User:Dpleibovitz/sandbox/Mindless
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Mindless is a state of having little or no mind, or being unable to use it fully. It, is a common stereotype in news, entertainment and philosophy that can easily become pejorative when applied to actual people. It can function as a thought-terminating cliché when used as opinion or oversimplification. Ironically, there are meditative practices that seek mindlessness in order to become more mindful. The dark side of mindlessness are the forces currently at work in society that renders everyone a little bit mindless, including our use of the word mindless, or its synonyms heedless, meaningless, purposeless, senseless and trivial.
Defining mind and mindless
[edit]Mindless is typically applied to things that ought to have had a mind (and reason) behind them, but are somehow lacking. This begs the question of what exactly is meant by mind? Unfortunately, there is no single accepted definition for what constitutes a mind, nor what the mark of the cognitive is?[1] While it is uncontroversial to suggest that plants are literally mindless,[a] research into plant cognition have questioned that view and have shown that plants can have all the individual cognitive processes that are thought to be necessary for thinking, albeit in a diminished capacity, and that plants, therefore, could be understood and investigated as having minds.[3][4] In a similar vein, a machine, whether a complex artificial intelligence or a simple thermostat, could be said to have beliefs and consciousness.[5][6]
Philosophers who have tried to understand mind directly have met with no success[7]. However, they implicitly agree about reductions to mind that make one mindless. The focus in this section, is on their mindless agreement.[b] Continental and Eastern philosophers who have investigated mindlessness directly have had better results, and these are reviewed in later sections.
Philosophy of Mind
[edit]Philosophers of mind have tried to understand mind directly, but there has been no consensus nor progress for millennia.[7] Indeed, it is not clear that philosophy itself can lead to progress,[8], possibly because there may be no genuine philosophical problems,[9] nor agreement in what philosophers mean by "progress",[10] nor agreement on anything at all![11]
Nevertheless, philosophers of mind have tried to understand mind using the tool of thought experiments. All of these experiments cover technical aspects such as functionalism, intentionality and consciousness which do not concern mindlessness directly.[c] Despite the tool, the interpretations of these experiments, and the conclusions drawn from them have still remained contentious and the problem of mind remains unsolved. What is surprising, is that all these experiments have highlighted an indirect area of significant agreement[d] - what reduces a mind, what makes one mindless, what makes one a cog in the machine.
Chinese Room
[edit]In 1980, John Searle introduced the Chinese room thought experiment[12] that would become one of the most famous,[13] and also the most problematic.[14] In it, Searle argues that machines will always be mindless, i.e., they could never understand nor have "intentionality".
Because the formal symbol manipulations by themselves don't have any intentionality; they are quite meaningless; they aren't even symbol manipulations, since the symbols don't symbolize anything. In the linguistic jargon, they have only a syntax but no semantics.[15]
Searle does not define understanding, but trivializes it[16] into a binary opposition of two (oversimplified[17]) intuitions - a clear case of Searle understanding English, and a clear case of zero understanding for Chinese.[e]
against machine understanding (or intentionality), but hides complexity by trivializing the concept of understanding. Binary opposition. The debate... When understanding is understood as local connections to distal patterns and systems, this informs mindlessness as obscuring such connections.
John Searle imagines either himself or a machine alone in a Chinese room with the only form of outside communication being via Chinese characters. In this thought experiment, he or the machine are given a set of instructions (in their native language) on how to manipulate Chinese intelligently. A native Chinese speaker communicating with 'the room' could assume that there is someone intelligent in the room that understand Chinese - the room effectively passes the Turing test. One could state that the room is intelligent, understands and can reason. In other words, the words themselves have intentionality (meaning or understanding[19]) to the entity inside. However, Searle claims that as he mindlessly follows the instructions, he does not understand what any of the Chinese characters are nor what they mean (he simply manipulates them as instructed).[20][21] If the words have no intentionality for Searle, then there is no reason to suppose they would have meaning for the machine. Ergo, machines can't understand (nor have intentionality).
Systems
[edit]One counterargument suggests that it is the system (the room with either the computer or Searle following instructions) that understands, not Searle or the machine alone,[22][f][g] but Searle had already prepared his defense. So while "system" may not inform understanding according to Searle, it features prominently in understanding mindlessness. This section merely gives a taste...
Philosophers have unanimously agreed with Searle that it is possible to mindlessly follow instructions,[21] and this aspect of his thought experiment remains uncontroversial. However, as to why Searle understands English but not Chinese (despite manipulating Chinese with ease, and despite having a brain that causally "secretes" intentionality[24]) remains poorly investigated. Partly, this is due to how Searle reduces understanding to a black and white dichotomy:
My critics point out that there are many different degrees of understanding; that "understanding" is not a simple two-place predicate; that there are even different kinds and levels of understanding, and often the law of excluded middle doesn't even apply in a straightforward way to statements of the form .. x understands y"; that in many cases it is a matter for decision and not a simple matter of fact whether x understands y; and so on. To all of these points I want to say: of course, of course. But they have nothing to do with the points at issue. There are clear cases in which "understanding" literally applies and clear cases in which it does not apply; and these two sorts of cases are all I need for this argument.[25]
Robert Abelson criticized this aspect. He claimed [bolding ours] that Searle did indeed understand Chinese, at least
the kind of understanding that people display in exposure to new content via language or other symbol systems. When a child learns to add, what does he do except apply rules? Where does "understanding" enter? Is it understanding that the results of addition apply independent of content, so that m + n = p means that if you have m things and you assemble them with n things, then you'll have p things? But that's a rule, too. Is it understanding that the units place can be translated into pennies, the tens place into dimes, and the hundreds place into dollars, so that additions of numbers are isomorphic with additions of money? But that's a rule connecting rule systems. In general, it seems that as more and more rules about a given content are incorporated, especially if they connect with other content domains, we have a sense that understanding is increasing. At what point does a person graduate from "merely" manipulating rules to "really" understanding?[26]
Allen Newell argued that symbols provide "distal access to other structures", possibly from a knowledge level to a lower program-level within a hierarchy of levels.[27] Putting these two ideas together [according to whom?], as distal connections to larger systems are added, understanding grows, and if these connections are obscured, mindlessness grows. And in regards to the Chinese room, as long as Searle connects symbols at the programming level and does not make distal connections himself, he will remain mindless to Chinese as Searle and all philosophers have agreed he is. Where symbols do not exist or distal facts are not memorized, understanding is an emergent illusion.[28]
Extended mind thesis
[edit]The extended mind thesis effectively takes the system's counterargument to the Chinese room as a premise. It assumes that cognition[h] extends beyond the mind of one individual into the interaction with the environment (and other people) a form of externalism.[33]In a thought experiment, both Inga (who has excellent memory) and Otto (who has Alzheimer's disease) are told about an exhibit at a museum. Both believe they have been at the museum before and know how to retrieve the address. Inga recalls the address from her memory, while Otto consults his notebook. If their mental states include details of memory recall, than by the parity principle, it should also include details of notebook access, i.e., of things beyond the individual.
The entire thesis remains controversial, as is the natural extension of whether the extended (or group) mind could (or must) be conscious and have understandings of its own.[34]
Aspects of the extended mind are studied as extended, distributed and social. Creatures can manipulate the environment in ways that can reduce there cognitive load. They add epistemic structures to their environment,[35] e.g., humans do so by taking notes or using a calculator. While this can make the extended system smarter, it can make an individual less so. For example, Plato commented on the invention of writing,
In Distributed cognition, Social neuroscience, Collective intelligence, ... group decision-making, the mind of the group is extended beyond the individual. This can lead to problems such as groupthink. How much of an individual identity is given up to be a member of the group? How much did the German populace give up to (the democratically elected) Hitler? Same issues as with cog in a machine - how do low-level decisions influence those on high?
A form of externalism. Enactivism
Writing
[edit]China Brain
[edit]In the China brain experiment by Davis (1974) & Block (1978)[36] each member of the Chinese nation simulates a single neuron of an actual brain while interacting with other "neurons" via telephone. Could the system have conscious experience of pain, despite each individual being mindless of it? While the jury is out, this is another example of each member of the China brain being a cog in the wheel and mindless of events at the larger scale.
The Chinese room though experiment argues that machines cannot have minds (nor consciousness) - or at least that their having a mind cannot be attributed to their behavior. They don't truly understand what they are doing, and neither would a human given a set of instructions (in English) on how to interact in Chinese. Such detailed local instructions hide detail and meaning at the larger level. In a similar vein, the China brain thought experiment wonders what if every human simulated a single local neuron of a brain. Would these humans understand what their collective brain was doing? For both Philosophers have argued both positions,
See: Global brain
Cog in the machine
[edit]Meaning of life
[edit]Meaning of life Being a mindless cog in the machine, an existential crisis can occur - is there a higher purpose or meaning for one's life?
What is my purpose or meaning in life? Related to cog in the wheel. See the Estonian play/movie Mindless about finding meaning by moving to the countryside.
Alienation:
Assembly Lines
[edit]Productivity increased when workers were made less mindless.
Mindless Self
[edit]Mindless Others
[edit]Entertainment & Philosophy
[edit]When dining with a philosophical zombie and enjoying good conversation, their total lack of consciousness, their sole deficit, may go unnoticed. However, a regular zombie would try to eat you for dinner as they lack intelligence - how much depends on the story. Both types of zombies have been referred to as mindless.
For example, it is now considered as degrading when the media portrays women as "mindless dolls".[37]
Mindless violence
[edit]People are naturally curious, and at the social level, this manifest as a teleological desire to understand the reason or explanation for something in function of its end, purpose or goal. When a sensible explanation cannot be found, that something is often called mindless.
mindless brutality
Police brutality mindless, indiscriminate and excessive: Petitioners http://www.sundaytimes.lk/120311/News/nws_08.html Automatic?
The violence of nonviolent protest https://newint.org/columns/essays/2016/01/01/violence-of-nonviolent-protest Very good article.
Mindless traditions
[edit]Similar to cog in the machine
Automated Behavior
[edit]Communication between couples https://books.google.ca/books?id=6ywKAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT131&lpg=PT131&dq=mindless+flooding&source=bl&ots=ZRVP20su7b&sig=gbmUE_RlKBkgP3v6fDLvI8kPFgU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi4ucfZ29_YAhVP5rwKHa8fCvoQ6AEIWDAM#v=onepage&q=mindless%20flooding&f=false
Vandalism
[edit]Often characterized as mindless. Patterened behavior. Is it really mindless? https://books.google.ca/books?id=zHyJDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=mindless+vandalism&source=bl&ots=b3qJkIeGlx&sig=qHcyo7cCT6O6PlT9im-wG1QpViE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjGuPrK4N_YAhVGwbwKHROIB8oQ6AEI_QEwKw#v=onepage&q=mindless%20vandalism&f=false
In Science
[edit]Mindless statistics (null ritual).[38]
"The Mindless Dash For Degrees Has Been A Disaster!" http://www.pimlicoplumbers.com/blog/the-mindless-dash-for-degrees-has-been-a-disaster
- Alsoabout bad statistics in making assumptions
- implicit assumptions
Not thinking about consequences
[edit]Stupid and other names. http://www.echo-news.co.uk/NEWS/11441797.___Mindless____flooding_driver_is_cautioned/ Also, no empathy
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23753-indian-flood-deaths-blamed-on-mindless-construction/ Note it is money first, consequences later "“The current devastation and human misery is largely man-made,” says Maharaj Pandit, head of the department of environmental studies at the University of Delhi. “Rampant unauthorised and mindless building activities on the river flood plains in the Himalaya”, deforestation and other activities that destabilise slopes are responsible for the loss of life, he says." See also: mindless urbanization
In Religion
[edit]Mindless faith
In Governement
[edit]"Our Mindless Government Is Heading for a Spending Disaster" https://www.thedailybeast.com/our-mindless-government-is-heading-for-a-spending-disaster "explain why government at all levels not only is on autopilot but on a flight path that can only end in disaster" (autopilot) Note that mindless acts like a superlative? or sensationalism eye-catcher; see also
- https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/cowens-cult-of-positive-thinking-is-a-mindless-recipe-for-disaster-26666191.html
- Cowen's cult of positive thinking is a mindless recipe for disaster
- where 'disaster' is also a sensational; Subjective opinion
Little intellectual value
[edit]A summer blockbuster movie like Geostorm Geostorm movie review: Mindless disaster movie, too serious to be fun: https://www.newsfolo.com/entertainment/geostorm-movie-review-mindless-disaster-movie-too-serious-to-be-fun/127374/ "is too stupid and dumb to be quite entertaining" [name calling]
Individuals
[edit]Medical/cognitive conditions
[edit]Mindless is often a pejorative along with moron, stupid, retard, fool, etc. While these terms may have had specific clinical definitions, in common use they had aquired negative connotations and have become obsolete. See mental retardation. There are several condition that may make people appear stupid in one area. One could be simply lack of experience, being phobic (possibly due to experience, allergies),
Groups
[edit]Groupthink leads to irrational or dysfunctional outcomes. The individuals have given up part of their rationality in their desire for harmony or conformity.
Popular culture
[edit]Disaster Movies: The Cinema of Catastrophe' p.52 https://books.google.ca/books?id=Bcw0AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=mindless+disaster&source=bl&ots=zlcnkX4MXF&sig=KMd7RFdgOmiLYxVCsOm8HNaI5AY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6tM7B1N_YAhXE64MKHXmgDsoQ6AEIejAU#v=onepage&q=mindless%20disaster&f=false "mindless spectacle"; "masculinity is expressed and tested even further through the resulting combination of action and disaster". It is not the disaster that needs explaining, it is the given, the larger the specticle the better, to show of male thinking (fairly mindless).
Calling some individual or group mindless, serves to stop critical thinking about why they performed an act.
Mindless Vandalaism
[edit]Mindless Terrorists
[edit]https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/15/terrorists-isis Very good article. They are working from a playlist (example of ritual but not thought of as such).
Five Strategies of Terrorism http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714005398
Mindless for Mindful
[edit]There are various meditative practices that suggest that becoming mindless is a way towards mindfulness. Some of these have an epistemic basis.
misc
[edit]https://www.amazon.com/Mindless-Smarter-Machines-Making-Dumber/dp/B00I9JK98M Mindless: Why Smarter Machines are Making Dumber Humans Epistemic Structures; Extended Mind
mindless crowds, mobs, reducing humans to marbles epistemic structures, calculators, notepads, deep learning with unfathomable decisions
science: levels of processing (e.g., taking notes in own words)); detachment.
Michel Foucault: power uses knowledge (and discipline) for social control turning individuals to mindless cogs in the "team"
Are oversimplification like mindless and terrorist a spectacle? The Society of the Spectacle
A Category:Propaganda techniques, Demonizing the enemy, Dehumanization, Appeal to fear - what can these irrational people do next? Argument from ignorance, Appeal to consequences, Appeal to ridicule, Category:Appeals to emotion, Wisdom of repugnance
How could god allow... Theodicy
Of secondary note, when an event lacks sense, reason, meaning (i.e., intentionality), it can also be called mindless.
Adversarial process - mindless entrenched polarizing positions (rather than learning). Group polarization, the tendency for a group to make decisions that are more extreme than the initial inclination of its members, syn for Groupshift can lead to mindless destruction? Deindividuation, in social psychology that is generally thought of as the loss of self-awareness in groups
- Social facilitation, the tendency for people to perform differently when in the presence of others than when alone
- Ringelmann effect, the tendency for individual members of a group to become increasingly less productive as the size of their group increases "feeling more mindless"
- Bystander effect, is a social psychological phenomenon in which individuals are less likely to offer help to a victim when other people are present. The greater the number of bystanders, the less likely it is that any one of them will help
- Group cohesiveness, arises when bonds link members of a social group to one another and to the group as a whole
- Diffusion of responsibility, a sociopsychological phenomenon whereby a person is less likely to take responsibility for action or inaction when others are present. Considered a form of attribution, the individual assumes that others either are responsible for taking action or have already done so.
- Collective responsibility
- Little Eichmanns Hannah Arendt, a political theorist who reported on Eichmann's trial for The New Yorker, described Eichmann in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem as the embodiment of the "banality of evil", as she thought he appeared to have an ordinary personality, displaying neither guilt nor hatred. Arendt also wrote that "this case was built on what the Jews had suffered, not on what Eichmann had done." In his 1988 book Justice, Not Vengeance, Wiesenthal said: "The world now understands the concept of 'desk murderer'. We know that one doesn't need to be fanatical, sadistic, or mentally ill to murder millions; that it is enough to be a loyal follower eager to do one's duty." The term "little Eichmanns" became a pejorative term for bureaucrats charged with indirectly and systematically harming others.
- Social loafing
- Design by committee, a disparaging term for a project that has many designers involved but no unifying plan or vision, ever individual is mindless of unifying plan or vision,
- Milgram experiment, mindless of other's emotions...
- Authority bias, mindless (or not confidant) of your own opinion
- Argument from authority
Capture errors Implicit
the matrix as a vat undermines everything. meaning of life is a battery. Kant's demon?
senseless vs. mindless, although these are on the subject rather than object.
See also
[edit]- Mindfulness
- On the Mindless Menace of Violence
- Group mind
- Collective intelligence, in sociology and philosophy, is shared or group intelligence that emerges from the collaboration, collective efforts, and competition of many individuals and appears in consensus decision making
- Groupthink, in which the desire for harmony or conformity in a group results in irrational or dysfunctional decision-making
- Sheeple, a derogatory term referring to groups of people who 'mindlessly follow those in power
- Group decision-making#Cognitive limitations and subsequent error
- Mind
- Enactivism, in philosophy, Enactivism#Psychological aspects|psychology]], education & artificial intelligence - argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.
- Situated cognition,
- Extended mind
- Distributed cognition, an approach to cognitive science research that deploys models of the extended mind
- Meaningless statement
- Meaningless (album) - song Meaningless; my interpretation is listed as a comment
I said, "Don't leave me, don't break the tie"
Then I left you and the time went rolling by
And here's what I can't stand
I know that every landmark
Triggers memories
Of stupid places and silly things
That were meaningless before
We'd seen them together (repeat 3x)
Jon Brion, Meaningless (song), 2001[39]
About how things taken for granted are full of meaning later on. Meaning is not in the objective things themselves, but what they subjectively do across time.
- Senseless violence ###
- Nihilism (redirect from Meaninglessness of life)
- Meaning of life (redirect from Meaningless of life)
- Nonsense word (redirect from Meaningless word)
- Meaning (existential) (redirect from Meaninglessness)
- CD Baby had: We found 316154 songs having "meaningless" in their title as of 18 Feb 2018
- Showbread:Everything Is Meaningless example of meaninglessness of life
“ | Everything, everything, everything is meaningless, |
” |
— Showbread |
Popular media
[edit]To be classified
Existential (meaning of life)
[edit]- Decadence: The Meaninglessness of Modern Life)
- "materialism and consumerism are making us unhappy and unfulfilled"
- "the West consumes without consequence, loves without longevity and lives without meaning"; "about how once 'we’ in the West had lives and now we have life styles and that has brought about a pervasive sense of nihilism" # about the branding in marketing/consumerism; "an epidemic of meaninglessness"
- life=bottom-up;life-style=top-down
Pejoratives
[edit]Many pejoratives refer to some aspect of mindlessness or diminishmant of mind, e.g., stupid. Here is a list of mindless pejoratives that are not found elsewhere
Notes
[edit]- ^ For example, plant neurobiology is considered an oxymoron[2]
- ^ Where mindless is used in both senses of the word - as a topic, and that their agreement is implicit, taken for granted and not discussed.
- ^ While understanding mind is of academic interest, what reduces it has not been seriously studied directly.
- ^ Hence little direct discussion!
- ^ He has, of course, been attacked on using intuitionsREFREF, and the fact that they are not so clear.[18]
- ^ This position is held by Ned Block, Jack Copeland, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Ray Kurzweil, and Georges Rey, among others.[23]
- ^ Note that listing these names is an appeal to authority which makes readers mindless of alternatives and mindless of the fact that these are merely philosophical opinions and not scientific or mathematical facts!
- ^ Cognition as 'very weak functionalism[29] is akin to commonsense[30] or folk psychology[31] which is not scientific and more of interest to philosophy.[32]
References
[edit]- ^ Adams, Fred; Garrison, Rebecca (18 November 2012). "The Mark of the Cognitive". Minds and Machines. 23 (3): 340. doi:10.1007/s11023-012-9291-1. ISSN 0924-6495. S2CID 6061756.
Everyone agrees and knows that memory, perception, reasoning, and perhaps emotion are cognitive processes, but what we are asking is what makes them cognitive? In virtue of what are these processes of the same type—cognitive? Most practicing scientists presume there is an answer to this question but few try to give it.
- ^ Allen, Colin (2017). "Review of Plant Minds: A Philosophical Defense". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews : NDPR. ISSN 1538-1617.
- ^ Gagliano, Monica (17 February 2017). "The mind of plants: Thinking the unthinkable". Communicative & Integrative Biology. 10 (2): 1288333 – 1. doi:10.1080/19420889.2017.1288333. S2CID 5076340.
Here I comment on the recent paper that experimentally demonstrated associative learning in plants, thus qualifying them as proper subjects of cognitive research. Additionally, I make the point that the current fundamental premise in cognitive science—that we must understanding the precise neural underpinning of a given cognitive feature in order to understand the evolution of cognition and behavior—needs to be reimagined.
- ^ Maher, Chauncey (2017). Plant Minds: A Philosophical Defense. Routledge. ISBN 9781138739192. OCLC 982044062.
- ^ McCarthy, John (1979). "Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines". In Ringle, Martin (ed.). Philosophical perspectives in artificial intelligence. Humanities Press. p. 161. ISBN 9780855279011.
To ascribe certain beliefs, knowledge, free will, intentions, consciousness, abilities or wants to a machine or computer program is legitimate when such an ascription expresses the same information about the machine that it expresses about a person.
- ^ Chalmers, David J (1995). "The puzzle of conscious experience" (PDF). Scientific American. 273 (6): 86. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican1295-80. PMID 8525350.
If this is so, then even a thermostat might have experiences, although they would be much simpler...
- ^ a b Stewart, Dugald (1792). Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. p. 9.
Among the various subjects of the inquiry, however, which, inconsequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of metaphysics, there are some, which are essentially distinguished from the rest, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general discredit, into which the other branches of metaphysics have fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed, the little progress which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; a science, so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been classed, in the public opinion with the vain and unprofitable disquisitions of the schoolmen.
- ^ Nudler, Oscar (2011). "Introduction". In Nudler, Oscar (ed.). Controversy Spaces: A model of scientific and philosophical change. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 1–2. ISBN 9789027218902.
In the case of philosophy, the debate is not so much about how it progresses but whether it does at all. [snip] Whereas it is reasonable to claim that modern science as a whole is more advanced than the science of any previous age, a similar claim in philosophy would be highly dubious, if not preposterous.
- ^ Fogelin, Robert J (1987). Wittgenstein (2nd ed.). Routledge. pp. 142–143. doi:10.4324/9780203219065. ISBN 9781134812813.
For Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are not genuine problems: they present nothing to be solved, nothing upon which an explanatory hypothesis can be brought to bear. A philosophical investigation should respond directly to a philosophical problem by exposing its roots and removing it: 'For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.' (PI, #133)
- ^ Heil, John (2013). Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (3rd ed.). Routledge. p. 6. doi:10.4324/9780203081105. ISBN 9780415891745.
Am I just conceding the point: philosophers agree only on questions, not on answers? Not at all. Progress in philosophy, like progress in any domain, can be measured in two ways. You can focus on some definite goal, and ask yourself whether you are approaching that goal. But you can also ask yourself how far you have come from your starting point. And, on this count, philosophy can be said to move forward. In any case, we have little choice. Philosophical questions about the mind will not go away. They occur, even in laboratory contexts, to working scientists. And as recent widely publicized controversies over the nature of consciousness attest, ignoring such questions is not an option.
- ^ van Inwagen, Peter (2004). "Freedom to Break the Laws". Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 28 (1): 334–335. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00099.x. ISSN 1475-4975.
Disagreement in philosophy is pervasive and irresoluble.There is almost no thesis in philosophy about which philosophers agree. If there is any philosophical thesis that all or most philosophers affirm, it is a negative thesis: that formalism is not the right philosophy of mathematics, for example, or that knowledge is not (simply) justified, true belief.
- ^ Searle 1980, pp. 417–457.
- ^ Andrews, Evan (2010-07-16). "Top 10 Most Famous Thought Experiments". TopTenz.net. Retrieved 2018-02-16.
- ^ Clancey, William J. (1997). Situated cognition: On human knowledge and computer representations. Cambridge University Press. p. 336. ISBN 9780521448710.
But his thought experiment is fundamentally flawed and has consequently produced more debate than insight.
- ^ Searle 1980, p. 422.
- ^ Danto, Arthur C. (1980). "The use and mention of terms and the simulation of linguistic understanding". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 428. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005793. ISSN 1469-1825.
The question of whether machines instantiate mental predicates has been cast in much the same terms since Turing, and by tacit appeal to outward indiscernibility the question of whether machines understand is either dissolved or trivialized. [snip] The argumentation is picturesque, and may not be compelling for those resolved to define (such terms as) "understanding" by outward criteria.
- ^ Minsky, Marvin (1980). "Decentralized minds". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 440. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005914. ISSN 1469-1825.
Well, I can see that if one regards intentionality as an all-or-none attribute, which each machine has or doesn't have, then Searle's idea - that intentionality emerges from some physical semantic principle - might seem plausible. But in may [sic] view this idea (of intentionality as a simple attribute) results from an oversimplification - a crude symbolization - of complex and subtle introspective activities. In short, when we construct our simplified models of our minds, we need terms to represent whole classes of such consonances and conflicts - and, I conjecture, this is why we create omnibus terms like "mean" and "intend." Then, those terms become reified.
- ^ Menzel, E. W. (1980). "Is the pen mightier than the computer?". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 438–439. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005902. ISSN 1469-1825.
The problem is especially difficult when Searle talks about subjects who have "zero understanding," for we possess no absolute scales or ratio scales in this domain, but only relativistic ones. In other words, we can assume by definition that a given subject may be taken as a criterion of "zero understanding," and assess the competence of other subjects by comparing them against this norm; but someone else is always free to invoke some other norm. Thus, for example, Searle uses himself as a standard of comparison and assumes he possesses zero understanding of Chinese. But what if I proposed that a better norm would be, say, a dog? Unless Searle's performance were no better than that of the dog, it seems to me that the student of Al could argue that Searle's understanding must be greater than zero, and that his hypothetical experiment is therefore inconclusive; that is, the computer, which performs as he did, cannot necessarily be said to have zero understanding either.
- ^ Haugeland, John (1980). "Programs, causal powers, and intentionality". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 432. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005835. ISSN 1469-1825.
Searle also suggests that "there is no reason to suppose" that understanding (or intentionality) "has anything to do with" computer programs. This too, I think, rests on his failure to recognize that specifying a program is (in a distinctive way) specifying a range of causal powers and interactions.
- ^ Searle, John R (1980). "Minds, brains, and programs". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 418. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756. ISSN 1469-1825.
I produce the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols
- ^ a b Lycan, William G. (1980). "The functionalist reply (Ohio State)". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 435. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005860. ISSN 1469-1825.
A purely formally or syntactically characterized element has no meaning or content in itself, obviously, and no amount of mindless syntactic manipulation of it will endow it with any.
- ^ Searle 1980, pp. 5–6; Cole 2004, pp. 6–7 ; Hauser 2006, pp. 2–3 ; Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 959 , Dennett 1991, p. 439 ; Fearn 2007, p. 44 ; Crevier 1993, p. 269 .
- ^ Cole 2004, p. 6.
- ^ Dennett, Daniel (1980). "The milk of human intentionality". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 429. doi:10.1017/s0140525x0000580x. ISSN 1469-1825.
For Searle, intentionality is rather like a wonderful substance secreted by the brain the way the pancreas secretes insulin. Brains produce intentionality, he says, whereas other objects, such as computer programs, do not.
- ^ Searle 1980, pp. 418–419.
- ^ Abelson, Robert P. (1980). "Searle's argument is just a set of Chinese symbols". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 424. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005768. ISSN 1469-1825.
- ^ Allen, Newell (1990). Unified Theories of Cognition (1st Harvard University Press paperback ed.). Cambridge, Mass. ISBN 0674921011. OCLC 31946465.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Bridgeman, Bruce (1980). "Brains + programs = minds". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3 (3): 427. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005781. ISSN 1469-1825.
The understanding of numbers greater than about five is always an illusion, for humans can deal with larger numbers only by using memorized tricks rather than true understanding. [snip] that an adequately designed machine could include intentionality as an emergent quality even though individual parts (transistors, neurons, or whatever) have none.
- ^ Clark, Andy (2008). Foreword. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. By Chalmers, David. Oxford University Press. p. xv. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001. ISBN 9780195333213.
All one needs is the very weak functionalism captured in the Parity Principle: roughly, if a state plays the same causal role in the cognitive network as a mental state, then there is a presumption of mentality, one that can only be defeated by displaying a relevant difference between the two (and not merely the brute difference between inner and outer).
- ^ Chalmers, David (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press. p. 88. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001. ISBN 9780195333213.
It is better viewed as [snip] "commonsense functionalism" concerning mental states.
- ^ Drayson, Zoe (2010). "Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind". Cognitive Systems Research. 11 (4): 375. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.05.002. hdl:1893/19374. S2CID 6563074.
It remains to be seen whether the states picked out by folk psychology, such as beliefs and desires, map neatly onto the states and processes picked out by cognitive science.
- ^ Clark, Andy (1989). Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing. MIT Press. p. 46. ISBN 9780262031486.
I therefore join the cynics in doubting the scientific integrity of folk psychology as a theory of states of the head. But I demur at both the move from this observation to the conclusion that cognitive science, as a theory of states of the head, has no philosophical relevance to the understanding of mind...
- ^ Andy Clark; David J Chalmers (1998). "The Extended Mind". Analysis. 58 (1): 7–19. doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7. JSTOR 3328150.; reprinted as: Andy Clark; David J Chalmers (2010). "Chapter 2: The extended mind". In Richard Menary (ed.). The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 27–42. ISBN 9780262014038.; and available on line as: Andy Clark; David J Chalmers. "The Extended Mind". CogPrints.
- ^ Clark, Andy (2009). "Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head". Mind. 118 (472): 963. doi:10.1093/mind/fzp110. ISSN 0026-4423.
Arguments for extended cognition, I conclude, do not generalize to arguments for an extended conscious mind.
; also at Scholars Portal - ^ Chandrasekharan, Sanjay; Stewart, Terrence C. (2007). "The Origin of Epistemic Structures and Proto-Representations". Adaptive Behavior. 15 (3): 329–353. doi:10.1177/1059712307076256. ISSN 1059-7123. S2CID 18690876.
- ^ David Cole (2009). "Section 2.3 The Chinese Nation". The Chinese Room Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Zeisler, Andi (2008). Feminism and Pop Culture. Seal Press.
- ^ Gigerenzer, Gerd (November 2004). "Mindless statistics". Journal of Socio-Economics. 33 (5): 587–606. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.033.
Collective illusions: Rituals call for cognitive illusions. Their function is to make the final product, a significant result, appear highly informative, and thereby justify the ritual.
- ^ Brion, Jon (2001). "Meaningless". Meaningless (Album). Straight to Cut-Out. Retrieved 2018-02-18.