User:Gog the Mild/Planned French invasion of Britain (1759)

Background

The War of the Austrian Succession ended in 1748 with the Peace of Aachen. All of its signatories considered it unsatisfactory; in France "as stupid as the peace" became a catch phrase. Frustrated by the loss of Silesia to Prussia, Maria Theresa of Austria looked for an alliance which would enable her to recover it. This led Austria to an historic rapprochement with France. France was prepared to ally with her historic enemy because this would, the Conseil du Roi thought, allow her to concentrate her efforts against Great Britain in a future war. In reaction, Prussia, which had emerged from the war as a newly significant European power, allied with her previous enemy, Great Britain. By 1755 Britain and France were fighting an undeclared war at sea and on the Indian frontier of North America; for example: in May 1755, 2,000 British soldiers invaded French North America; in June, the Royal Navy captured nearly 300 French fishing vessels off Newfoundland and their 4,000 crew, both hitting France economically and reducing the French navy's potential recruitment pool of experienced seamen. The invasion of Saxony by Prussian troops, in August 1756, triggered what was later known as the Seven Years' War. France supported Austria and Russia in a land campaign against Prussia, and launched what she saw as her main effort in a maritime and colonial offensive against Great Britain.

By the beginning of 1759 neither alliance had the advantage, in either the land or sea campaigns. Both France and Great Britain were having serious problems financing the war. In 1759 over 60% of French revenue went to service its debt, causing numerous shortages. The French navy in particular was overstretched and suffered from the lack of a coherent doctrine, exacerbated by the inexperience verging on incompetence of the Secretary of State for the Navy, Nicolas René Berryer, a former chief of police. Meanwhile, Britain's war effort over the first three years of the war had been a failure. From the summer of 1757 the British war effort came under the control of William Pitt, who imposed an assertive and coordinated strategy. It consisted of a naval and colonial effort to expel the French from North America and ruin their maritime trade, while dispersing their efforts between fighting Prussia in Europe and attempting to defend the wide range of French overseas possessions. By early 1759 this was beginning to bear fruit.

French plan

Conception

The Duc de Choiseul was the principal author of the invasion plan, with which he hoped to end the war against Britain with a single masterstroke.

In response the Duke of Belle-Isle, French Secretary of State for War, proposed to the Duke of Choiseul, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that French forces launch a direct invasion of Britain, which if successful would have decided the war in their favour. This idea was presented to Louis XV: "Prussia is not the enemy we should be fighting; it is England we need to crush". He supported the proposal and the decision was ratified at a Council of the King in December 1758. A secret planning committee was created, responsible for defining the main lines of the "grand design". In addition to Belle-Isle and Choiseul, Marshal Berryer, Secretary of State for the Navy, was a member, as well as, later, the Duke of Aiguillon, a protégé of Belle-Isle. Madame de Pompadour, a highly influential courtier, played a decisive role throughout the decision making process. The struggle for political power continued between the members of this group, destabilising the war effort. For example, in February 1759, control of the French coastal defences, including, the coastal militia, coastal fortifications, harbour defences and shore batteries, passed from Berryer to Belle-Isle.

Jacobite involvement

Further information: Jacobitism

Prince Charles Edward Stuart, after a portrait by Giles Hussey

As part of the scheme the French considered trying to start a Jacobite rebellion, as they had in 1745, by sending the heir apparent of the Jacobite movement Charles Edward Stuart with or ahead of the invading forces. A secret meeting was arranged with Charles Stuart in Paris in February 1759, but it went badly. Charles turned up late and drunk, and proved surly and uncooperative. Convinced that the Jacobites were of little material help, Choiseul dropped them from the plan. From then on, any French landing would have to be entirely accomplished by French troops. He did however consider sending Bonnie Prince Charles to Ireland where he could be declared King of Ireland and lead a rebellion. Eventually the French decided to try to recruit Jacobite supporters without involving Charles directly in the operation.

France also sought support from Sweden, encouraging them to invade Scotland in concert with the planned French invasion; the Swedes refused. Next the French gained tentative agreement from Russia to provide troops, with the proviso that the Swedes provide the ships. The Swedes accepted French subsidies and sold them naval stores, but never provided the ships. Denmark was sympathetic, but too concerned by Britain's maritime strength to be pressed into action. Spain was approached, but also had reservations. Furious French diplomacy elicited gestures of support but no definite commitments, while alerting and alarming the British government. The Dutch Republic, traditionally a British ally but neutral at the time, demanded assurances that the French were not planning to place Charles Stuart on the British throne; an action they believed would threaten their own security. The French ambassador assured them they were not.

Invasion preparations

Choiseul, still convinced that striking directly at Britain was the best strategy, decided that the French would have to go it alone and planned on despatching 50,000 men. By the spring of 1759, French shipbuilding activity was intense. The ports of Nantes, Bordeaux, Bayonne, La Rochelle, Brest, Morlaix and St. Malo were all building vessels to take part in the various expeditions. These included a fleet of large flat-bottomed transports, each 100 feet (30 m) in length, 24 feet (7 m) in breadth and 10 feet (3 m) deep. A total of 325 were completed by late 1759, most of them in the Brittany ports, but the single largest concentration was at Le Havre, including 100 specifically to ferry food and munitions – as they could be supplied there via the inland waterway of the Seine. During the year, over 30 million livres had been spent on these transports. A dozen flat-bottomed prams, each carrying 20 large cannons, were also built to support the planned landings at Dunkirk, Boulogne and Le Havre. Materials and equipment were imported through Holland. The men of the allocated invasion force practised loading and disembarking by flotillas and became proficient. Choiseul's original intention was that when the wind was right this fleet would sail for England, accepting the risk that some components might be intercepted and destroyed by British warships. However, his colleagues on the planning committee insisted that the near-defenceless transports be escorted by warships of the French navy in the regular fashion. Choiseul complained that this would unnecessarily and perhaps fatally complicate the manoeuvre, but he was over-ruled.

A plan was developed to attack Britain on three fronts. The most important attack would focus on the Thames Estuary in order to capture London. An army of 20,000 men, 72 regiments, under the command of Charles, Prince of Soubise and General François de Chevert, would be transported from the Austrian Netherlands (modern Belgium), and landed on the Essex shore of the Thames, near the mouth of the River Blackwater, 40 kilometres (25 miles) from London. Simultaneously, two diversionary actions would be carried out. Scotland would be invaded, with 20,000 French troops landing along the River Clydeon the west coast commanded by Vice-Admiral Conflans, Marshal of France. Weapons for an additional 4,000 would be carried as it was hoped to raise Scottish volunteers. The ships for this part of the plan would sail from Brest, while the troops would assemble around Vannes on the Gulf of Morbihan. A transport fleet of 90 vessels was planned, plus several warships sailing en flute, that is with their guns stripped out to allow them to transport more soldiers. The force to invade Scotland consisted of nineteen French infantry battalions, five Irish battalions, four squadrons of dragoons and thirty-two artillery pieces. Few horses were to be dispatched; there would be reliance on confiscating local horses after landing. To escort the Scottish expedition, Conflans has of a squadron of 21 ships, stationed in Brest. To man this fleet required 9,000 sailors and 4,000 marines.. A third, small, French force, led by the privateer François Thurot, would sail from Dunkirk and land in north west Ireland. The Commissioner-General of the Navy, Le Brun, was responsible for organising and coordinating the maritime parts of the plan.

Requiring the French fleet to escort the transports introduced a number of problems. At the best of times the French struggled to crew their full fleet with experienced mariners; landsmen could be used, but even a small deficiency in ship handling translated into a significant handicap in a combat situation. Three years into the war, thousands of French seamen were held as prisoners by the British; many more were engaged in speculative, and occasionally lucrative, privateering careers; and the unhealthy conditions, onerous onboard discipline and poor wages, paid late, acted as a strong disincentive to service. The transports also required at least a cadre of skilled men. The French had 73 ships of the line, the largest warships of the time, 30 serving abroad and 43 in home waters. The ships in home waters had a aggregate complement of about 25,000 men; they were more than 9,000 short of this.

The 43 French ships in home waters were split between the Atlantic port of Brest (22 ships} and the Mediterranean port of Toulon.{{ It was widely accepted that in order to make sure of clearing a route for an invasion force, at least a significant part of the French Mediterranean fleet would need to be combined with the ships in Brest. The two ports are separated by 600 miles (970 km) and the only route passes through the Strait of Gibraltar, which was then dominated by the British naval base at Gibraltar.

Brest was the obvious starting point for the Scottish expedition, it was a major port, it was well placed with regard to the prevailing winds, and departure from it minimised the sailing distance and time to the proposed landing site. However, Brest was at the end of a long and relatively infertile peninsula, which made supporting a large number of men there difficult; supplies of food had to come in by sea and were vulnerable to the British blockade. A typhoid epidemic in Brest during 1757–1758 killed over 4,000 French seamen, greatly exacerbating their shortage of experienced sailors. In addition there was fear of a recurrence of the of typhus outbreak. Therefore the army assembled at Vannes and its transports gathered around the Gulf of Morbihan; the terrain was more fertile, the anchorage was large and sheltered, and men and supplies could readily be despatched from Bordeaux, Rochefort, Nantes, or Orleans. By November 1759, 17,000 soldiers and nearly 100 transports had been gathered around Vannes and in the Gulf of Morbihan.

British response

William Pitt was the British war leader, and mobilised Britain's defences against the invasion threat.

Raid on Le Havre

The squadron Admiral Rodney was detached in the beginning of July with a small squadron and sailed from Spithead on 2 July, arrived off Le Havre. Rodney's squadron consisted of the 60-gun ship of the line Achilles as flagship, four 50-gun ships, five frigates, a sloop, and six bomb ketches and anchored there placing the bomb vessels in the narrow channel of the river leading to Honfleur. The next day the attack commenced on the flat-bottomed boats and supplies which had been collected there. Over 3000 shells were fired at the principal targets - the magazines, batteries and the boats as well as into the town for fifty consecutive hours. Rodney, with some of his frigates, remained off the port for the rest of the year, and captured numerous prizes.

The bombardment did immense damage, while Rodney's fleet received little harm in return. A numerous body of French troops came down to the shore and under the cover of entrenchments and batteries kept up an active fire upon the assailants. The town was set on fire in several places and burned with great fury while the inhabitants fled.

The success of the venture, however, lured the British commanders into a false sense of security, making them believe it had been a greater setback than it had. The French intended to capitalise on this, but scaled back their initial plans instead.

Battle of Quiberon Bay

Sir Edward Hawke's ships kept up a constant blockade of the French coast throughout 1759

Landing in Ireland

Main articles: Battle of Carrickfergus (1760) and Battle of Bishops Court

A privateer, François Thurot, sailed from Dunkirk with five ships to provide diversionary support to the invasion. In 1760 he landed on the northern Irish coast and set up a base at Carrickfergus. Had he not repeatedly clashed with the commander of the land expedition, the force might have captured poorly defended Belfast. Having sailed for home, the Royal Navy killed Thurot and destroyed his squadron in the Irish Channel. By this point, the French had abandoned the invasion. However, many French people took heart from Thurot's expedition as it demonstrated that French forces could land in the British Isles. Madame de Pompadour suggested that France would have won at Quiberon, had Thurot been in command instead of Conflans.

Aftermath

With the Brest fleet destroyed at Quiberon Bay, they were now unable to escort the French troops across the Channel. Some now began pressing Choiseul for a return to the original plan of an unescorted crossing, suggesting that the invasion be postponed to early 1760.

The French fully abandoned the plan in 1763, when the Peace of Paris mandated a general cessation of hostilities. Choiseul continued to advocate a direct strike against Britain as the way to win future wars, and despatched engineers and agents to examine British defences in preparation. During the Falklands Crisis of 1770 he proposed a similar action, but was dismissed by the French King, Louis XV. Further French invasions were planned in 1779 during the American War of Independence, and by Napoleon in 1803–04, but none came to fruition for much the same reasons as Choiseul's 1759 campaign had been abandoned.

Notes, citations and sources

Sources

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• Chaline, Oliver (2011). "Quiberon Bay, 20 novembre 1759". Les cahiers du Pays de Guérande (in French) (53). Société des Amis de Guérande: 17–29. ISSN 0765-3565.

• Clowes, William Laird (1897). The Royal Navy: A History From the Earliest Times to the Present. Vol. Vol. III. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)

• la Condamine, Pierre de (2000). Le combat des Cardinaux : 20 novembre 1759, baie de Quiberon et rade du Croisic (in French). La Turballe: L'Esprit large-Éd. Alizés. ISBN 978-2911835032.

• Cust, Edward (1862). Annals of the Wars of the Eighteenth Century. Vol. 2. London: J. Murray. OCLC 4789197.

• Ériau, Jean-Michel (2011). "La Bataille du Croisic". Les cahiers du Pays de Guérande (in French) (53). Société des Amis de Guérande: 17–29. ISSN 0765-3565.

• Goodman, Elise (2000). The portraits of Madame de Pompadour: Celebrating the Femme Savante. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0520224087.

• Jenkins, E.H. (1973). A History of the French Navy : From Its Beginnings to the Present Day. London: Macdonald and Janeś. ISBN 978-0356041964.

• Longmate, Norman (1993). Island Fortress: The Defence of Great Britain, 1603–1945. London: Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0586208465.

• McLynn, Frank (2005). 1759: the Year Britain Became Master of the World. London: Pimlico. ISBN 978-0099526391.

• Middleton, Richard (1988). "Naval Administration in the Age of Pitt and Anson, 1755-1763". In Black, Jeremy & Woodfine, Philip (eds.). The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century. Leicester: Leicester University Press. pp. 109–127. OCLC 572510434.

• le Moing, Guy (2003). La Bataille navale des Cardinaux: 20 novembre 1759 (in French). Paris: Economica. ISBN 978-2717845037.

"The Battle of the Monongahela, 1755". Library of Congress. World Digital Library. 2017. Retrieved 6 July 2019.

• Rodger, N.A.M. (2004). The Command of the Ocean. London: Penguin. ISBN 978-0713884111.

• Szabo, Franz A. J. (2007). The Seven Years' War in Europe 1756–1763. Harlow, Essex: Longman. ISBN 978-0582292727.