User:Gog the Mild/Battle of Maleme

Battle of Maleme
Part of the Battle of Crete
German paratroopers jumping over Crete
Date 20–23 May 1941 Location Maleme, Crete 35°31′45.70″N 23°49′56.23″E Result German victory
Belligerents
Greece United Kingdom New Zealand	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Andrew	Generalmajor Eugen Meindl
Casualties and losses
Unknown	Unknown
class=notpageimage| Location within Crete

The Battle of Maleme was one of three main battles that occurred in the Battle of Crete against the Fallschirmjäger, in the Nazi German Mediterranean campaign in 1941. The overall plan was to conquer Crete as part of Operation Merkur, with German Paratroopers landing in three main areas, Heraklion, Maleme and Rethymno. The operation relied on German airborne troops, both paratroopers and in military gliders. Due to a mistake, and despite being in a superior position, New Zealand troops abandoned a strategic hill (see below), leaving it to the Germans, and then lost the airport. The airport was then used by the Germans to transport in more troops which saw the whole island lost to the Germans.

Background

Main article: Battle of Greece

Greece became a belligerent in World War II when it was invaded by Italy on 28 October 1940. A British and Commonwealth expeditionary force was sent to support the Greeks which eventually totalled more than 60,000 men. British forces also garrisoned Crete, enabling the Greek Fifth Cretan Division to reinforce the mainland campaign. This arrangement suited the British: Crete could provide the Royal Navy with excellent harbours in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Ploiești oil fields in Romania would be within range of British bombers based on the island. The Italians were repulsed without the aid of the expeditionary force. A German invasion in April 1941 overran mainland Greece and the expeditionary force was withdrawn. By the end of the month, 57,000 Allied troops were evacuated by the Royal Navy. Some were sent to Crete to bolster its garrison, although most had lost their heavy equipment.

The German army high command (Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH)) was preoccupied with the forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union, and was largely opposed to a German attack on Crete. However, Hitler was concerned about attacks on the Romanian oil fields from Crete and Luftwaffe commanders were enthusiastic about the idea of seizing Crete by an airborne attack. In Directive 31 Hitler asserted that "Crete... will be the operational base from which to carry on the air war in the Eastern Mediterranean, in co-ordination with the situation in North Africa." The directive also stated that the operation was to take place in May and must not be allowed to interfere with the planned campaign against the Soviet Union.

Opposing forces

Further information: Crete order of battle

Allies

On 30 April 1941 Major-General Bernard Freyberg, who had been evacuated from Greece with the 2nd New Zealand Division, was appointed commander-in-chief on Crete. He noted the acute lack of heavy weapons, equipment, supplies and communication facilities. Equipment was scarce in the Mediterranean, especially in the backwater of Crete. The British forces had seven commanders in seven months. The Allies had a total of 42,000 men available. Of these, 10,000 were Greek and 32,000 Commonwealth; 27,000 Commonwealth troops had arrived from Greece within a week, many lacking any equipment other than their personal weapons, or not even those; 18,000 of these remained when the battle commenced. No Royal Air Force (RAF) units were based permanently at Crete until April 1941, but airfield construction had begun, radar sites built and stores delivered. By early April, airfields at Maleme and Heraklion and the landing strip at Rethymno, all on the north coast, were ready and another strip at Pediada-Kastelli was nearly finished.

Germans

Map of the German assault on Crete; Maleme is the most easterly attack

The German assault on Crete was code-named "Operation Mercury" (Unternehmen Merkur) and was controlled by the 12th Army commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm List. The German 8th Air Corps (VIII Fliegerkorps) provided close air support; it was equipped with 570 combat aircraft. The infantry available for the assault were the German 7th Air Division, with the Air-landing Assault Regiment (Luftlande-Sturm-Regiment) attached, and the 5th Mountain Division. They totalled 22,000 men grouped under the 11th Air Corps (XI Fliegerkorps) which was commanded by Lieutenant-general Kurt Student who was in operational control of the attack. Over 500 Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft were assembled to carry them. Student planned a series of four parachute assaults against Allied facilities on the north coast of Crete by the 7th Air Division, which would then be reinforced by the 5th Mountain Division, part transported by air, and part by sea; the latter would also ferry much of the heavy equipment.

The Germans planned to launch four regiment-sized attacks on the day of the attack, two in the morning, and a further two in the afternoon. In the morning the Air-landing Assault Regiment would attack the airfield at Maleme, while another force would simultaneously be landed in Prison Valley – so called because Ayia Jail was a prominent feature there – and then capture Hania and Souda. The latter force consisted of the 3rd Parachute Regiment, commanded by Colonel Richard Heidrich, reinforced by an engineer battalion and an unknown number of anti-aircraft guns. Two companies were detached from the Air-landing Assault Regiment; they would land in gliders in advance of the 3rd Parachute Regiment in order to capture the Allied anti-aircraft guns in the area. The divisional commander, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Süssmann, and the divisional headquarters was also to land in the valley. The German airbourne attack was divided operationally into three parts and the force tasked with capturing Suda and Hania, together with that assaulting Rethymno to the east were part of Gruppe Mittel (Central Group).

Before the invasion, the Germans conducted a bombing campaign to establish air superiority and forced the RAF to evacuate its aircraft and rebase them in Alexandria. A few days before the attack, German intelligence summaries stated that the total Allied force on Crete consisted of 5,000 men.

Paratroopers

The design of the German parachutes and the mechanism for opening them imposed operational constraints on the paratroopers. The static lines, which automatically opened the parachutes as the men jumped from the aircraft, were easily fouled, and so each man wore a coverall over all of their webbing and equipment. This precluded their jumping with any weapon larger than a pistol or a grenade. Rifles, automatic weapons, mortars, ammunition, food and water were dropped in separate containers. Until and unless the paratroopers reached these they had only their pistols and hand grenades with which to defend themselves.

The danger of fouling the static lines also required that German paratroopers leapt headfirst from their aircraft, and so they were trained to land on all fours – rather than the usually recommended feet together, knees-bent posture – which resulted in a high incidence of wrist injuries. Once out of the plane German paratroopers were unable to control their fall or to influence where they landed. Given the importance of landing close to one of the weapons containers, doctrine required jumps to take place from no higher than 120 metres (400 ft) and in winds no stronger than 23 kilometres per hour (14 mph). The transport aircraft had to fly straight, low and slowly, making them an easy target for any ground fire. Paratroopers were carried by the reliable tri-motored Ju 52. Each aircraft could lift 13 paratroopers, with their weapons containers carried on the planes' external bomb racks. The German airborne forces also utilised assault gliders, the DFS 230, which could carry a load of 2,800 pounds (1,300 kg) or nine soldiers and their weapons. They could glide up to fifty miles after release and land very close to a target. Fifty-three in total were used in the attack on Crete.

Battle

Day one

Airborne attack

The initial phase of the operation began on May 20, 1941. The Germans used gliders at Maleme, with the intention of landing the troops in the gliders to initially gain control of the ground, and then the bulk of the troops and heavier equipment would be brought in using the Junkers 52 transport planes landing at Maleme airport. Gliders were launched from their towing transport plane offshore with the Germans intent on keeping the transport planes away from the anti-aircraft positions on the Island. Maleme was particularly dangerous to planes as the Maleme airport was heavily defended by anti-aircraft guns.

At around 8 am of the morning of 20 May, gliders appeared in the sky over Maleme. This was followed up by German transport planes that began emptying paratroopers and supply canisters. This was West Group under the code-name "Comet", commanded by German paratroop general Eugen Meindl. The allied forces in the area were the 21st, 22nd and the 23rd battalions of the New Zealand Army, based at the Maleme airport and surrounding areas. The defending New Zealanders started firing at them, and there were heavy losses for the Germans, with many paratroopers killed before they hit the ground. Cretan civilians started attacking the landing troops with improvised peasant weapons, including shotguns, axes and spades. About 50 gliders landed in the dry riverbed, where resistance was less, however paratroopers landed to the South and East of Maleme and were largely destroyed by New Zealand forces that were in positions there. In the initial landing, the Germans casualties were immense, one regiment lost 112 out of 126 men, and III battalion lost 400 out of 600 men on the first day.

The initial landing of the gliders was successful, with them landing in the Tavronitis River. The German soldiers dug in, but were doggedly resisted by New Zealand troops, who were in possession of the strategic Hill 107. The main New Zealand unit at Maleme was the 22nd Battalion, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Andrew. His unit maintained Hill 109 and the western edges of the airport. The battalion persisted engaging the Germans, and Andrew requested support from the 23rd battalion. The support was refused, under the mistaken believe that the 23rd Battalion was engaged in combat when in fact, it wasn't. Andrew decided to try to drive the Germans back from the edge of the airfield, but the two tanks he used in the assault broke down, and the assault faltered.

Withdrawal from Hill 107

However, though the New Zealand units were convinced they were winning, and the Germans thought they were lost, Andrew decided to retreat from Hill 107, and join up his forces with the 21st Battalion. This he did on the night of 20 May This was an error. Andrew had asked for support, but the nearby units were not given permission to move up to support him, in the incorrect belief they were engaged. They were in fact not deployed, unengaged and waiting for orders, and free to assist. The Germans on the other hand, were in a bad position strategically, and in addition, were only armed with small arms and grenades, as no heavy equipment had come in on the gliders. The Germans themselves were expecting to be overrun by the New Zealand troops the next day. When the Germans saw the New Zealanders move off the strategic position of the hill, they moved to occupy it. There were two other New Zealand units on the edge of the airfield. When they saw their comrades had retreated from the hill area, they retreated as well.The Germans took the vacated hill position, though they only had small arms and were low in numbers. The New Zealanders did not immediately counterattack the hill. This was a decisive event. The Luftwaffe also played a part, attacking ground forces around the hill, with Stuka attacks on the allied troops.

Day two and onwards

Damaged and destroyed Junkers Ju 52s at Maleme Airfield

At this point, the Germans started landing transport planes on the airfield. With the Germans now in control of the hill overlooking the landing strip, Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 52 transport planes could then land, and by 5pm the entire town of Maleme was then captured. By this time, the entire 100th Mountain Regiment, under the command of Colonel Willibald Utz, had landed. However, in landing the planes on the airstrip enduring hostile fire, the cost to the Germans was huge; one in three transport planes were destroyed, a total of eight planes. The landing strip was strewn with destroyed planes. Though the New Zealand troops attacked the planes as they landed, enough troops came off the remaining planes to enable the Germans to reinforce the troops that had landed previously.

Seaborne contingent

Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion of the 85th Mountain Regiment (II/85) from the 5th Mountain Division and much of the division's artillery and anti-aircraft guns had loaded onto commandeered Greek caiques at Piraeus, the port of Athens, and sailed to Milos escorted by the Italian torpedo boat Sagittario. This convoy was known as the 2nd Motor Sailing Flotilla. Alongside them was the 1st Motor Sailing Flotilla, bound for Maleme. The two flotillas totalled 70 small vessels. The plan was for both to sail for Milos, then cross from Milos to Crete while a strong escort of aircraft deterred the British navy from attacking. They were detected by Allied signal intelligence and their position confirmed by aerial observation. At nightfall on 20 May an Allied naval squadron known as Force C and consisting of two cruisers, HMAS Perth and HMS Naiad, and four destroyers, commanded by Rear Admiral Edward King, entered the Aegean via the Strait of Kasos to the east of Crete. They sailed to intercept the force believed to be heading towards Heraklion and were attacked by Italian aircraft and light ships at dusk. They found no invasion force between Milos and Heraklion, patrolled off Heraklion until dawn and then returned to the Mediterranean. En route they were attacked by German dive bombers but suffered no losses.

Painting of the British cruisers intercepting part of the German convoy to the north of Crete on the night of 21/22 May

Wary of the Allied naval patrols the German convoys had spent the night in the vicinity of Milos. At first light on the 21st they headed south. Student had asked Admiral Karlgeorg Schuster to divert the Heraklion-bound convoy to Maleme, in keeping with his new concentration on the latter. The caiques moved at around 6 knots (10 km/h; 7 mph) and the impressed Greek crews were suspected of not getting the best out of their vessels. At 10:00 the convoy was ordered back to Milos due to inaccurate reports of Allied ships in the area; this order was subsequently cancelled, reinstated and cancelled again. Aware of the convoy's progress due to Ultra signals intercepts the Allies sent a squadron through the Kythira Strait to the west of Crete. This was Force D, consisting of the cruisers HMS Ajax, HMS Orion and HMS Dido, and three destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral Irvine Glennie. They were unsuccessfully dive bombed as they entered the Aegean and intercepted the 1st Motor Sailing Flotilla at about 22:30. The British attacked the head of the by now scattered convoy, harried by the Italian destroyer Lupo, which was hit repeatedly and driven off. Believing that they had destroyed the convoy, the British ships withdrew. In fact many caiques escaped in the confusion, although according to the 5th Mountain Division's commander the battalion was destroyed as a fighting unit.

Reports of this setback caused the recall of the 2nd Motor Sailing Flotilla, but these orders did not reach it until 09:30 on the 22nd. Meanwhile, Force C, reinforced by the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Carlisle, had re-entered the Aegean the previous night to patrol off Heraklion. Not finding any shipping the squadron searched to the west and intercepted the 2nd Motor Sailing Flotilla at 10:10 approximately 25 miles (40 km) off Milos. After a brief attack had scattered the convoy, King, knowing that his ships were low on anti-aircraft ammunition and feeling that he had achieved his main objective, ordered Force C to withdraw. As it headed south Naiad was badly damaged and Carlisle set on fire by German bombers.

Allied counter attack

On the night of the 21/22 May, the Allied forces realised the importance of the airfield, and they started to organise a counter attack. two battalions moved to attack it, in an attempt to get it back under control. However, by this time, the 100th Mountain regiment had landed fully deployed, and were dug in; the attempts to take it failed. Another abortive attempt was made to regain the airstrip on 22 May. It reached the edge of the airfield by 7.30 in the morning of that day, but could proceed no further, and was forced to withdraw.

German advance

With the Germans now in control of the airport at Maleme, they could continue to land more troops and equipment, and started to get the overall advantage in equipment and numbers. The Allied forces withdrew from the area, to Galatos, as they were in danger of being outflanked.

Fighting retreat

Pushed back.

42nd Street.

Evacuation

On 26 May, Freyberg informed General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, that the Battle of Crete was lost. The next day Wavell ordered the evacuation of the island.

Retreat.

Evacuation.

Casualties

A dead paratrooper lying under his parachute

Daniel Davin, in the New Zealand Official History warns "reports of German casualties in British reports are in almost all cases exaggerated". German records do not show losses at regimental level, so their actual casualties cannot be accurately assessed. They launched four regimental assaults against Crete on the 20th, of which the attack on Prison Valley was one. A total of 10,750 airborne troops were deployed. German paratrooper and glider infantry losses throughout the campaign on Crete have been variously assessed as up to 3,022 killed and approximately 1,500 wounded in the British Official History, up to 2,818 killed and 1,505 wounded in a 2002 study for the US Army, or 3,077 killed, 2,046 wounded and 17 captured in the New Zealand Official History.

Allied casualties incurred during the fighting around Prison Valley are similarly unknown. During the battle of Crete as a whole the Commonwealth forces suffered approximately 1,750 killed, about the same number wounded and evacuated; and 12,254 captured, of whom about 2,000 were wounded. In addition, 260–300 soldiers died during the evacuation and more than 2,000 Allied sailors died during the naval operations around Crete. The number of Greek casualties suffered during the battle is not known, although the Germans reported taking 5,255 Greek prisoners in the course of the campaign.

Aftermath

Crete fell to the Germans, but they suffered more casualties than during the entire campaign in the Balkans until then. Almost 200 Ju 52s were put out of action. Due to their heavy losses on Crete the Germans attempted no further large-scale airborne operations during the war. The German occupation of Crete was brutal: 3,474 Cretan civilians were executed by firing squad and many more were killed in reprisals and atrocities. The commander of the German troops on Crete, Major-general Hans-Georg Benthack, unconditionally surrendered in Heraklion on 9 May 1945 at the end of the war.

Citations and sources

Sources

• Admiralty Historical Section (2002). The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: November 1940 – December 1941. Whitehall Histories. Vol. II. London: Whitehall History in association with Frank Cass. ISBN 978-0-7146-5205-4.
• Antill, Peter D. (2005). Crete 1941: Germany's Lightning Airborne Assault. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84176-844-1.
• Beevor, Antony (1991). Crete: The Battle and the Resistance. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-4857-4.
• Bell, Rachael (2015). "Evidence and Interpretation in New Zealand's Official History: The Battle for Crete, May 1941". War in History. 22 (3): 364–381. JSTOR 26098397.
• Brown, David (2002). The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: November 1940 – December 1941. Whitehall Histories. Vol. II. London: Whitehall History in association with Frank Cass. ISBN 978-0-7146-5205-4.
• Davin, Daniel Marcus (1953). Crete. The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945. Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Government of New Zealand. OCLC 1252361. Archived from the original on 28 July 2020. Retrieved 16 December 2020.
• Donaldson, I. A. (2004). "The Evacuation of the Heraklion Garrison from Crete, 28–29 May 1941". Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. 82 (331): 210–226. JSTOR 44232721.
• "The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces" (PDF). The Dupuy Institute. 2002. Retrieved 19 January 2021.
• Falvey, Denis (1993). "The Battle for Crete—Myth and Reality". Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. 71 (286): 119–126. JSTOR 44224765.
• Filer, David (2010). Crete: Death from the Skies. Auckland, New Zealand: David Bateman. ISBN 978-1-86953-782-1.
• Gilbert, Martin (1989). Second World War. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-79616-9.
• Gill, G. Hermon (1957). Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1942 (PDF). Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 848228.
• Hellenic Army History Directorate (1985). Επίτομη Ιστορία του Ελληνοϊταλικού και Ελληνογερμανικού Πολέμου 1940–1941 (Επιχειρήσεις Στρατού Ξηράς) [Abridged History of the Greco-Italian and Greco-German War 1940–1941 (Land Operations)] (in Greek). Athens. OCLC 34158145.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Kay, Antony L.; Smith, John R. (2002). German Aircraft of the Second World War. London: Putnam. ISBN 978-0-85177-920-1.
• Kippenberger, Howard (1949). Infantry Brigadier. London: Oxford University Press. OCLC 1047844805.
• Long, Gavin (1953). Greece, Crete and Syria. Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Vol. 2. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 251302540.
• MacDonald, Callum (1995). The Lost Battle: Crete 1941. London: Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-333-61675-8.
• McConnell, Lynn (2006). Galatas 1941: Courage in Vain. Auckland: Reed Books. ISBN 978-0-7900-1049-6.
• Mrazek, James E. (2011). Airborne Combat: The Glider War/Fighting Gliders of WWII. Stackpole military history series. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0-8117-4466-9.

• Murfett, Malcolm H. (2008). Naval Warfare 1919–1945: An Operational History of the Volatile War at Sea. London: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-415-45804-7.
• Pack, S.W.C. (1973). The Battle for Crete. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-0-87021-810-1.
• Pelvin, Richard (1991). "The Royal Australian Navy and the Evacuations from Greece and Crete". Australian Defence Force Journal. 88 (May–June): 43–47. ISSN 1320-2545.
• Playfair, Major-general I.S.O.; Flynn, Captain F.C.; Molony, Brigadier C.J.C. & Toomer, Air Vice-Marshal S.E. (2004) [1956]. Butler, J.R.M (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Germans Come to the Help of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. II. London: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 978-1-84574-066-5. Archived from the original on 27 October 2012. Retrieved 30 May 2012.

• Prekatsounakis, Yannis (2017). The Battle for Heraklion. Crete 1941: the Campaign Revealed Through Allied and Axis Accounts. Solihull: Helion. ISBN 978-1-913336-01-1.
• Pugsley, Christopher (2014). A Bloody Road Home: World War Two and New Zealand's Heroic Second Division. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-143-57189-6.
• Richards, Denis (1974) [1953]. Royal Air Force 1939–1945: The Fight at Odds. Vol. I (paperback (online) ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-771592-9. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 4 November 2015.
• Schreiber, Gerhard; Stegemann, Bernd; Vogel, Detlef (1995). Germany and the Second World War: The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 1939–1941. Vol. III. London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-822884-4.
• Spencer, John H. (1962). Battle for Crete. London: Heinemann. OCLC 2517566.
• Stubbs, David (2017). "Indefensible? A Reassessment of the Part Played by RAF Personnel in the Battle of Crete 1941". Air Power Review. 20 (1): 44–65.
• Vick, Alan (1995). Snakes in the Eagle's Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-1629-4.
• Vogel, Detlef (1995). "German Intervention in the Balkans". In Schreiber, Gerhard; Stegemann, Bernd; Vogel, Detlef (eds.). Germany and the Second World War: The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 1939–1941. Vol. III. London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-822884-4.
• Walker, Allan S. (1962) [1953]. Middle East and Far East (PDF). Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 6162767.