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Soviet Spies in the Tube Alloys Project:

Klaus Fuchs began disclosing information to the Soviet Union about the possible production of a British atomic bomb when he joined the Tube Alloys project, although Fuchs' contribution towards soviet espionage was more more severe during the Manhattan Project. Rudolf Peierls recruited Fuchs to Birmingham to begin theoretical research for an atomic bomb because Great Britain felt a sense of urgency [1]. On June 18, 1942 Klaus Fuchs was pressured to become a British citizen in order to continue work on the British atomic bomb effort due to heightened tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II.[2] Sir Edward Appleton was the secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research(DSIR) who decided that Fuchs was so essential to the Tube Alloys that his participation in the project outweighed the risks being taken.[3] Despite his allegiance to Great Britain through the Official Secrets Act, Fuchs felt obligated to share available information from the Tube Alloys project regarding atomic bomb production in Great Britain with the Soviet Union so they would not fall behind in the war.[4]. Fuchs was able to contact a London based KPD leader of the Soviet Union, Jürgen Kuczynski and his new courier Ursula Beurton, under the code name 'REST'.[5].


Intro:

At the University of Birmingham in Birmingham, United Kingdom, Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch released their memorandum stating that a small mass of Uranium-235 could possibly be used to produce a chain reaction in a bomb, which was backed up with theoretical research.[6] Their memorandum was immediately acknowledged by several enterprises, who eventually formed the MAUD Committee, standing for "Military Application of Uranium Detonation".[6] It was only after a small number of scientific reports written by the MAUD Committee when Winston Churchill suggested the group adopt a more formal codename, so Wallace Akers chose the misleading name 'Tube Alloys' in order to protect the private interest of atomic bomb research in the United Kingdom.[6] Among other enterprises involved, the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) dominantly oversaw the Tube Alloys project which was directed by Wallace Akers.[7] Wallace Akers was responsible for directly reporting significant findings of the Tube Alloys project to John Anderson, who was the Lord President of the Council and also involved with the Imperial Chemical Industries.[8] John Anderson then relayed the findings to the Prime Minister Winston Churchill [9] (Williams p.40). After substantial discussion regarding the continuity of atomic bomb research after World War II, the British government suggested that Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) give up its control of the Tube Alloys project to a new group, the Department of Industrial Research (DSIR), while Wallace Akers remain director of the project.[10]

Tube Alloys under Wallace Akers:

When the British government decided to hand over the atomic bomb research to the Imperial Chemical Industries of Great Britain in January of 1942, Mark Oliphant, despite his outspoken opposition for the change in power, referred Wallace Akers to become the next chairman, which is who John Anderson and Frederick Lindemann, Winston Churchill's advisers, ultimately chose to run the Tube Alloys project.[11] Soon after taking over the project, Wallace Akers realized that it would be in the best interest of Great Britain to merge their atomic bomb research with the United States. This decision was made due to the fact that Wallace Akers found out the United States had begun concentrating their experimental work on Plutonium-239, which was seen as a better way to start a Nuclear chain reaction.[12] Although many British officials, including John Anderson and Frederick Lindemann, were opposed to the idea of merging their project with the United States, in the summer of 1942 Akers was eventually able to convince them otherwise by warning them about the idea that the Germans may be the first to produce an atomic bomb if Great Britain does not amalgamate with the United States.[13]

After Winston Churchill approved the merger, which was supposed to include unrestricted scientific interchange, it seemed to be too late for Great Britain to gain any authority in the United States Manhattan Project which lead to only a few physicists participating and limited financial support from the government of Great Britain in the Manhattan Project [14]. American officials were concerned that Wallace Akers and other people involved in the Tube Alloys project from Imperial Chemical Industries were trying to exploit American nuclear scientific knowledge to create a profitable industry for their company, which was the United States' reason behind excluding Great Britain's involvement during the Manhattan Project.[15] In October of 1942, Vannevar Bush and James Bryant Conant, American scientists and administrators of the Manhattan Project, played a critical role in convincing Franklin D. Roosevelt that the United States should independently control the atomic bomb project, despite an agreement of unrestricted scientific interchange between United States and Great Britain.[16] The Military Policy Committee was responsible for creating policy restricting scientific interchange on research and convincing president Theodore Roosevelt to fund the American military atomic weapon effort.[17] Wallace Akers and the rest of the Tube Alloys scientists were powerless in terms of having a role in producing an atomic bomb at this point during World War II when German military forces were successfully advancing toward Stalingrad. Eventually, Wallace Akers was forced to stand down as director of Tube Alloys because his connection with the Imperial Chemical Industries was not trusted by Leslie Groves and Vannevar Bush.[18] James Chadwick took over the project in the latter half of 1943.

A nuclear agreement was eventually made between the United States and Great Britain after a series of meetings amongst Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. At the Quebec Agreement, Winston Churchill was desperately able to restore collaboration of atomic research and development, and British scientists were now cleared to participate in the Manhattan Project.[19]

Niels Bohrs's contribution to Tube Alloys:

In January, 1939, Niels Bohr traveled to the United States from Copenhagen with news regarding a successful fission of Uranium by Hitler's scientists; this put the Manhattan Project in overdrive.[20] John Anderson was eager to invite Niels Bohr to the Tube Alloys project because he was a world famous scientist who would help the British government gain leverage in the Manhattan Project.[21] Niels Bohr was highly sought after by United States Manhattan Project officials after he escaped being arrested in Copenhagen, Denmark and joined the Tube Alloys project. Leslie Groves offered Bohr substantial pay, but Bohr initially refused the offer because he wanted to make sure that the relationship between the United States and Great Britain remained a real cooperative partnership.[22] In December 1943, after a meeting between Bohr and Albert Einstein, long time friends separated by Adolf Hitler, Niels Bohr and his son committed to working on the Manhattan Project.[23]

Niels Bohr's contribution to the atomic bomb effort primarily revolved around making an impact towards preventing an atomic arms race after World War II, which he believed to be a serious threat. In 1944, Bohr made several key points he believed to be essential towards international nuclear weapon control. He claimed that Great Britain and the United States should inform Russia about the Manhattan Project in order to decrease the likelihood of Russia feeling threatened on the premise that the other nations were building a bomb behind their back.[24] Bohr's powerful beliefs stemmed from the fact that he was convinced the Russians already knew about the Manhattan Project; which led him to believe that there was no point in hiding it.[25] Bohr's proof came from an interpretation of a letter he received from a Soviet friend and scientist in Russia, which Bohr showed British security.[26] Also, Bohr claimed that the longer the United States and Great Britain hid their nuclear advancements, Russia would feel increasingly threatened and more inclined to speed up their effort to produce an atomic bomb of their own.[27] With the help of Felix Frankfurter, American supreme court justice, Franklin D. Roosevelt was initially understanding and in agreement to Niels Bohr's ideas about controlling nuclear weapons; however, Winston Churchill was sternly opposed to informing Russia of such work, which was expressed during a meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1944.[28] At this meeting, Franklin D. Roosevelt sided with Winston Churchill deciding that it would be upon the nations best interest to keep the atomic bomb project a secret. Moreover, the two leaders decided Bohr was potentially dangerous and specific security measures must be made in order to prevent Niels Bohr from leaking information to the rest of the world, Russia in particular.[29]


  1. ^ Simkin, John. "Klaus Fuchs". Spartacus Educational. Spartacus Educational.
  2. ^ Williams 1987, pp. 43
  3. ^ Williams 1987, pp. 42
  4. ^ Hunner, Jon (July 15, 2007). Inventing Los Alamos: The Growth of an Atomic Community. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. p. 112.
  5. ^ Laucht, Christoph (2012). Elemental Germans Klaus fuchs, Rudolf Peierls and the Making of British Nuclear Culture 1939-59. England: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 86.
  6. ^ a b c Fakley, Dennis C. (1983). "The British Mission". Atomic Archive. AJ Software & Multimedia.
  7. ^ Williams 1987, pp. 40
  8. ^ Williams 1987, pp. 40
  9. ^ Williams 1987, pp. 40.
  10. ^ Williams 1987, pp. 42
  11. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 201
  12. ^ Brown, A. (1997). The Neutron and the Bomb. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 205–8.
  13. ^ For Akers's view on the threat of the German project: memo to Anderson from his assistant, 11 June 1942, CAB 126/166, N.A.
  14. ^ Groves, Leslie R. (1962). Now It Can Be Told. New York: Da Capo Press. pp. 125–126.
  15. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 218
  16. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 224.
  17. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 227
  18. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 249
  19. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 241
  20. ^ Long, Doug (1995). "Niels Bohr, The Atomic Bomb and Beyond". Hiroshima: Was it Necessary?.
  21. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 245
  22. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 251
  23. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 253
  24. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 258
  25. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 261
  26. ^ Kapitza to Bohr, 28 October 1943, CAB 126/39, NA. 'Correspondence between Kapitza and B.' 2 May 1945, CAB 126/39
  27. ^ Long, Doug (1995). "Niels Bohr: The Atomic Bomb and Beyond". Hiroshima: Was it Necessary?.
  28. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 273
  29. ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 272
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