils], two and a half of which are now in PAJK while the rest are on the Indian side.
  • Google books [3]
  • p.105: The Deliverance of the State
  • p.105: (possibly in a footnote): ... of partition dictated that the Muslim majority states would join Pakistan and the Hindu majority ones would accede to India. This happened in all the cases except the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh.
  • p.105: Sensing the aggressive designs of India, the Kashmiri people revolted against the ruler who asked India for help and subsequently got about 1/3 of the state of J&K 'freed' (Azad). Azad Kashmir declared self-government on October 24, 1947. Exploiting the situation by extorgint he Instrument of Accession from the ruler on October 27, 1947,..., Indian troops landed in Kashmir even prior to the claime ddate of October 27, 1947. Lord Mountbatten as the governor-general of independent India accepted the accession but only as provisional, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made a pledge to resolve the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the wishes of the people.
  • p.105: Pakistan reacted sharply to the so-called `accession' and the revolt in Kashmir turned into a Pak-India war with Pakistan supporting the Kashmiris who were opposing the Kashmir's accession to India. Meanwhile, India referred the Kashmir
  • p.107: (top) though we cannot grant recognition to the Azad Kashmir government."[7]
  • p.107: Besides these remarks, ...
  • p.107: Where does Pakistan Stand?
  • p.107: Successive goernments in Pakistan...
  • p.111: Those from the Kashmir Valley wholeheartedly backed Sardar Ibrahim, while those from Jammu stood by Chaudhary Abbas.
  • p.113: Azad Kashmir government was deprived of important powers."[29]
  • p.113: 1961-70 — Crawling to a Democratic Era
  • p.114: In this context, the leading political parties headed by Sardar Ibrahim Khan,
  • The IPS is a pro-right think-tank, linked those in it say only "indirectly" to the Jamaat-i-Islami, political/ideological mentor of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. While the JI advocates Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, it has also been critical of Islamabad's policies in PoK. It describes President Pervez Musharraf's "out of the box" proposals on Kashmir as a dilution of Pakistan's Kashmir cause.
  • While Mr. Mahmud argues for meaningful devolution to PoK, it is interesting, given the JI position on the "out of the box" proposals, that the paper considers the possibility that the idea of self-rule for Jammu & Kashmir may eventually boil down to a settlement that will provide more devolution on both sides without altering the present territorial claims of either India or Pakistan. According to Mr. Mahmud, this possibility demands that Pakistan start cleaning up its act immediately.
  • Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir), together with the Northern Areas, constitutes... under Pakistani administration since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1947. Pakistan has divided these areas into two parts: 13,300 sq km as a nominally autonomous state of Azad Kashmir, and 72,496 sq km incorporated into Pakistan as the Northern Areas and administered as a de facto dependency.
  • The politics of Azad Kashmir have mostly been influenced and dominated by prevalent trends in the political and military echelons of Pakistan. During its first 50 years Azad Kashmir has, almost uninterruptedly, been ruled by the Muslim Conference, a pro-establishment party, led by Sardar Qayyaum. Economically, the area is relatively underdeveloped and a long-running source of dissatisfaction has been AJK's claim of a share in the royalties of the Mangla Dam.
  • Federally Adminisered Northern Areas
  • The area has been under Pakistani administration since the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948. Though administered as a de facto union, accession of the area has not been formally accepted by Pakistan lest India interpret it as a validation of the status quo in the Kashmir dispute. The resultant ambiguity and lack of political representation has been a continuous cause of frustration amongst the region's inhabitants.
  • p.38: The contemporary administrative territory of he "Northern Areas" does not appear as such on the map, as it is not named and its space is divided up so that most of it is included in Pakistan while the rest (including K-2) appears as...
  • Azad Kashmir, Chiefa Coins web site, retrieved 16 November 2016.
  • Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan born into an eminent political family of Kashmir, he is the son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan Karelvi, a name synonymous with one of the first major uprisings against the repressive Dogra regime in 1931. It was Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan Karelvi, who led the popular agitation against an arbitrary tax on salt imposed by the Maharaja's regime. Three years later in 1934, running as a candidate for the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, he was elected to the Jammu and Kashmir Legislature, the Praja Sabha, from his home constituency of Mendhar-Poonch, an office he successfully held through the elections of 1938 and 1944. In 1948 when he was President of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference Mendhar, he organised the supply of arms to protect the Poonch and Rajauri area and later, he also served as a member of the State Council during 1969-70. He is remembered today by the Muslims of Azad Jammu and Kashmir as one of the pioneers of the struggle of the people of Jammu and Kashmir for their rights under the tyrannical and alien rule of the Dogras.

Mirpur

[edit]
  • p.186: Chapter 11 (Mirpuri-Punjabi)
  • Says Mirpuri-Punjabi is one of a variety of dialects of Western Punjabi. Ethnologue includes it as a separate language distinct from Potwari or Pahari, although Mirpuri is listed as a dialect of the latter.
  • Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (2007, p. 130) says Pahari has a script known as Shahmukhi, also called Naksh in Urdu. Hindko, Kaghani, Karnahi, Pothohari, Hazarvi, Mirpuri, Chhibalvi and Poonchi are various dialects of Pahari.

Self-governing

[edit]
  • Azad Kashmir, nominally still independent of Pakistan, and Kashmir in India, which the Indians have incorporated within their republic's constitution.
  • p.193: Azad Kashmir - "Free Kashmir," the more populated and nominally self-governing part of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir
  • p.193: Gilgit and Baltistan - remote and sparsely populated mountainous parts of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir directly governed by Islamabad as the "Northern Areas"
  • Is this outdated?
  • p.193: The Kashmir independentists' sacred geography, the territory of the former princely state of Kashmir, is a patchwork of diverse regions and communities that existed under a tin-pot monarchy for barely one hundred years, 1946-1947.[43] It is not clear why this territory should be a natural, timeless, and sacrosanct unit of sovereignty in the manner the rhetoric of the independist JKLF seems to take for granted: "Jammu and Kashmir State as it existed on 14 August 1947.. in an indivisible political entity. No solution not approved by a majority of the people of th eentire State as a single unit will be accepted."[44]
  • p.129: Administered as a self-governing province within India since 1947, J&K consists of Kashmir... Jammu... and Ladakh; ...
  • p.129: The remaining 35 per cent... is either directly administered by Pakistan (the Northern Territories), or nominally independent (Azad Kashmir).
  • p.136: The spiritual, artistic, and linguistic commonalities are often considered to inform a specific lifestyle-kashmiriyat. Drawing succor from vague notions of sociocultural harmony and a "simple lifestyle," these values represent a "golden age" of what can be termed "cultural security."
  • p.137: Many of the politically conscious use the term, though in diverging ways. For Hindus kashmiriyat represents intercommunity togetherness. They link this to an allegedly specifically Kashmir form of Islam which they think harmonizes with the secular ethos informing the idea of the Indian state. For Muslims, feeling betrayed by the political attitudes of most Kashmiri Hindus, kashmiriyat developed from a vague longing for political-cum-cultural identity into a form of Kashmiri Muslim identity, both intimately linked ot the concept of independent Kashmir ("self-determination" for J&K or "Greater Kashmir") state. Islamists reject the term outright, as contradicting the ideals of the global Islamic community and negating their aim of union with Pakistan as a Muslim nation.
  • p.126: Federalism in Pakistan: charting a treacherous course toward provincialization
  • p.126-127: [Pakistan] is a federation with four provinces, Punjab (56 percent of the population), Sindh (23 percent), Northwest Frontier Province (13 percent) and Balochistan (5 percent). In addition to the four provinces, parts of Kashmir which were included in Pakistan are organized as the State of Azad Kashmir and enjoy self-government. Federally administered northern areas include the adminsitrative districts of Daiamir, Ghanche, Ghizer, Gilgit and Skardu. There are also seven self-governing federally administered tribal areas where the laws of Pakistan do not apply, a situation which is consistent with the tradition fostered under the British Empire. For administrative purposes, the provinces are divided and each division is subdivided into districts. Again, each district is divided into tehsils. At the district and tehsil levels, elected councils and provincial civil administrators ahve ovelapping responsibilities.
  • p.127: Local governments in Pakistan do not have any distinct constitutional status; they are establsihed by provincial governments and powers are determined by provincial statutes. At the present time, there are 5,195 local government units in Pakistan of which only 512 units are in urban areas. For local government purposes, urban areas are organized according to
  • p.1: `Azad' preceding J&K as the name of recently won territory derived its inspiration from the political character of freedom movement launched by native Kashmiris for liberationof State of J&K. In practice, however, the critics content that ever since its emergence as an interim governance dispensation in October 1947, the territory is not azad or independen tby any stretch of imagination.
  • p.1: Human Rights Watch (and some other international NGOs) has described Azad Kashmir as anything but "Azad", which invited censure from the Pakistani government.[6]
  • P.1: Among the prominent Kashmiris are voices that concede that maximum autonomy should be given to AJ&K but also assert that most of the problems are of administrative nature rather than constitutional...the actual problem lies in the functions of AJ&K Council.[8]
  • p.1: Christopher Snedden, in an upcoming book, critically reexamines Azad Kashmir's internal politics by a survey of former administrative structures, economic and political systems, and subordinate relationship with Pakistan. He notes, contrary to expectations of the Azad Kashmiris' ruling entire J&K after reunification, Azad Kashmir effectively, if not legally, became a (dependent) part of Pakistan. Therefore, long disenchantment with Islamabad, some Azad Kashmiris now favor independence for Jammu and Kashmir and hope to prosper without help from their neighbors, he concludes.[9: Snedden]
  • [6] For example read, "Pakistan: Free Kashmir Far from Free", Human Rights Watch, September 21, 2006.
  • [8] Remarks by Gen Muhammad Aziz Khan, former Chairman Joint Chiefs Staff Committee; for details read, PILDAT proposes provincial status for AJK, G-B, May 19, 2011, Daily Times.
  • p.2: A senior government functionary expressed before this author that, whatever internal autonomy was left, present political alignment at the centre and AJ&K has compromised it. Winning of the bye-election by PML(N) by a thumping majority in a keenly-contested electoral fight against heavy ruling coalition, is cited as a popular reaction to the increasing interference by the Central Government. Consequently, the emerging perceptions if not bordering a crisis of mutual trust, are a quagmire of serious ramificaiton swarranting an indepth appraisal and immediate redressal.

AJK elections

[edit]

Gilgit-Baltistan

[edit]
  • Chapter 1: Mapping liminal territories
  • Section called Classifying the liminal: 1895-1947: Since its inception in 1889, the Gilgit Agency was an amorphous territorial unit...
  • In 1935, the British decided to lease from the State of J&K that portion of the Gilgit Wazarat lying on the north-western bank of the Indus river, specifically, the valleys of Gilgit and Punial. This act, affirmed through the signing of a treaty, firmly defined the Wazarat as a possession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
  • p.247: The region currently comprised of Baltistan and Ladakh can be divided into three contiguous linguistic zones with different religiocultural coordinates. [Footnote says: The Kargil dialect is intermediate between Balti and Ladakhi and is sometimes referred to as Purigi or Puriki.]
  • p.247: Before annexation into the state of Kashmir in 1840, Baltistan was further divided into three zones centered around the relatively large-scale agricultural inhabitaitons at Skardu (the curren tcapital), Shigar and Khaplu. Although at times unted under a single state, the three regions had separate ruling lineaages immediately prior to the loss of autonomy to Kashmir.
  • p.180: Kargil district came under Balti influence in the 16th century, during the reign of Ali Sher Khan Anchan, the Maqpon king whose capital was at Skardu. Kargil itself was developed as a garrison town by General Zorawar Singh during the Dogra invasion in the 1830s, and it was during this period that the foundations of the modern conurbation were laid down. Dogra control lasted until 1947.
  • p.180: After independence, the First Kashmir War and the resulting creation of the LoC dissected Baltistan, cutting Kargil district off from many of its
  • GB, as a whole, neither remained constituent part nor was excluded from the suzerainty of the erstwhile State of Maharaja of Kashmir. In fact, the entities, i.e. princely states of Yasin, Ponial, Ishkoman, Hunza, Nagar and areas of Chilas never remained part of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. The verdict given during 1941 by Viceroy of the British Government of India turned down the claim of Maharaja Kashmir to declare the above entities to be the part state and made it clear that although the above entities remained under suzerainty of Kashmir but never formed part of State of Kashmir, Whereas, the remaining parts of GB i.e. Gilgit, Skardu and Astore remained under the suzerainty and formed part of the State of Maharaja Kashmir, till 1947.

Gilgit-Baltistan: autonomy

[edit]
  • Sökefeld, Martin. "Migration and Society in Gilgit, Northern Areas of Pakistan." Anthropos (1997): 83-90.
  • Sökefeld, Martin. "Bālāwaristān and other imaginations. A nationalist discourse in the Northern Areas of Pakistan." M. van Beek; K. B. Bertelsen; P. Pedersen (eds.): Ladakh: Culture, History, and Development between Himalaya and Karakoram (1999): 350-368.
  • The issue of its status appears even more anomalous because, at the time of independence, the princes whose separate principalities comprised the area, had indicated their willingness to join Pakistan.
  • That their accession has never been accepted has been a great disappointment to the majority of the approximately one million inhabitants, who are 100% Muslims (Sunnis, Shias and Ismailis).
  • Unlike Pakistan's other four provinces, the Northern Areas therefore have no political representation and no status under Pakistan's constitution.
  • Bansal, Alok (2007), "In Pursuit of Forced Assimilation: Sectarian and Ethnic Marginalisation in Gilgit-Baltistan", India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 63 (2): 56–80, doi:10.1177/097492840706300203, S2CID 153450836 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • p.73: Being unsure of its political status in this vital area, especially in view of the activities in the UN Security Council, Pakistan decided to play safe. It made the so-called Azad Kashmir administration and its political arm, the Muslim Conference transfer the responsibility and legal right over the Gilgit area. In Karachi an agreement was signed on 29 April 1949...
  • p.73: In view of the Western intention of keeping the Gilgit areas out of control of India and also in view of the Karachi Agreement, UNCIP scrupulously avoided any mention of or decision in this area in any resolution or deliberation in its negotiation with India. ... Nehru wrote a letter to the UNCIP Chairman on 20 August 1948. Among other matters, the letter sought explanation for the absence of any mention about the problem of administration or defence of the large area in the north.... on 25 August 1948, Josef Korbel wrote back to say... "The Commission wishes me to confirm that, due to the [peculiar] condition of this area, it did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the problem in its Resolution of 13 August 1948. It believes, however, that the question raised in your letter could be considered in the implementation of the resolution'. The Czech member of UNCIP, Dr. Chyle, in his minority report to the UN Security Council, pointedly said, ‘The situation in the Northern Areas had meanwhile undergone a material change in that the Pakistan Army conquered many strategically important places during the interval. The Commission is bound to admit that while the reservation of the Government of India of 20 August 1948 may be legally valid, it is physically impossible to implement it.'
  • p.74: The Northern Areas have not figured in the territories of Pakistan as mentioned in the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973. In the Sino-Pakistan Agreement of 2 March 1962, Pakistan admitted that the Northern Areas are a part of Jammu and Kashmir.
  • Sering, Senge H. (2010), "Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout", Strategic Analysis, 34 (3): 354–358, doi:10.1080/09700161003658998, S2CID 154847994 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • p.354: Instead of the chief minister, the order rests all administrative, political and judicial authority with the governor, which makes him the supreme authority and portrays the assembly as a toothless tiger. At best, the order legitimises Pakistan’s occupation and claims political rights for the locals without changing the power equation.
  • Bangash, Yaqoob Khan (2010), "Three Forgotten Accessions: Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38 (1): 117–143, doi:10.1080/03086530903538269, S2CID 159652497 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • footnote 22: This is a rather controversial issue. While the Government of Pakistan officially maintains that the territory is disputed on the grounds it was part of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, on certain occassions it has been ambivalent and Islamabad's policy has been to progressively integrate the region into Pakistan, if with certain restrictions. The ambivalence rests on the assumption that only some parts of the now Gilgit-Baltistan would be disputed, while other areas coul dbe considered as full Pakistan territory because at the time of Partition som eformer local elites agreed to the integration with Pakistan. For instance, the ltter sent on 8 May 2007 by the Pakistani Ambassador to Baroness Nicholson on her report `Kashmir: Present Situation and Future Prospects' notes that `the whole of Northern Areas, which include Gilgit Agency and Baltistan Agency was not part of Jammu and Kashmir State in August 1947' and that the `UNCIP resoluitons are relative to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and do not, in any manner, apply to any part of the Northern Areas which were not included in the State of Jammu and Kashmir before 1947. From this perspective, integration of the Northern Areas with Pakistan is also not prohibited.'
2006
2009
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  • Says that it is largely independent internally. Obviously misinformed.
  • GB's PPP president gives his view on what GB is and why it should become a province of Pakistan.
  • Pakistan did not bother with any fiction of “Azad” Gilgit-Baltistan, nor did it claim that the government represented the will of the people. Two weeks after Brown’s coup, a nominee of the Pakistan government, Sardar Mohammed Alam, was appointed Political Agent and took possession of the territory.
  • In 1970, Pakistan changed the name of the region to “Northern Areas”, but kept it detached from Azad Kashmir. But while AJK was given a semblance of constitutional government right from the outset, Gilgit Baltistan was in a constitutional limbo, or simply a colony of Pakistan. In 2009, Pakistan finally sought to give some legal cover to this relationship by passing a Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order in the Cabinet and getting presidential assent for it. The order allegedly granted self-rule to the people by creating a legislative assembly and a council, yet did not provide for any constitutional means of linking it to Pakistan. Islamabad believes that this way it is able to maintain its somewhat convoluted stand on Jammu & Kashmir.
  • Unlike the PoK, Pakistan got possession of this area through the connivance of two British military officers. In 1935, the Gilgit agency was leased for 60 years by the British from the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir because of its strategic location on the northern borders of British India. It was administered by the political department in Delhi through a British officer. The region’s security was the responsibility of a military force called the Gilgit Scouts, which was officered by the British.

Gilgit-Baltistan: CPEC

[edit]

Senge Hasnen Sering

[edit]
  • Senge Hasnan Sering, Urdu realpolitik, Himal South Asian magazine, February 2011.

Gilgit

[edit]
  • Bunji Cantt, GlobalSecurity.org, retrieved 2 December 2016

Ladakh

[edit]
  • Leh district, Ladakh Hill Development Council, retrieved 10 August 2016.

Ladakh: history

[edit]
  • Lamb, Alistair. "Tibet in Anglo-Chinese relations: 1767–1842." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland (New Series) 90.1-2 (1958): 26-43.
  • p.53: Western Himalayas map
  • p.96: This region is now administratively divided into two districts of Kargil and Leh (Ladakh). Kargil district, comprising two tehsils, Kargil and Zanskar, has a mixed population of the Muslims and Buddhist. While the Shia Muslims who constitutte about 80% of the total population, predominantly inhabit Kargil tehsil, Zanskar tehsil is almost totally Buddhist. The bona fide population of Leh (Ladakh) tehsil is totally Buddhist.
  • p.5: It may be pointed out tha the old established frontiers on the Tibet-Ladakh border were reaffirmed by the 'Peace Treaty', signed between the dogras and Tibetans in September 1842. The Tibetans also accepted the Dogras as the legitimate authority in Ladakh, and trade in shawl-wool and tea was continued in accordance with old customs via Ladakh. Similarly, Baltistan (Skardu), which was later occupied by Pak forces in 1947-48... remained part and parcel of Ladakh division of Jammu and Kashmir State under the Dogras. However, Lahoul and Spiti, which were part of Raja Gulab singh's territory of Ladakh, were taken away by the British in 1846-47 and merged with the British possessions of Kangra in the Western Himalayas. Ladakh's distict geo-cultural identity was consolidated by the Dogras who maintained a separate Wazarat for Ladakh and Baltistan.

Chinese Ladakh

[edit]

Kargil

[edit]
  • Introduction, Ladakh Affairs Department, Jammu and Kashmir, retrieved 24 November 2016.

British Mirpuri, Kashmiri diaspora

[edit]
  • Bolognani, Marta; Lyon, Stephen M., eds. (2011), Pakistan and Its Diaspora: Multidisciplinary Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-0230119079
  • Sökefeld, Martin; Bolognani, Marta (2011), ""Kashmiris in Britain: A political project or a social reality", in Bolognani, Marta; Lyon, Stephen M. (eds.), Pakistan and Its Diaspora: Multidisciplinary Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 111–134, ISBN 978-0230119079
  • Sokefeld, Martin; Bolognani, Marta (2011), "Projecting Kashmir in Britain", in Bolognani, Marta; Lyon, Stephen M. (eds.), Pakistan and Its Diaspora: Multidisciplinary Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 111–134, ISBN 978-0230119079
  • -- This might be fake
  • Ellis, P.; Khan, Z. (1999), "Political allegiances and social integration: the British Kashmiris", in Reuven Kahane; Shalṿah Ṿail (eds.), Roots and Routes: Ethnicity and Migration in Global Perspective, Magnes Press, Hebrew University, pp. 119–134
  • The Change Institute (March 2009), The Pakistani Muslim Community in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities, Department for Communities and Local Government, Government of United Kingdom, ISBN 978-1-4098-1173-2
  • Robin Richardson; Angela Wood, eds. (2004), The Achievement of British Pakistani Learners (Work in Progress), The report of the RAISE project, 2002-04 funded by Yorkshire Forward, Trentham Books Limited
  • Ali, Nasreen. "The making of Kashmiri identity." South Asian Diaspora 1.2 (2009): 181-192.
  • Ali, Nasreen. "Kashmiri nationalism beyond the nation-state." South Asia Research 22.2 (2002): 145-160.
  • Ellis, Patricia, and Zafar Khan. "Diasporic mobilisation and the Kashmir issue in British politics." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24.3 (1998): 471-488.
  • p.45: Prior to the early 1990s, most British Kashmiris called themselves Mirpuris or Pakistanis. The Mirpuri category was looked down on by other Pakistanis – Mirpuris were racially stereotyped as uneducated hill-people with little culture. Becoming Kashmiri is an important component of increasing the status and prestige of a group of British South Asians.
  • p.45: The tiny UK community of Valley Kashmiris – people who speak Kashmiri – tend to socialize with other Valley Kashmiris. Some 500 families all told, a mixture of Hindus and Muslims, Valley Kashmiris maintain that they are Kashmiris – and Mirpuris are ‘nouveaux Kashmiris’. Just as both the Kashmir Valley and now the Neelum Valley are changing rapidly, so too is the British community that originates from Kashmir.
  • p.46: Valley Kashmiris view Mirpuris with much the same condescension as their Punjabi counterparts, but they also consider Mirpuris part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. They remain Kashmir state subjects, even if not ethnically Kashmiri as Valley Kashmiris would understand it.
  • Sokefeld, Martin; Bolognani, Marta (2011), "Kashmiris in Britain: A Political Project or a Social Reality?", in Marta Bolognani; Stephen M. Lyon (eds.), Pakistan and Its Diaspora: Multidisciplinary Approaches, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 111–134, ISBN 978-0230119079
  • p.?: between the company and the government of Pakistan, 300 displaced persons from Mirpur were given work permits in Britain.
  • p.783: During the rule of Pakistan president Ayub Khan in the 1960s, 400 work permits were given by the British government for the displaced population of Mirpur.

Web resources

[edit]

Reconciliation

[edit]
  • Says Mehbooba Mufti wants to open multiple points of bus routes across the LOC.
  • Other information on existing bus routes.
  • Nice!
  • p.146: Kashmir Study Group - Kathiawari Formula
  • p.147: Musharraf proposal
  • p.147: Dr Manmohan Singh's proposal
  • p.148: Neelam plan
  • p.148: Buch formula
  • Kumar, Radha; Puri, Ellora (4 February 2009), "Jammu and Kashmir", in Radha Kumar (ed.), Negotiating Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: A Set of Simulations, SAGE Publications, pp. 247–355, ISBN 978-81-321-0218-2
  • p.323: Kashmir Study Grou Proposals
  • p.325: Delhi Policy Group Proposals, G. Parthasarathy

Kasuri memoirs

[edit]

Highways

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