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A Plebiscite for deciding the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was proposed by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 30 September 1947, as part of all disputed princely states of the former British Indian Empire. The offer was again made formally via Governor General Louis Mountbatten to Mohammad Ali Jinnah on 1 November, after the Maharaja of the state acceded to India, and proposed to the United Nations Security Council as a solution to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The Security Council Resolution 47 recognised plebiscite as the solution, attaching two preconditions: Pakistan's withdrawal from the state and India's reduction of its troops. Following the failure of the Security Council to implement the preconditions and the subsequent military alliance between Pakistan and the United States, the Indian Government withdrew the plebiscite offer in 1954 and maintained ever since that Kashmir is an integral part of India.

Origin of the Plebiscite offer

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Prior to the independence of India and Pakistan, principles of popular choice had been applied to the issues of partition, with votes in the elected assemblies of Punjab and Bengal and referenda in the Northwest Frontier Province and Sylhet.[1]

After independence, the idea of using a plebiscite to decide the accession of disputed princely states first arose in connection with the Junagadh State. Junagadh had announced on 15 August that it had acceded to Pakistan, which India contested on account of the state being contiguous to India and its population being predominantly Hindu. Nehru declared that India "would be prepared to accept any democratic test in respect of the accession."[1] On 25 September, Pakistan rejected the proposal, stating that it was a matter between the Nawab of Junagadh and his subjects.[2] Indeed, the Muslim League's stated position was that the princely rules had an absolute right to accede to either country.[3]

With the prospect of a looming war between the Dominions on account of Junagadh, Nehru searched for a solution for peace. On 30 September, he presented a policy paper in the Cabinet's Defence Committee, wherein he proposed:

Wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory, the matter should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people concerned. We shall accept the result of this referendum whatever it may be."[4]

The next day, Nehru presented the proposal to Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who was present in Delhi for a Joint Defence Council meeting. Mountbatten intervened to emphasise that the proposal applied to any state. Liaquat Ali Khan's eyes "sparkled," according to Mountbatten, who added that he was no doubt thinking of Kashmir.[5][6]

Significantly, Liaquat Ali Khan made no response to Nehru's proposal.[7] He had already set in motion plans for a forcible take over of Kashmir.[8][9]

Accession and dispute

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Nehru had always been emphatic that he would not accept the accession of Jammu and Kashmir from the Maharaja without popular support. His position was that Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of the Kashmir Valley who had been imprisoned by the Maharaja, had to be released from prison and a popular government installed. Only then could the state declare accession to India. He indicated this clearly to the state's Prime Minister appointee Mehr Chand Mahajan when he visited Delhi on 19 September 1947 to explore the state's accession to India. The Maharaja however insisted that he should be allowed to implement political reforms at his own pace. Following deterioration of relations with Pakistan, an uprising in Poonch, and further pressure from India, Sheikh Abdullah was released on 29 September.[10][11]

Following the Pakistani tribal invasion of the state, the Maharaja sent an urgent appeal for help to Delhi. The Cabinet's Defence Committee met on 25 October and took the decision to accept Maharaja's accession subject to the proviso that the people's wishes would be ascertained following the restoration of order. Indian troops were flown into Srinagar the next day.[12] Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference endorsed the accession.[13] The Maharaja in turn appointed Sheikh Abdullah as the head of emergency administration.[14]

Pakistan accused India of having acquired the state's accession through "fraud and violence," setting the stage for the Kashmir dispute.[15]

References

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  1. ^ a b Raghavan 2010, p. 31-34.
  2. ^ Dasgupta 2014, p. 24.
  3. ^ Behera 2007, p. 11.
  4. ^ Note on Junagadh by Nehru, 29 September 1947, F200/246, Mountbatten Papers, APAC, quoted in Hodson (1969, pp. 434–435), Dasgupta (2014, pp. 28–29), Raghavan (2010, pp. 47–49)
  5. ^ Dasgupta 2014, pp. 28–29.
  6. ^ Raghavan 2010, pp. 50–51.
  7. ^ Dasgupta 2014, pp. 29.
  8. ^ Raghavan 2010, pp. 105–106.
  9. ^ Nawaz 2008, p. 120.
  10. ^ Raghavan 2010, p. 106.
  11. ^ Mahajan, Looking Back 1963, pp. 126–127.
  12. ^ Raghavan 2010, pp. 107–108; Varshney, Three Compromised Nationalisms 1992, p. 194; Nyla Ali Khan, Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir 2010, p. 30
  13. ^ Varshney, Three Compromised Nationalisms 1992, p. 195; Panigrahi, Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West 2009, p. 54
  14. ^ Raghavan 2010, pp. 107–108.
  15. ^ Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict 2003, p. 61.

Bibliography

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  • Behera, Navnita Chadha (2007), Demystifying Kashmir, Pearson Education India, ISBN 978-8131708460
  • Dasgupta, C. (2014) [first published 2002], War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48, SAGE Publications, ISBN 978-81-321-1795-7
  • Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan, Hutchinson, ISBN 9780090971503
  • Khan, Nyla (2010). Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-11352-7.
  • Mahajan, Mehr Chand (1963), Looking Back: The Autobiography of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Former Chief Justice of India, Asia Publishing House
  • Nawaz, Shuja (May 2008), "The First Kashmir War Revisited", India Review, 7 (2): 115–154, doi:10.1080/14736480802055455, S2CID 155030407 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • Panigrahi, D. N. (2009), Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-136-51751-8
  • Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
  • Schofield, Victoria (2003) [First published in 2000], Kashmir in Conflict, London and New York: I. B. Taurus & Co, ISBN 1860648983
  • Shankar, Mahesh (2016), "Nehru's legacy in Kashmir: Why a plebiscite never happened", India Review, 15 (1): 1–21, doi:10.1080/14736489.2016.1129926, S2CID 155701436 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  • Varshney, Ashutosh (1992). "Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir has been a Problem" (PDF). In Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.). Perspectives on Kashmir: the roots of conflict in South Asia. Westview Press. pp. 191–234. ISBN 978-0-8133-8343-9.
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