User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war

While initially neutral towards the Iran-Iraq War, the United States changed its policy to "tilt to Iraq", and supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. took an essentially neutral position. In an October 1983 United States Department of State policy review memorandum, Jonathan Howe summarized the policy as:

When the war began, our poor relations with both combatants and concern for our security interests in the Gulf led us to reinforce air defenses by the deployment of AWACS to Saudi Arabia and to block the use of air bases in the Arabian Peninsula by Iraqi aircraft to reduce the threat of expansion of the war. Our neutrality policy evolved out of this preventive reaction. Until now, this policy has served our objectives and interests well. It has:

• "avoided direct great power involvement
• prevented spread of the war beyond the territory of the combatants to threaten Gulf oil supplies
• contributed to the current military stalemate
• preserved the possibility of developing a future relationship with Iran while minimizing openings for expansion of Soviet influence.

Nearly 30 countries supported Iraq during the war, with the Soviet Union and France selling the most weapons to Iraq. Some countries, or their nationals, provided war materials to both Iraq and Iran.

as a counterbalance to post-revolutionary Iran.

Motivations for policy

Initial U.S. reaction

The United States was wary of the Tehran regime since the Iranian Revolution, not least because of the taking hostage of its Tehran embassy staff in the 1979–81 Iran hostage crisis. Starting in 1982 with Iranian success on the battlefield, the U.S. made its backing of Iraq more pronounced, supplying it with intelligence, economic aid, normalizing relations with the government (broken during the 1967 Six-Day War), and also supplying weapons.

The U.S. and Iran had clashed before the war with the Iran Hostage Crisis and verbal attacks on the "Great Satan," as Iran's leader the Ayatollah Khomeini called the U.S. Support from the U.S. for Iraq was not a secret and was frequently discussed in open session of the Senate and House of Representatives, although the public and news media paid little attention. On 9 June 1992, Ted Koppel reported on ABC's Nightline, "It is becoming increasingly clear that George H.W. Bush, operating largely behind the scenes throughout the 1980s, initiated and supported much of the financing, intelligence, and military help that built Saddam's Iraq into" the power it became, and "Reagan/Bush administrations permitted — and frequently encouraged — the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq.”

An interview on PBS with Said Aburish, Saddam made a visit to Amman in the year 1979, before the Iran-Iraq war, where he met three senior CIA agents. He discussed with them his plans to invade Iran. This does not appear consistent with the stance of neutrality in the classified 1983 memorandum.

According to then-National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, during the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the United States initially took a largely neutral position on the Iran-Iraq war, with some minor exceptions. First, the United States acted in an attempt to prevent the confrontation from widening, largely in order to prevent additional disruption to world oil supplies and to honor US security assurances to Saudi Arabia. As a result, the US reacted to Soviet troop movements on the border of Iran by informing the Soviet Union that the US would defend Iran in the event of Soviet Invasion. The US also acted to defend Saudi Arabia, and lobbied the surrounding states not to become involved in the war. Brzezinski characterizes this recognition of the Middle East as a vital strategic region on a par with Western Europe and the Far East as a fundamental shift in US strategic policy.

Second, the United States explored whether the Iran-Iraq war would offer leverage with which to resolve the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In this regard, the Carter administration explored the use of both "carrots," by suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iran upon release of the hostages, and "sticks," by discouraging Israeli military assistance to Iran and suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iraq if the Iranians did not release the hostages. (Ultimately, however, Brzezinski does not suggest that the Carter Administration provided military assistance to either side).

Policy changes: "tilt" to U.S. support for Iraq

Support for Iraq gradually became the order of the day. Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 4-82.

In March 1983, Reagan signed a NSDM with the originally classified title, "U.S. Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War". This placed the highest priority on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, a goal around which other U.S. policy, such as foreign basing and rules of engagement for combat.

Donald Rumsfeld meets Saddām on 19 December – 20 December 1983

.

Operational assistance

Later in 1983, In 1983, President Ronald Reagan initiated a strategic opening to Iraq, and sent Donald Rumsfeld as his emissary to Hussein, whom he visited in December 1983 and March 1984. According to the Boston Globe, Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations saw Iraq could be a strategic partner to the United States, a counterweight to Iran, a force for moderation in the region, and possibly help in the Arab-Israel peace process.In conformance with the Presidential directive, the U.S. began providing tactical battlefield advice to the Iraqi Army. "The prevailing view", says Alan Friedman, "was that if Washington wanted to prevent an Iranian victory, it would have to share some of its more sensitive intelligence photography with Saddam."

At times, thanks to the White House's secret backing for the intelligence-sharing, U.S. intelligence officers were actually sent to Baghdad to help interpret the satellite information. As the White House took an increasingly active role in secretly helping Saddam direct his armed forces, the United States even built an expensive high-tech annex in Baghdad to provide a direct down-link receiver for the satellite intelligence and better processing of the information... ^{p. 27}
The American military commitment that had begun with intelligence-sharing expanded rapidly and surreptitiously throughout the Iran-Iraq war. A former White House official explained that "by 1987, our people were actually providing tactical military advice to the Iraqis in the battlefield, and sometimes they would find themselves over the Iranian border, alongside Iraqi troops." ^{p. 38}

Howard Teicher served on the National Security Council as director of Political-Military Affairs. According to his 1995 affidavit and other interviews with former Regan and Bush administration officials, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly directed armaments and dual-use technology to Iraq through false fronts and friendly third parties such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait, and they quietly encouraged rogue arms dealers and other private military companies to do the same:

President Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp. The NSDD, including even its identifying number, is classified...

Pursuant to the secret NSDD, the United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat...

The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.

The full extent of these hidden transfers is not yet known. Teicher's files on the subject are held securely at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and many other Reagan era documents that could help shine new light on the subject remain classified. Teicher refused to discuss details of the affidavit with the Washington Post shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Removed designation as state sponsor of terror=

In 1982, Iraq was removed from the U.S. Department of State list of terrorist-supporting nations to ease the transfer of dual-use technology to that country. According to investigative journalist and award-winning author Alan Friedman, Secretary of State Alexander Haig was "upset at the fact that the decision had been made at the White House, even though the State Department was responsible for the list." "I was not consulted," Haig is said to have complained.

Export controls

Changes in export licensing=

About two of every seven licenses for the export of "dual use" technology items approved between 1985 and 1990 by the US Department of Commerce "went either directly to the Iraqi armed forces, to Iraqi end-users engaged in weapons production, or to Iraqi enterprises suspected of diverting technology" to weapons of mass destruction according to an investigation by House Banking Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez. According to the investigation, confidential Commerce Department files also reveal that the Reagan and Bush administrations approved at least 80 direct exports to the Iraqi military. These included computers, communications equipment, and aircraft navigation and radar equipment. Many of these exports were made before Iraq's eight-year war with Iran ended in 1988, a period in which Washington maintained an official policy of neutrality toward the combatants but vigorously worked to block foreign military purchases by Iran.

Timmerman cites 771 approved export licenses, the same number reported by Rep. Henry Gonzales. Of these, he believes that 474 of those licenses, worth $1,272,466,525, represented sensitive technology.

U.S. verification of end user certificates

The secret United States policy to enhance Iraq's military capability was perfected by the administration's refusal to verify the end use of United States technology that arrived in Iraq--so-called post installation checks. In fact, out of 771 export licenses approved for Iraq, only once did the United States Government check to ensure that the equipment was actually being used for civilian purposes.

In short, the policy was to let Iraq have United States equipment that could easily be used by or diverted to military applications, with a simple request that Saddam Hussein refrain from doing so. This happened even though the United States knew Saddam Hussein was making every effort to develop chemical and nuclear weapons as well as other advanced weapons."

Policy deficiencies

Gonzales observed "On the basis and predicate of all this, banking resources, banking facilities, just like everything from military procurement to drug money laundering, all filters through this banking system. The problem is that we are the only industrialized country that has no protective mechanism, no defense regulatory system." He said Congress had learned that U.S. intelligence had been aware of these events for some time, although Congress first became aware of them in hearings held in 1990.

In short, the policy was to let Iraq have United States equipment that could easily be used by or diverted to military applications, with a simple request that Saddam Hussein refrain from doing so. This happened even though the United States knew Saddam Hussein was making every effort to develop chemical and nuclear weapons as well as other advanced weapons.

This is the conclusion that the administration at first tried to use mostly through the person of the then Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, now the acting Secretary of State. The U.S. Government knew about the secret procurement network, and it made a decision, and that decision was to tolerate it, even after the BNL office was raided in 1989 but before the 1991 Gulf War.

Land warfare

The largest, according to journalist Kenneth R. Timmerman, was a $491 million proposal to sell several thousand military trucks in 1986 and 1988.

Timmerman believes that Iraq did not actually intend to complete this relatively noncontroversial sale, but to establish Iraq as a legitimate military sales customer of the U.S., and paving the way to procurement of more sensitive goods and technology, with major business opportunities for the United States. "Was the United States Iraq's principa; supplier of arms or advanced production technology? Certainly not. Those honors must go to France and Germany. Was the American contribution to Saddam Hussein's military build-up significant? Absolutely, in financial terms, in terms of the technology actually supplied, and for the political impact this had in emboldening the Iraqi regime.

Helicopters

Contracts were signed in December 1982, when the Reagan Administration agreed to support the sale of 60 Hughes MD 500 "Defender" helicopters to Baghdad, despite their obvious military applications. The Hughes "Defender" was advertized by Hughes as a dedicated anti-tank machine; an earlier version was used in Vietnam equipped with TOW missile launchers.

"All 60 helicopters were delivered by the end of 1983. Iraq paid for them in a barter agreement through Chevron Oil. The deal was brokered by the Lebanese-American intermediary, Sarkis Soghenalian, and is described in some detail in my book.

Naval warfare

"In February 1984, the Italian subsidiary of Bell Textron, Agusta Bell, agreed to sell Iraq eight AB 212 military helicopters equipped for anti-submarine warfare, worth a $164 million. They were intended equip the Lupo class frigates Iraq had purchased from Italy four years earlier. This sale also required U.S. approval, but to my knowledge was never submitted to Congress." There were other helicopter contracts.

"a Dutch company called Delft Instruments N.V. Delft purchased infra-red sensors and thermal imaging scanners from U.S. defense contractors, and re-exported them illegally to Iraq. The Iraqis used this equipment successfully during their night attack across the border into the Saudi town of Kafji. U.S. intelligence had been unaware that Iraq possessed night vision equipment for its Soviet-built tanks, until it cost the lives of Allied soldiers.

Financial and Procurement

Bank and CCC financing

The "Iraq-gate" scandal revealed that an Atlanta branch of Italy's largest bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), relying partially on U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans, funneled US$ 5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989.

On 4 August 1989, the FBI raided the Atlanta office of BNL, the Italian Government-owned bank agency in Atlanta, were transactions relating to Matrix Churchill and its takeover by Iraq, as well as several other firms, including TDG, TEG, and Euromac, that the CIA linked to Iraq's clandestine military procurement network. The branch manager, Christopher Drogoul, was charged with making unauthorized, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq—some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology. He was subsequently sentenced to 37 months in prison.

A CIA report, released by Gonzales, summarized the international significance of information gained by the raid. He stated that the United States had allowed Iraq to become the biggest customer of the Commodity Credit Corporation, a guaranteed program. That was financed largely through loans made by the BNL Atlanta office. Not only that, Iraq operated an extensive secret military procurement network in this country and in Europe which was also financed through the BNL Atlanta, not through CCC guarantees but through commercial loans.

Rep. Gonzales revealed a CIA Directorate of Intelligence report regarding the BNL financing for Matrix Churchill and the other firms. The report, which the DCI claimed revealed sensitive information, evaluated the matter as a significant scandal for the US and Italy, but not likely to interfere with Iraqi procurement.

The revelation that a US branch of an Italian bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), granted more than $3 billion in unauthorized letters of credit to Iraq has had wide-ranging repercussions for Iraq and Italy. For Iraq, public disclosure that is used some of the credits to acquire military-related technology has impeded procurement efforts, and the suspension of BNL credits has slowed civilian reconstruction and development projects. For Italy, the BNL scandal has cast at least a temporary shadow on Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's new government, raised questions about public-sector enterprises, and reopened the issue of privatization.

The affair is unlikely to have a major impact on Iraqi military procurement efforts, but cash-short Baghdad probably will have to postpone plans for some civilian projects. The loss of BNL financing and, more important, any reduction in US agricultural credit guarantees because of negative publicity about the scandal probably would damage US-Iraqi commercial ties. For Iraq's part, however, the strain in political relations is likely to be short-lived, particularly if Baghdad believes US credit guarantees will be forthcoming. Iraq is eager to maintain good ties to the United States, an attitude intensified by improved relations between Iran and the USSR.

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"The Atlanta, Georgia branch of the state-owned Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL)--Italy's largest bank--extended $3.2 billion in 2,500 unauthorized letters of credit for Iraq between February 1988 and July 1989. U.S. and Italian authorities have been investigating the scandal since July for violations of banking regulations and tax and customs laws.

"Fragmentary reporting indicates BNL-Atlanta disbursed $1.85 billion of the $3.2 billion, including at least $800 million in letters of credit guaranteed by the US Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). BNL headquarters agreed to release another $550 million in early October, after Iraq threatened to suspend payment to Italian firms if the bank failed to honor its commitments.

"BNL-Atlanta's unusual activities included:

• Exceeding the branch's allowable debt of $500,000 per customer.
• Charging Baghdad an average 0.2-percent commission instead of the usual 15 percent for a poor credit risk.
• Financing the letters of credit by borrowing from other banks for 90 to 180 days but allowing Iraq up to five years to repay.

BNL's North American headquarters in New York and the bank's directors in Rome publicly denied knowing about the letters of credit, although a BNL official in Chicago claims he notified New York and Rome several times about the unusual activity in Atlanta, according to press reports. Press reports also indicate a BNL branch in Udine, Italy referred customers exporting to Iraq to the Atlanta branch. Iraqi officials have generally denied knowledge of any wrongdoing, arguing that Baghdad is a victim in the scandal.

Iraq used some BNL credits--at least $600 million, according to British press--to buy military and dual-use technology through various front companies and legitimate firms in Western Europe.

British press says that BNL-Atlanta also financed Iraqi military purchases from Kintex, the Bulgarian armament company. Beginning in September, 1989, the Financial Times laid out the first charges that BNL, relying heavily on U.S. government-guaranteed loans, was funding Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapons work. For the next two and a half years, the FT provided the only continuous newspaper reportage (over 300 articles) on the subject. Among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the U.S. government, according to the Financial Times, were Hewlett-Packard, Tektronix, and Matrix Churchill, through its Ohio branch.

In 1992, it was determined that the 1989 investigation was flawed, principally in assuming that the Italian government was unaware that a state-owned bank, BNL, had secretly lent billions of dollars to the Iraqi regime. According to the New York Times, the investigation was marred by bitter feuding among Atlanta prosecutors, their superiors in the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The 1989 decision, according to the Times, was that the case would have been much weaker if the Rome headquarters of the bank was aware of the loans, it could not have been a victim. Since the bank was state-owned, the scandal could have damaged the entire Italian banking system and caused the fall of the government of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. The United States Department of Justice prosecutors said that without the assumption the bank was a victim, the U.S. prosecution would change from a multibillion-dollar matter into a "minor prosecution of technicalities".

Iraqi procurement in the United States

Iraq variously took control of several high-technology firms and had other firms under its control as fronts to hide its financial transactions.

The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and ABC's Ted Koppel, covered the story. There was Congressional interest, althugh not formal hearings. even though the U.S. Congress became involved with the scandal.

CIA on effects of BNL

Effect on US-Iraqi relations

According to the CIA, the scandal has made some Iraqi officials believe that the U.S. is trying to interfere with Iraq's efforts to form better political ties with the U.S. They were displeased with the U.S. decisions regarding the CCC, apparently not considering any U.S. domestic fallout from that aspect. They saw reductions in CCC guarantees as jeopardizing Iraq's ability to import agricultural goods and damage its international credit rating.

Several US companies, dealing in both military and civilian goods, were by the scandal. Many US firms are trying to arrange other means of payment to avoid losing lucrative contracts.

Nevertheless, Iraq was thought eager to resolve the crisis, as they still feel threatened by Iran, and believe that the superpowers favor Iran. As a consequence, improving Iraq's importance to the U.S. is a priority.

Iraq subsequently defaulted on foreign debt just before the 1991 war, and the United States Department of Justice announced, on 16 February 1995, the CCC would pay BNL $400 million, in settlement of the bank's claims filed against the U.S. These guarantees were for reducing the risk of agricultural producers and other American exporters in doing business with developing countries. Ten banks including BNL filed claims under the program, and the CCC paid out $1.6 billion to banks other than BNL.

Impact on Italy

The CIA observed that the BNL and other scandals have caused difficulty for Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's government, three months old when the BNL matter surfaced. While other scandals are receiving publicity, the Italian political consensus seemed to be that BNL could not strengthen its position vis-a-vis Christian Democrat Andreotti.

This did call attention to the "spoils system" in state-owned enterprises such as BNL. BNL's president and several directors traditionally came from the Italian Socialist Party, with a Christian Democratic Party executive director. It was deemed unlikely that this system would change.

"We believe the revelations of BNL's dealings with Iraq--along with other recent scandals--stand in counterpoint to growing Italian self-confidence on the international stage in recent years. After more than three decades of international diffidence, we believe Italian leaders have been pursuing a diplomatic profile more commensurate with their country's international economic role. Italians have felt particular pride because:

• Italian troops in the Beirut peacekeeping forces had fulfilled their mission as defined by Rome.
• The Italian decision to accept U.S. cruise missiles played a decisive role in swinging West Germany behind deployment.
• Their country's GDP had surpassed that of the United Kingdom and possibly France.

In the opinion of almost all Italian press commentators, the BNL affair had a negative impact on Italy's credibility throughout the West. We believe, however, that the setback to Rome's international standing has been substantially less than that portrayed in the Italian press, and we expect the scandal will gradually fade from public view within Italy and will have little lasting impact on the country's perception of its international role."

Outlook

Some of the CIA observations included a belief that Iraq greatly values its procurement networks, some of which remain clandestine. While important networks were, or will be, compromised by U.S. and Italian investigations, the agency expects Iraq will put considerable effort into replacing them. Iraq's demonstrated skill in clandestine procurement, as well as the likely existence of undiscovered networks, means that event this multibillion dollar loss will not, in the long term, hurt Iraqi military procurement.

Iraq probably did some economic planning, especially in the civilian sector, based on the availability of BNL-Atlanta credit. Until Iraq repays substantial amounts of its non-Arab foreign debt, governments and commercial banks are probably unwilling to grant more credit. Iraq will probably avoid more barter arrangements, which may be overextended.

According to the CIA, the BNL scandal will not have a deep impact on Italian-Iraqi relations, unless BNL does not issue the remaining promised letters of credit. Iraqi threats to withhold payment to Italian firms that have already provided goods and services to Iraq are likely to be Iraq's most potent weapons. Italy has backed down from such threats in other international situations.

While Italian financial institutions can be expected to examine deals with Iraq more closely, Italy's general interest in commerce with Iraq seems unharmed. Italy does get significant oil from Iraq. The most heated subject is probably Italy's seizure of warships ordered by Iraq, although Iraq has not fully paid for the ships, and Iran threatened retaliation against Iran if the ships are delivered.

Implications for the United States

If CCC credits from the United States Department of Agriculture are reduced, Iraq will probably import less food from the US due to Iraq's preference for buying on credit. Australia and the EC lost sales when the U.S. became the leading agricultural supplier to Iraq, and Iraq also has long obtained food from Turkey and Brazil. Several of these nations are aggressively selling to Iraq while the BNL affair is unresolved. probably would reduce Iraqi's food imports from the United States because Baghdad prefers to buy on credit.

If Iraq believes the U.S. will grant new credit, the strain, from the Iraqi point of view, will be brief once the investigation ends. Baghdad values the relationship with the U.S., especially in technology transfer. Iraq will both lobby U.S. officials and offer commercial opportunities to U.S firms.

It is not expected that there will be serious damage to U.S.-Italian relations.

CIA on Iraqi-controlled organizations

Baghdad has created complex procurement networks of holding companies in Western Europe to acquire technology for its chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile development programs. According to British press, one such network begins in Baghdad with the Al-Arabi Trading Company, which controls the London-based Technology and Development Group, Ltd. (TDG) and another UK firm, TMG Engineering. TDG and its Brussels-based partner, Space Research Corporation, own the Ulster-registered firm Canira Technical Corporation, Ltd.= Canira in March established SRC Composites, which acquired access to advanced composite and carbon fiber technology used in aircraft and missile production. In 1987 TMG gained control of Matrix-Churchill, Ltd., the United Kingdom's leading producer of computer-controlled machine tools that can be used in the production of sophisticated armaments.

CIA linked these firms to Iraq's clandestine military procurement network, run by the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization [MIMI]. MIMI was headed by Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil, eventually utilized over $2 billion in BNL loans for its ambitious military industrialization effort. The procurements included conventional military equipment, but also missile and nuclear technology.

Increased Western awareness of Iraqi procurement, and British opposition to Iraq's control of a company possessing sensitive technology, for example, led SRC Composites to divest its advanced composites factory, according to press reports. Some other firms in the networks have gone out of business.

Al-Arabi Trading Company

The BNL-funded network operating in Europe and the United States was called the Al-Arabi Trading Co. network. Al Arabi was headquartered in Baghdad and appears to have been under the control of Iraq's main weapons complex, the Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries [NASSR]. NASSR was the key producer of Iraqi missiles and was heavily involved in clandestine nuclear and chemical weapons programs and some aerial bombs.

In 1987, Al-Arabi set up its main procurement front in London, a holding company called Technology Development Group (TDG). In 1987, TDG set up a firm called TMG Engineering (TMG) which was the vehicle used to buy the established British machine tool maker Matrix-Churchill Ltd. and its Cleveland, OH, affiliate Matrix-Churchill Corp.

Matrix-Churchill

Matrix-Churchill was a well-established machine tool and specialized equipment firm, founded in Britain and with a U.S. subsidiary. Matrix-Churchill literature details its military significance:

Churchill is a major supplier of machines for munitions production in the United Kingdom and one of the leading suppliers worldwide with some 275 munitions installations.

Matrix-Churchill machines are in U.S. military production facilities. Matrix-Churchill machines are also used to produce shells for the militaries of Canada and Mexico. Matrix-Churchill machines are also sold to the U.S. nuclear energy industry. All of this made Matrix-Churchill an attractive company to purchase.

In fact, the Bush administration continued to approve the sale of military-useful technology to Iraq even when that technology was known to be destined for Iraqi arms factories. This policy was in place right up until Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Matrix-Churchill machines are in the arsenals of countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, China, Argentina, Austria, Norway, India, Belgium, Netherlands, Australia, Egypt, Italy, and South Africa, among others. Matrix machines are used to make artillery shells, the body for artillery fuses, armor-piercing ammunition and more. Matrix-Churchill records show that in 1988, over half of the machine tool deliveries were for munitions applications--the majority of them destined for Iraq.

Matrix-Churchill had contracts to provide machines for Iraq's armaments industry even before it was sold to the Iraqi front company TDG. Matrix had a contract called the ABC contract to supply machines to an Iraqi munitions factory called the Hutteen General Establishment [Hutteen]. These machines were used to produce 155 mm, and 122 mm, artillery shells. A second contract, called the ABA contract, was to supply machines to be used in the production of a short-range rocket called the Ababel rocket which was manufactured at the Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries [NASSR].

The United Kingdom Government knew about the Iraq-related activities of Matrix-Churchill. The British Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approved the deals. The director general of Hutteen even had a picture of himself and the British military attache hanging in his office.

Likewise, the Bush administration approved licenses for exports of U.S. equipment to Hutteen and other Iraqi weapons complexes even though intelligence reports verified they were armaments plants. Approval of these licenses helped enhance Iraq's military capability, contrary to the President's claim that the United States did not help arm Iraq.

Chemical warfare

Equipment and supplies

In December 2002, Iraq's 1,200 page Weapons Declaration revealed a list of Eastern and Western corporations and countries—as well as individuals—that exported chemical and biological materials to Iraq in the past two decades. By far, the largest suppliers of precursors for chemical weapons production were in other than the United States, although front companies and financing for some transactions may have been in the U.S. See Singapore support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, Egyptian support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, Indian support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and West German support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.

By contrast, Alcolac International, for example, a Maryland company, transported thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, to Iraq. Alcolac was successfully prosecuted for its violations of export control law. The firm pleaded guilty in 1989. A full list of American companies and their involvements in Iraq was provided by The LA Weekly in May 2003.

Chemical warfare operations

According to retired Army Colonel Walter "Pat" Lang, senior defense intelligence officer for the United States Defense Intelligence Agency at the time, "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose." Lang cautioned that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival; despite this allegation, the Reagan administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports affirming the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.

Biological warfare

On 25 May 1994, The U.S. Senate Banking Committee released a report in which it was stated that "pathogenic (meaning 'disease producing'), toxigenic (meaning 'poisonous'), and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce." It added: "These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction."

The report then detailed 70 shipments (including Bacillus anthracis) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, concluding "It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the UN inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."

A report by Berlin's die tageszeitung in 2002 reported that Iraq's 11,000-page report to the UN Security Council listed 150 foreign companies that supported Saddam Hussein's WMD program. Twenty-four U.S. firms were involved in exporting arms and materials to Baghdad.

Donald Riegle, Chairman of the Senate committee that authored the aforementioned Riegle Report, said,

UN inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development programs. ... The executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. I think that is a devastating record.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control sent Iraq 14 agents "with biological warfare significance," according to Riegle's investigators.

See also

External links

• Text of the U.S. Senate Riegle Report
• STEPHEN R. SHALOM, THE UNITED STATES AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, Z-magazine, Feb. 1993
• Iraq gate
• U.S. Export Policy Toward Iraq: An Agenda for Tomorrow, by Kenneth R. Timmerman

Books

• Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.
• Friedman Alan, Spider's Web: The Secret History of how the White House Illegally Armed Iraq. New York, Bantam Books, 1993.
• Jentleson Bruce, With friends like these: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990. New York, W. W. Norton, 1994.
• Phythian Mark, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam's War Machine. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1997.

See also

• U.S. support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war
• Arms sales to Iraq 1973-1990
• CIA Activities by Region: Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia (Iran, 1980)
• Iraq-gate (Gulf War), also see Riegle Report
• Arms-to-Iraq affair, also see Scott Report
• Saddam Hussein - United States relations