User:HAOster

AGAINST ALL ODDS

The failure of military leadership

in Nazi Germany

On July 29, 1940, the OKW Chief of Operations, Jodl, announced in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy, Adolph Hitler's decision to attack the USSR, the following May (1941) . Preliminary studies requested in early July had elicited a positive response from the Army, in the context of a border conflict for the limited purpose of territorial gains; however, Hitler had much more than this in mind.

On June 22, 1941 the Wehrmacht would launch the largest invasion in history, with inadequate intelligence preparation, manpower, supply, and logistical support. Preparations were made to support over three million personnel only long enough for an anticipated quick and decisive victory. Despite initial air superiority, support from the Luftwaffe was often poorly coordinated or entirely lacking. Reserve forces were inadequate from the outset, and this problem became acute when casualties began to mount. The Army General Staff (Oberkommando des Herres or OKH), initially cautious, became a willing participant in this astonishing and fateful undertaking.

The reasons for this are examined in the context of Hitler’s rise to power as chancellor of Germany in 1933. The Nazi regime was faced with irreconcilable conflicts between Hitler’s concept of Germany as a military power and the limited available resources for rearmament, permitted by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919. These conflicts between established military doctrine and evolving Nazi party doctrine created obstacles for the military leadership and represented a crucial element leading to Germany's defeat.

The Leaders

Army leadership in under Hitler and Stalin, underwent purges to assure universal assent. Serious criticisms of Hitler's designs toward Austria and Czechoslovakia, made at a meeting in the Reich Chancellery in November 1937, convinced him to dispose of Commander in Chief of the Army, Fritsch, along with Foreign Minister Neurath. Hitler had assumed the office of Chancellor of Germany through duplicity, involving his soon-to-be Vice Chancellor, Papen. The intrigue was made necessary by a costly succession of political defeats in which the Nazi party, while the largest in Germany, could garner only a plurality of votes. Hitler’s suspicions had previously brought him into conflict with Ernst Rohm, leader of the SA. Rohm's arrest was carried out with the complicity of Theodor Eicke and the fledgling SS on June 30, 1934 the night of the “long knives,” during which many other SA leaders were also summarily executed. Rohm’s subsequent summary execution, which could not otherwise be justified, was accompanied by a public expression of support from a Herr Schmitt, a leading professor of public law at Berlin University. 1

Fritsch, who had opposed the Nazification of the armed forces, and had remained on duty under increasingly adverse circumstances, until false and scurrilous charges of misconduct were lodged against him. He had previously resigned himself to continued service, despite open conflict with Hitler, Himmler and others, in lieu of more drastic opposition. The General vigorously defended himself and was ultimately exonerated, but not reinstated to his former position. The opportunity for his vindication, so uncharacteristic for the Nazi regime, was doubtlessly intended to mollify Fritsch's remaining supporters who took no further action.

Fritsch's departure came on the heels of another contrived scandal involving defense minister Blomberg, whom Fritsch had refused to support. This gave Hitler, already commander of the army and navy after the death of President Hindenburg, the opportunity to abolish the position of defense minister, and assume the position of supreme commander for himself. He appointed a docile successor to the Wehrmacht office (OKW), Keitel, and Brauchitsch to Commander in Chief (OKH). Goering, who had been Reich Commissioner for civil aviation, and overseer of the developing Luftwaffe,* (and who may have had designs of his own on the defense ministry), was given a marshall's baton to assuage his vanity. Thus the stage had been set for complete political control of the armed forces. (Goering's insistence in 1933 that the Air Ministry be under separate control from that of the Army and Navy, was more likely related to self interest, rather than to organizational skill. His influence permitted the Luftwaffe to ultimately garner over 1/3 of the budget allocated for defense.4 A concept ahead of its time, separate command of the air force proved unwieldy for the German Army.)

Upon granting himself the title of Fuehrer following the death of Hindenburg in August 1934, Hitler compelled the Army to swear personal allegiance to himself, as the embodiment of the German State, in keeping with evolving Nazi doctrine. After the murder of Rohm, Hitler's public statement articulated his self appointed role as "supreme judge of the German people."3 Furthermore, the legislative function of the Reichstag, which seldom met anyway from 1933 until last convened in 1942, was largely supplanted by Fuehrer directive.

Thus there was little remaining power not directly answerable to the chancellery office. After his victory over the Allies in northern France, Hitler paid homage at the tomb of Napoleon in Paris, having confirmed his place in history. Now his attentions typically turned elsewhere.

Having created an army with two command structures, Hitler took steps to ensure neither knew what the other was planning. The Anschluss of Austria, the subsequent occupation of Sudetenland, and the invasion of Poland were OKH responsibilities. Hitler had usurped the OKH in announcing in September 1939 his intent to attack in the west. Halder, Chief of the General Staff since the August 1938 resignation of Beck, would have himself resigned, but was convinced by Brauchitsch to stay on. After open conflict with Hitler's policy erupted, Brauchitsch' own resignation would be rejected.5 Brauchitsch would not again oppose Hitler until shortly before his dismissal in December, 1941 and after Halder's dismissal in September of 1942, the emasculination of the General Staff (OKH) would be complete.

Hitler's distrust of his generals and his personal indecision poorly served an Army laboring to deliver the victories he envisioned. His imagination and intuition were countered by mood swings and disorganized work habits. He preferred to reach decisions on his own, and his staff and ministerial appointments were made rather haphazardly, often based upon personal and political bias. Despite increasing distrust on the part of many, his close personal staff remained loyal to him. Sydnor's commentary on the characteristics of SS administration, describes the personalities attracted to service in that organization. Theodor Eicke had responsibility for the action against Rohm and the SA, and was Himmler’s immediate subordinate. Most of Eicke's staff had seen combat during WWI. Nearly all of them had succumbed to the lure of the postwar Freikorps, with their fanatical loyalty to individual officer, and freebooter, soldier-of-fortune spirit and camaraderie. Consequently...they became misfits in civilian life. Blacklisted by the labor unions, jobless and aimless, they were among the most politically explosive malcontents in the society of Weimar Germany. Most of them eventually sought refuge either in police work or in a return to military life through a career in the Reischswehr."6 Hitler's belief in his role as Fuehrer, and its connotation of infallibility, coupled with the fanaticism demanded by Nazi doctrine, set in motion the fateful events culminating in military disaster.

OKH planning meetings were regularly interspersed with "Fuehrer conferences," often consisting of little more than political diatribe. Halder reported during the later stages of planning for operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, that Hitler, after failing to subdue Britain in the west, somehow believed victory over the Red Army would bring about Britain's capitulation. His vague and ever changing objectives served to alarm all in attendance at the meeting, particularly Halder.

The counterpart of Brauchitsch in Stalin's Defense Commissariat was Timoshenko, who was largely responsible for the turn-around victory in the winter war ending in 1940 against Finland. A former laboror, brought up through the ranks, he was in Stalin's favor after the Finnish War ended with suitable territorial gains for the protection of Leningrad. His Chief of the General Staff was Zhukov, appointed to the role after his exemplary participation in war games conducted in January 1941 further embellished his generalship against the Japanese in 1939.

On June 23, 1941, two days after the German attack, Stalin authorized formation of the Stavka (Headquarters). It was to be subordinate to the Committee for the Defense of the State (GOKO), presided over by Stalin, and included Molotov, Voroshilov, who had been Defence Commissar from 1934-1940, Malenkov, and Beria, chief of the NKVD from 1935-1952. Stalin then remained out of the public eye for a time, until the border battles were largely over, while Red Army forces reeled under the onslaught. On July 10, a week after a remarkable show of support by his ministers who came unsolicited to his dacha, he became Supreme Commander, later conferring the Supreme High Command upon Stavka of which he remained as chairman. And on July 19, with dictatorial defiance of logic, Stalin became his own Commissar of Defence.7 Following the stunning defeat of the Red Army at Smolensk, succeeding Timoshenko, who had by then taken Pavlov's position in command of what was left of the Western Army Group. These events were revolutionary, even by Soviet standards.8 Timoshenko would continue to be supported by Zhukov, who correctly noted that he bore little responsibility for the defeat after only 4 weeks in command of the Western Army Group, and should remain as a front commander.9

Red Army Groups opposed the three major routes of advane of the German forces at the beginning of operation Barbarossa, north, center and south. Under Kirponos' command in the south was the Kiev Special Military District, to which most available forces were assigned, opposing Rundsted's Army Group South. Kuznetzov commanded the Baltic Special Military District opposite Leeb's Army Group North, where decisive early tank battles were fought. In the path of Bock's Army Group Center lay the Western Military District commanded by the above mentioned Pavlov, the "Guderian of the East," who had come off second best during the war games against the indomitable Zhukov.

Intelligence

From late 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, came to rely upon the regular delivery of a pouch which contained the latest German air force messages, Gestapo and counter intelligence (Abwehr) radio traffic, and a summary of other intelligence developments, such as those involving German Navy (Kreigsmarine) communications.10 German officers interviewed after the close of hostilities were astounded at this achievement by the British, which remained undiscovered for the remainder of the war. This resource provided the basis for information supplied to Stalin concerning the likely outbreak of hostilities even before June, 1941. Significantly, Stalin obtained confirmation of the details of the invasion from Sorge, through his contacts with the German embassy in Tokyo. This was supplemented by information from German deserters, during the final days prior to June 22. The wealth of intelligence information available to Stalin had to be taken seriously, although he publicly discounted it for reasons which can only be surmised.

The Abwehr remained autonomous throughout much of the war. Many, of its officials, including Admiral Canaris, and General Oster were to pay with their lives for treason against the Reich, and the full extent of their activities will therefore never be known. It is recorded that Britain, rather for reasons of propriety than any other, missed numerous opportunities for collaboration with this opposition to Hitler. Churchill, by then confident of American support, and in his intelligence service, saw no reason to follow such means. Had one of the various plots against the Fuehrer been successful, and the planned takeover of the army been less than successful, the result would have been in grave doubt. Goering was Hitler's named successor, but it is likely that other ardent Nazis such as Himmler, to whom the SS divisions would remain loyal, or Goebbels, who later refused a request to surrender to the Red Army, after Hitler's death in 1945, would demonstrate even more ingenuity than he. The German people by then were accustomed to ruthless logic in succession to power. Nonetheless, the Army, once free of Hitler's control, would be a major factor in the transfer of power.

Stalin, himself a cult figure, represented another enigma for the plotters. His armies might have been halted in anticipation of an unlikely truce early in the conflict, then released when the Germans demonstrated a willingness to continue the battle. Later in the war, Stalin was motivated by the opportunity to extend Communism throughout Europe by conquest, and would not likely have halted his, by then victorious, forces.

However, by turning away overtures by the opposition forces, the Allies ignored any possibility of early diplomatic intervention with a provisional government, and may have unwittingly lent stability to a Nazi regime that was shakier than it outwardly appeared.

Then Defense Commissar Voroshilov disclosed (during secret talks exploring avenues for collaboration with the French in August 1939), that the Soviets could field "between 9,000 to 10,000" tanks.11 These talks, if as reported, serve as a remarkable diplomatic failure in that they represented the last opportunity for cooperation between Stalin and the western Europe before he turned to Germany for support. Hitler ignored such intelligence figures and the existence of "only a small number" of newer heavy tanks was discussed at the German chancellory in March 1941, along with the outmoded nature of Soviet air power.

Kinzel, chief of Foreign Armies East for Germany, accurately reported on April 25, 1941, that the Red Army was being brought up to "war strength" at the border.12 However, Hitler continued to publicly rely on other outdated and inaccurate army intelligence information13, which may have served his ulterior motives and predicted a rapid collapse of Red Army defenses.14 However, the major reasons for failure to defeat the Red Army during the early period, lay with supply and logistics.

Logistics and Supply

Although the directive for operation Barbarossa was officially signed in December 1940, Hitler was unwilling to implement emergency economic measures, instead relying upon an anticipated quick victory. Much of Germany's industry was under the control of the head of the Four-Year Plan begun in the autumn of 1936, Goering, whose Reichswerke would spring up throughout occupied territory. Much of the remainder would be under the control of Todt, who had been in charge of the autobahn project and in 1940 would become Reichminister for armaments. Todt’s untimely death in an airplane accident, allowed the succession of Hitler's chief architect, Speer. Under his later administration, output of aircraft, tanks and artillery would rise each year, while other industrial output would remain stable.15 at the outset of hostilities in the east, however, certain shortages had already become acute.

The supply of tungsten, a material necessary for production of advanced anti-tank weaponry was among the essential imports interdicted by the naval blockade imposed by Great Britain and shortages were noted by Bock after October, 194116. In May 1941, Halder recorded blandly that supply resources had already failed the Afrika Korps, and that additional meat rationing would be required, for all military personnel as well as civilians.17 These were startling admissions for an army staff planning the largest invasion in history.

Paulus, who for a time served as Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Operations, had predicted with considerable accuracy that the Army would suffer supply shortages after reaching Smolensk. Demonstrated during map exercises in lieu of war games in December 1940, these predictions demonstrated the limitations of blitzkrieg warfare in Russia.18, 19 There is no indication of any initiative on his part for a change in plans, much less open opposition toward the Fuehrer.

These few facts, among the many, serve as clear indications of the limitations in supplying Germany's attacking forces. The references are silent regarding discussions of what consequences would result, if the strategy were interrupted prior to achieving its vague objectives of huge territorial gains, perhaps extending to the Ural Mountains. Such considerations would have provided the strongest rationale for opposition to the Barbarossa plan, as difficulties in distribution were certain to occur, regardless of the initial availability of supplies. Leeb would bemoan the fact that he lacked troops to protect rear areas from attacks by partisans, as early as August, 1941.20 Such difficulties would remain permanent issues in a theater of operations with vast areas of uninhabitable terrain, without paved roads, and subject to extremes of climate. For military theorists advocating that the blitzkrieg attack was stopped east of the Dnepr River in July 1941, 21 Paulus most closely predicted the outcome in advance, had Hitler chosen to listen.

Arms and Men

Both armies had been rebuilt since World War I and both served to test the influences of evolving political ideology. The Red Army Defense Commissar, Voroshilov, to be replaced after the early defeats in Finland in 1940, was a holdover from the Bolshevik revolutionary era when the army was most useful as a political instrument. His successor, Timoshenko, would assume the task of reorganizion of the Red Army into a professional fighting force after it had been deprived of most of its leadership during purges initiated by Stalin in 1937. But in June 1941, this process was just beginning.

The astonishing victories in France by Germany in 1940 were followed by a hasty reorganization of Red armored forces. This involved a revision of the motorized rifle division unit which contained a small number of tanks into the mechanized corps to be comprised of 36,000 men and 1,031 tanks in 2 divisions, over half of which were to be the superior T-34 and KV models. However, none of the border units had their full complement of heavy tanks at the outbreak of hostilities in June 1941, and lack of training and logistics further reduced capabilities. Nonetheless, the effects of the new Soviet dispositions were felt during the border battles. For example, the Red Army 2nd Tank Division, fighting in the North near Rasenai with just over 50 of the newer tanks in its complement, was able to pin the 6th Panzer, and the 41st Corps for several days. German units rejoiced in the hard-won early victories, but there were grave concerns. Manstein's 56th Corps after capturing bridgeheads on the Dvina, was held back by reserve armor formations, in what would be a series of many delays for Army Group North.

Two of the divisions in Panzer Group 4, the 6th and the 8th were comprised of tanks of Czech design (35t), as were the 38t tanks of the 7th division of Group 3. But the panzertruppen were hampered even more by the inferior armor piercing capability of the 37mm anti-tank gun, standard for both the Czech models, and the German Mark III, which served the remaining divisions. The deficiencies of this weapon had already been appreciated during periods of hard fighting in France in 1940. Although it was effective in disabling the heavier tanks, many more shots were required, and disabled tanks still required eventual destruction by other means, often necessitating dangerous exposure of infantry. German tankers were plagued, for the first time, by significant shortages of armor piercing ammunition.

In Germany’s center, Guderian's Panzer Group 2, included 4 panzer divisions numbering 953 tanks, of superior German manufacture, with a 5th division in reserve. It was to provide the southern pincer of a huge operation to envelop opposing forces in the Western Military District. Opposing Army Group Center, Pavlov's Red Army forces included 4 mechanized corps and a total of 2072 tanks.22 Of these, 437 tanks of older design, remained attached to motorized divisions, theoretically providing combined arms capability. Two of the tank divisions, the 4th and the 7th, stationed south of Grodno, contained enough medium and heavy tanks of modern design to cause much difficulty for the Germans had they been properly utilized. Their crews lacked basic training, suffered shortages of fuel and ammunition and were vulnerable to air attacks. The panzer group, after initially smashing the weaker tank units near the border, chased the remaining Red Army infantry into the forest and marshland of the Pripet and proceeded toward Minsk. Most of the Soviet armor, which evaded the Luftwaffe, fuel shortages, and the swampland, had to be dealt with by the German infantry near Grodno. However, the northern pincer, Panzer Group 3, commanded by Hoth reached its objective near Minsk 2 days before Guderian. This theme was to recur at Smolensk, only the delay there would be significantly longer.

Hitler, preoccupied with political and ideological concerns hardly befitting a military commander, worried about the Allies' capacity to rearm before his constantly changing goals could be achieved. He had a surprising recall for technical detail, and was skillful in manipulating his staff from whom he deliberately kept much information. Having interfered in the slightest detail, he ignored logistical problems and failed to provide oversight. German units were superiorly trained resulting in high morale. However, the end result was that the OKH, largely through skillful machinations, found it had seriously compromised its overall standard of preparedness, largely to meet the Fuehrer's timetable.

Hitler's order in 1940 to replace the 37mm gun, on Mark III tanks, with the long barreled 50mm, was not implemented in time for Barbarossa. Regardless of this, German tanks had been intended for use primarily against infantry. The German infantry, equipped with antitank weapons and expert at elastic defense against tanks, was supposed to do the rest. Hitler’s initiative in implementation of heavier antitank weapons led to some success; however, relatively few of the new 50mm antitank weapons were available for distribution to the Panzerjaeger battalions, and these were also of increasingly limited effectiveness against heavier armor.

By mid-July 1941, at a time when slow progress was being made on all fronts in the east, Hitler was needlessly interfering in various details. Halder reports that a Fuehrer order was received which would have increased the number of armor units from 20 to 36 divisions, with 18 motorized infantry divisions!23 This amounted to nothing less than reorganization of the entire German Army, with field units from the Eastern front being given up in order to meet Hitler's goals for world domination.

This was a far cry from Moltke:

"In no instance must a military commander allow himself to be swayed in his operations by policy decisions only. He should rather keep military success in view."24

If it had not been previously concluded that the Fuehrer had taken leave of his senses, this should have resolved any lingering doubt. Bland recordations give testimony to the fact that senior staff officers suffered a paralysis of the will to oppose him. Capable, professional officers, such as Fritsch and Beck were long gone. Hitler's intemperance and his intimidation of Brauchitsch compromised the latter's independence and moral conscience. After the departure, of Brauchitsch, and later Halder, Hitler would tolerate only blind allegiance to the Fuehrerprinzip ("Fuehrer principle") provided by men such as Jodl.

Little attention was given to implementation of human resources of the occupied territories, and Hitler forbade any exercise of executive power by army group leadership.24a Although the Soviets had belatedly joined the League of Nations in 1934, the Axis powers had withdrawn from this organization after the ascent of Hitler in 1933. This, together with lack of endorsement of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, likely contributed to decisions pertaining to conduct of inhumane acts toward prisoners and civilian inhabitants, alike.

On the home front, competition for resources continued. Leeb, commander of the Army Group North, reported at a morning conference in May 1941, that helicopter development, apparently perceived by him as useful in the confined spaces of forest and swamp prevalent in the north of Russia, was "much too slow." Standard anti-tank ammunition would be rapidly expended during the fierce battles on the Eastern front, and obsolete earlier model tanks would later be useful only for training and for replenishment under fire. A new tapered bore design offered a muzzle velocity for anti-tank projectiles approaching 1400 meters/second.25 High explosive anti-tank or high explosive armor piercing (HEAT or HEAP) technology was well known to the German munitions industry. However all of these weapons required imported metallic components, and were of limited availability. Heavy combat involved employing standard antitank rounds initially, and shifting to HEAT rounds (which were extremely effective against heavily armored Red Army tanks) only if the standard rounds proved ineffective.

Other resources were wasted in developing and building needlessly redundant and complex armor vehicles. More effort directed toward earlier development of Panthers, not introduced until 1943, would have better served the German tank units. However, this was a symptom rather than a cause, and lack of coordination of planning efforts made greater efficiency in Germany's military industrial complex unlikely.

Resources likewise had been diverted toward two failed missions: the submarine blockade, and the attempted strategic bombing by the Luftwaffe of Great Britain. The latter was unsuccessful, largely due to the almost total lack of a strategic bomber force, as well as the shift away from tactical bombing of British airfields, which permitted optimum use of fighter planes in defense, guided by radar. British radar installations were only sporadically attacked. Despite dependence of combined arms operations upon air support, there was an overall shortage of air units, and lack of close coordination between air and ground forces.26 After early setbacks in June and July, the Soviets would soon challenge German air superiority.

Personnel losses were realistically predicted by Fromm, commander in chief of the reserve army, just prior to the invasion: 275,000 for the border battles, and 200,000 "for September."27 Replacements for losses in battle were projected at 370,000 by October 1.28 German planning was consistently distorted by the misconception that most of the Red Army forces would be destroyed in the early battles. As resistance stiffened, a total of 360 enemy divisions would be identified (160 more than originally estimated) and casualties would mount precipitously. Halder cites revised casualty figures of 318,000 at the end of July, or nearly 10% of the entire army in the east. By the end of September, this had risen to 551,000 or 16%, of which nearly 117,000 were killed in action. By November 26 the casualty figures had risen to 743,000, and by December 31, 830,000 or an astonishing 26%. Casualties continued to climb at a similar rate following the Red Army attacks in late 1941; however, the more significant detriment was the rate at which the Red Army exchanged casualties with those of the Wehrmacht, which were not so easily replaced.

Losses in the leading combat units were heavier, and Hoth was to report a decline of 50% in combat strength by the time his panzer corps reached the Dvina, July 4. Similar tank losses were reported by other units by July 13, with 20% of damaged tanks considered beyond repair.29 Although supply had improved, combat strength would only be marginally better by the time these units would be needed for their next advance.

Strategy

During the 19th century, Germany had won a succession of decisive, short wars: Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870), which punctuated a lengthy period of relative peace brought to an end by World War I. While the Germans envisioned yet another quick capitulation, the Soviets, on the other hand, recognized the likelihood of a prolonged conflict.

Hitler appropriated grandiose aims which had been generally expressed by the Kaiser to justify mobilization of his armies in 1914.30 His reorganization of the war ministry allowed him a free hand in planning the occupation of Scandinavia in April, 1940. This was a far-reaching operation, requiring close coordination of all branches of the military, but was initially kept from the High Command by the OKW.31 Bullock attributed the subsequent successes in the west against the Allies, which collectively possessed rough parity in number of divisions, to unity of command and leadership, air superiority, and innovative use of armored formations.32 The latter advantages would be mitigated by the politically motivated decision by Hitler to hold back the panzers before Dunkirk, allowing nearly 400,000 troops to be evacuated, but thereby limiting his own losses.

Shortly after the defeat of France, and against the advice of his generals, Stalin insisted upon creating a new defensive line at the border of Soviet occupied territory in the east. This strategy was also opposed by Zhukov, who had been appointed Chief of the General Staff. The construction and manning of the new defensive line, was greatly hampered by Stalin's unwillingness to provoke the Germans, and it would remain largely unfinished on the eve of the invasion. Reserves were ultimately called up in March, and forward deployment of some 28 divisions, 9 corps headquarters, and 4 army headquarters (16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd) was authorized in early June.

Most of the available newer model tanks were formed into mechanized corps, positioned behind the infantry, ostensibly for immediate counterattack. The Soviet battle plan, such as it existed, was based upon the dangerous assumption that German forces would be stopped by infantry with tank support, and quickly thrown back. Timoshenko adhered to Stalin's view, that Hitler's immediate goal was the occupation of the agriculturally and industrially rich Ukraine, and most of his forces accordingly were positioned in the south.

After the defeat of Poland, the Red Army began relocating its defenses from the Stalin line in the vicinity of the historic border of Russia, to the newly captured border region in what had been eastern Poland. This effectively widened the distance over which Army Group Center would conduct its fighting advance by some 300 miles, but galvanized belief that redeployed Soviet forces would be vulnerable during the early border battles.

Hitler's timetable for war in the east had been delayed by two or three years by Britain's stubborn refusal to capitulate. Once hostilities were a reality, his was a race against time while the western Allies were rearming. He had no similar concerns regarding Soviet rearmament, but justified broadening the scope of the planned invasion based upon the need to eliminate Communist activities supported from within the country, as well as the need to acquire territory and resources. The OKH promulgated the doctrine of concentration of forces on a primary objective, presumably Moscow, with its industrial and communication centers, and extensive rail network just to the east. This was to have drawn in Red Army reserve forces, leading to their complete defeat, and was likewise contemplated by the Soviet leadership. Halder, who had briefly considered an attack through the Baltic followed by a southward diversion toward Moscow, later became a proponent of the direct route over the land bridge between the upper Dvina and Dnepr rivers toward Moscow. But Hitler, preoccupied with economic and political concerns, issued a directive on July 19, aimed at dividing his forces after reaching Smolensk.33 This caused much dissention, but Halder and Bock appeared uncertain of the outcome until a later August 21st, memorandum, issued by Hitler in response to the mounting dispute. They were now required to direct Hoth north, and Guderian south at the expense of Army Group Center's advance on Moscow. The apparent turnabout, when consided in light of the Fuehrer's designs at least 6 months before the attack, can hardly be viewed as a surprise. Rather, Halder and Bock were likely embarrassed by the fact that various machinations, along with those of Guderian, to undermine Hitler's original plan had failed. It is truly remarkable that this pivotal decision was left open from December 1940 on, and that these facts must have been understood by all higher staff and army group commanders. At this point Halder again offered resignation, but was deterred by Brauchitsch.

At the outset, Bock pressed for rapid forward progress by the panzer corps. At Vilnius, the 25th Panzer Regiment was put to its biggest test of the war against poorly led but surprisingly resilient T-34 tanks of the 5th Mechanized Corps. At Grodno, German infantry held the armoured counterattacks by the 4th and 7th Mechanized Corps destroying hundreds of tanks, most of which ran out of fuel and ammunition. The distance to Minsk was covered by the panzer units in 5 days. But the resulting battles of encirclement held up the drive toward Smolensk, for nearly 2 weeks, by which time German casualties totaled just over 50,000 or 2.2% of the total deployed, with officer losses proportionately somewhat higher.34 This allowed the Red Army to position 5 more reserve armies which had been ordered deployed forward in early June. Guderian had deflected away weaker armoured units with his southern pincer, but was harried by Red Army infantry, which retreated into the Pripet marshes to the south, and remained a threat to his right flank. This pattern would reemerge when Guderian's corps crossed the Dnepr in early July. With only limited infantry support for his tank regiments, they would be relentlessly assailed from the south by some 20 divisions of Soviet infantry, deployed there after the experience gained by the war games. This flank attack, in concert with that from the northern flank, was to cause the Germans to divert available Panzer forces, reducing their overall effect. Furthermore, delays in closing the infantry rings after the armor breakthroughs at Minsk, and subsequently at Smolensk, allowed hundreds of thousands of Soviet fighting men to escape, to fight another day. 34a Halder, despite increasing disillusionment, held to the original plan, even after Hitler's July 19th directive effectively delayed the anticipated drive to Moscow until late fall. There would be one final confrontation between the leaders in August.

Within Bock's own command there was dissention. Subordination of the panzer corps commanded by Guderian and Hoth to von Kluge's 4th Army for the encirclement east of Smolensk had placed an additional tier of responsibility above Guderian, whose tactical use of armor would subject his and adjacent units to greater risks. Guderian, somewhat stubbornly, retained coordination of his 2 panzer corps; however Hoth, was forced to divert 57th Panzer Corps north toward Velikiye Luki to counter strong Red Army forces, including 22 Army which was ably commanded by Ershakov.35 Consequently, he had only one Corps available for the northern pincer of the encirclement east of Smolensk. Other armored units, which could have made a contribution to Hoth's effort, were at that time languishing in the north, and likely would not have been released for assistance of Hoth, in any event.

From the beginning, Bock had bemoaned his perceived shortage of infantry divisions, which were either diverted or removed from his command by OKW, with little notice. Transport was inadequate. Manstein, commander of 56th Panzer Corps in the Baltic, and later, 11th Army in the Ukraine, believed the "rapid pace" of rearmament had detracted seriously from the quality of his troops, as well.36 Luftwaffe paratroops had been augmented by Goering, adding to personnel shortages in the Army.

Nonetheless, the great battles of encirclement served to elevate spirits, not only Hitler's. Bock had opposed the idea of massed armor at Minsk, as it would then lead to delay while meandering through marshy terrain to reach the next objective, Smolensk. Surprisingly, Brauchitsch granted him some leeway here, but the fact remained that additional time and fuel were expended.

Guderian, effectively granted even more leeway by the interposition of Kluge, to whose 4th Army command he was then subordinated, halted at the Dnepr July 3, having left his infantry support behind. Bock became dissatisfied with the conduct of this operation, generally favoring a quicker advance. However, as previously mentioned, Panzer Group 2 was soon assailed by Timoshenko's second echelon defense force, which had been set in motion toward assembly areas east of the Dnepr in early June. This effectively interdicted Guderian's southern pincer, but "hurrying Heinz" contented himself with rushing elements of XLVI Panzer Corps to occupy a jumping off point at Yelna, in preparation for his next advance. Lesser Red Army Forces were to threaten Bock's left flank north of the Dvina, however, Hoth, despite huge losses, was able to maintain forward momentum reaching his designated area east of Smolensk. As the advance ground to a halt, it came under concentrated artillery fire, for the first time. This could not be effectively countered, because, as predicted by Paulus, ammunition for the German guns was by this time in short supply. For the moment, the Germans got no further east, than Guderian's small salient, destined to become a killing zone, at Yelna. By August 8th, having begun diverting his forces south, Guderian managed to encircle a smaller pocket near Roslavl. This had torn another 50 mile gap in the Red Army's defenses, which, unfortunately, could not be exploited.37, 37a

There ensued a short stalemate, due largely to lack of sufficient reserves, the Germans for the purpose of carrying on the attack to Moscow, and the Russians to "bar the door." However, the latter, through desperate flank attacks, had bought the Red Army more time to establish its third echelon of defense. The battle for Smolensk, lasting through July and August, had effectively decided the outcome for Army Group Center, in Stalin's favor.

Several aspects of the Baltic campaign were poorly planned and executed.38, 38a In the opening days, 56th Panzer Corps had pressed on to the Dvina essentially unmolested. After Hoeppner's 41st had been needed to destroy Soviet mechanized corps at Rasenai, the initial victories faded. Hitler had begun to interfere, after 56th Corps had reached the Dvina. Leeb, for his part, must have known about the extreme problems posed by terrain and distance, which would not allow Hoeppner to proceed toward Leningrad by the most direct route. Two panzer corps were by mid-July hopelessly bogged down in swamp and forest, with mounting casualties. Here, too, there were ammunition shortages, and the Red Air Force became increasing active. Manstein's flank had been assailed by Red Army forces south of Lake Ilmen, and had to fight its way out of encirclement. After this, Hitler's angst led to relentless interference extending to divisional operations, Leeb's repeated expressions of resentment to Brauchitsch notwithstanding. By November, Hitler was communicating with Army Group North through Keitel, Brauchitsch's attentions apparently being drawn to more pressing matters involving Army Group Center's final push.

Before the encirclement of Leningrad could be completed in September 1941, 5 panzer and 2 motorized divisions, together with Richthofen's 8th Air Corps, were taken from Leeb for operation Typhoon, the attack on Moscow, which was also to be a battle of encirclement. Hitler had belatedly acceeded to the pleas of Halder and Bock, to resume the drive toward Moscow. Rundstedt was also forced to relinquish 9 divisions to Army Group Center, of which 2 were panzer and 2 more motorized. By early December, virtually all operations were brought to a standstill, and the Red Army was poised for its counterattacks.

The reorganization of the panzer divisions to single tank regiments after 1940 fostered interdependency among the armor divisions, each needed for support of the other. Smaller tactical combined arms units were created as the need arose. Reinforced by early successes, the German Army remained dependent upon the tactics of blitzkrieg, basically the exploitation of operations involving deep armor penetration, supported by infantry, and with accompanying air support. But the use of armor was destined to be less successful in the marshland between Lake Peipus and Ilmen. After the victory at Rasenai*, there would be no additional "kesselschlacht" (battle of encirclement) in the Baltic.

Was there an alternative for use of the German tank units in the north? A simple maneuver toward Velikie Luki after reaching the Corps' first major objective, the Dvina bridges was apparently never considered. Such a maneuver, would have provided necessary flank protection for Bock, and would also have placed at the disposal of Army Group Center much needed reserve forces necessary to pursue the advantage gained east of Smolensk, although not, in and of itself, leading to the hoped for capture of Moscow. The dependence of each army group, regardless of its mission, upon the tactics of blitzkrieg and combined arms, led to the stubborn refusal to relinquish any of its resources, absent a direct order from Hitler.

• The 6th Panzer Division, fighting on the Siaulai axis at Rasenai (Rosseinie), was pinned by a strong force made up of 2nd Tank Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, together with remnants of the 48th Infantry Division, not previously destroyed by initial engagements. The 1st Panzer Division, with virtually no air support at hand, was required to conduct a flanking maneuver from the north, which in concert with a meneuver from the south by the 269th Infantry, was able to encircle and destroy the adversary.

.

Terrain differences in the Baltic notwithstanding, the deployment of tanks in the center with infantry armies on the wings had inherently led to a different result in the north. The infantry divisions fought better with combined arms, and would doubtless have suffered with redeployment of their panzers, although the enemy suffered similar handicaps. Leeb during November near Tikvin would later bemoan the weakness of his remaining forces in the midst of determined counterattacks , a clear sign that the Red Army wasn't beaten.

In the south, there was a delay in the invasion of the infantry army, which could have served as a weak southern pincer for Kleist's panzer group. However, even under ideal circumstances, the availability of only a single tank arm did not permit the successes achieved by Army Group Center.

What resources would have been required to achieve the goals of Army Group Center during July, 1941? Several units of up to Corps strength were pulled out of combat or refitting for use in other operations. By enumerating these, it is possible to estimate what additional manpower would have accomplished the task.

Near the Dnepr, the deployment of XII Corps at Starya Bychov, requested on July 17, was initially refused by Bock, who later relented. He had for too long watched his divisions dissipated by higher authority. Several divisional and lesser units were sent to hold Yelna; however, the Smolensk pocket remained open, and Bock would regret that escaping Red Army forces would continue to stream eastward until July 26. The failure to rapidly seal and destroy the Smolensk pocket, was permitted by a combination of factors -- Guderian's early advance across the Dnepr unassisted by infantry, permitting success of the flank attack ordered by Timoshenko on Panzer Group 2, and the diversion of badly needed forces to Yelna, itself. Guderian's spent forces had been prevented from immediately linking up with Hoth and further expanding the bridgehead there. Red Army troops, escaping east from the pocket would indeed soon be encountered elsewhere.

Stalin was to appoint Zhukov, who had resigned from his General Staff position over a dispute with Stalin over the Southwest Front with respect to Kiev, to the command of the Reserve Front to reduce the Yelna salient.39,39a When Guderian was later allowed to remove a panzer regiment and mobile artillery from the salient, ostensibly to conserve his forces for a later advance, this potentially strategic site had to be abandoned to the Red Army, which reoccupied the salient on September 6. Losses from Red Army artillery and counterattacks were grievous, in this, the Germans' first major setback.

IX Infantry Corps was directed to the relief of elements of Panzer Group 2, and subordinated to its command during the drive to the south in August. Several mobile units were reassigned during August, prior to the involvement of now renamed Armeegruppe Guderian in the Kiev encirclement ordered by Hitler on July 23. Hoth, the more dependable commander of the two, received no such recognition. His 39th Corps, consisting of 12th Panzer and 2 motorized divisions, were sent north to support Leeb's right flank at Staraya Russa, much to Bock's distress. 24th Panzer Corps, consisting of 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions, and 10th motorized were ordered by Guderian south in support of the northern flank of 2nd Army, which was encountering stubborn resistance. Diversion of one division would likely have sufficed, however, Guderian did not think in those terms, and strove to keep his forces aggregated. This would be a recurring theme on all fronts, which lacked uncommitted reserve forces for assignment by OKH.

In summary, to continue the drive on Moscow through the gap at Roslavl and the salient at Yelna, in August, 1941 the following would likely have been required:

1. 1 panzer corps 2. 2 infantry corps 3. 1 reserve infantry division 4. 3 reserve panzer divisions, and an additional regiment each of tanks and self-propelled artillery (to protect and enlarge Guderian's salient at Yelna).

Properly outfitted, these reserve forces would require 924 additional tanks, and a minimum of 175,000 additional personnel, which would have exceeded available resources in materiel. While armor could have been redeployed from the Baltic toward Velikye Luki in July, it is still likely that somewhere near the above increment would have been necessary for the advance to continue in August. This analysis leads one to conclude that the Germans deployed enough infantry and artillery to achieve the encirclement of Moscow, but lacked sufficient armored vehicles, and logistical support. When shortages in replacement personnel, materiel, and supplies are considered, it is clear that such deficits could not have been overcome, absent emergency economic measures, which were refused by Hitler until 1942.

Analysis

Among the causes of this war, must be considered Hitler's disregard for lasting political solutions for a Germany strained by forced economic recovery under the Four-Year Plan. The harsh provisions of the Versailles treaty, often cited as justification, had by the fall of the Weimar Republic in 1929 been effectively done away with. However, the requirement by the Armistice that Germany withdraw its victorious occupying troops from Russia remained a bone of contention. Hitler’s oft-repeated designs upon Russia, were temporarily ignored during the heady diplomatic days of the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact. However treaties with Russia had been broken before. Prior to the Armistice of 1918, a truce with the Bolsheviks would be short lived, allowing Ludendorf, by then himself a virtual military dictator, to send his occupation forces as far south as Baku.40

Much has been said of Stalin's apparent failure to appreciate the threat posed by the German forces on his borders, and to take effective countermeasures. The Red Army was undergoing a buildup, while plans were put into effect for saving Russian industrial production within reach of the war zone. Stalin alone, not his generals, bore the responsibility for the tragedy of the border battles. He alone ordered the abandonment of the Stalin line, considered a defensive position, now deep within Soviet territory, and the manning of partially constructed border emplacements, and he allowed others to pay with their lives for the inevitable early defeats.41, 41a

Newer model Soviet tanks were available only in limited numbers, and without immediate training for their use. Plagued by shortages of ammunition and fuel, it appears little more could have been accomplished even by the heavier tank divisions. As previously discussed, the 2nd Tank Division was employed effectively in blocking 6th Panzer at Rasenai, but was quickly outflanked and destroyed. Virtually all of the tanks deployed in border defense, suffered this fate, while artillery units, positioned farther to the rear, were spared. Initially, however, the entire Red Army lacked the means to withstand such an onslaught, and it would take until late 1942 for these tactical deficiencies to be remedied.

The fact remained, as succinctly demonstrated by the early victory in the west and the war games of 1941, that border defenses were vulnerable to the German tactics. This fact must have been known to all, including Pavlov, who had lost to Zhukov's blue forces during the war games, yet naively believed in the set plan (But see Fugate and Dvoretsky, p. 303). Had Stalin not expressly forbidden any preparations that could be construed as "provocations," a better defense might have been mounted, although the outcome of the border battles was inevitable. A strategic withdrawal was out of the question on the eve of battle, although there is cursory evidence that this tactic was utilized to a limited extent in the Baltic.42

Stalin was certainly aware of these realities, and could at best hope for a miracle. Whether he consciously planned, together with Timoshenko and Zhukov, the contingency plans amounting to the sacrifice of his armies far from Moscow as a delaying tactic, is less important than the fact that this is actually what occurred. Meanwhile, he held up the orders for forward deployment of the reserve forces, which would ultimately provide the defense in echelon. These leaders must have understood the likelihood of the early defeats, and realized how limited were their options. There would have been relatively little concern about the magnitude of human sacrifice. After recovering from his disbelief at Hitler's rash act of war, the Red Army's next surprise was the rapidity of the German advance, which, because of problems of logistics and communication, could only be slowed by committing the remaining divisions piecemeal into combat. Red Army battle plans emphasizing immediate counter-attack may have served to maintain morale, but led to greater casualties, as the Red Army divisions were swept into the “kesselschlacht”.

While actively participating in defensive measures after the outbreak of hostilities, Stalin initially remained out of the spotlight, allowing his military leaders to bear responsibility for the early defeats, and preserving for himself the later role of Supreme Commander. Referring to his temporary retirement to his dacha outside Moscow in the early days following the invasion, analysts have cited an apparent crisis of confidence, until his ministers appeared on the scene. However, Glantz notes ample documentation that he remained busily involved with conferences and meetings during that time. Thereafter his power remained supreme; however, he would limit his intervention in tactical matters. Most importantly, he would transfer increasing responsibility from party cronies, such as Voroshilov and Budenny, to professional staff officers such as Zhukov. After managing to stall the invasion during July 1941, Stalin's confidence in ultimate victory for the Red Army began to appear realistic.

Hitler, on the other hand, did a great deal to assist Stalin in his efforts. Even though a seemingly victorious Supreme Commander, he could not long resist the temptation to meddle in even the most minor tactical and logistical details. Under extreme pressure, the General Staff had relinquished its prerogatives, and submitted to his dictates. Command by directive (vollmacht) and the concept of joint responsibility between commanding and staff officers, permitted central control of the combat scenario, yet flexibility, .43 However, the concept of “mission responsibility,” the provision to the individual commander of support and equipment sufficient for independent accomplishment of his mission, was more difficult to apply in the eastern front, for reasons given previously.44 After the departure of Halder, the very existence of the German General Staff depended upon its implementation of the will of the Fuehrer.

Of those in a position to earlier criticize Hitler’s strategy, only Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Commander in Chief of the Navy, openly opposed the decision to attack the USSR.45 Of those remaining in Army staff positions, only Halder would have been likely to have the wherewithal to prevail in any protracted dispute with his Fuehrer. Germany lacked the equivalent of the British Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, which had existed since 1922, in order to resolve command conflicts.46 Goering was Hitler’s named successor, and his other party cronies would doubtless exercise similar ambitions in any command crisis. Halder must have known of Raeder's dissent, as well as that of the lower ranking Army generals, whose complicity in the resistance to Hitler, would lead to a wave of executions, after the most serious of several attempts on Hitler's life in 1944. But early in the war, open dissent was exceptional, and this fact represented the greatest failure of the General Staff in its duties in support of the Army. Although previously discouraged by Brauchitch, passive dissent through resignation was still an option available to Halder, along with that attempted by Admiral Raeder. However, even the latter supported continuation of the war, albeit with greater emphasis in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. At any rate, if further dissent had been attempted, it remains likely that both would have been dismissed, if not prosecuted. After the war, Halder's commentaries were highly regarded and he was awarded the Meritorious Civilian Service Award for service to the US Army Historical Division.

The German Army’s dependence upon the concept of blitzkrieg, and improper allocations of armor according to terrain and objective led to many tactical shortcomings. Manpower and equipment shortages forced reliance on weaker allies. Finland, beset by political concerns, and preoccupied largely with defensive operations, represented an unreliable ally. Lacking enough tanks for deep armor penetrations, it would commit only to regaining territory lost to the Red Army in 1940. In the south, reliance would be placed upon weaker Italian and Rumanian units. Finally, after repeatedly voicing a disinclination to allow his forces to decimate themselves in urban battles, Hitler was to do exactly that at Stalingrad. Losses in men and materiel there and in north Africa, although preventable, were irreplaceable, and would seal the fate of the Wehrmacht during 1942.

After initial victories in the north, panzer units should not have been held back from their easterly advance from Dunaberg, as iterated by Manstein. Such a maneuver might have secured Bock's northern flank from later attacks or hastened the siege of Leningrad. Optimally, this could have enabled a large enough force concentration to close the Smolensk pocket immediately, while widening the Yelna salient. Even greater local gains might have been facilitated, but those enumerated would likely have been decisive for Army Group Center, allowing armor later to be diverted north to encircle Leningrad and south toward Kiev. Even before the rasputitsa (October rains) the German Army should have prepared its winter positions. If the Red Army were by that time exhausted, winter would not offer much respite for it, and local advances would still be possible for the Germans. An exhaustive analysis lays much of the responsibility for the continuation of operations during November 1941 with Halder.47 It seems from his diary, that Bock would have favored a halt before reaching Moscow. However, the published diary, rewritten after destruction of the original by fire, contains weak admonishments concerning a winter defensive position. This is not in accord with his later insistence upon advance, despite the inclement weather. Nor are these assertions contained in the other diaries cited. At any rate, the strained relationship among Hitler, the OKH and army group commanders, would eventually take its toll, and Bock must share responsibility for this.

Despite logistical concerns, the Germans had by early July 1941, achieved tactical victories largely predicted by war games conducted by both sides before the onset of hostilities. After the halt at Smolensk, this advantage inevitably passed to the Red Army, which required only determined leadership to fulfill its mission. By November 1941 that leadership was more realistically committed to counterattacking and thereby defeating the Germans, when winter maximized the advantage conferred by reinforcement divisions, and after the German advance had ground to a halt

The possibility that the Red Army was still being reinforced should have been seriously considered, as indicated by the presence of fresh Siberian troops near Moscow and vigorous counterattacks in the north at Tikvin during November. In that event, entrenched positions with natural obstacles, and availability of mobile reserves could have been decisive. In September 1941, a weakened SS Totenkopf division, fighting defensively south of Lake Ilmen, managed to smash 3 Red Army divisions hurled against it in desperate struggles to interdict a breakthrough by the Red Army.48 This scenario would be repeated during Operation Uranus in November 1942.

On the other hand, until the onset of winter, the Red Army had only to adhere to various defensive tactics, of which the first, strategic withdrawal behind a natural obstacle, has already been noted. Opposite Army Group Center, flank attacks and stubborn resistance by encircled forces, later accompanied by stiff artillery and air support caused delays in the German's timetable together with irreplaceable losses.

While it is possible that Hitler, on his own, could have postponed the encirclement of Moscow until 1942, this would have made little difference to the eventual outcome. Success required adequate logistics, and a superb elastic defense. With time tables failing, Hitler, convinced by his intelligence staff that the Red Army had no further reserves, refused to consider a defensive posture. When the German Army was ultimately forced to defend itself before Moscow, there were few options other than to stand and fight in unprepared positions. However, even defensive victories, such as that at Rzhev in 1942 (Operation Uranus), would came at a high price for the Germans. As the Red Army gained experience, the Wehrmacht was no longer able to trade casualties at a favorable rate. Even Hitler realized that Germany was doomed in a long war, unless ideology could somehow prevail over the impossible odds.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 Bullock, Alan, Hitler and Stalin, parallel lives, London, 1991 p. 344.

2 ibid p. 343.

3 ibid, p. 443.

4 O'neill, Robert in Barnett, Correlli ed., Hitler's Generals, New York, 1989, p. 83.

5 Bullock, p. 772.

6 Sydnor, CW, Soldiers of Destruction, the SS Death's Head Division, 1933-1945, Princeton, 1977, p 53.

7 Overy, Richard, Russia's War, a History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945, New York, 1998, p. 29.

8 ibid, p. 77.

9 Spahr, William J., Zhukov, The Rise & Fall of a Great Captain, Novato, California, p. 58.

10 Brown, Anthony Cave, "C," the secret life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, New York, 1987.

11 Ovary p. 46.

12 The Halder Diaries, vol VI, Boulder, 1976, p 85.

13 O'neill, p. 113.

14 ibid. p. 121.

15 Bullock, p. 773.

16 Gerbet, Klaus, ed., Fedor von Bock, The War Diary, 1939-1945, Atglen, Pennsylvania, 1996 p. 338.

17 Halder, May 12, 1941, p. 112.

18 Fugate, Bryan and Dvoretsky, Lev, Thunder on the Dnepr, Zhukov, Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg, 1997, pp. 44, 155.

19 Boog, H, et al, eds. Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, Oxford, 1998, p 276.

20 Meyer, Georg, ed., Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb,, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen, Stuttgart 19, p. 337.

21 Fugate and Dvoretsky, p. 168.

22 Glantz, David, The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June-August, 1941, London, 1993, p. 191.

23 Halder, p. 239.

24 Hughes, Daniel J., von Moltke, Selected Writings on Art of Warfare, Novato, California, 1993, p. 36.

24a Halder, p. 49.

25 Leeb p. 114.

26 Glantz, p. 150.

27 Halder, May 20, 1941, p. 125.

28 ibid, June 16, 1941, p. 155.

29 ibid, July 13, 1941, p. 234.

30 Kagan, David, On the Origins of War, New York, 1995, p. 337.

32 Bullock, p. 665.

32 ibid, p. 668.

33 Seaton, Albert, The Russo-German War 1941-1945, Novato, California, 1993, p.60.

34 Halder, July 6, 1941, p. 201.

34a Seaton, p. 129.

35 Fugate and Dvoretsky, p. 193.

36 von Manstein, Erich, Lost Victories, The War Memoir of Hitler’s most Brilliant General, Random House, p. 77. Originally published Verlorene Siege, 1955.

37 Fugate, p. 221

37 a Clark, Alan, Barbarossa, the Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945, New York, 1965, p. 95

38 Kurowski, F, Panzerkrieg, An overview of German Armored Operations in World War 2, Winnepeg, 2005, p.174.

38a Seaton, p.114.

39 Fugate, p.184.

39a Spahr, p.60.

40 Hughes, p.292.

41 Glantz, p.467.

41a Spahr, p.54.

42 Glantz, p. 152

43 Megargee, G.,Inside Hitler’s High Command, Lawrence, 2000, p.10.

44 Boog, p.723.

45 ibid, p.379

46 Jackson, Bill, and Bramall, Dwin, The Chiefs, the story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, Brassey’s, London, Washington, New York, 1992, p.137.

47 Boog, p.688.

48 Sydnor, p.191.