User:JhDio

The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: Dropping the Atomic Bomb Necessary and Justifiable?

Like many historical facts, there are both accurate and inaccurate facts. I agree with admitting to our mistakes, forgiveness and moving on; but many acts will never see a truce. Violent acts should never be forgotten, but instead of continually arguing over details or issues that will never be resolved or proven, society has an obligation to take what is known and/or speculated about and make positive future actions for all mankind. Arguing over what can not be changed seems futile, and yet agreeing, that similar potential acts will be prevented from the future. The dropping of the Atomic Bomb is one such argument that may seem more controversial today than in 1945.

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Gar Alperovitz believes that dropping the Atomic Bomb was neither necessary nor justifiable. On the contrary, Robert P. Newman believes that dropping the bomb was both necessary and justifiable and the authors’ arguments are: Alperovitz claims that the readily available options were to modify the surrender terms and/or await the shock of the Russian attack. According to, “Evidence from the MAGIC intercepts, the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 1945 intelligence studies, numerous statements by military leaders, close to the decision process, and the Leahy, Stimson, Forrestal, McCoy and Brown-- diaries allows us to go beyond this…..it is quite clear that alternatives to using the bomb existed—and that the president and his advisers were aware of them….” (2003 Wadsworth) Alperovitz , “Modern evidence… suggests not only that the president and [Secretary of State James] Byrnes knew Japan was on the verge of surrender, but that once the new weapon had been successfully tested, rushing to end the war before an expected mid-August Red Army attack was indisputably a major concern…” (2003 Wadsworth) Explicit decisions were made which set the terms of reference for the bomb’s use making it all but impossible to oppose the bombings. “The first decision involved rejection of the recommendation that to offer any meaningful possibility of surrender a statement to Japan would have to allow enough time for the development of a serious response. A conscious choice not to allow a meaningful interval was made early on—and explicitly reaffirmed at Potsdam.” (2003 Wadsworth) “The second and more fundamental choice was the decision not to offer Japan assurances for the Emperor. Once this decision had been made—and the Japanese were allowed to believe the Emperor might be removed and possibly hanged as a war criminal—it was obvious to all concerned that the fighting would continue….” (2003 Wadsworth) “The decision to delete assurances for the Emperor from the Potsdam Proclamation was one relegated to political authority. Once the president had made his choice on this matter—and since it was known that therefore the fighting would now unquestionably continue—the basic military options were to two: The only choice now was to use the bomb or go forward with an invasion.” (2003 Wadsworth) The chain of events and lack of discussion prevented any likely hood of opposition to dropping the bomb, especially after the president announced his decision. “The third fundamental choice has now also been fully documented. It was the decision not to test the impact of the Russian declaration of war—indeed; to weaken the military challenge posed to Japan by attempting to put off an event which all understood would have extraordinary impact. This decision, too, was made at the political level….” Alperovitz believes, “If the war could have been ended by clarifying the terms and/or the Russian shock, there would have been no lives lost in an invasion. Fighting was reduced as both sides regrouped, and the most that may be said is that the atomic bombs may have saved the lives which might have been lost in the time it would have taken to arrange the final surrender terms….” (2003 Wadsworth)

“The preponderance of evidence shows that at the time of decision the Truman administration believed, with food reason, that invasion plans threatened an unacceptable loss of life, to Japanese as much as to Americans.” (2003 Wadsworth) Speculation still leads us to the bomb being dropped on Japan because of racism. When in actuality the first bomb wasn’t developed until after Germany surrendered.  And yet, contradicting evidence indicates that “The directive issued to Col. Paul Tibbets in September 1944 instructed him to train two bomber groups to make simultaneous drops on Germany and Japan.” (2003 Wadsworth) 

Newman disputes, “The intellectual idea to which Hiroshima cultists are devoted is that since Japan was about to surrender when the bombs were dropped the slaughter of innocents at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not motivated by military reasons. It was instead motivated primarily by the desire to intimidate the Russians, by racism, by the desire of Robert Oppenheimer and company to experiment with a new toy, by the fear of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and others that Congress would investigate if their 2 billion expenditure was found not useful, or by the sheer unthinking momentum of a bureaucratic juggernaut.” (2003 Wadsworth)

“No knowledgeable historian would dispute the idea that so long as the Emperor’s position was in doubt—as it was throughout this entire period—the Japanese would likely have resisted to the end. The army faction held all the cards so long as the Emperor was threatened. And so long as the Russians were neutral they could also argue it was not totally insane to continue the war.” (2003 Wadsworth) After the war some Japanese leaders admitted that they planned to continue fighting considering that U.S. policy continued to threaten the Emperor. This was a primary argument within the U.S. government and why our military leaders encouraged the president to offer Japan assurances for the Emperor. U.S. intelligence agencies along with our military leaders believed the war may have ended before November’s invasion. “It is difficult to believe Japan would have fought on once the Russians actually attacked and once assurances for the Emperor were actually given. It is also hard to believe that in the end assurances would not have been given if the alternative was an invasion.” (2003 Wadsworth) A notable fact and issue documented over the years that even with the bombing of Hiroshima and Hagasaki, with the Soviet and out numbered American invading, surrender almost did not happen.

According to Alperovitz, “diplomatic factors were of far greater significance. The most important points concern Byrnes’ attitude and his influence on the president—especially when compared with virtually all the other top advisers. Some matters are no longer in doubt: First, in general Byrnes clearly saw the weapon as important to his diplomacy as the Soviet Union. Second, of particular significance are features of the context established during the two weeks in Germany. Byrnes and the president took a hard line position on a variety of issues during the Potsdam discussion because of—in anticipation of—the atomic bomb. This fact itself set the terms of reference for the next stage of decision making. Third, it was in this specific context—and at this specific time—that Byrnes arranged for the elimination of language offering assurances for the Emperor. Fourth, it is beyond question that once the atomic bomb was successfully tested, Byrnes saw it as a way to end the war before the entered Manchuria—and urgently attempted both to get a surrender and to stall the Russians….” Alperovitz believes that the Potsdam conference had been postponed in order to have the weapon tested before negotiation with Stalin. It was also obvious from the Stimson diaries that as early as May 16 Truman believed that the U.S. would “hold more cards in our hands later than now”—and that by June 6 the president had “postponed [the Big Three meeting]… on purpose to give us more time” Stimson had first brought information to the president about the atomic bomb because of its bearing on the crisis over Poland. And at the end of May, according to Szilard, Byrnes saw the bomb as a way to make Russia more manageable in Europe….”(2003 Wadsworth) According to Robert Messer who researched Byrnes’ concerns back in the early 1980’s; Roosevelt had sent Byrnes to sell the Yalta agreement to the Senate and to the Americans, Byrnes had an invested interest in achieving a satisfactory settlement in Eastern Europe. Byrnes’ personal political stature now rested almost entirely on his performance as a secretary of state—and in general it is evident that the bomb appeared critical in this regard as well. Byrnes seemed genuinely to have wanted Russia to enter the war prior to mid July. Almost surely the combination of new of the Emperor’s intervention with the news of the successful test immediately thereafter crystallized the final decisions: Now the bomb might end the war not only before an invasion but also before the Red Army moved into Manchuria.” (2003 Wadsworth) “Truman’s strong interest in the Manchurian question—perhaps partly because of its importance to many Republicans—probably also played a role.” Both European and Asian issues appear to have weighed heavily on the minds of American leaders in the final weeks before Hiroshima.” (2003 Wadsworth) Newman defends that according to intelligence, General Marshall and President Truman believed that an additional 31,000 lives would be lost within the next 30 days before the Japans surrendered or defeated. “The shock of the atom gave the emperor the leverage he needed to compel compliance with his decision…. Anami and others made convincing arguments that the United States could not have more bombs. Nagasaki, when it came so soon after, was equally a shock. These shocks were fundamental to ending the stalemate in the cabinet and the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, and needed to convince Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu not to join Hatanaks, Ida and the other insurgents who assassinated the commander of the Palace Guard and attempted to reverse the emperor’s decision…”(2003 Wadsworth) “Despite the final submission of War Minister Anami, Army Chief of Staff Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, who had been the three Supreme Council holdouts, army hotheads got out of control. Dissident forces seized the Imperial Compound the night before the emperor’s broadcast, turned the Lt. Gen. Mori Takeshi (commander of the Imperial Guard at the palace), attempted to assassinate Premier Suzuki Kantaro and burned down his house when they found he had escaped, and tried to take over the radio station that was to broadcast the emperor’s surrender the next day.” (2003 Wadsworth) “The sticking point in Japanese surrender in August 1945 was not the terms of surrender; it was the still unknown ability of the emperor to make a surrender of any kind hold.” (2003 Wadsworth) The Japanese wanted to manipulate the surrender terms and in doing so very well may have extended the war, giving the Japanese the time to gain the leverage and support needed to defeat America. Newman compiled an estimate of 17,222,500 people from nine nations who died due to the Japanese. 10,000,000 died in China alone from 1931 to 1945. It is also estimated that approximately 250,000 people may have died each month if the Japanese were not stopped. The peace talks were not effective and the Japanese military were determined to fight on. The German and Japanese military were evil forces out to destroy any form of democracy and oppress those who fought for freedom. Not to justify the killing of innocent people, but if the Japanese had not been defeated the world as we know it may not exist. Today’s world humans would most likely be enslaved and mistreated to unimaginable cruelty. Many feel that in order to protect the majority that the minority may have to be sacrificed. Many Japanese citizens may feel the same way and realize that although the bombings were horrific and possibly avoidable; at that time it was the best way to protect the world’s future. There will always be speculations and differences of opinions, but we should learn from history and make sure that evil individuals are never empowered to inflict cruelty on any population.

Bibliography: Stoler, Mark & S. Gustafson, Melanie. The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II. Major Problems in the History of World War II. (2003). Pg. 394-426.