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Definitions

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Understanding - Expert

primary and secondary biological knowledge [1][2][3]

knowledge shouldn't be first in reasoning [4]

Priori knowledge is essentially knowledge of necessary truths [5][6] posteriori

Turning testimonial knowledge into priori knowledge can’t be done by your say so [7]

With knowledge, no internal grasp is needed. – propositional knowledge (descriptive knowledge) [7]

Rational insight is seeing or grasping there is no possible world that something is not priori knowledge 1+1=2 [7]

  1. ^ GEARY, DAVID C. (2008-10-23). "An Evolutionarily Informed Education Science". Educational Psychologist. 43 (4): 179–195. doi:10.1080/00461520802392133. ISSN 0046-1520.
  2. ^ Carlson, Jerry; Levin, Joel R. (2007-06-01). Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual Foundations for an Evolutionary Educational Psychology. IAP. ISBN 978-1-60752-588-2.
  3. ^ Sweller, John (2011-01-01), Mestre, Jose P.; Ross, Brian H. (eds.), "CHAPTER TWO - Cognitive Load Theory", Psychology of Learning and Motivation, vol. 55, Academic Press, pp. 37–76, retrieved 2021-11-19
  4. ^ Silva, Paul (2021-12-01). "Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach". Synthese. 199 (1): 2925–2947. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02916-5. ISSN 1573-0964.
  5. ^ "Review of In Defense of Pure Reason". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 63 (3): 673–698. 2001. doi:10.2307/3071165. ISSN 0031-8205.
  6. ^ Plantinga, Alvin; Plantinga, Professor of Philosophy Alvin (1993). Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-507862-6.
  7. ^ a b c Grimm, Stephen R. (2014), Fairweather, Abrol (ed.), "Understanding as Knowledge of Causes", Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Synthese Library, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 329–345, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_19, ISBN 978-3-319-04672-3, retrieved 2021-11-28