User:HLGallon/WIP
| Operation Dharab | |||||||
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| Part of Dhofar Rebellion | |||||||
.jpg) SAF soldiers advancing through thick scrub | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Sultanate of Oman Pahlavi Iran |
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman | ||||||
Operation Dharab took place during the Dhofar War in which a revolutionary movement sought to overthrow the Sultanate of Oman. It was a hastily planned and executed operation by a battalion of the Sultan's Armed Forces to capture a Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) logistical base located in a complex of caves at Sherishitti, near the village of Rakhyut on the southern coast of the province of Dhofar. Due to a confused start of the operation and the difficulties of navigating through thick scrub, a comany leading the SAF battalion involved blundered into an ambush in a prepared "killing ground" near the the cave complex and suffered heavy casualties.
Background
[edit]Dhofar Rebellion
[edit]The Dhofar rebellion began in 1962 as a low intensity insurgency in the mountainous interior of the province of Dhofar, known as the jebel, against the arbitrary rule of Sultan Said bin Taimur of Oman. In 1967, following the British Withdrawal from Aden and the establishment of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen bordering Oman, the rebel movement was greatly strengthened and radicalised. By 1970, the rebel movement (the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf or PFLOAG) had overrun the entire jebel and the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) were confined to the provincial capital, Salalah, and a few other enclaves on the coast.
In the 1970 Omani coup d'état, Said bin Taimur was overthrown with British connivance and replaced by his son, Qaboos bin Said. Under Qaboos, vigorous measures were taken on both the political and military fronts to oppose the rebellion. The most important of these were a civil aid program to provide wells, schools, clinics and veterinary care to the communities on the jebel, an information program to oppose the rebel propaganda, the formation of Firqat irregular units largely composed of fighters who had defected from the PFLOAG, and improvements in the strength, equipment and training of the SAF.
By late 1974, these measures had induced many of the jibalis (inhabitants of the jebel) to support the Sultan, and interfered with the movement of rebel supplies from west to east across the jebel. The rebel movement changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).
Iranian intervention
[edit]One of Sultan Qaboos's initiatives had been to seek support from other nations in the region, most of which were conservative emirates or kingdoms. Several sent financial support or small military contingents, but Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran was prepared to commit substantial forces. The first Iranian battalion was deployed in 1973, and helped secure the "Midway" road across the jebel, linking Salalah, the capital, on the coast with Thumrait in the Empty Quarter to the north. In 1974, the Iranian contribution was expanded into the Imperial Iranian Task Force (IITF), consisting of 129th and 153rd infantry battalions, with supporting arms detachments including artillery and helicopters.
Once relieved of their role protecting the "Midway" road (by a Jordanian Special Forces battalion and Oman Gendarmerie) in 1974, the IITF wished to operate on the eastern jebel. Here, the terrain was comparatively easy and the PFLO had been greatly reduced in numbers and effectiveness. The Sultan's civil aid program was providing material benefits to the population, few weapons and supplies were reaching the PFLO guerrillas as a result of the creation of an interdiction line (the Hornbeam line) across the PFLO supply routes west of Salalah, and the largest number of defections from the PFLOAG to the Firqats had taken place. The senior officers of the Sultan's Armed Forces objected to the Iranian Task Force operating in this area, as the Iranians had already acquired a reputation for their lavish and indiscriminate use of supporting fire which could hit civilians or even friendly forces.[1]
Operation Nader
[edit]
Instead, the IITF were deployed to the western jebel where the terrain was rougher and PFLO had their strongest concentrations. They first established an airstrip codenamed Manston near Aydim on the Gatn, a narrow stip of open grazing land north of the thick vegetation of the southern part of the jebel. In December 1974, they mounted Operation Nader, an advance towards the coastal settlement of Rakhyut, which the PFLO held to be the capital of their liberated territory and where they had held several political congresses.
129th Battalion advanced towards the PFLO's main logistic base at Sherishitti. It suffered heavy casualties and pulled back. 153rd Battalion advanced directly on Rakhyut. On 25 December, they had barely reached the "treeline" south of the Gatn when they were ambushed and suffered heavy casualties, including the commanding officer, several other HQ staff officers and Major John Bradell-Smith, an attached SAF officer. Major General Timothy Creasey, the Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, later estimated rhat a mere 20 PFLO guerillas carried out the successful ambush.
(The failure was blamed on the Iranian troops' lack of experience. The Iranian policy was to rotate its soldiers through Dhofar every three months for a single tour only, so any earlier experience gained on the operations to open the "Midway" road had been lost by the time that Operation Nader was launched.[2] Attached SAF liaison officers also criticised Iranian officers as lacking in initiative and independent judgement, and even some basic leadership skills.)[3]
The shaken Iranian troops concentrated into a single group south of Manston. It was planned that they would establish a new interdiction line, similar to the Hornbeam line, codenamed the Damavand line, running south from Manston. To assist the Iranians, the SAF would mount a renewed attack against the Sherishitti supply base.
Operation Dharab
[edit]Ground
[edit]The PFLO was supplied from Hauf in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen via a track sometimes referred to as the "Ho Chi Minh trail" or the "Freedom Road" which ran along the coast to a wadi with precipitous sides running roughly northwards from the coast. The supplies were stored in a complex of caves (the Sherishitti caves) on the eastern side of the wadi at the point where it cut through the main east-west scarp at the southern edge of the jebel. PFLO camel trains loaded weapons, ammunition and other supplies from the caves as required and carried them eastwards.
SAF Plan
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An infantry battalion of the SAF (the Jebel Regiment) had been operating in the Central jebel. For the operation it was concentrated at Manston and reinforced by "Red Company",[nb 1] armoured cars, artillery and a firqat unit. Specialist personnel from the Special Air Service were also attached: climbers to descend from captured positions on the scarp of the wadi into the caves, and demolition experts to destroy captured PFLO stores.[5]
The operation depended upon speed, stealth and local knowledge of the ground.[5] The force would move at dawn by helicopter from Manston to an abandoned airstrip at Deefa about 6 kilometres (3.7 mi) northwest of the caves. They would then advance eastwards to the head of the wadi, and then move south along its eastern side to establish picquets along the scarp above the caves, after which a company would move into the cave complex.[6]
Battle
[edit]The operation ran into difficulties almost immediately. The helicopter move to Deefa was so badly organised that the commanding officer of the Jebel Regiment was removed and the advance could not begin until well after first light. The advance was led by the firqat unit, who carried small arms only. They insisted on a reassuring barrage of artillery, aircraft and armoured cars every few hundred yards, which slowed the advance and deprived the operation of surprise.[5]
The advance proceeded by way of the Zakhir Tree, a prominent landmark in the terrain covered by low scrub bushes. From this point onwards, there were continuous small skirmishes with PFLO patrols and increasingly accurate PFLO machine gun, rocket and mortar fire.[5] By nightfall, the Jebel Regiment had reached an area of high ground designated "Point 980" from its elevation, where they formed a defensive position. At last light, a clash with a PFLO patrol caused several SAF casualties, with three PFLO dead.[7]
Throughout the next day, the Jebel Regiment prepared to make a deliberate advance on their original objectives. At first light on the third day of the operation, Red Company, guided by the firqat, led the advance, intending to pass the head of the wadi before turning south along its eastern edge. Navigation in the scrub was difficult, and Red Company turned south too soon and advanced down the western side of the wadi.[8]
When the navigation error was discovered, Red Company was forced to cross the wadi at a point where the scrub and vegetation had been cleared by the PFLO. The company split into two parts, one of which would cover the other while it moved. As the leading troops of the company reached the cleared area they were ambushed by PFLO fighters in positions above the open ground, using not only small arms but also rocket launchers, mortars and heavy machine guns. The company commander (Captain Nigel Loring) and 12 men were killed, and 22 wounded.[9] The SAF called in supporting fire from mortars, artillery and BAC Strikemaster aircraft to suppress the PFLO positions while individual officers and SAS personnel rescued wounded men from the open ground. At dusk, the SAS squadron moved forward to assist in withdrawing the company. After a heavy firefight, the Jebel Regiment eventually pulled back to Point 980. Single shots could be heard as PFLO fighters finished off SAF wounded who could not be reached and had been left behind.
Although the Jebel Regiment was shaken and the operation had resulted in heavy causalties, the SAS and senior officers of the SAF were not prepared to abandon the operation entirely. They reasoned that even if the caves could not be captured, it could be made difficult for the PFLO to make use of them. Two companies advanced to a small hill crowned by huge broken boulders, nicknamed "Stonehenge", about 3,500 m (3,800 yd) north of the caves. From this position, sustained fire GPMGs, Browning M2 heavy machine guns and two 106mm recoilless guns could fire directly into the cave mouths, and dominated the "Freedom Rad" below the caves.[10] A bulldozer cleared a track from the Gatn to the same area, which allowed Saladin armoured cars to move forward to use their 76mm guns against the caves. This fire was maintained for ten days. Eventually, the Jebel Regiment withdrew to Deefa, after mining the "Freedom Road".[10]
Although the operation had failed to achieve its objectives, the PFLO had actually suffered heavier casualties than the SAF, and did not regard the outcome as a victory.[7]
Aftermath
[edit]Evan as this action was taking place the Iranian Task Force renewed its advance southward. Supported by fire from Iranian Navy frigates and gunboats off the coast, they captured Rakhyut against little opposition. They then constructed the very substantial Damavand Line, which consisted of "a triple concertina fence windlassed between angle irons and booby trapped, then a minefield and then on the home side a simple fence to repel cattle and humans."[11] This line, with the existing Hornbeam Line and the new Hammer Line west of the "Midway" road effectively stopped all PFLO movement into the Eastern jebel.
Over the next few months, an operation led by Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Salusbury Trelawny, commanding the SAF Frontier Force Regiment, mounted an operation ("Hinaar") from the Hornbeam Line against the PFLO 9th June Regiment (named after the date of the outbreak of the rebellion). This operation, which involved detachments from three SAF battalions and made extensive use of helicopter insertions on commanding peaks and ridges, was completely successful and cleared the PFLO from the Central jebel, and also largely restored SAF morale.
In October 1975, after the khareef or monsoon ended, which coincided with the end of Ramadan, the SAF and Iranian Task Force mounted a final offensive to clear the PFLO from Dhofar. The Iranians faced severe opposition as they cleared positions from which the Sherishiiti Caves could be threatened from the south. As operations elsewhere succeeded, the SAF Frontier Force Regiment captured the caves in November. They were found to contain 100 tons of stores, to the annoyance of Brigadier John Akehurst, commanding the SAF's Dhofar Brigade, who had repeatedly been told by his Intelligence staff that the PFLO were down to "a dozen rounds and their last teabag".
Notes
[edit]- Footnotes
- ^ "Red" Company had been detached from the Northern Frontier Regiment in 1966 to create a nucleus around which another battalion, the Desert Regiment, was formed.[4]
- References
- ^ Hughes 2016, p. 103.
- ^ Hughes 2016, p. 105.
- ^ Hughes 2016, pp. 103–105.
- ^ McKeown 1981, p. 29.
- ^ a b c d Devore 1982, p. 11.
- ^ McKeown 1981, p. 86.
- ^ a b McKeown 1981, p. 87.
- ^ mcKeown 1981, p. 88.
- ^ Devore 1982, p. 12.
- ^ a b McKeown 1981, p. 88.
- ^ Devore 1982, p. 17.
Bibliography
[edit]- DeVore, Marc (1982). "The United Kingdom's last hot war of the Cold War: Oman, 1963-75" (PDF).
- Hughes, Geraint (2016). "Amateurs Who Play in League Division One? Anglo-Iranian Military Relations During the Dhofar War in Oman". British Journal for Military History.
- Jeapes, Tony (1980). SAS Operation Oman. London: William Kimber. ISBN 0-7183-0018-1.\
- McKeown, John (1981). Britain and Oman, The Dhofar War and its Significance (PDF). University of Cambridge.