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Sortition Edit Plans

[edit]

Introduction - I plan to thicken this portion of the article with additional summarization of later points and introduce new information about general pro/con themes.

1 History - Additional information, after research, will be added about historical examples of sortition. This especially includes a deeper dive into the systems of Greece, Venice and Florence.

Example: "In Athens, to be eligible to be chosen by lot, citizens self-selected themselves into the available pool, then lotteries in the chlorite machines. The magistracies assigned by lot generally had terms of service of 1 year. A citizen could not hold magistracy more than once in his lifetime, but could hold other magistracies. All citizens over 30 years of age, who were not guilty of atimia, were eligible. Those selected through lot underwent examination called dokimasia in order to avoid incompetent officials. Rarely were selected citizens discarded [1]. Magistrates, once in place, were subjected to constant monitoring by the Assembly. Magistrates appointed by lot had to render account of their time in office upon their leave, called euthynai. However, any citizen could request the suspension of a magistrate with due reason[2].

In Florence, lot was used to select magistrates and members of the Signoria during republican periods. Florence utilized a combination of lot and scrutiny by the people, set forth by the ordinances of 1328 [3]. In 1494, Florence founded a Great Council in the model of Venice. The nominatori were thereafter chosen by lot from among the members of the Great Council, indicating a decline in aristocratic power [4].

Lot was used in the Venetian system only to select members of the committees that nominated candidates to be considered by the Great Council for political posts. A combination of election and lot was used in this multi-stage process. Lot was not used alone to select magistrates, unlike in Florence and Athens. The use of lot to select nominators made it more difficult for political sects to exert power, and discouraged campaigning [5]. By reducing intrigue and power moves within the Great Council, lot maintained cohesiveness among the Venetian nobility, contributing to the stability of this republic. Top magistracies generally still remained in the control of elite families[6]."

2 Advantages - I plan to add 1-2 more advantages. Additionally, I plan to connect some of the advantages back to historical examples of their success.

3 Disadvantages - I plan to add another disadvantage, the difference between arithmetical and geometrical equality as outlined by Isocrates [7].

Methods - Further information needs to be added on the varying processes for selection bodies of citizens eligible for sortition and differing lengths of service within these deliberative parties. Also, internal versus external deliberative methodology must be summarized and compared.

Examples - This portion seems redundant after “History.” I will add further examples to it, such as the Great Council of Venice [8], to make it more substantive.

  1. ^ Manin, Bernard (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-45891-9. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  2. ^ Hansen, M. H. (1981). Election by Lot at Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. ^ Manin, Bernard (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-45891-9. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  4. ^ Brucker, Gene (1962). Florentine Politics and Society 1342-1378. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  5. ^ Manin, Bernard (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-45891-9. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  6. ^ Rousseau (1762). On the Social Contract. New York: St Martin's Press. p. 112.
  7. ^ Isocrates (Monachii). Areopagiticus. 1840. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: location (link)
  8. ^ Maranini. La Costituzione di Venezia (II ed.). p. 118.

Introduction - I plan to expand this portion of the article with additional summarization of later points and introduce new information about general pro/con themes.

1 History - Additional information, after research, will be added about historical examples of sortition. This especially includes a deeper dive into the systems of Greece, Venice and Florence.

Example: "In Athens, to be eligible to be chosen by lot, citizens self-selected themselves into the available pool, then lotteries in the chlorite machines. The magistracies assigned by lot generally had terms of service of 1 year. A citizen could not hold magistracy more than once in his lifetime, but could hold other magistracies. All citizens over 30 years of age, who were not guilty of atimia, were eligible. Those selected through lot underwent examination called dokimasia in order to avoid incompetent officials. Rarely were selected citizens discarded [1]. Magistrates, once in place, were subjected to constant monitoring by the Assembly. Magistrates appointed by lot had to render account of their time in office upon their leave, called euthynai. However, any citizen could request the suspension of a magistrate with due reason[2].

In Florence, systems of lot were used to select magistrates and members of the Signoria during republican periods. Florence utilized a combination of lot and scrutiny by the people, set forth by the ordinances of 1328 [3]. In 1494, Florence founded a Great Council in the model of Venice. The nominatori were thereafter chosen by lot from among the members of the Great Council, indicating a decline in aristocratic power [4].

Lot was used in the Venetian system only to select members of the committees that nominated candidates to be considered by the Great Council for political posts. A combination of election and lot was used in this multi-stage process. Lot was not used alone to select magistrates, unlike in Florence and Athens. The use of lot to select nominators made it more difficult for political sects to exert power, and discouraged campaigning [5]. By reducing intrigue and power moves within the Great Council, lot maintained cohesiveness among the Venetian nobility, contributing to the stability of this republic. Top magistracies generally still remained in the control of elite families[6]."

2 Advantages - I plan to add 1-2 more advantages. Additionally, I plan to connect some of the advantages back to historical examples of their success.

·Effective representation of the interests of the people ·Fairness & Equality ·Democratic ·Less corruptible than elections ·Fair representation ·Power to ordinary people ·Voter fatigue ·Loyalty is to conscience not to political party


3 Disadvantages - I plan to add another disadvantage,

The difference between arithmetical and geometrical equality as outlined by Isocrates [7]. Choosing the correct mean is essential to correctly estimating the central tendency of a population or calculating investment returns. Although the concept of an average may seem simple, it is imperative for a user to carefully consider which mean to use–and to communicate to reader or intended audience the method of deriving the average and the rationale for doing so.

·Pure sortition does not discriminate ·Misrepresentation ·Sortition can put in power people with minority views ·Voting confers legitimacy ·Some forms of sortition entail compulsion ·Enthusiasm of the representatives ·Accountability

Methods - These processes are generally measured in terms of political efficacy. Researchers at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center originally introduced the concept of political efficacy in their mid-twentieth century studies of national elections in the United States[8]. Campbell, Gurin, and Miller defined efficacy as the "feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worth- while to perform one's civic duties".[9] Later researchers convincingly argued, though, that efficacy is not simply a unidimensional construct.[10] Instead, efficacy consists of at least two related, but distinguishable, concepts: (1) external efficacy, which refers to citizens' perceptions of the responsiveness of the political system to their demands, and (2) internal efficacy, which refers to the citizens' feelings of personal competence "to understand and to participate effectively in politics."[11]

Examples - This portion seems redundant after “History.” I will add further examples to it, such as the Great Council of Venice [12], to make it more substantive.

  1. ^ Manin, Bernard (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-45891-9. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  2. ^ Hansen, M. H. (1981). Election by Lot at Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. ^ Manin, Bernard (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-45891-9. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  4. ^ Brucker, Gene (1962). Florentine Politics and Society 1342-1378. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  5. ^ Manin, Bernard (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-45891-9. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  6. ^ Rousseau (1762). On the Social Contract. New York: St Martin's Press. p. 112.
  7. ^ Isocrates (Monachii). Areopagiticus. 1840. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: location (link)
  8. ^ Maranini. La Costituzione di Venezia (II ed.). p. 118.
  9. ^ Cambell, Gurin and Miller (1954). The Voter Decides. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
  10. ^ Balch, George (1954). "Multiple indicatorsin surveyresearch:the concept of 'sense of political efficacy'". Political Methodology (1): 1-43.
  11. ^ Craig, Niem and Silver (1990). "Political efficacy and trust: a report on the NES pilot study items". Political Behavior (12): 289-314.
  12. ^ Maranini. La Costituzione di Venezia (II ed.). p. 118.
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