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User:Dumelow/The Royal Navy Channel Fleet during the invasion scare of 1778-82

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Background

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Britain had been fighting the American Revolutionary War in North America since 1775. Following the British defeat at the October 1777 Battle of Saratoga France, keen to avenge their losses in the 1756-63 Seven Years' War, declared war on Britain.[1][2] Britain was unable to find an ally on continental Europe and, with a small standing army, was unlike to embark on a campaign there. France's hopes, therefore, lay with an invasion of the British Isles.[3] The most likely landing grounds were in the southern counties of Devon, Dorset, Hampshire, Sussex, Kent, and Essex and the adjacent sea, the English Channel.[4] A successful invasion depended upon favourable winds, sufficient harvested food and fodder available in the meadows to sustain a force in the field and was therefore limited to the late summer or early autumn.[5] Britain was in this period engaged in fighting in North America, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, Africa and India limiting the forces available for home defence.[6]

In 1778 there was little public confidence that the British armed forces could repel an invading force.[5] The Spanish declared war on Britain in 1779 which led to heightened fears that only subsided with the failure of that year's Franco-Spanish Armada.[7][6] The outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1780 led to increased invasion fears, particularly for the east coast. A Franco-Spanish fleet appeared in the Western Approaches in 1781 which raised fears once more, subsiding in 1782.[6] The American Revolutionary War and the wars with France, Spain and the Netherlands were ended by the Treaty of Paris, negotiated 1782-3 and coming into force in 1783-4.[8][9]


The First Lord of the Admiralty, John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich, had warned the prime minister Frederick North, Lord North of the threat posed by the French in December 1777. Sandwich requested that ships be reactivated from lying in ordinary to increase the strength of the Royal Navy.[3] Sandwich refused to detach ships from the home fleets for foreign service and indeed recalled ships from overseas, depriving the North America and West Indies Station of strength at a key time in the war.[10][11] When France declared war, it was unclear what they would do with their navy. They had particularly large fleets stationed in Toulon and Brest, and the British government was unsure whether they would go to North America, attempt to capture British islands in the Caribbean, or invade the British Isles.[12]

1778

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With intelligence indicating that a French declaration of war was imminent the Royal Navy was formally mobilised for home defence on 14 March 1778. Four days later Sandwich placed Admiral Augustus Keppel in command of the Channel Fleet, key to the defence of the south coast.[13] Keppel had commanded a ship at the Battle of Quiberon Bay that scuppered France's 1759 invasion plans but had more recently been more involved in politics than seamanship.[14] In 1775 he had been involved involved in a public spat with Hugh Palliser, one of his junior officers about the latter's appointment to lieutenant-general of the marines in preference to Keppel.[15]

The movement of French ships in early April, including a large squadron under Charles Henri Hector d'Estaing, heightened invasion fears.[16] North's cabinet thought d'Estaing was headed to North America and ordered the detachment of 13 ships of the line from the Channel Fleet for the North America Station, the Admiralty disagreed and eventually had this order overturned by the king.[17][18] The state of coastal defences was called into question by the actions of the American captain, John Paul Jones who, in April, landed at Whitehaven, Cumbria, attempted to capture the Earl of Selkirk at St Mary's Isle, Scotland and captured HMS Drake in Belfast Lough.[19]

As the Channel Fleet lacked sailors to fully man six of its ships a general impressment was ordered on 23 May and, six days later, merchant vessels were ordered to remain in British ports to preserve a supply of trained men.[20] On 5 June fresh news was received that d'Estaing's squadron was headed for the West Indies and Keppel lost 13 ships which were ordered overseas under Admiral John Byron.[21] Keppel, now with 21 ships, put to sea on 13 June and soon afterwards captured a number of smaller French vessels in the channel.[22] One of Keppel's prizes carried documents indicating that the French maintained berths for 27 ships of the line at their naval base in Brest. Keppel inferred that his force was inferior in strength and returned to port on 25 June, refusing to sail again until he possessed 24 ships of the line, the minimum he considered suitable for the task of opposing the French.[23]

The Channel Fleet was reinforced and Keppel sailed again on 9 July with 24 ships and was reinforced with a further 5 ships within a week.[24] Keppel sighted the 32-ship French fleet off Ushant on 23 July and successfully brought them to battle four days later.[25] The Battle of Ushant was indecisive, no ships were sunk on either side, though the British suffered the bulk of casualties.[26] Afterwards both sides withdrew to make repairs; Keppel remained in port at Plymouth until late August and the French, under Spanish pressure not to risk serious losses, were ordered not to sail again that season.[27][28] Many in Britain considered Ushant a lost chance for a significant victory to rule out French invasion, as Quiberon Bay had in 1759.[29] Keppel and Palliser blamed each other for the failure, which became known as the Palliser-Keppel Affair, and both men were court-martialled and acquitted for their actions.[30]

1779

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The Royal Navy of 1779 was split by the Palliser-Keppel Affair and a new admiral, Charles Hardy, was chosen to lead the Channel Fleet as a compromise, though he lacked recent fleet experience.[31] The fleet was again understrength, 13 ships lay in harbour with insufficient men to bring them into action, and parliament debated new impressment measures - though there were fears of riots if stricter measures were enforced.[32][33] The East India Company offered to build three ships and consideration was given to requisitioning merchant vessels and privateers.[33] A squadron of lighter ships was found that was used, under Rear Admiral Sir Francis Samuel Drake, as a reconnaissance force to check the French ports for gathering troops.[34]

Rear-Admiral Francis William Drake was detailed to blockade Brest, but did not blockade the city in time. The British struggled to maintain adequate naval forces around England as their fleet was spread across the world and few people wanted to join the navy.[35] In March, the Channel fleet needed an additional 5,600 men (out of a necessary 24,800), and only had 2,200 who could be added to the fleet. Two months later, they were still down 1,416 with 259 replacements. On 1 May a 5,000 person French raid led by the Prince of Nassau on the Channel Islands was launched. Though the British easily defeated it, Vice-admiral Mariot Arbuthnot was forced to bring his ships to relieve the island instead of leaving for North America. As a result, he was vulnerable to a French attack from Brest, and the British had to devote several ships towards escorting Arbuthnot's force. He did not leave until 21 May and likely delayed preparation of the Channel Fleet.[36] By the 29th, although the Channel Fleet was still short men, Hardy was ordered to leave with all ships that were ready to watch Brest and blockade it if possible.[37]

A 60-ship Franco-Spanish armada was sighted on 12 June 1799 and Hardy sailed against it with just 28 ships.[7][31] Strong winds caused difficulties in positioning and the armada bypassed Hardy and entered the channel on 15 August, soon afterwards capturing a British frigate. It thereafter threatened the channel ports while Hardy attempted to chase them down. On 31 August Hardy made contact but the armada withdrew and he entered Spithead to re-provision. The armada was badly affected by sickness and three days later withdrew to Brest, ending the invasion threat for the year. Once more the Royal Navy was criticised for failing to secure a decisive victory, though modern assessments consider that Hardy had little chance in a straight fight, given his inferiority in strength.[31] Jones continued to operate close to the British coast and, on 23 Sepember, captured HMS Serapis off the Yorkshire coast.[38]

1780

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The British cabinet decided, on 7 March 1780, that the Channel Fleet must number 30 ships to defend against invasion. In preparation for the next invasion season Hardy resumed command of the fleet on 17 May, but died the following day.[39] After Samuel Barrington refused the command, and short of other candidates, Sandwich appointed the elderly Admiral Sir Francis Geary to the fleet.[40] The failure of the Armada of 1779 led the French to focus their naval efforts in the West Indies and the Spanish upon the Mediterranean, where they were besieging the British port of Gibraltar.[41] During the 1780 season the Channel Fleet was engaged in nothing more than routine cruises.[42]

1781

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In 1781 Admiral George Darby was appointed to command the Channel Fleet. He was soon on offensive service and on 13 March 1781 sailed for Gibraltar to relieve the siege.[42] The Spanish failed to intercept the fleet and Darby was able to offload a significant quantity of stores for the garrison and remove a number of civilians. The fleet returned to Spithead on 21 May. From 20 July it cruised to the west of the British Isles but failed to meet the Franco-Spanish fleet which was intercepting merchant shipping near the Scilly Isles.[43] Darby feared they would enter the Channel proper and had the channel Fleet harbour at Torbay in preparation..[44] During this time there were fears that the French and Spanish would launch an attack upon Ireland.[45] However, the combined fleet was again badly affected by disease and chose to return to port at Brest.[44] In December part of the Channel Fleet, under Rear Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, intercepted a French convoy of supplies and men headed to the West Indies, despite being outgunned by the French escort squadron he dispersed the convoy and captured 15 merchant ships.[46]

1782

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The Surrender at Yorktown led to the resignation of North in March 1782 allowing his successor, the Marquess of Rockingham, to appoint Admiral Richard Howe to command the Channel Fleet on 20 April.[47][48] He faced a difficult task, monitoring the stronger Franco-Spanish fleet in the west, the Dutch fleet based out of Texel in the east, to protect British convoys and provide ships to resupply Gibraltar again.[49] For much of the season the fleet operated in smaller squadrons detached to the North Sea, Western Approaches and the Bay of Biscay. In April one of the squadrons captured two ships-of-the line and many merchant vessels in an attack on French convoy.[47]

Howe sailed in May to Texel to check on the Dutch fleet which was feared to be preparing to raid the Eastern English coast. Finding them still in port a squadron of nine ships was detached which successfully prevented the Dutch from putting to sea for the rest of the season.[47][49] The Franco-Spanish fleet meanwhile had put to sea and was raiding British merchant ships in the Western approaches. With a large convoy incoming from the West Indies Howe put to sea with 25 ships-of-the-line compared to the 36 under Admiral Córdoba. As Howe manoeuvred the combined fleet was scattered by a strong gale which allowed the convoy to reach the safety of the English Channel.[50]

IN August news reached Howe of a Dutch squadron that had evaded his blocking force and was holding off the Naze of Norway. It's presence there threatened the supply of Baltic timber, vital to repair and re-equip the Royal Navy. Howe had to postpone his relief mission to Gibraltar, risky as it was known to be in short supply and danger of surrender. However the threat soon vanished, the Dutch squadron returned to port at Texel; Howe sent a force to check on them and found they had resumed their earlier attitude of inactivity. Howe was reassured though Keppel, who was now First Lord of the Admiralty still feared for the east coast.[51]

Howe resumed his plans for the relief of Gibraltar. Whilst overhauling his ships a setback occurred when the Royal George sank while being heeled over. Rear Admiral Kempenfelt and 900 other perished. Despite this Howe continued his plans, loading troops of the 29th and 59th regiments and essential food, ornance stores and fuel for the garrison. The fleet, with 35 ships-of-the-line left Spithead on 11 September escorting both its own transport vessels and three trade convoys headed to the East Indies, the West Indies and Portugal. Poor weather and adverse winds delayed the fleer which did not arrive at Cape St Vincent until 9 October.[52]

Howe received reports of a 50-ship Franco-Spanish fleet assembled in Gibraltar Bay. However, the weather intervened and the fleet was dispersed with the loss of four ships driven ashore, including the San Miguel which was captured and refloated by the British.[52]



RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR September 1782

INFO ON DUTCH Battle of Dogger Bank (1781) & Brest Affair



https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=B_Z3GZb5SdAC&pg=PA137&lpg=PA137&dq=%22francis+geary%22+1780&source=bl&ots=K6HL33HKTT&sig=ACfU3U0QhOW-xH8VVd_hKSOL6VyUYV44BA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjhioW75N3pAhURuHEKHUctDWAQ6AEwB3oECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22francis%20geary%22%201780&f=false


1782 relief of gibraltar

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vA-DiiGIKAUC&pg=PT332&dq=1782+relief+of+gibraltar&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiWpfjHid7pAhVoSBUIHTt_ASEQ6AEIbDAI#v=onepage&q=1782%20relief%20of%20gibraltar&f=false

  1. ^ Conway 1997, p. 547.
  2. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 17.
  3. ^ a b Syrett & Still 1998, p. 18.
  4. ^ Jones 2002, p. 25.
  5. ^ a b Latham 2005, p. 158.
  6. ^ a b c Conway 1997, p. 548.
  7. ^ a b Jones 2002, p. 24.
  8. ^ Renehan 2007, p. 109-110.
  9. ^ Morris & Irwin 1970, p. 48.
  10. ^ Volo 2008, p. 73.
  11. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 19.
  12. ^ Rogers 2006, p. 50.
  13. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 20.
  14. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 22.
  15. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 23.
  16. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 26.
  17. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 27.
  18. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, pp. 28–32.
  19. ^ Tonsetic 2013, pp. 71–74.
  20. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 31.
  21. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, pp. 35–36.
  22. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 38.
  23. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 39.
  24. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 40.
  25. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 41.
  26. ^ Grant, R. G. (2017). 1001 Battles That Changed the Course of History. Book Sales. p. 170. ISBN 978-0-7858-3553-0.
  27. ^ Rutland, David; Ellis, Emma (2017). Resolution: Two Brothers. A Nation in Crisis. A World at War. Head of Zeus Ltd. p. 176. ISBN 978-1-78497-990-4.
  28. ^ Brecher, Frank W. (2003). Securing American Independence: John Jay and the French Alliance. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 108. ISBN 978-0-313-32591-5.
  29. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 59.
  30. ^ "Augustus Keppel, Viscount Keppel". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 25 May 2020.
  31. ^ a b c Davies, J. D. "Hardy, Sir Charles, the younger (bap. 1717, d. 1780), naval officer and politician". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/12282. Retrieved 8 May 2020.
  32. ^ Hansard 1814, p. 978.
  33. ^ a b Patterson 1960, p. 114.
  34. ^ Patterson 1960, p. 184.
  35. ^ Patterson 1960, p. 102–103.
  36. ^ Patterson 1960, p. 104–105.
  37. ^ Patterson 1960, p. 106.
  38. ^ Harmon, J. Scott. "The Battle of Flamborough Head". Historic shipwrecks: Science, History, and Engineering. US Naval Academy. Retrieved 27 May 2020.
  39. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 133.
  40. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 134.
  41. ^ Palmer 2007, p. 137.
  42. ^ a b Clarke et al., p. 91.
  43. ^ Clarke et al., p. 92.
  44. ^ a b Clarke et al., p. 93.
  45. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 147.
  46. ^ Palmer 2007, p. 137-138.
  47. ^ a b c Mahan 2012, p. 332.
  48. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 156.
  49. ^ a b Syrett & Still 1998, p. 157.
  50. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 158-9.
  51. ^ Syrett & Still 1998, p. 160.
  52. ^ a b Syrett & Still 1998, p. 161.
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