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Iranian opponents of the Bahá'í Faith have promoted various anti-Bahá'í conspiracy theories which accuse the faith's followers of dual loyalty and of being involved with foreign or hostile powers. These theories are used to justify persecution of the religious minority.

In the early history of the Bahá'í Faith, the religion, and it's predecessor the Bábí movement, was experiencing a significant number of converts from other religious groups in the country of Iran. The level of growth was noticed by both the religious and government leaders,[1] who saw the growth of the religion as a risk to their continuing influence in the region; thus they tried to find ways as to limit the movement's growth.[2] In addition to the direct persecution of the Bahá'ís, there has been a number of conspiracy theories brought forward by the Iranian government connecting Bahá'ís to other hated groups and policies, such as British colonialism, Russian imperialism, Zionism, American expansionism, and previous governments in the country such as the Shah of Iran.[3] These accusations against the Bahá'ís have been disputed, and described as misconceptions,[4] with no basis in historical fact.[5][6] Bahá'u'lláh, the founder of the Bahá'í Faith, taught that Bahá'ís are to be loyal to one's government, not be involved in politics, and to obey the laws of the country they reside in.[7]

Historical context

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The Bahá'í Faith grew out of Bábism, which was established in 1844 by the Báb in Iran.[8] 89% of Iranians adhere to the Twelver school of the sect of Shi'a Islam, which holds as a core doctrine the expected advent of a messianic figure known as the Qa'im or as the Imam Mahdi.[9] The Báb claimed he was the Imam Mahdi and thus he had equal status to the Islamic prophet Muhammad with the power, which he exercised, to abrogate the final provisions of Islamic law.[10]

Bahá'u'lláh, a Bábí who claimed to be the one foretold by the Báb, claimed a similar station for himself in 1863 as a Manifestation of God and as the promised figure foretold in the sacred scriptures of the major religious traditions of the past and founded what later came to be known as the Bahá'í Faith.[11]

Accusations and reasons

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The principles in Bahá'u'lláh's writings dealt with themes that challenged Shí‘i Islamic doctrines, including the finality of the prophet-hood of Muhammad, the need for a priesthood, and also the entire Shí‘i ecclesiastical structure.[12][13] The claims of the Báb and Bahá'u'lláh were originally treated by the Islamic clergy with hostility as it was a threat to their doctrinal legitimacy and social prestige.[14] In 1852, two years after the execution of the Báb, Bahá'u'lláh learnt of an assassination plan against the Shah, Nasser-al-Din Shah, by a couple of radical Bábí leaders, in retaliation for the Báb's execution. While Bahá'u'lláh condemned the plan strongly, and renounced the movement's early anti-Qajar stance, on August 15, 1852 the radical Bábís attempted the assassination of the Shah and failed.[15][16] Notwithstanding the assassins' claim that they were working alone, and that Bahá'u'lláh had not participated in the assassination attempt, the entire Bábí community was blamed, and a slaughter of several thousand Bábís followed.[17] From that time Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar always remained suspicious of the Bábís and Baha'is and viewed them as agitators similar to the European anarchists.[18]

Originally, as the Bahá'í religion spread through Iran, many of the Islamic clergy tried to discredit the religion through the use of religious axioms. However, the methods of attacking and persecuting the Bahá'í Faith changed during the 1900s, and moved away from religious discussions.[19][20] Since Bahá'ís did not belong to any specific ethnic group, could not be identified with any geographical location, and spoke the same language, they became "the enemy within",[13] and figure prominently in Iranian conspiracy theories.[21] This type of non-religious accusation worked well within Iranian society, because a large percentage of the Iranian population believe in conspiracy theories.[19][20]

By the end of the 19th century, there was a growing dissension with the Qajar state, and thus charges of subversion and conspiracy against the Bábís and Bahá'ís increased, drawing public attention away from the government and instead toward the evils of the 'devious sect'.[18] In the early 20th century, the Bahá'ís were seen as being non-conformant in a society looking for unanimity and fearful in losing is perceived unique Shi'a culture due to threats from outside its boundaries.[22] During the 1940s the clerical and governmental groups started stating that the religion was entirely manufactured by colonialists and imperialists to destroy the "unity of the Muslim nation" and that those who did not share the beliefs of the Muslim nation were agents of foreign powers.[23]

By the 1960s the cynical disdain for the Bahá'í social message among the pro-religious intellectuals increased, and they increasingly started using charges of spying, and of connections to foreign powers over labeling Bahá'ís as heretics.[24] These new charges helped define a new 'other' and reaffirmed a threatened Shi'i self.[24] This new attitude towards the Bahá'ís was now not confined to the clerics, but was also rampant among the secular Iranian middle-class.[24] In the 1970s accusations of Bahá'ís being numerous in the Shah's regime surfaced, as well as there being a perception that Bahá'ís were generally better off than the rest of the population.[25] Chehabi suggests that the accusations and prejudices of secular Iranians against the Bahá'ís arise from the anti-cosmopolitan outlook of Iranian nationalism; while the Bahá'í Faith affirms the unity of humanity, Iranian nationalism has contained strong xenophobic elements.[25] He notes that while Iran's sovereignty was recognized in the 19th century, Britain and Russia meddled in the country's affairs to further their own interests, and that groups that have trans-national ties like the Jews and the Bahá'ís are therefore seen as suspicious by Iranian nationalists.[25] He also notes that while the teachings of the Bahá'í Faith mitigate against a preferential attachment of Bahá'ís to Iran, Iran is seen by Bahá'ís as the "Cradle of the Cause" to which it commands a degree of affection by Bahá'ís worldwide.[25]

Since the founding of Israel, there are also accusations of Bahá'ís being associated with Zionism, since the Bahá'í World Centre is located in current-day Israel, which is a historical accident.[25] The Bahá'í World Centre has its historical origins in the area that was once Ottoman Syria. This dates back to the 1850s and 1860s when the Shah of Iran and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz, successively exiled Bahá'u'lláh from Iran to the fortress of Acre for lifetime incarceration.[26] (While the location of the Baha'i World Centre may be viewed as a historical accident at one level, Baha'is believe that it also fulfills numerous prophecies of multiple religions regarding the coming of the Promised One in this area.)

Since the Iranian revolution

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After the overthrow of the Shah during the Iranian revolution, the Islamic regime targeted the Bahá'ís in Iran, since they held a deep hostility toward them as they saw them as infidels.[27] As nationalism grew in Iran, Bahá'ís were viewed as unpatriotic and linked to foreign elements.[28] During this time the Bahá'ís were accused of being anti-Islamic, agents of Zionism, friends of the Shah's regime, and being engaged with the US and British governments.[28] The National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of Iran, both privately and publicly, addressed the charges against them point by point, but received no response to their rebuttal.[28] In January 1980 with the election of President Bani Sadr and the continuing anti-Bahá'í sentiment, the Bahá'í Faith was officially described by the government as a political movement against the Iranian revolution and Islam.[29] Before the revolution, Bani Sadr had connected the universal message of the Bahá'í Faith with Western colonialism.[29] In February 1980, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations stated that Bahá'ís were SAVAK agents and repeated the cleric's charges; only later when he broke with the regime in 1982 did he recant his previous statements.[29]

By 1981, however, revolutionary courts no longer couched the execution of Bahá'ís with political terms, and they instead cited only religious reasons.[30] Also documents were given out to Bahá'ís that if they would publicly embrace Islam, their jobs, pensions and property would be reinstated. These documents were shown to the United Nations as evidence that the Iranian government was using the political accusations as a front to the real religious reason for the persecution of the Bahá'ís.[30]

In 1983, Iran's prosecutor general once again stated that the Bahá'ís were not being persecuted because of their religious belief, but that instead they were spies, and that they were funneling money outside the country.[31] The National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of Iran, once again, addressed the issues raised by the prosecuted point by point; the letter was sent to various government agencies. The letter acknowledged that funds were being sent abroad as Bahá'í contributions to the shrines and holy places, but denied all other points, and asked for proof of the charges.[31] No response was obtained from the government to this letter. The clerics continued to persecute the Bahá'ís and charged the Bahá'ís with "crimes against God" and Zionism.[31] Then in 1983 to a report to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations the official view of the Islamic Republic was published in a twenty-page document; the document stated that British encouraged the Bahá'í Faith in Iran, and that it was not a religion, but a political entity created by colonial powers, that there was a link between the Bahá'í Faith and Zionism and SAVAK. The United Nations Human Rights Commission Sub-Commission Expert Mr. Eide stated that the publication provided by the Iranian government "recalled the publications disseminated in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, which had contributed to severe prejudice costing the lives of hundreds of thousands of peoples. The Sub-Commission should be on guard against any recurrence of such campaigns".[32] The Iranian government's statement was not accepted by the United Nations as the United Nations had received no evidence from the Iranian government regarding its claims.[33][34] The representative from Germany stated that "the documents concerning the Bahá'ís showed that the latter were persecuted, not for criminal offences, but simply for their religious beliefs".[35] The Iranian delegate dismissed the text of the Commission's resolution, and persecution of the Bahá'ís continued.[36]

In 1991, the Iranian government again gave a statement to the United Nations stating that since the administrative centre of the Bahá'í Faith is located in Israel, it is directly controlled by Zionist forces,[37] even though Bahá'í World Centre has its historical origins in the area that was once Ottoman Syria.[26]

More recently, during Muhammad Khatami's presidency, the name-calling and accusations have not ended, and even more recently with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the frequency and intensity of the name-calling and accusations has increased.[38]

Russian and British ties

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During the 19th century, Britain had firm control over India; at the same time Russia had been expanding south and east into Central Asia toward India, and a rivalry started between Britain and Russia over territorial and political control in Central Asia. The middle zone of land that was located between India and Russian holdings, included Persia, and was a highly coveted region, where both Russia and Britain worked to gain influence.[39] The support of the United Kingdom during the Constitutional Revolution, the Anglo-Russian convention which solidified boundaries that identified control between Britain and Russia in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the occupation of Iranian territory during the First World War by the UK, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the coup d'état of 1921 which was backed by the British, all encouraged the development of conspiracy theories related to foreign powers.[40] Muslim clerics and other anti-Bahá'í groups tried to connect the Bahá'í Faith, and it's predecessor the Bábí movement, to the external governments of Britain and Russia to project the mistrust of these two latter groups onto the Bahá'ís.[21][40]

Russian ties

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The foundation of many of the conspiracy theories relating the Bahá'í Faith to Russian influence is a fictitious memoir that is attributed to Dimitri Ivanovich Dolgorukov (also known as Dolgourki), who was the Russian ambassador to Persia from 1846 to 1854.[19][21] The memoir states that Dolgorukov created the Bábí and Bahá'í religions so as to weaken Iran and Shi'a Islam.[21] The document, in many ways, is the functional equivalent of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which was a fraudulent anti-Semitic tract alleging a Jewish plot to achieve world domination.[21] The fictional memoir has been published twice, both in 1943. The main difference between the two versions is that some of the historical errors in the first publication have been corrected in the second publication, though given the remaining issues with the book it is unconvincing in it's authenticity.[19]

The memoir states that Dolgorukov used to attend gatherings of Hakím Ahmad Gílání, where he would meet Bahá'u'lláh. However, Gílání had died in 1835, before Dolgorukov's arrival in the country. There are numerous other errors relating to the dates and times of events that the memoir describes; the memoir describes events after the death of personages, or when the people involved were young children, or when they were in different parts of the world.[19] Dolgorukov actually only became aware of the Bábí movement several years after its foundation, and his letters show that he was afraid of the movement spreading into Russian controlled areas, and asked the Iranian authorities to move the Báb further away from those areas.[19][41]

During 1852, a radical group of Bábís attempted the assassination of the Shah and failed. The group of Bábís linked with the plan, were rounded up and killed, and, notwithstanding the assassins' claim that they were working alone, and that Bahá'u'lláh had condemned the plan, the entire Bábí community was blamed and a general pogrom of the Bábí community was started by the Shah.[42] After Bahá'u'lláh was arrested, his family asked the Russian delegation in Tehran to help exonerate him, and Dolgorukov agreed.[43]

After Dolgorukov, and the Grand Vizier of Persia, both pressured the Shah to bring forward evidence that Bahá'u'lláh had participated in the assassination attempt, the Shah relented and freed Bahá'u'lláh, but under the condition that Bahá'u'lláh had to leave Iran.[43] Dolgorukov provided an offer of residence in Russia for Bahá'u'lláh but Bahá'u'lláh instead decided to move to the region in Iraq where there was a large proportion of Shi'a Muslims.[44] The memoirs, however, extend this assistance to all facets of Bahá'u'lláh's life. As Dolgorukov left the Russian diplomatic service in 1854 and died in 1867, he was unable to interact with Bahá'u'lláh in ways which the memoir states.[19]

British ties

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There have also been claims that the Bábí movement was started by the British, and that the Bahá'í Faith has ties to British imperialism; the connection to the British, however, has also been spread due to conspiracy theories that are not based on the historical record.[19] Firaydun Adamiyyat, in a biography on Iranian Prime Minister Amir Kabir, stated that one of the Báb's first disciples was chosen by Arthur Conolly, a British intelligence officer, explorer and writer, to help spread the movement. Adamiyyat stated that he made the accusation because Conolly's book about his travels through Iran includes details about the connection, but there is actually no reference to the Báb's disciple in the book. In later editions of Adamiyyat's biography on Amir Kabir, the made-up accusation is no longer present.[19]

The accusations of ties to the British also come of the knighting in 1920 of `Abdu'l-Bahá, then head of the religion, by the British Mandate of Palestine — an act that the conspiracy theorists assert is proof of the ties to the British.[45] `Abdu'l-Bahá was, however, awarded for his humanitarian efforts during World War I.[46] During the war the region of Palestine was affected by a famine that was caused by both natural (locusts) and political reasons (government mismanagement of resources). Because of the famine, `Abdu'l-Bahá asked the local Bahá'ís to farm grain and help distribute the grain to the people affected by the famine.[47]

Bahá'ís as agents of international Zionism

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Bahá'ís have also been accused of ties to Zionism, a movement that calls for the self-determination of the Jewish people and a sovereign, Jewish national homeland. This claim is typically advanced is by noting that the most holy shrines of the Bahá'ís are located in current-day Israel.[25] However, Bahá'u'lláh was banished from Persia by Nasser-al-Din Shah, at which time Bahá'u'lláh went to Baghdad in the Ottoman Empire.[48] Later he was later exiled by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, at the behest of the Persian Shah, to territories further away from Iran and finally to Acre in Syria,[49] which only a century later was incorporated into the state of Israel.[19] Bahá'u'lláh died in 1892 near Acre, and the resting place is in Bahji. Following Bahá'u'lláh's death, `Abdu'l-Bahá, as instructed by Bahá'u'lláh in his will, led the religion until his own death in 1921. He is buried in Haifa, which was then in Palestine.[50] Another other important figure for Bahá'ís who is buried in current-day Israel is the Báb, whose remains were clandestinely brought to Palestine and interred on the slopes of Mount Carmel in Haifa in 1909.[51] Israel did not form until 1948 which was more than half a decade after Bahá'u'lláh's death, 40 years after the Báb's remains were brought to the region, and 27 years after `Abdu'l-Bahá's death.

More recently, there have been accusations that the Bahá'ís support Israel because they send fund contributions to the Bahá'í World Centre which is located in northern Israel.[31][52] The donations are used in the Bahá'í World Centre for upkeep of the Bahá'í properties, as well as the administration of the worldwide Bahá'í community.[31] The National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of Iran in a 1983 letter to the Iranian government stated that while Muslims were praised for sending money out of the country to Iraq and Jerusalem for the upkeep of their religious shrines, when Bahá'ís sent money for the upkeep of their own shrines it was considered an unforgivable sin.[53]

Bahá'ís as agents of the Shah's regime and its secret police

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Another often-repeated accusation against the Bahá'ís is that they were treated favourably by, and held many prominent positions in, the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and collaborated with its secret police, SAVAK.[54] Even before the Iranian revolution, the Bahá'ís, viewed as the "other" in Iranian society, were held responsible by the rest of the Iranians for the abusive suppression by SAVAK and the Shah's unpopular policies.[55] After the revolution, the assertion that the Bahá'ís were agents of the Shah partly mostly originates because Bahá'ís did not help the revolutionary groups, since one of the tenets of the Bahá'í Faith is to obey the government of one's country.[56]

The Bahá'í International Community has, however, stated that the Bahá'í community in Iran was the victim of the Shah's regime, and that SAVAK was one of the main ways of persecuting the Bahá'ís.[34] For example the Shah's government closed the Bahá'í Tarbiyat school, and other Bahá'í schools throughout the country in 1934.[57] Also during the month of Ramadan in 1955, when the Shah decided to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact and wanted to divert attention from that decision, it sought the support of the clerics. Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi, acting as the Marja Taqlid, a Grand Ayatollah with the authority to make legal decisions within the confines of Islamic law, pushed the Shah's government to support the persecution of the Bahá'í community.[58][59] The 1955 attacks were particularly destructive and widespread since the clergy and the government combined to use the mass media, such as radio and newspapers, to spread hatred against the Bahá'ís, which eventually led to mob violence.[58][59][60] The Shah's military also occupied the Bahá'í centre in Tehran, which was destroyed in the violence.[58][59] Mottahedeh states that while the Bahá'ís were tolerated under Pahlavi rule in the mid 190s, the toleration was not because the dynasty was favouring Bahá'ís, but rather the dynasty was using the Bahá'ís as a pawn against the clerical establishment.[58]

There is also evidence that SAVAK collaborated with Islamic groups throughout the 1960s and 1970s in harassing Bahá'ís.[59] SAVAK also had links to Hojjatieh, a radical anti-Bahá'í group. Rahnema and Nomani state that the Shah gave Hojjatieh free rein for their activities toward the Bahá'ís.[34] Keddie states that the accusations of Bahá'ís being part of SAVAK were mainly false pretexts for persecution.[61]

With regards to the accusation that Bahá'ís held many prominent positions in the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, there is no empirical study that endeavours to determine the truth of such an accusation.[54] There were a number of individuals who were part of the government and who had Bahá'í backgrounds, but were not Bahá'ís themselves. One problem that arises is the definition of a Bahá'í: a Bahá'í is a member of a voluntary association that admits people only when they meet certain religious qualifications, and one can choose to become, remain or cease to be a Bahá'í.[54] However, Muslims who do not recognize the possibility of apostasy (leaving one's religion) may not understand that individuals are free to reject their previous, in this case Bahá'í, beliefs.[34] Bahá'ís have used the term Bahá'ízada to refer to people of Bahá'í background who are not Bahá'ís themselves or part of the Bahá'í community; there is no Muslim equivalent of the term.[54] Of the Bahá'ís who held positions near the Shah, the best known is the Shah's personal physician, Abd al-Karim Ayadi. While Asadullah Sanii, another Bahá'í, was appointed Minister of Defence, the Bahá'í community of Iran revoked his administrative rights — as he had accepted a political position and Bahá'ís are prohibited from involvement in partisan politics — the public, however, still continued to associate him with his previous religion.[54] Parviz Sabeti, a SAVAK official, was raised in a Bahá'í family, but had left the religion and was not a member of the community by the time he started working with the agency.[54] Other people who were associated with the Bahá'í Faith either had Bahá'í backgrounds or were not connected with the religion at all.[54] For example, it was often rumoured that the Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveida was a Bahá'í. While Hoveida's father had been a Bahá'í, he had left the religion and Hoveida himself was not religious.[54] Other people rumoured to be Bahá'ís included Mahnaz Afkhami, who was the Minister for Women's Affairs and the daughter of a Bahá'í mother, and Farrokhroo Parsa, a cabinet member who was not connected to the religion at all.[54] Chehabi notes that the allegations that half of the Shah's cabinet were Bahá'ís are fanciful and, given the persecution the Bahá'ís have suffered, irresponsible exaggerations.[54]

Bahá'í ties to Freemasonry

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Iranian conspiracy theorists have also accused the Bahá'í Faith of having ties to Freemasonry.[19] As Freemasonry was a secretive society originating from the West, many in Iran connected the movement with conspiracy theories relating to the introduction of foreign ideas into the country.[19] As many of the Bahá'í principles were world-embracing, the Freemasons were connected with the Bahá'í Faith as movements involved in a conspiracy to undermine Iranian values.[19] As seminal part of the conspiracy theory connecting the Bahá'í Faith to Freemasonry and to the introduction of foreign ideas into the country was the claim that many of the earliest Freemason lodges, such as Malkom Khan's faramush-khanih, which were founded in 1858, were linked to European lodges.[62][63] However, Freemasonry was brought to Iran by Iranians who had seen the movement in other parts of the world.[19]

The specific accusation that connects the Bahá'í Faith to Freemasonry and continues the conspiracy theory that there are Bahá'í ties to Freemasonry normally come from the assertion that Dr. Dhabih Qurban, who was a well-known Bahá'í, was also a freemason.[19] This assertion is based on a Iranian book publishing documents related to Freemasonry in the country; that book states that in specific pages of Fazel Mazandarani's book on the Bahá'í Faith there are statements that Dr. Dhabih Qurban is a Freemason, but the pages of that referenced Bahá'í book do not speak about the subject of Freemasonry.[19] Furthermore, the Iranian book that is the source of the conspiracy theories includes a discussion between a the Grand Master of the Great Lodge in Iran, and the Grand Master notes that "no Bahá'ís have become masons and this is repeated by others present with no-one disagreeing."[19]

The teachings of the Baha'i Faith expressly forbid membership in secret societies. Shoghi Effendi, the guardian of the Bahá'í Faith, asked all Bahá'ís to remove their memberships from all secret societies, including the Freemasons, such that they can serve the teachings of the Bahá'í Faith without compromising their independence.[64]

Notes

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  1. ^ Momen 1981, p. 70
  2. ^ Momen 1981, pp. 71–82
  3. ^ Ghanea 2003, p. 294
  4. ^ Cooper 1993, p. 200
  5. ^ Simpson & Shubart 1995, p. 223
  6. ^ Tavakoli-Targhi 2008, p. 200
  7. ^ Smith, Peter (2000), "government, Bahá'í attitude towards", A concise encyclopedia of the Bahá'í Faith, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, p. 167, ISBN 1-85168-184-1
  8. ^ "The Bahá'í Faith", Britannica Book of the Year, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1988, ISBN 0852294867
  9. ^ Amanat 1989
  10. ^ Amanat, Abbas (2000), Stephen J. Stein, ed. (ed.), "The Resurgence of Apocalyptic in Modern Islam", The Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism, III, New York: Continuum: 230–254 {{citation}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  11. ^ Hutter, Manfred (2005), "Baha'is", in Ed. Lindsay Jones (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 2 (2nd ed.), Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, pp. 737–740, ISBN 0028657330
  12. ^ Affolter, Friedrich W. (2005), "The Specter of Ideological Genocide: The Bahá'ís of Iran" (PDF), War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 1 (1): 59–89
  13. ^ a b Sanasarian 2008, pp. 163
  14. ^ Amanat 2008, pp. 173
  15. ^ Cole, Juan (1989), "Baha'-allah", Encyclopædia Iranica
  16. ^ Bahá'u'lláh (1988) [1892], Epistle to the Son of the Wolf (Paperback ed.), Wilmette, Illinois, USA: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, p. 20, ISBN 0877431825
  17. ^ Balyuzi 2000, p. 72
  18. ^ a b Amanat 2008, pp. 177–178
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Momen 2004
  20. ^ a b Sanasarian 2008, pp. 159
  21. ^ a b c d e Chehabi 2008, pp. 186–188
  22. ^ Amanat 2008, pp. 180–181
  23. ^ Tavakoli-Targhi 2008, p. 202
  24. ^ a b c Amanat 2008, pp. 171–172
  25. ^ a b c d e f Chehabi 2008, pp. 190–194
  26. ^ a b Buck, Christopher (2003), "Islam and Minorities: The Case of the Bahá'ís", Studies in Contemporary Islam, 5 (1): 83–106
  27. ^ Sanasarian 2000, p. 114
  28. ^ a b c Sanasarian 2000, p. 115
  29. ^ a b c Sanasarian 2000, p. 116
  30. ^ a b Ghanea 2003, p. 103
  31. ^ a b c d e Sanasarian 2000, p. 119
  32. ^ Ghanea 2003, p. 114
  33. ^ Sanasarian 2000, p. 121
  34. ^ a b c d Ghanea 2003, pp. 109–111
  35. ^ Ghanea 2003, p. 112
  36. ^ Ghanea 2003, p. 113
  37. ^ Ghanea 2003, p. 132
  38. ^ Sanasarian 2008, p. 157
  39. ^ Amanat 1989, pp. 23–28
  40. ^ a b Ashraf, Ahmad (1997), Conspiracy theories and the Persian Mind, Iranian.com, retrieved 2008-07-13
  41. ^ Balyuzi 1973, p. 131
  42. ^ Balyuzi 2000, pp. 77–78
  43. ^ a b Balyuzi 2000, pp. 99–100
  44. ^ Balyuzi 2000, pp. 102
  45. ^ (in Persian)Clamour in the City, Part 4, Version 1.2 (PDF), pp. 180–182
  46. ^ Bausani, Alessandro and Dennis MacEoin (1989), "'Abd-al-Bahā'", Encyclopædia Iranica {{citation}}: External link in |article= (help)
  47. ^ Balyuzi 2001, p. 418
  48. ^ Balyuzi 2001, p. 99
  49. ^ Taherzadeh 1977, pp. 56–58
  50. ^ Balyuzi 2001, p. 452
  51. ^ Balyuzi 2001, pp. 452–483
  52. ^ (in Persian)Clamour in the City, Part 4, Version 1.2 (PDF), p. 163
  53. ^ Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 2007, p. 34
  54. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Chehabi 2008, pp. 186–191
  55. ^ Tavakoli-Targhi 2008, pp. 224
  56. ^ (in Persian)Clamour in the City, Part 4, Version 1.2 (PDF), p. 111
  57. ^ Momen 1981, pp. 477–479
  58. ^ a b c d Mottahedeh 1985, p. 231
  59. ^ a b c d Sanasarian 2000, pp. 52–53
  60. ^ Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 2007, p. 9
  61. ^ Keddie 1995, p. 151
  62. ^ Keddie 2006, pp. 431–32
  63. ^ Keddie 2006, p. 5
  64. ^ Compilations (1983). Hornby, Helen (Ed.) (ed.). Lights of Guidance: A Bahá'í Reference File. Bahá'í Publishing Trust, New Delhi, India. ISBN 8185091463. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |pg= ignored (help)

References

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  • Amanat, Abbas (2008), "The Historical Roots of the Persecution of the Babis and Baha'is in Iran", in Brookshaw; Fazel, Seena B. (eds.), The Baha'is of Iran: Socio-historical studies, New York, NY: Routledge, ISBN 0-203-00280-6 {{citation}}: Missing pipe in: |editor= (help); More than one of |editor= and |editor-last= specified (help)
  • Amanat, Abbas (1989), Resurrection and renewal: The making of the Bábí movement in Iran, 1844-1850, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, ISBN 0801420989
  • Balyuzi, H.M. (2001), `Abdu'l-Bahá: The Centre of the Covenant of Bahá'u'lláh, Oxford, UK: George Ronald, ISBN 0853980438
  • Balyuzi, H.M. (1973), The Báb: The Herald of the Day of Days, Oxford, UK: George Ronald, ISBN 0853980489
  • Balyuzi, H.M. (2000), Bahá'u'lláh, King of Glory, Oxford, UK: George Ronald, ISBN 0853983283
  • Cooper, Roger (1993), Death Plus 10 years, HarperCollins, ISBN 0002550458
  • Chehabi, H.E. (2008), "Anatomy of Prejudice", in Brookshaw; Fazel, Seena B. (eds.), The Baha'is of Iran: Socio-historical studies, New York, NY: Routledge, ISBN 0-203-00280-6 {{citation}}: Missing pipe in: |editor= (help); More than one of |editor= and |editor-last= specified (help)
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