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Mandate Period

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Main article: Mandatory Palestine

Zionist settlement of the Negev

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See also: Aliyah and Concessions in Mandatory Palestine

When England assumed the League of Nations mandate for Palestine,[1][2] it took on a "dual obligation": (1) to the Palestinians, to guide them towards establishing a self-governing state,[3][4] and (2) to the Zionists, to "use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement [...] of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" (→ Balfour Declaration).

Jewish immigration to Mandatory Palestine

For England, this dual obligation mainly served as a pretext[5][6] to extend the mandate, which effectively only meant a "change of colonial masters"[7][8] from the Ottomans to the British, for as long as possible, because the "national home for the Jewish people" still needed to be established. Accordingly, the British promoted massive Jewish immigration to North and Central Palestine during the mandate period and redistributed money from Palestinian farmers to Zionist industries through taxes.[9][10][11] This was further exacerbated by the fact that already the Ottomans had overtaxed the peasants[12] and massively exploited the natural resources of Palestine for World War I (such as the felling of 60% of the olive trees),[13] compounded by eight consecutive poor agricultural years during the Mandate period,[14] and by various British land concessions to the Zionists,[15] through which the Palestinians lost even more natural resources. Hence, by 1930, 29.4%[16] of Palestinian farmers had lost their land to banks, wealthy Arabs, or Zionists,[17] while by 1948, the Zionists had legally acquired just under 8.5% of mandatory Palestine.[18]

Early Jewish Settlements in Southern Palestine.[19][20]

In the Negev, however, Zionists were slow to establish a foothold. The desert played a central role in Zionist mythology: neglected by the Palestinians, the entire Promised Land had become a desert and now had to be saved by its rightful inhabitants.[21][nb 1] However, due to Ottoman[38][39] and British[40] settlement policies, Zionist colonization of the Negev predominantly began only in the 1940s: Until the end of the 1930s, the southernmost Zionist settlement was Kfar Menahem, established north of the Negev in 1935.

Ruhama's pumping station

The only exception was the farm Ruhama (1911), built by illegal Russian immigrants[41][42] on the land of the nearby Bedouin village al-Jammama, where in 1912 the first pumping station in Palestine was constructed.[43] Ruhama, however, was not profitable without external investment: From the beginning, the first generation of settlers did not have enough money to pay the expelled former tenants their compensation[41] and seem to have paid for the appropriated land only in 1913;[44] during World War I, the first owner had to incur massive debts;[45][46] after the war, the farm was initially scaled back by its second owner for the same reasons and gradually abandoned by its Jewish inhabitants[47][48] in the 1920s.[49][50][51] These difficult economic circumstances may have been additionally exacerbated by the fact that the farm was attacked and destroyed several times by Palestinians;[52][53][54] however, none of these destructions are uniformly reported in the secondary literature or corroborated by contemporary newspaper reports.

Thus, in 1936, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) held only 800 ha in the Negev.[55] Additionally, the only concession of direct relevance to the Negev Bedouins was the "Dead Sea Concession." Effectively, however, the Bedouins had already lost the Dead Sea by the time of the Ottomans: Arabs had used the Dead Sea at least since the 18th century to harvest and trade salt and bitumen.[56] However, the Ottomans granted the rights to exploit the Dead Sea to an Ottoman subject so that he could extract bromine. Afterwards, the British contested the validity of this concession and instead granted a concession to the Zionist Moshe Novomeysky to extract potash, along with nearly 1000 hectares[57] of "state land" at the southern end of the Dead Sea.[58]

The Three Lookouts

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Main article: Three lookouts

The deteriorating socioeconomic situation of the Palestinians led to the Great Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, which prompted the British to consider partitioning Palestine. The 1937 Peel Commission's proposal and the 1938 Woodhead Commission's considerations both excluded the Negev from the proposed Jewish state due to the minimal Zionist presence there. The latter suggested maintaining the Mandate over the Negev for an additional decade, restricting Zionist settlements and potentially forcibly settling or expelling the Bedouins to facilitate agricultural experiments.[59]

In response, the JNF circumvented British restrictions[60] to increase land purchases in the Negev. Starting in 1939, new Zionist settlements like Kfar Warburg and a kibbutz programmatically named "Negba" ("toward the Negev") emerged in the Gaza District. Important were also the two settlements of Nir Am and Dorot, located between Ruhama and Gaza, as they provided the Zionists with access to the Gaza coastal aquifer, which also supplied groundwater to the Palestinians of the Gaza District:[61] Shortly thereafter, pumping stations were constructed in these two settlements, along with a water pipeline that extended to supply settlements further south.[62] Among the most important of these more southerly settlements were the so-called "Three Lookouts" established in 1943 in the Beersheba Subdistrict, the southernmost and by far the largest[63] of which – Revivim – would soon play a pivotal role in the UN Partition Plan. Officially, these "Lookouts" served the same purpose as the British had intended – conducting agricultural experiments[64] –, indeed carried out such experiments,[65] and thus received advice and support from the British.[66] However, the actual plan was to construct ten fortified and armed mitzpim ("Lookout posts"), serving as military installations and "strongholds on the country's borders",[67][68][69] from which further settlement of the Negev was to be conducted.

The 11 Points in the Negev

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Main article: 11 points in the Negev

Since only three of the planned ten lookout posts materialized, the Morrison–Grady Plan again excluded the Negev from a envisioned Jewish province when partition was revisited in 1946, due to the sparse Zionist foothold. In response, the Zionists now also rapidly intensified the settlement of the Negev; overnight, eleven additional settlements were established, known as the "11 Points in the Negev," and subsequent "stronghold settlements" constructed around 1947 for military objectives,[70] aimed at consolidating strategic positions and preventing Egyptian incursions. However, even in 1947, Zionists controlled only about 15,800 hectares (=1,26%)[55] in the Negev, comprising less than 1% of the population in the Hebron and Beersheba Districts and 2% in the Gaza District.[71]

For this reason, and because the military nature of the settlements was well-known,[72] intense propaganda efforts were made for the Negev settlements. By the early 20th century, the majority of the northern and central Negev was already being cultivated agriculturally by Bedouins (see above). By 1931, according to the Palestine Census, 89.3% of the Bedouins surveyed indicated that agriculture was their main occupation.[73] Nonetheless, the Negev settlements were marketed, for example in a propaganda pamphlet produced towards the end of the war by Keren Hayesod, as "veritable oases amid the bleak expanse of the Negev,"[74] although in most Zionist Negev settlements at that time, agriculture had not even begun.[75]

The UN Partition Resolution

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Main article: United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine

Over the course of the mandate, with increasing presence and power in Palestine and growing influence on the international stage, the demands of the Zionists became more comprehensive, until eventually even officially, the establishment of a "national home in Palestine" was no longer the goal, but rather the establishment of "Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth" was demanded (→ Biltmore Conference). Amidst the Palestinians, unrest and uprisings repeatedly broke out, escalating over time. Notable are the Nebi Musa riots of 1920 in Jerusalem, the Jaffa riots of 1921, the Palestine riots of 1929, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine from 1936 to 1939.[76] In response, the British repeatedly declared their intention not to establish a Jewish state (see above) and increasingly restricted Jewish immigration. This culminated in the White Paper of 1939, which, during the time of the Shoah, definitively limited Jewish immigration to a further 75,000 immigrants. Additionally, the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, instead of the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state, recommended in 1946 the establishment of a unified state in Palestine with two provinces. The Zionists responded by escalating their activities, including terror attacks on the British carried out by Irgun and Lehi, most notably the massive attack on the King David Hotel.[77] Therefore, in the deadlock over the Palestine issue and with Palestinian uprisings and Zionist terror attacks, the British turned to the newly founded United Nations, the successor organization to the League of Nations.

The UN Partition Plan

After the UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) drafted an initial partition proposal, the UN partition resolution recommended dividing Palestine into an Arab (orange) and a Jewish state (blue). The major geographical innovation was that, contrary to all older proposals for partitioning Palestine, the Negev was allocated to the Jewish state, not the Arab state. This had mainly three reasons:

(1) Some Palestinian researchers[78][79][80] have suggested that the British – who were determined not to cede the Negev to the Zionists, as they aimed to provide Jordan access to the Mediterranean and prevent Egypt, both of which were under British influence, from being isolated from other Arab states[81] – may have provided inaccurate information about the land use of the Negev in 1946 and 1947.[nb 2] Specifically, the British reported the agricultural area as 164,000[83] and 200,000 hectares[84] instead of the estimated 400,000 hectares (see above). Additionally, they portrayed the Negev as largely barren with the exception of an area "in the extreme north-west of the sub-district" that was already firmly in the hands of the Bedouins,[85] the barren remainder being suitable only for Bedouin livestock breeding.[86] Finally, they emphasized the "land rights" of the "Beersheba Bedouin" and their "historic association" with the Negev.[87]

(2) If the British numbers were indeed inaccurate, they had just the opposite effect: Walter C. Lowdermilk, an American Christian Zionist, had written a renowned[88] book that, among other topics, envisioned a water pipeline from the northern Jordan River to the Beersheba District to irrigate the Negev.[89] During the UNSCOP's visit to Revivim in the Negev, the sight of a field of gladioli, freshly irrigated by water from the new Nir Am pipeline, convinced them of the feasibility of Lowdermilk's plans for agricultural development in the Negev.[90][91][92] Thus, although the British portrayed the Bedouins as the agricultural innovators in the Negev,[85] UNSCOP believed that large areas of the Negev were still "capable of development", though only achievable with significant Zionist investment in irrigation, and recommended including the Negev in the Jewish state.[93]

(3) The most crucial factor was the fact that, at the behest of an unnamed American politician, Herbert Evatt, the chair of the Special committee, excluded the Arab states from the detailed elaboration of the partition plan,[94][95][96] which resulted in the Arab perspective being even less considered during its formulation.[97][98][99]

Accordingly, the Arab UN member states commented: Since all other agriculturally and economically important areas of Palestine had already been allocated to the Jewish state and the Bedouin were "responsible for the cultivation of the greater part of the [200,000 hectares] of cereal land" of Beersheba (which still amounted to nearly 22% of the agricultural land in Palestine),

[...] it is certain that the proposed Arab State cannot be viable. It would have no cultivable lands of any importance. Such cultivable lands as it would have would not supply a small fraction of the cereal requirements of its population. It would have no other economic resources, no raw materials, no industries, no trade, and would have to subsist on subsidies or loans.

— Sub-committee 2.[100]

It almost turned out differently: Among the members of the Partition Committee, there was no consensus on whether the Negev should indeed be left to the Zionists.[101] Additionally, the dominant USA had already planned to reallocate the Negev to the Arab state to gain favor with Arab states and secure their support for the partition plan. However, when the Zionists learned of these plans, President Truman's advisor David Niles arranged a meeting with Chaim Weizmann on the day the partition committee's decision on the Negev was due.[102] Weizmann persuaded the President with the vision of a canal running through Jewish territory from the Gulf of Aqaba to Tel Aviv. Following Truman’s direct orders, the Americans abandoned their earlier tactic[103][104][105][106][107][108] and only introduced a modification proposal (which was accepted) to slightly enlarge the Palestinian area with the city of Beersheba and a section on the border with Egypt.[109] This, however, did little to change the issue of insufficient arable land, as the northern half of this section consisted of sand dunes northwest of the Negev highlands.[110][111]

Israeli period

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Expulsion of the Negev Bedouins during the war

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1947 Survey of Palestine map: "Distribution of Nomad Population of the Beersheba Sub-district", described by Kark and Frantzman as "extraordinarily important". It was produced from aerial photographs.[112]
The Palestine War from July 18, 1948.[113]
Main articles: Nakba and 1948 Palestine war

As expected, following the partition resolution, Palestinian and Israeli assaults, attacks, and counterattacks gradually escalated into a civil war, and from May 15, with the invasion of the Arab states, it also turned into an international war.

The expropriation of the southern Bedouin tribes had been minimal before the war began. Also, before the second UN-enforced ceasefire on 18 July 1948, the war had barely reached the Negev. By the end of May, the Zionists had primarily established territorial continuity between their various settlements. In the process, 199 Palestinian localities had already been depopulated, and nearly 400,000 Palestinians had become refugees.[114] In contrast, according to a report from the Israeli intelligence service, by mid-June 1948, no Negev Bedouins had yet fled or been expelled at all.[115] Hence, the Negev Bedouins were, on the whole, less hostile towards the Zionists compared to the Palestinians living further north. Thus, before and during the war, there was no unified Bedouin political stance towards the Zionists/Israelis on one hand, and the sedentary Palestinians on the other. Some tribes (notably the Azazima and the Tarabin[116]) collaborated with the Arab armies and acted against the inhabitants of the Israelite Negev settlements, particularly through sabotage of the Nir Am water pipeline and attacks on supply convoys.[117] Others (notably the Tiyaha[116]) had allied with the Israelis and supplied the Negev settlements, which were cut off from supply lines, with smuggled deliveries.[118]

Accordingly, the Israelis differentiated between "friendly tribes" and other Bedouins. However, besides that, there was no consensus among the Israelis on how to approach the Bedouins. Some argued for maintaining friendly relations with the "friendly tribes" during the war, to prevent them from allying with the Arab armies.[119] Others were for driving all Bedouins out of the land, just like the rest of the Palestinians.[120] Ben-Gurion was of the opinion that, in any case, Bedouin lands should be transferred entirely into Israeli possession without compensation.[121]

In the end, regardless of the official stance of the Israelis, when the war reached the Negev starting with Operation Yoav on the 15 October 1948, the fate of both the friendly and hostile Bedouin settlements was the same: Remaining Bedouins were prevented from harvesting their fields using military force, in order to drive them out of the land. Others were directly expelled or driven out of the country with military force. The fields of displaced Bedouins were either harvested by Israelis or burned to give Bedouins no reason to return.[122] This is well-documented through oral histories from Bedouins, as well as through complaint letters from Israeli settlers regarding offenses committed against "friendly tribes."[123][124]

Kark and Yahel suggest that Bedouins were more likely to flee than to be expelled, due to their higher mobility compared to the sedentary population of Palestine.[125] However, the specific reasons why the individual sub-tribes left their settlements at that time have not been thoroughly analyzed. From the Israeli side, only an analysis by the intelligence agency is available until mid-June.[115] The most comprehensive post-analysis by Abu Sitta covers 88 localities in the Beersheba District.[126] This analysis instead suggests that while the Bedouins were indeed more willing to leave their settlements without a fight, Israelis were even more directly involved here than in the villages in the north.[nb 3]

Displacement and expropriation of the Bedouins after the war

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Main article: Negev Bedouin § Land ownership issues

Not all Bedouins were expelled or driven out during the Negev operations of 1948 and 1949. During and after the war, some Bedouins from friendly tribes remained in the Negev, while others were allowed to return even during the conflict. These groups were required to register in the newly established Israeli city of Beersheba, after which the able-bodied men among them were conscripted into the minorities unit of the Israeli military.[127] Additionally, a third group re-migrated illegally back into the Negev. This wave of illegal immigration persisted until around 1953, after which it gradually subsided.[128] It also served as a pretext to expel even more Bedouin after the war. For instance, a UN report from September 1950 details the fate of some 4,000 Azazima Bedouins, who, wrongly dubbed as "infiltrators", two years after their initial flight to the southern Negev, were further driven into the Sinai.[129] This continued until 1959.[130]

In the end, of the original 57,000 to 65,000[131] or 90,000 to 100,000[132] Negev Bedouins from 95 sub-tribes, some 11,000 Bedouins from 18 or 19 sub-tribes remained residing or returned to the Negev. Most of them (> 90%) were Tiyaha, but there were also three Tarabin and one large Azazima sub-tribe included.[133][nb 4] Seven of the 18/19 tribes had resided in the biblical Negev and the adjoining northeastern central Negev before the war,[135] eleven or twelve tribes had lived in the Tiyaha territory between Gaza and Beersheba.[136] However, in 1951, these about 5000 northwestern Bedouins were partly ordered and partly forced to relocate to the area of the northeastern tribes, which was subsequently transformed into a military restricted zone named "Siyag" ("fence").[137]

Thereafter, in line with Ben-Gurion's view, no land had to be purchased from the Bedouins. In 1949, the Israeli authorities decided that the Bedouins in the Negev, considered merely nomads, had had no land ownership rights, and all their lands were initially declared as mawat ("dead land").[138][139] Then, in 1969, with the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, which abolished the mawat category, all mawat land was declared "state land."[140][141] Additionally, about 14,000 hectares[142] of lands belonging to the Bedouins who were displaced into the Siyag in 1951 and thereby "abandoned" as of 1 April 1952 were appropriated under the Land Acquisition Law of 1953.[143][144] The legitimacy of these laws and Israel's legal views has been confirmed several times by Israeli courts, most notably in the well-known "Umm al-Hiran case"[145] and the even more famous "Al-Araqeeb case."[146][147] However, the international community does not share this legal assessment; mostly due to the history of Palestinian land law.[nb 5] Additionally, international organizations, human rights organizations, and legal scholars are increasingly also arguing with human rights and indigenous land rights, which are progessively seen as independent of concrete legal histories.[166][167][168][169][145][170][171]

The Negev after 1949

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The Siyag

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Main article: Siyag

The displacement of the northwestern Bedouins into the Siyag was initially driven by three main reasons: According to the IDF's Operations Branch, it was "to secure land suitable for settling Jews and setting up IDF bases,"[172] and as Moshe Dayan stated, "to serve the general policy of expelling the Arabs from the country 'by peaceful means': in the first stage, moving them to an area without adequate living conditions so that they would leave the country of their own free will."[173]

The Siyag area[174]

Originally, the Siyag measured nearly 150,000 hectares. Due to the low rainfall in the biblical Negev, only 40,000 hectares were arable lands,[175][176][177] which was not enough for self-sufficient agriculture.[178] Additionally, the land used for agriculture there had to be leased from the state, including by Bedouins who had previously lived there and farmed it, thus further diminishing the profitability of Bedouin agriculture. Finally, even on leased land, Bedouins did not receive the same water allocations as Jewish farmers; moreover, since 1962, over 96% of the Siyag has been excluded from drought relief benefits.[179] This means that from the beginning, the Siyag was indeed "an area without adequate living conditions."

The Bedouins, however, didn't leave the country; instead, they spontaneously structured their landscape into "dispersed settlements," with individual homesteads spread throughout the Siyag region. As a result, almost every construction project in Siyag inevitably leads to the displacement of individual homesteads or entire dispersed settlements, causing the region outside these construction areas to become even more densely populated,[180][181] thereby further reducing the arable land. This happened repeatedly in the following years for different reasons:

Development towns

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Main articles: Ma'abarot and Development town
Ma'abara, 1951
Arad, 2013

First, Beersheba became a restricted area within the restricted zone; until 1959, Bedouins were only allowed to enter the city area once a week.[182] Second, in the 1950s and 1960s, large numbers of immigrants from Arab countries and African countries streamed into Israel or were flown there. The existing Jewish towns and settlements could not accommodate all of them. Even the areas of the 350 Palestinian villages, which were now newly settled by the new immigrants,[183] were insufficient. For this reason, so-called ma'abara transit camps were initially set up to temporarily house the immigrants, later evolving into "development towns." This was further exacerbated by the simultaneous establishment of industries where the new immigrants were expected to work in low-skill jobs.[184][185] Yeroham (1951, for workers in mineral mines and for construction workers), Dimona (1955, for potash workers), and Arad (1961, as service center for future agricultural settlements and for workers in chemistry based industries) were three such towns established within the original Siyag area, further restricting Bedouin access to Siyag land. This led to a new social stratification in the Israeli state: at the top were now the European settlers, below them the newly immigrated Arab and African Jews in the camps and development towns,[186][187] and at the bottom the Bedouins[188][189] (along with other Israeli Palestinians).

At that time, also Mitzpe Ramon in the central Negev highlands (for mining workers) grew to such a development town. Additionally, five more development towns were established in the northwestern Negev, from where the remaining western Negev Bedouins had been displaced; most notably Netivot and Ofakim.[190] Furthermore, dozens of agricultural kibbutzim and moshavim were established in the same area to absorb further immigrants.[191]

Planned Bedouin towns

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Main article: Negev Bedouin § Israeli-built townships

This further reduction of arable land and grazing areas in the Siyag as well as Israeli movement restrictions[192] had the side effect of rendering many Bedouins unemployed, forcing them into low-paid, unskilled labor in Beersheba and the development towns "due to their having no suitable alternative."[193] Between 1958 and 1962, outside employment among the Bedouin rose from 3.5% to 13%.[194][195] Already by the mid-1960s, 23% of Bedouin male laborers worked in low-wage work as construction, transport, and services (and 45% in agriculture, while 32% were unemployed).[196]

Consequently, Israel shifted its Bedouin policy, aiming to concentrate the Bedouins into a few economically weak dormitory towns near Beersheba and the development towns, which lacked their own employment opportunities.[197][198][199] Hence, the third and decisive measure to curtail the settlement area of the Siyag was the Israeli Law of Planning and Construction of 1965. This law rendered all "spontaneously" established Bedouin settlements in the Siyag retroactively illegal;[200] from then on, building was only permitted in settlements approved by Israel.[201]

Rahat, 2015

The first of these "legal" townships was Tel as-Sabi, established around 1967, built directly adjacent to the administrative area of Israeli Beersheba.[202] This planned town was deemed a planning failure due to its proximity to the city, cramped layout, and houses that were too small for the Bedouin population. As a result, Rahat, the second planned town, was established northwest of Beersheba in 1972. Constructed according to a radically different, more "Bedouin-friendly" plan.[203][204] Rahat quickly developed into the largest Bedouin city, a status it still holds today. It was followed by Shaqib al-Salam in 1979, Ar'arat an-Naqab and Kuseife around 1982, Lakiya in 1985, and Hura in 1989.[205] Predominantly, the Bedouins who moved to these planned towns were the ones who had not lived in the Siyag area before the war and therefore had no land rights there according to Bedouin law.[206] Thus, the proportion of Bedouins among these town residents who worked in Israeli localities further increased after the 1960s.[207][208]

Relocating to recognized towns has done little to change the disadvantaged socio-economic status of the Bedouins.[209][210] In 2003, for example, all seven at the time recognized towns were among the eight poorest places in Israel.[211] The probability that a Negev Bedouin worked in a statistically better-paid job was still negligible in 2017.[212] In 2018, nearly 57% of the Bedouin earned below the minimum wage[213] and 73% of the Bedouins living in the recognized towns were below the poverty threshold.[214]

Unrecognized settlements

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Main article: Unrecognized Bedouin villages in Israel
See also: Albeck Committee, Goldberg Commission, and Prawer Plan
Unrecognized village

All other Bedouin settlements could legally be destroyed from then on, and they were,[215] even if the Bedouins living in these settlements had originally been placed there by the Israeli military, as in the well-known cases of Atir,[216][217][218] Umm al-Hiran,[219] and Rakhma.[220] The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality documents these demolitions of unrecognized villages.[221] The most notable example is Al-Araqeeb,[222] which as of 2024 has been destroyed 225 times[223] and subsequently rebuilt by its residents.

An exception are some villages that were legalized under the "Abu Basma Plan" of 2003, as it was recognized that the legal towns were not well received by the Bedouins, partly because they were established as towns rather than villages, and thus were unsuitable for farmers and herders.[224][225] Most recently, in 2021, the three villages of Hashm al-Zena, Rakhma, and Abde were recognized, but under the condition that 70% of the residents relocate within the newly drawn and smaller boundaries of these villages.[226] As of 2024, discussions regarding this matter were still ongoing.[227]

Unrecognized villages were and still are not connected to Israeli infrastructure such as running water, electricity, sewage, or waste removal services, which further exacerbates the socioeconomic situation of the Bedouins. This is somewhat different in some of the recognized localities.[228] However, since moving to the recognized towns did little to change the Bedouin's socioeconomic situation, but entailed giving up the land they consider as their own, as well as agriculture and livestock farming,[229] as of 2023, some 100,000 Bedouins (around 28%) continue to live in unrecognized villages,[230] despite having to endure a lack of infrastructure and repeated demolitions of their homes.

Beersheba suburbs

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Income distribution in three Bedouin towns, three development towns and Beersheba, and the three Jewish Beersheba suburbs Lehavim, Omer, and Meitar.[231]

The establishment of the Bedouin dormitory towns led to an economic upswing for certain population groups. However, since the beneficiaries of this situation – "overwhelmingly [...] the Negev’s executives and researchers, as well as senior officials in both the civil and the military echelons"[232] — moved to their own suburbs of Beersheba in the following years, which took more land from the Bedouins (1983: Lehavim; 1984: Meitar; Omer also developed into such a suburb), Beersheba remained roughly at the same socio-economic level as the development towns, whose residents were and are only marginally better off than the Negev Bedouins.

Countermeasures against the Bedouin "demographic threat"

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See also: Blueprint Negev
Demography of the Beersheba District.[233]

Since the Jewish residents of the development towns are also not significantly better off economically than the Bedouins, the Negev became a region of outmigration.[234] Since the 1980s, Jews have been continuously moving away, although Israel's policy from 2005 to 2015 had aimed to encourage 200,000 financially stronger Jews from central Israel to relocate to the Negev (hoping for a trickle-down effect of wealth).[235] At the same time, Bedouins have a much higher birth rate than Jewish Negev settlers.[236] For this reason, it is becoming apparent that the demographic ratio in the Negev will soon reverse.

Since Israeli politics views this as a "demographic threat," this trend has been shaping Israeli housing and zoning policies for several years.[237] Among Israel's latest projects worth mentioning in this regard is the construction of the new city of Kasif, a town planned for 100,000 Haredim (=ultraorthodox Jews with the highest birth rate of all populations groups in Israel) in the west of Arad. This is primarily intended to address the real existing housing crisis in Israel, but will also work against this trend. At the same time, however, it will likely exacerbate rather than alleviate the socio-economic situation in the Negev due to the usual unemployment among Haredim.[238][239][240] Additionally, twelve new Jewish "community towns" are planned to be established northwest of Arad and east of Beersheba, again partly on the land of unrecognized villages.[241] Israeli society is divided on how to regard these plans – not primarily because of Bedouin land rights, but due to fears that relocation to the Negev (and to Galilee, for which similar plans exist) would constitute a "poverty trap."[242][243][244]

Part-time agriculture, agritourism and Agro-Tech

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See also: Agricultural research in Israel
Agricultural Areas in Israel and the Golan Heights, 2017

Another notable policy addressing the "demographic threat"[245][246][247] was to provide free land and support[248][249] to establish new agricultural single-family homesteads or to retroactively recognize[250][251] those that had already been built illegally in the Azazima's central Negev territory, now called Ramat HaNegev Regional Council.[252] This, however, again had mainly two other backgrounds: Firstly, this was intended to prevent the Azazima from engaging in agriculture, as they continued to move south from the Siyag during planting and harvest seasons to cultivate their fields, which was deemed illegal by Israeli law.[245][250][253] The second background is more complex:

In the post-war years, the farming villages were massively supported by the state.[254] However, the neoliberalization of Israel from the 1980s plunged agriculture into a crisis: some subsidies were cut, and with the lifting of import restrictions, cheap products from Southern Europe flooded the market, making it even harder for Israeli farmers, whose farms' "locations and farming plans were based on ideological and territorial priorities more than their ecological fit,"[255] to compete. This was exacerbated by inflation and a debt crisis, also resulting from neoliberalization.[256][257] As a result,

  • farms were abandoned en masse: from 1981 to 1995, the number of Israeli farms shrank from over 43,000 to just under 26,000.[258]
  • some former farmers turned to other economic sectors,[259] but many turned to related agritourism, often with part-time agriculture.[260][261][262] The homesteads in the Negev highlands are among those established during this period; many of them are small vineyards along the enotouristic Ramat HaNegev Wine Route.[245][263] This process has not yet concluded; several small kibbutzim, moshavim, and individual homesteads settled by part-time farmers were still being established in the Central Negev and further south during the 2000s and 2010s,[264] often starting as a new type of illegal settlement outposts organized by the Or Movement.[265]
  • the abandoned fields that were not converted into residential or industrial areas[266][267] were concentrated in the hands of a few larger agricultural enterprises.[262]
  • Israeli policy invested massive amounts of money in agricultural research and development[268] (instead of, as before, in traditional agriculture) to make Israeli agriculture more competitive in the medium term. Gulati et al. counted "close to 500 active Israeli companies working in the agro-tech field" in 2021.[269] Thanks to the favorable structuring of the agricultural system, agricultural innovations resulting from this investment could quickly be adopted by larger enterprises.[270][271]

These processes also have led to the emergence of four clearly distinct agricultural areas in the Negev today: a modern Jewish agricultural area in the northwest Negev, a poorer Bedouin agricultural area in the northeast Negev, a homestead area in the central Negev Highlands,[272] and the southern Arava Valley near Eilat, which was branded as the "Silicon Valley of Israeli agriculture"[273] and as such was also integrated into Israel's new agritourism system.

Military building projects

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Further sections of the Siyag were designated as restricted military zones, notably the Nevatim Airbase, established in 1983 right in the center of the Siyag, or a planned military training area near Arad.[274] Finally, since 2019, there have been plans to build military industries in the new Ramat Beka industrial zone. Further plans to reduce and segment the Siyag area even more are already underway. Notably, these include building several roads and railways through unrecognized villages.[241]

Notes

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  1. ^ This idea — that the Bedouins had allowed Palestine to become a desert — is extensively documented in early Zionist writings. However, it had no basis in reality. For example, in 1890, Petrie reported on the area around Tel el-Hesi and Ruhama at the northern edge of the Negev that the land was "astonishingly closely cultivated."[22] In contrast, twenty-four years later, when Bedouin barley cultivation was at its height, one of the first Zionist settlers in the area depicted this same barley land as a "desolate waste."[23] This imaginary "waste" was also later given a constructed genesis: the creation of the "desert" was attributed to the "lazy neglect" of farming by the Bedouins.[24][25][26][27] The Bedouins were even blamed for the formation of sand dunes, as they had supposedly allowed "winds to carry clouds of sand from the desert," thus transforming the once fertile land "into a sorrowful country, with only barren hills and stretches of sand,"[28] ultimately causing its desertification. This portrayal, still the prevailing view in Zionist scholarly discussions as recently as 2012,[29] likely stems from orientalist and colonialist discourses of the 19th century, common among Europeans concerning various regions of the Middle East and North Africa.[30][31][32] For the Negev, it has since been disproven: Bedouin land and livestock management were, at most, minimally harmful to the environment.[33] Contrary to these traditional practices, it now has been demonstrated that intensive agriculture — the Israeli alternative to Bedouin farming — is six times as damaging, and thirty times more harmful than Bedouin livestock farming.[34] The Israeli "countermeasures" against supposed Bedouin environmental damage, which include the construction of different terrace forms and tree planting to prevent erosion ("savanization"[35]), are even eight times more detrimental than Bedouin agriculture and forty-three times worse than Bedouin livestock farming.[36][37]
  2. ^ Regarding the Jewish-owned area, this is certain: It did not measure 6,515 hectares, as the British informed Sub-committee 2, nor 9,000 hectares, as they had informed the Anglo-American Committee one year earlier; instead, the Jewish National Fund alone already owned 15,800 hectares, which equals 1.26% of the Beersheba sub-district.[82]
  3. ^ Specifically, according to the intelligence agency's analysis, 70% of Palestinians were forced to abandon their villages due to military actions, including attacks and the destruction of their settlements or adjacent urban centers by the military, Irgun, or Lehi, and only 2% left due to "evacuation ultimatums."[115] Contrary, data from the Beersheba Subdistrict show that only 34% of the population left their settlements due to military actions, while a significant 60% departed due to evacuation ultimatums.[126]
  4. ^ This, however, is not entirely certain; it appears that the friendly Bedouins were forced to reorganize into these new sub-tribes, and the 18/19 registered are not the original ones.[134]
  5. ^ The historical legal background is as follows: Israeli authorities and courts primarily argue that Ottoman and British land laws required Bedouins to register their lands.[148] Since they did not do so, these lands are to be considered mawat ("dead land"; → Mawat land doctrine); therefore, the Bedouins possess no rights to these lands. However, the Ottoman Land Code provided for the possibility that "vacant land [...], such as mountains, rocky places, [...] grazing grounds, which are [...] assigned 'ab antiquo' to the use of inhabitants of a town or village"[149] should not be classified as mawat. It is uncertain how relevant this "ab antiquo" regulation was for the Ottomans: it is certain that during the Ottoman era, the land rights of the Bedouins were recognized (1) because the Ottomans levied land tax on Bedouin agricultural land,[150] (2) because they purchased land from Bedouins to establish the city of Beersheba,[151] (3) because Ottoman officials repeatedly resolved Bedouin land ownership disputes in the Negev,[152][153] (4) and because Zionists had to buy their land in the Negev from Bedouins.[154] But whether this was due to the "ab antiquo" regulation or because the Negev was considered miri or matruka land despite not being registered is unclear.
    External image
    image icon Affirmation "not to interfere with the special rights and customs of the Bedouin Tribes of Beersheba", given during the British land registration process.[155]

    With the British, however, it is certain that they regarded the Negev as Bedouin property on this basis: The British District Officer of Beersheba considered the uncultivated land in his district in 1926 as "Metruka for pasture by custom";[156] the British also prohibited Zionist land purchases in the Negev, stating that "the cultivable land in the Beersheba sub-district is regarded as belonging to the Bedouin tribes by virtue of possession from time immemorial",[157] furthermore, they assured that the Bedouin's "special rights and customs" were not affected by newer Ordinances such as the "Mewat Lands Ordinance" of 1921.[158][159][160][161] On this note, the 1931 Palestine Census stated:

    In a strict sense most of the land [in the Negev] may be described as mewat, not having been assigned or disposed by deed. Nevertheless, the 'privileges' of the nomads have been confirmed from time to time, and it is, undoubtedly, part of the 'customary' law, as opposed to formal law, to recognize the nomadic traditional cultivation in this area as a normal assignment.

    — Census of Palestine 1931, 1933[162]

    After the war, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) adopted this assessment from the British and considered the entire Beersheba District as land owned by the Bedouins ("Arab owned land").[163][164] Subsequently, the UN repeatedly emphasized that these property rights still exist, and that Palestinian refugees "are entitled to their property and to the income derived therefrom" — firstly in Resolution 194 (III), and as of 2024, most recently in Resolution 78/75.[165]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ International Court of Justice. "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004" (PDF). p. 165. Retrieved 2024-05-24.: "Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the First World War, a class ‚A‘ Mandate for Palestine was entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provided that: 'Certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.'"
  2. ^ Cf. "Palestine Mandate (1922)". Retrieved 2024-05-24.
  3. ^ Victor Kattan (2009): From Coexistence to Conquest. International Law and the Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949. Pluto Press. p. 127–133, 136–141, 143– f., 147.
  4. ^ Ardi Imseis (2023): The United Nations and the Question of Palestine. Rule by Law and the Structure of International Legal Subalternity. Cambridge University Press. p. 56–59.
  5. ^ Noura Erakat (2019): Justice for Some. Law and the Question of Palestine. Standford University Press. p. 30 : "a pretext for its sustained presence and intervention in the region [...] to protect oil and trade routes, and also to counter French influence in the region"
  6. ^ Cf. similarly e.g. Kenneth W. Stein: "Driven by security considerations, the British government protected the rights and ambitions of the Jewish community in their efforts to establish a Jewish national home. However, even this concern was of secondary importance within the dual obligation, compared to the much greater interest of the government in maintaining its strategic position on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean. Throughout the mandate territory, the government focused on establishing a military infrastructure in Palestine that secured peace at a low cost, while simultaneously protecting the diversity of British economic and political interests in Egypt (Suez), in Iraq (oil) and as far as India, and vis-à-vis other major powers in the region."
    Translated after Kenneth W. Stein: Die politische Tragweite der ländlichen Ökonomie Palästinas 1917 – 1939, in: Linda S. Schilcher, Claus Scharf (ed): Der Nahe Osten in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1919 – 1939. Die Interdependenz von Politik, Wirtschaft und Ideologie. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989. p. 265: "Aus einem Sicherheitsdenken heraus protegierte die britische Regierung die Rechte und Ambitionen der jüdischen Gemeinschaft in deren Bemühungen, eine nationale jüdische Heimstätte aufzubauen. Aber auch dieses Anliegen hatte in der dual obligation eine untergeordnete Bedeutung, gemessen an dem weit größeren Interesse der Regierung, ihre strategische Position am östlichen Rand des Mittelmeerraumes aufrechtzuerhalten. Im ganzen Mandatsgebiet konzentrierte sich die Regierung darauf, eine militärische Infrastruktur in Palästina aufzubauen, die den Frieden zu einem geringen Preis sicherte, während sie gleichzeitig die Vielfalt der britischen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen in Ägypten (Suez), im Irak (Öl) bis nach Indien und gegenüber anderen Großmächten in dieser Region schützte."
  7. ^ Translated after Fabian Klose (2014): Dekolonisation und Revolution. Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO): "lediglich ein Austausch der Kolonialherren".
  8. ^ Cf. similarly e.g. Peter Sluglett (2014): An Improvement on Colonialism? The "A" Mandates and Their Legacy in the Middle East. International Affairs 90 (2). p. 418.
  9. ^ Cf. the Hope Simpson Enquiry of 1930: "The economic state of the agricultural population is desperate. Hardly any Arab village exists which is not in debt. The fellahin are so over-taxed that they find great difficulty in paying the tithe. Moreover, after an excellent harvest, they are unable to sell their corn or barley or oil. [...] 'We have been struggling in deep water for several years, and very soon the water will close over our heads' was the statement made in one village, which may be taken as typical of the state of mind in every village."
    John H. Simpson: Palestine. Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development. His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930. p. 65.
  10. ^ Cf. the report of the Peel Commission: "After [World War I], when Jewish immigrants brought into the country their industrial experience and capital, a number of small factories producing a variety of articles and few large factories for the manufacture of cement, vegetable oils, flour, and stockings, were established. [...] We are informed that so far few, if any, of the[se] industries can at present compete with imported articles as regards price and quality, though a notable exception is the Nesher Cement Company. [...Therefore, i]n 1927 the policy of protecting local industry was initiated and the familiar phrase 'infant industries' became part of the fiscal language of Palestine. Machinery and certain raw and semi-manufactured materials imported for use in production were freed from duty, while in certain cases the charges on the finished article were increased. Where it is not possible to exempt from import duty imported commodities used in local production and the local industry is producing for export, a system of drawbacks permits in approved cases a refund on exportation, representing a substantial part of the import duty colected on the imported commodities used in the locally produced article.": "Palestine Royal Commission Report" (PDF). p. 209. Retrieved 2024-05-24.
  11. ^ For an example of these tax policies, cf. Nimrod Ben Zeev: Building to Survive: The Politics of Cement in Mandate Palestine. Jerusalem Quarterly 79, 2019. p. 45 f.
  12. ^ Cf. Gabriel Polley: "Palestine is Thus Brought Home to England": The Representation of Palestine in British Travel Literature, 1840–1914. PhD Thesis, 2020. p. 254 f.
  13. ^ Cf. Kenneth W. Stein: Die politische Tragweite der ländlichen Ökonomie Palästinas 1917 – 1939, in: Linda S. Schilcher, Claus Scharf (ed): Der Nahe Osten in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1919 – 1939. Die Interdependenz von Politik, Wirtschaft und Ideologie. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989. p. 271 f.
  14. ^ Cf. Kenneth W. Stein: Die politische Tragweite der ländlichen Ökonomie Palästinas 1917 – 1939, in: Linda S. Schilcher, Claus Scharf (ed): Der Nahe Osten in der Zwischenkriegszeit 1919 – 1939. Die Interdependenz von Politik, Wirtschaft und Ideologie. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989. p. 274 f.
  15. ^ Cf. Evan B. Gabe: The Great White Umpire in Palestine: British Economic Policies and Arab Grievances, 1920–1936. Master's Thesis, 2013. p. 55–75.
  16. ^ "Palestine Royal Commission Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 1937" (PDF). p. 239. Retrieved 2024-05-23.
  17. ^ Cf. Charles Anderson: The British Mandate and the Crisis of Palestinian landlessness, 1929–1936. Middle Eastern Studies 54 (2), 2018.
  18. ^ Matthew J. Longland: A Sacred Trust? British Administration of the Mandate for Palestine, 1920–1936. Dissertation, 2013. p. 115.
  19. ^ After Ruth Kark (1981): Jewish Frontier Settlement in The Negev, 1880–1948: Perception and Realization. Middle Eastern Studies 17 (3). p. 349.
  20. ^ Muhammad Y. Suwaed (2015): Bedouin-Jewish Relations in the Negev 1943–1948. Middle Eastern Studies 51 (5). p. 773.
  21. ^ Cf. Yael Zerubavel (2019): Desert in the Promised Land. Stanford University Press. p. 22.
  22. ^ "The astonishing matter to me is, how closely these Bedawin cultivate the ground. There is but a small proportion of pasture, nearly all being arable, some fallow, but mostly in barley. [...] The straightness of the ploughing is striking – seldom could I see six inches of bend in the line." – W.M. Flinders Petrie: Journals of Mr. W.M. Flinders Petrie, in: Palestine Exploration Quarterly 22 (4), 1890. p. 221, 219 f.
  23. ^ "The land was like a desolate desert before the Jews arrived at this place; wandering Bedouins lived here, plowing and sowing barley and sometimes wheat; usually, the harvest was just enough to sustain their families. Once every two or three years, when the rains came on time, they would harvest enough to sell as well. They would load the barley onto camels and bring it to Gaza to sell to grain merchants, who would then load it onto boats and bring it to ships anchored far from the shore. This is the famed barley that was exported to England for beer production. [...] The Bedouins saw that the 'Jew' was a savior in times of trouble [...]. One sheikh stood on the hill planted [by the settlers of Ruhama] with almond trees, looking at the straight rows, the soft and even soil, and the shade cast by the trees on the ground, raising his eyes to the distant plain, to the scorched wilderness, and said to his followers: 'Our land is abandoned and mourns like a bereaved mother for her children, but the land of the Jews rejoices like a groom for his bride.'" – Translated after "Ruhama [Heb.]". Ha-Tzefira. 1914-07-17. Retrieved 2024-07-03.
  24. ^ E.g. Eliahu Epstein (1939): Bedouin of the Negeb. Palestine Exploration Quarterly 71 (2). p. 66: "Before the War some limited measure of cultivation was practiced by some of the Negeb tribes, in particular the weaker among them, who made desultory use of their more cultivable areas to sow barley and wheat for their own needs. This occupation, however, never held any attraction for the Bedou, disliking any type of work because of his natural laziness and more particularly the tilling of the soil because of his inborn scorn of the cultivator – 'the fellah' – a term of opprobrium in his language, used as a symbol of weakness and faintheartedness, the two cardinal sins in the Bedouin code. He would have no hesitation in giving up his plot of land and throwing off the indignity of agriculture for any other however meagre form of livelihood. It was natural, therefore, that under the rule of the Bedouin those regions of the Negeb which had been cultivated in past periods of its history and had supported populous villages and towns, should have again reverted to desert."
  25. ^ Eliahu Elath (1958): The Bedouin of the Negev. Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 45 (2). p. 125, 129: "Again and again, through the constant raids on the cultivated fringes, the Bedouin has in the past helped the desert to encroach upon the sown. It is no accident that one who knew him – and his destructive qualities – well has called him not only 'the son' but also 'the father' of the desert. [...] This happened in many parts of the Middle East, where once fertile countrysides are now no more than camping-grounds for Bedouin tribes, whose camels, sheep and goats graze among the ruins of once prosperous villages and townships. This kind of 'man-made desert' may be observed in many parts of Israel, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Often it is the nomads themselves who are primarily responsible for the fact that some vast areas in these countries, known in ancient times as the granaries of the Middle East, can today provide no more than the scantiest subsistence for the Bedouin. [...]
    The Bedou who had previously tilled a small plot for his own needs now took to cultivation on a rather wider scale for the market, in order to get some income to compensate for his losses in other branches of his economy. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the nomads of the Negev, any more than their brethren elsewhere, turned easily or rapidly from their free pastoral life to the more arduous work of cultivating the soil. Bedouin, in the Negev as elsewhere, despised agricultural labour, and were only too pleased to lease their land to any tenant on almost any terms, so long as they did not have to work it themselves. [...] How little the Bedouin cared about agricultural pursuits was clear to me when, before the last World War, I watched tribesmen in the Negev sending not only their young sons, but also their daughters, to plough their fields."
    "One who knew him" apparently referred to Chaim Weizmann, who had declared about all Palestinians: "The Arab is often called the son of the desert. It would be truer to call him the father of the desert. His laziness and primitivism turn a flourishing garden into a desert. Give me the land occupied by one million Arabs, and I will easily settle five times that number of Jews on it." Apud Benny Morris (2004): The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge. p. 53.
  26. ^ Somewhat more general Mordechai Haiman (1995): Agriculture and Nomad-State Relations in the Negev Desert in the Byzantine and Early Islamic Periods. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 297. p. 48: "The mass transition to agriculture among these groups was the combined result of ongoing contact with permanent settlers an a gradual change in their economy. [...] In sum, when the frontier was neglected, even fertile areas became wastelands and were frequented by starving nomads. Conversely, when the frontier was controlled and supported by the [Israeli] state, even areas in the heart of the desert became fertile agricultural lands."
  27. ^ Cf. on this discourse Steven A. Rosen (2000): The decline of desert agriculture: a view from the classical period Negev, in: Graeme Barker / David Gilbertson (ed.): The Archaeology of Drylands. Living at the margin. Routledge. p. 58 f.
  28. ^ Entry from a settler's diary, apud Yael Zerubavel (2019): Desert in the Promised Land. Stanford University Press. p. 22.
  29. ^ Cf. No'am G. Seligman (2012): The Environmental Legacy of the Fellaheen and the Bedouin in Palestine, in: Daniel E. Orenstein et al. (ed.): Between Ruin and Restoration. An Environmental History of Israel. University of Pittsburgh Press. p. 30–32.
  30. ^ Yael Zerubavel (2019): Desert in the Promised Land. Stanford University Press. p. 23.
  31. ^ Gideon Avni (2020): Terraced Fields, Irrigation Systems and Agricultural Production in Early Islamic Palestine and Jordan: Continuity and Innovation. Journal of Islamic Archaeology 7 (2). p. 114.
  32. ^ Matan Kaminer (2022): The Agricultural Settlement of the Arabah and the Political Ecology of Zionism. International Journal of Middle East Studies 54. p. 45.
  33. ^ Cf. No'am G. Seligman (2012): The Environmental Legacy of the Fellaheen and the Bedouin in Palestine, in: Daniel E. Orenstein et al. (ed.): Between Ruin and Restoration. An Environmental History of Israel. University of Pittsburgh Press. Esp. p. 43–46.
  34. ^ On this, cf. also Leah Temper (2009): Creating Facts on the Ground: Agriculture in Israel and Palestine (1882–2000). Historia Agraria 48. p. 95 f.
  35. ^ Cf. Peter Wolff (1992): Savanization – ein Konzept zur Schaffung von Grüngürteln in den israelischen Wüstengebieten. Der Tropenlandwirt 93 (2).
  36. ^ Stephen Prince, Uriel Safriel (2021): Land Use and Degradation in a Desert Margin: The Northern Negev. Remote Sensing 13 (15).
  37. ^ Cf. also Matan Kaminer (2022): The Agricultural Settlement of the Arabah and the Political Ecology of Zionism. International Journal of Middle East Studies 54. p. 53.
  38. ^ Cf. esp. Büşra Barin: The Ottoman Policy towards Jewish Immigration and Settlement in Palestine: 1882–1920. Dissertation, 2014. p. 35–41.
  39. ^ Nora E. Barakat (2023): Bedouin Bureaucrats. Mobility and Property in the Ottoman Empire. Stanford University Press. p. 166 f.
  40. ^ Cf. e.g. Muhammad Y. Suwaed (2015): Bedouin-Jewish Relations in the Negev 1943–1948. Middle Eastern Studies 51 (5). p. 770 f.
  41. ^ a b Cf. Kanaani, Eliyahu (1981). Ruhama, the first Jewish settlement in the Negev (in Hebrew). Yad Ben Zvi. Retrieved 2007-09-18.
  42. ^ On the legal background, cf. Büşra Barin: The Ottoman Policy towards Jewish Immigration and Settlement in Palestine: 1882–1920. Dissertation, 2014. p. 35.
  43. ^ Jeffrey A. Blakely: The Changing Landscape of the Hesi Region and Its Implications for Archaeological Research, in: Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 9 (1-2), 2021. p. 149.
  44. ^ Ginsburg, Mitch (2014-02-13). "Israel's next major land dispute brews in the Negev desert". Times of Israel. Retrieved 2024-07-01.
  45. ^ Yosi Katz: The "Achuza" Projects in Eretz-Israel, 1908-1917, in: Cathedra 22 (1), 1982. p. 134, 136 [Heb.].
  46. ^ "Ruhama [Heb.]". Ha-Poel Ha-Tzair. 1919-03-27. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  47. ^ "Ruhama". Ha-Poel ha-Tzair. 1924-03-28. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  48. ^ "Ruhama". Ha-Poel ha-Tzair. 1925-06-05. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  49. ^ Already abandoned in 1929:"On the Establishment of Beacons". Ha-Olam. 1929-10-18. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  50. ^ Already abandoned in 1932: "The Hebrew Economy in the Land of Israel in 1932". Davar. 1932-09-30. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  51. ^ Already abandoned before 1937 and in 1938: "Ben-Zvi and the "Natural" Division of Jerusalem". Ha-Yarden. 1938-05-06. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  52. ^ Destroyed in 1921 / after the war: "Jews will not Buy Peace at Price of Ghettoizing Palestine, Goldie Myerson Tells Press". The Canadian Jewish Chronicle. 1946-09-06. Retrieved 2024-07-02. / Arieh L. Avneri: The Claim of Dispossession. Jewish Land-Settlement and the Arabs 1878-1948. Yad Tabenkin, 2009. p. 218.
  53. ^ Destroyed in 1929: Arieh L. Avneri: The Claim of Dispossession. Jewish Land-Settlement and the Arabs 1878-1948. Yad Tabenkin, 2009. p. 218; Aharon Kellerman: Society and Settlement. Jewish Land of Israel in the Twentieth Century. State University of New York Press, 1993. p. 244; "The Last Jew, Hochmann, Left Ruhama". ha-Boker. 1938-08-25. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  54. ^ Destroyed in 1936: Arieh L. Avneri: The Claim of Dispossession. Jewish Land-Settlement and the Arabs 1878-1948. Yad Tabenkin, 2009. p. 218; Ruth Kark: Jewish Frontier Settlement in the Negev, 1880-1948: Perception and Realization, in: Middle Eastern Studies 17 (3), 1981. p. 341; "Jews will not Buy Peace at Price of Ghettoizing Palestine, Goldie Myerson Tells Press". The Canadian Jewish Chronicle. 1946-09-06. Retrieved 2024-07-02.; "When Ruhama was Searched". The Sydney Jewish News. 1946-11-01. Retrieved 2024-07-02.
  55. ^ a b Eric E. Tuten: Between Capital and Land. The Jewish National Fund's finances and land-purchase priorities in Palestine, 1939–45. RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. p. 134.
  56. ^ "The Arabs make pits on the side of the lake, which are filled by its overflow on the melting of the snow, and when the lake is lower, the water evaporates, and leaves a cake of salt, which is about an inch thick, as I concluded from the salt I saw at Jerusalem; the country for a considerable distance is supplied with it for common use. It is observed that the bitumen floats on the water, and comes ashoar after windy weather; the Arabs gather it up, and it serves as pitch for all uses, goes into the composition of medicines [...]; it has been much used for erecloths, and has an ill smell when burnt."
    Richard Pococke: A Description of the East, and Some other Countries. Vol. II, Part I: Observations on Palestine or the Holy Land, Syria, Mesopotamia, Cyprus, and Candia. W. Bowyer, 1745. p. 36 f.
  57. ^ Roy S. Fischel, Ruth Kark: Sultal Abdülhamid II and Palestine: Private Lands and Imperial Policy. New perspectives on Turkey 39, 2008. p. 165.
  58. ^ Jacob Norris: Land of Progress. Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905–1948. Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 181–192.
  59. ^ "Palestine Partition Commission Report". p. 122. Retrieved 2024-05-23.
  60. ^ "A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Comittee of Inquiry. Volume I" (PDF). p. 269. Retrieved 2024-05-23.
  61. ^ George S. Blake (1928): Geology and water resources of Palestine. Government of Palestine. p. 38 f.
  62. ^ Cf. Donna Herzog (2019): Contested Waterscapes: Constructing Israel's National Water Carrier. Dissertation. p. 140 f.
  63. ^ Cf. Mansour Nasasra (2017): The Naqab Bedouins. A Century of Politics and Resistance. Columbia University Press. p. 99: 1,200 ha; population: 125.
  64. ^ Cf. Victor N. Rego (2009): The Efficacy of the Israeli Legal System in Protecting and Fulfilling Naqab Bedouin land Rights. Master's Thesis. p. 43.
  65. ^ Cf. on Revivim Ruth Kark: The Agricultural Character of Jewish Settlement in the Negev: 1939–1947. Jewish Social Studies 45 (2), 1983.
  66. ^ "A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Comittee of Inquiry. Volume I" (PDF). p. 371. Retrieved 2024-05-23.
  67. ^ S. Ilan Troen (2003): Imagining Zion. Dreams, Designs, and realities in a Century of Jewish Settlement. Yale University Press. p. 77. Cf. also p. 73–76.
  68. ^ Ilanit Ben-Dor Derimian (2021): From the Conquest of the Desert to Sustainable Development. The Representation of the Negev in Public Discourse in Israel. LIT Verlag. p. 55.
  69. ^ James Fergusson: In Search of the River Jordan. A Story of Palestine, Israel and the Struggle for Water. Yale University Press, 2023. p. 241: "Of course, the fort [Revivim] was not only about agricultural research. Its other purpose was to establish a Jewish foothold on territory that Palestine's British overlords firmly viewed as Arab. In this respect, too, Revivim was a stunning success. [...] Its defence in the early years was organized by the Haganah, the underground military arm of the Jewish Agency, pre-state Israel's government in waiting. As elsewhere, Revivim's Haganah commander double-hatted as a sergeant in the British colonial police, a role that allowed him to smuggle in illegal weapons hidden in the false bottom of a police van."
  70. ^ Avinoam Meir / Ze'ev Zivan (2018): Sociocultural Encounter on the Frontier: Jewish Settlers and Bedouin Nomads in the Negev, in: Oren Yiftachel / Avinoam Meir (ed.): Ethnic Frontiers and Peripheries. Landscapes of Development and Inequality in Israel. Routledge. p. 248.
  71. ^ Mahdi A. Hadi (2014): The Palestine Question in Maps. 1878 – 2014. Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. p. 23.
  72. ^ Cf. Yigal Yadin (1949): Our Military Operations, in: Elieser Doron (ed.): The Negev. An Anthology. Lion the Printer. p. 31: "There seems to have been a fundamental misunderstanding both on the part of the Arab States and others about our general position and about the situation of the Israeli armed forces.
    The fact is that our settlements are not purely military outposts. Our settlements in the Negev, for example, are places in which people live and which they are determined to keep alive."
  73. ^ "Census of Palestine 1931. Volume I. Part I: Report" (PDF). p. 334. Retrieved 2024-05-23.
  74. ^ Marie Syrkin (1949): The Significance of the Negev, in: Elieser Doron (ed.): The Negev. An Anthology. Lion the Printer. p. 58.
  75. ^ Cf. Ruth Kark: The Agricultural Character of Jewish Settlement in the Negev: 1939–1947. Jewish Social Studies 45 (2), 1983. p. 168.
  76. ^ Cf. the report of the Peel Commission: "[W]e have no doubt as to what were 'the underlying causes of the disturbances' of last year. They were: –
    (i) The desire of the Arabs for national independence.
    (ii) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home. [...]
    They were the same underlying causes as those which brought about the ‚disturbances‘ of 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933. [...]
    They were the only 'underlying' causes.": "Palestine Royal Commission Report" (PDF). pp. 110 f. Retrieved 2024-05-24.
  77. ^ Cf. Arie Perliger / Leonard Weinberg (2003): Jewish Self-Defence and Terrorist Groups Prior to the Establishment of the State of ISRAEL: Roots and Traditions. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 4 (3). p. 100–104, 111–113.
  78. ^ Sami Hadawi: Village Statistics 1945. A Classification of Land and Area Ownership in Palestine. With Explanatory Notes. Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1970. p. 36
  79. ^ Salman H. Abu-Sitta: Atlas of Palestine 1917–1966. Palestine Land Society, 2010. p. 24.
  80. ^ Cf. also Alexandre Kedar et al.: Emptied Lands. A Legal Geography of Bedouin Rights in the Negev. Stanford University Press, 2018. p. 130, 132.
  81. ^ Cf. Michael Oren: The diplomatic struggle for the Negev, 1946–1956. Studies in Zionism 10 (2), 1989. p. 200 f.
  82. ^ Cf. Eric E. Tuten: Between Capital and Land. The Jewish National Fund's finances and land-purchase priorities in Palestine, 1939–45. RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. p. 134.
  83. ^ Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946. The Government Printer, Palestine, 1946. p. 369 f.
    On this number, cf. Salman H. Abu-Sitta: Atlas of Palestine 1917–1966. Palestine Land Society, 2010. p. 24.
  84. ^ UN Sub-Committee 2 on the Palestinian Question: Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question of the UN General Assembly 1947. Appendix VI.
    On this number, cf. Sami Hadawi: Village Statistics 1945. A Classification of Land and Area Ownership in Palestine. With Explanatory Notes. Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1970. p. 36.
  85. ^ a b "Every dunum which can be economically sown is cultivated by the Beduin inhabitants (apart from some 90,000 dunum [=9,000 hectares] of Jewish land). The Beduin are keen farmers and very much alive to possibilities of improving their agricultural methods. Tractor ploughing has made considerable strides within recent years and an increasing area is being planted each year with fruit trees."
    Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946. The Government Printer, Palestine, 1946. p. 369 f.
  86. ^ "a wild confusion of bare limestone hills [...], providing winter pasture for the goats and camels of a few small tribes":
    Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946. The Government Printer, Palestine, 1946. p. 369 f.
  87. ^ "The term Beersheba Bedouin has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it."
    UN Sub-Committee 2 on the Palestinian Question: Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question of the UN General Assembly 1947. Appendix III
  88. ^ James Fergusson: In Search of the River Jordan. A Story of Palestine, Israel and the Struggle for Water. Yale University Press, 2023. p. 165 f.
  89. ^ Christopher Ward et al.: The History of Water in the Land once Called Palestine. Scarcity, Conflict and Loss in Middle East Water Resources. Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. p. 46–49.
  90. ^ Donna Herzog: Contested Waterscapes: Constructing Israel's National Water Carrier. Dissertation, 2019. p. 141 f.: "In retrospect, the Negev pipeline did have the intended impact Ben-Gurion and Blass conceived it would. In April 1947, Mekorot began sending water to the Negev in the pipeline, and this became a major factor in the deliberations made during the visit of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP); as one UN surveyor who visited the Negev stated to his Jewish escort 'This water pipe will give you the Negev.' Indeed, in the case of the Negev, water determined the land division, and the Negev was included in the border of the Jewish state."
  91. ^ Elad Ben-Dror: UNSCOP and the Arab–Israeli Conflict. The Road to Partition. Routledge, 2023. p. 80 f: "The members of the kibbutz [Revivim] proudly showed the delegation the gladiolas and vegetables they grew in the desert, and a reservoir of water collecting using a special method they had developed. [...] The subtext was that only the Yishuv could take full advantage of the Negev and Aravah regions. The members of UNSCOP were largely convinced."
  92. ^ James Fergusson: In Search of the River Jordan. A Story of Palestine, Israel and the Struggle for Water. Yale University Press, 2023. p. 233: "Revivim, the Jewish Agency argued, proved that the Yishuv, and only the Yishuv, had the capacity and technical know-how to exploit and colonize the empty desert; the Negev should therefore be given to them.
    The first thing the UNESCO [sic] delegation saw on the morning of their arrival at Revivim was a garden of fresh pink gladioli. The pioneers, apparently quite by chance, had watered the gladioli the night before, causing them to burst into bloom as though choreographed. The bright colours against the dun-coloured land made a great impression on the delegates, who were accompanied by the press; a colour photograph of the flowers appeared in the English-language Palestine Post the following day.
    The officials went away convinced that the Negev should be granted to Israel, and in November 1947 – in a vote from which Britain pointedly abstained – the UN General Assembly agreed."
  93. ^ United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. "Report to the General Assembly. Volume I". Retrieved 2024-05-24. p. 14, 54: "The area has good soil but insufficient rain to support a denser population. It can only be developed by irrigation. There are small Jewish settlements in the south of this area (sometimes loosely described as the Negev) which are at present experimental and based on water brought by pipeline at great cost from a considerable distance. The further development of this area remains, therefore, problematic, being dependent either on the discovery of non-saline underground water at economic depths or the development of reservoirs to store the winter rainfall over fairly wide areas. [...] The inclusion of the whole Beersheba sub-district in the Jewish State gives to it a large area, parts of which are very sparsely populated and capable of development, if they can be provided with water for irrigation. The experiments already carried out in this area by the Jews suggest that further development in an appreciable degree should be possible by heavy investment of capital and labour and without impairing the future or prejudicing the rights of the existing Bedouin population. The Negev south of latitude 31, though included in the Jewish State, is desert land of little agricultural value, but is naturally linked with the northerwn part of the sub-district of Beersheba."
  94. ^ Daniel Mandel: H. V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel. The Undercover Zionist. Frank Cass, 2004. p. 128.
  95. ^ Michael J. Cohen: Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948. Princeton University Press, 1982. p. 284.
  96. ^ UN, Department of Public Information: Yearbook of the United Nations. 1947–48. p. 240.
  97. ^ Cf. Nabil Elaraby (1968): Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Law and Contemporary Problems 33 (1). p. 101: „It seems anomalous that the procedure adopted for the consideration of the report was delegated to two subcommittees of the Ad Hoc Committee, one composed of pro-partition delegates and the other of Arab delegates plus Colombia and Pakistan, which were sympathetic to the Arab cause. It was obvious that those two sub-committees were so unbalanced as to be unable to achieve anything constructive. As was later evident, the task of reconciling their conflicting recommendations was impossible. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that no serious attention was given to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.“
  98. ^ Cf. similarly Victor Kattan (2009): From Coexistence to Conquest. International Law and the Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949. Pluto Press. p. 148 f.
  99. ^ Cf. John B. Judis (2014): Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Section 13: "Months later, [Swedish UN representative] Hagglof told Lionel Gelber from the Jewish Agency that a majority of nations felt that the United States and the chairmen of the ad hoc committee, the Australian Herbert Evatt, had manipulated the issue so that the countries were forced to choose between 'partition and some pro-Arab scheme.' They would have preferred an 'attempt at conciliation,' but that was not among the choices they were given."
  100. ^ Cite error: The named reference Critique was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  101. ^ Moshe Sharett reported in a letter about the debates towards the end of the negotiations: "Of these five, the first three [Uruguay, Guatemala, Canada] also demanded the inclusion of most of the Northern Negev [into the Jewish state]. At first it had been their inclination not to grant us all of the 'desert triangle,' so as not to inflate the territory of the Jewish state unnecessarily, and this led them to the idea of removing the shore of the Dead Sea altogether from the Jewish state, and annexing the shore strip either to the international region or to the Arab state for the sake of continuity. Opposing them, the other two [... Netherlands, Australia] never even leaned towards giving us the Negev – according to one version they did not intend at that stage to give us anything at all from the Negev, but it is possible that this was a bargaining position and nothing more. [...] The Peruvian at that point was prepared to grant us more of the Negev than [the Swedish] Sandstrom-Blom. [...] On the one hand the path is open for our two Latin friends [Guatemala, Uruguay] to influence their Peruvian comrade to come closer to their position. [...] At the same time the Guatemalan came along with the proposal to give up some of the Galilee in order to preserve most of it, along with some bonus in the Negev [...U]pon my return the next day to Geneva I found a dramatic turn of events: the seven parties had reached a compromise which left the vast majority of the mountainous Galilee with the western shore line to the Arab state and granted all of the Negev, north and south, including the town of Beersheba, to us."
    Ruth Gavison (ed.): The Two-State Solution. The UN partition Resolution of Mandatory Palestine. Analysis and Sources. Bloomsbury, 2013. p. 238 f.
  102. ^ Michael J. Cohen: Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948. Princeton University Press, 1982. p. 289.
  103. ^ Cf. Chaim Weizmann: Trial and Error. Schocken Books, 1966. p. 457–459.
  104. ^ Abba Eban: An Autobiography. Random House, 1977. p. 94.
  105. ^ Robert J. Donovan: Conflict and Crisis. The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948. W. W. Norton & Company, 1977. p. 327 f.
  106. ^ John W. Mulhall: America and the Founding of Israel. An Investigation of the Morality of America's Role. Deshon Press, 1995. p. 140–142.
  107. ^ Allis Radosh / Ronald Radosh: A Safe Haven. Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel. Harper Collins Publishers, 2009. p. 261–265.
  108. ^ John B. Judis: Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014. Epub edition, section 13: "The most controversial of these [subsequent pro-Arab] amendments was giving most of the Negev to the Arabs. With the Negev included, an Arab state would be larger than the Jewish state, and it would have a direct link to the sea and a contiguous border with Egypt and Jordan. Such a plan [...] might have at least brought the Arab League into negotiations. And it would have been a far fairer distribution of Palestine's assets. Truman approved the State Department's amendments, which fit his own sense of fairness. But the Jewish Agency was determined to defeat the proposal."
  109. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 53. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9.
  110. ^ Cite error: The named reference sand dunes 1 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  111. ^ Cite error: The named reference sand dunes 2 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  112. ^ Kark and Frantzman, 2012, p.74-76
  113. ^ After Salman H. Abu-Sitta (2010): Atlas of Palestine. 1917–1966. Palestine Land Society. p. 86, 88.
  114. ^ Cf. Salman H. Abu-Sitta (2010): Atlas of Palestine. 1917–1966. Palestine Land Society. p. 86.
  115. ^ a b c Cf. the translation of this report by Akevot. On this report, cf. also Benny Morris (1986): The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: The Israel Defence Forces Intelligence Branch Analysis of June 1948. Middle Eastern Studies. 22 (1). p. 5–19; Simha Flapan (1987): The Palestinian Exodus of 1948. Journal of Palestine Studies 16 (4). p. 8.
  116. ^ a b Havatzelet Yahel / Ruth Kark (2014): Israel Negev Bedouin during the 1948 War: Departure and Return. Israel Affairs 21 (1). p. 57–59. Cite error: The named reference "Yahel" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  117. ^ Cf. Havatzelet Yahel / Ruth Kark (2014): Israel Negev Bedouin during the 1948 War: Departure and Return. Israel Affairs 21 (1). p. 53.
  118. ^ Cf. Mansour Nasasra (2017): The Naqab Bedouins. A Century of Politics and Resistance. Columbia University Press. p. 107 f.
  119. ^ E.g. Yisrael Galili: "[...We] must distinguish [...] between villages guilty of attacking us and villages that have not yet attacked us. If we don't want to bring about an alliance between the Arabs of the country and the foreign – it is important to make this distinction." Apud Benny Morris (2004): The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge. p. 85.
  120. ^ E.g. Yosef Weitz: "There is no way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries, to transfer all of them, save perhaps for Bethlehem, Nazareth and old Jerusalem. Not one village must be left, not one tribe." Apud Benny Morris (2004): The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge. p. 54.
  121. ^ "In the Negev we will not buy land. We will conquer it. You are forgetting that we are at war." Apud Benny Morris (2004): The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge. p. 360.
  122. ^ Cf. Benny Morris (1986): The Harvest of 1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Middle East Journal 40 (4). p. 680–682, 685.
  123. ^ Cf. e.g. complaints of Israeli Negev pioneers from Ruhama, Nir-Am and Dorot about burning the fields of fled "friendly tribes.": Benny Morris (1986): The Harvest of 1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Middle East Journal 40 (4). p. 680.
  124. ^ Cf. e.g. complaints about expelling Bedouins of three villages that had even spied for the Israelis: Havatzelet Yahel / Ruth Kark (2014): Israel Negev Bedouin during the 1948 War: Departure and Return. Israel Affairs 21 (1). p. 62.
  125. ^ Havatzelet Yahel / Ruth Kark (2014): Israel Negev Bedouin during the 1948 War: Departure and Return. Israel Affairs 21 (1). p. 57.
  126. ^ a b Salman H. Abu-Sitta (2010): Atlas of Palestine 1917–1966. Palestine Land Society. p. 116.
  127. ^ Cf. Mansour Nasasra (2017): The Naqab Bedouins. A Century of Politics and Resistance. Columbia University Press. pp. 106–108.
  128. ^ Chanina Porat (2000): The Strategy of the Israeli Government and the Left Parties' Alternative Plans Towards Solving the Beduin Issue in the Negev, 1953–1960. Iyunim 10. p. 420. [Heb.]
  129. ^ Cf. United Nations (1950): Security Council Official Records. No. 56. p. 9 f.
  130. ^ Kurt Goering (1979): Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev. Journal of Palestine Studies 9 (1). p. 5.
  131. ^ Havatzelet Yahel / Ruth Kark (2014): Israel Negev Bedouin during the 1948 War: Departure and Return. Israel Affairs 21 (1). p. 49.
  132. ^ Mansour Nasasra (2017): The Naqab Bedouins. A Century of Politics and Resistance. Columbia University Press. p. 107
  133. ^ Cf. Emanuel Marx (1967): Bedouin of the Negev. Frederick A. Praeger. pp. 12 ff.
  134. ^ Mansour Nasasra (2017): The Naqab Bedouins. A Century of Politics and Resistance. Columbia University Press. p. 131.
  135. ^ Gary Fields: Enclosure. Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror. University of California Press, 2017. p. 264.
  136. ^ Mansour Nasasra (2017): The Naqab Bedouins. A Century of Politics and Resistance. Columbia University Press. p. 131.
  137. ^ Cf. Gadi Algazi (2024): Nomadizing the Bedouins: Displacement, Resistance, and Patronage in the Northern Naqab, 1951–1952. Journal of Palestine Studies 53.
  138. ^ Havatzelet Yahel / Ruth Kark (2014): Israel Negev Bedouin during the 1948 War: Departure and Return. Israel Affairs 21 (1). pp. 59–61.
  139. ^ Gary Fields: Enclosure. Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror. University of California Press, 2017. p. 267 f.
  140. ^ Cf. Ronen Shamir (1996): Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the Law of Israel. Law & Society Review 30 (2). p. 238.
  141. ^ Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 124–126.
  142. ^ Ahmad Amara: The Negev Land Question: Between Denial and Recognition. Journal of Palestine Stuides 42 (4), 2013. p. 36.
  143. ^ Ewa Górska: Construction of Imagined Geographies through Law: The Case of Judaization of the Negev Desert. Folia Iuridica 94, 2021. p. 35–37; esp. p. 36: "At the time when 'abandoned' lands were declared state property, most of the Bedouins in the Negev Desert were forcibly resettled to Siyag so they could not counteract the process. Some who managed to stay in their homes (especially those native to the lands where Siyag was placed) tried ot register their estate with the new authorities. However, not only were their customary ownership rights not recognized, but the Israeli courts also denied the validity of purchase contracts, property deeds and other documents issued prior to 1948."
  144. ^ Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 121.
  145. ^ a b Alon Margalit: The Israeli Supreme Court and Bedouin Land Claims in the Negev: A Missed Opportunity to Uphold Human and Indigenous Rights. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 24 (1), 2017.
  146. ^ For an overview of the case proceedings, see Noa Kram (2013): Clashes over recognition: The struggle of indigenous Bedouins for land ownership rights under Israeli law. Dissertation. p. 166–191.
  147. ^ For an analysis of this case, see Emma Nyhan (2018): Indigeneity, law and terrain: the Bedouin citizens of Israel. Dissertation. p. 211–242.
  148. ^ Cf. Pekka Hakala: Forced displacement looms for Bedouins in the Negev (DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_310). European Parliament, 2012. p. 2.
  149. ^ Article 103. Quoted after R. C. Tute: The Ottoman Land Laws. With a Commentary on the Ottoman Land Code of 7th Ramadan 1274. Greek Conv. Press, 1927. p. 97.
  150. ^ Mansour Nasasra: Ruling the Desert: Ottoman and British Policies towards the Bedouin of the Naqab and Transjordan Region, 1900–1948. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42 (3), 2015. p. 267.
  151. ^ Gary Fields: Enclosure. Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror. University of California Press, 2017. p. 269 f.
  152. ^ Oren Yiftachel: "Terra nullius" and planning. Land, law and identity in Israel/Palestine, in: Gautam Bhan et al. (ed.): The Routledge Companion to Planning in the Global South. Routledge, 2012. p. 246.
  153. ^ Ahmad Amara: The Negev Land Question: Between Denial and Recognition. Journal of Palestine Studies 42 (3), 2013. p. 34.
  154. ^ Oren Yiftachel: "Terra nullius" and planning. Land, law and identity in Israel/Palestine, in: Gautam Bhan et al. (ed.): The Routledge Companion to Planning in the Global South. Routledge, 2012. p. 246.
  155. ^ Salman Abu Sitta. "Al-Araqib: All of Palestine". Retrieved 2024-05-11.
  156. ^ Ruth Kark / Seth J. Frantzman: The Negev: Land, Settlement, the Bedouin and Ottoman and British Policy 1871–1948. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39 (1), 2012. p. 59.
  157. ^ Oren Yiftachel (2012): "Terra nullius" and planning. Land, law and identity in Israel/Palestine, in: Gautam Bhan et al. (ed.): The Routledge Companion ot Planning in the Global South. Routledge. p. 247.
  158. ^ Ahmad Amara: The Negev Land Question: Between Denial and Recognition. Journal of Palestine Studies 42 (3), 2013. p. 34.
  159. ^ Cf. Alexandre Kedar et al.: Emptied Lands. A Legal Geography of Bedouin Rights in the Negev. Stanford University Press, 2018. p. 75 f.
  160. ^ Cf. also Naomi Shepherd: Ploughing Sand. British Rule in Palestine, 1917–1948. John Murray, 1999. p. 102.
  161. ^ Cf. also Mansour Nasasra: Ruling the Desert: Ottoman and British Policies towards the Bedouin of the Naqab and Transjordan Region, 1900–1948. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42 (3), 2015. p. 268 on an interview with Lord Oxford, Beersheba's assisting district commissioner from the 1940s: "British officials who served in Beersheba and Gaza, such as the late Lord Oxford, acknowledged Bedouin land ownership as the Bedouin themselves perceived it, and according to their respected customs."
  162. ^ "Census of Palestine 1931. Volume I. Part I: Report" (PDF). p. 335. Retrieved 2024-05-23.
  163. ^ UNCCP. "Identification and valuation of refugee property/Methods by land expert – CCNUP – Working paper". p. 12. Retrieved 2024-06-16.
  164. ^ On this, cf. Michael R. Fischbach: Records of Dispossession. Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Columbia University Press, 2003. p. 296 f.: "[UNCCP's] Jarvis later wrote [to Israel's UN ambassador] Comay on November 13 and cited Village Statistics, 1945, the Survey of Palestine, as well as mandatory lists of state lands to support his claim. He told Comay:
    [the mandatory records] contain evidence of the ownership by the government of comparatively small areas of land in the Beersheba Sub district. The assumption was made that all other land in this sub-district was Arab owned, other than that for which documentary evidence indicated a non-Arab ownership. ... I believe that the position was that the great bulk of the area was used and lived on by the Bedouin."
  165. ^ United Nations, General Assembly (2023-12-07). "GA Resolution (A/RES/78/75): Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues". Retrieved 2024-06-16.
  166. ^ For a short analysis, see Eric David. "The Legal Situation of the Bedouin in Israel – an Analysis] (2013)". Retrieved 2024-06-21.
  167. ^ European Parliament: Resolution of 5 July 2012 on EU policy on the West Bank and East Jerusalem (2012/2694(RSP)). 2010: "The European Parliament, [...] whereas Arab Bedouins are indigenous people leading a sedentary and traditionally agricultural life on their ancestral lands and are seeking formal and permanent recognition of their unique situation and status; whereas Arab Bedouin communities, threatened by Israeli policies undermining their livelihoods and including forced transfer, are a particularly vulnerable population both in the occupied Palestinien Territory and in the Negev; [...c]alls for the protection of the Bedouin communities of the West Bank and in the Negev, and for their rights to be fully respected by the Israeli authorities, and condemns any violations (e.g. house demolitions, forced displacements, public service limitations); calls also, in this context, for the withdrawal of the Prawer Plan by the Israeli Government [...]."
  168. ^ United Nations Human Rights Committee: Consideration of reports submitted by State parties under article 40 of the Covenant (CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3). 2010. p. 9: "In its planning efforts in the Negev area, the State party should respect the Bedouin population's right to their ancestral land and their traditional livelihood based on agriculture."
  169. ^ Norwegian Refugee Council: Bedouin Rights under Occupation: International Humanitarian Law and Indigenous Rights for Palestinian Bedouin in the West Bank. 2015. p. 26–39.
  170. ^ Alexandre Kedar et al.: Emptied Lands. A Legal Geography of Bedouin Rights in the Negev. Stanford University Press, 2018. p. 170–181, 188–190, 193–208.
  171. ^ Morad Elsana: Indigenous Land Rights in Israel. A Comparative Study of the Bedouin. Routledge, 2021. p. 153–170.
  172. ^ Apud Shlomo Swirski, Yael Hasson: Invisible Citizens. Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin. Adva Center, 2006. p. 16.
  173. ^ Apud Gadi Algazi (2024): Nomadizing the Bedouins: Displacement, Resistance, and Patronage in the Northern Naqab, 1951–1952. Journal of Palestine Studies 53. p. 10.
  174. ^ After "dukium.org". Retrieved 2024-05-31.; Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages. "Map of the Unrecognized Arab Villages in the Negev (2006)". Retrieved 2024-05-31.; "citypopulation.de". Retrieved 2024-06-05.
  175. ^ Cf. Ghazi Falah (1985): The Spatial Pattern of Bedouin Sedentarization in Israel. GeoJournal 11 (4). p. 363.
  176. ^ Mansour Nasasra (2017): The Naqab Bedouins. A Century of Politics and Resistance. Columbia University Press. pp. 121.
  177. ^ Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 150.
  178. ^ Cf. Emanuel Marx (1967): Bedouin of the Negev. Frederick A. Praeger. p. 19 f.
  179. ^ Shlomo Swirski, Yael Hasson: Invisible Citizens. Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin. Adva Center, 2006. p. 90.
  180. ^ Cf. the map in Regavim (2023): The Vanishing Negev. Land Use Policy and Practice in the Negev 2005– 2021 [sic]. Past, Present and Future. Almog Printering and Offset. p. 7.
  181. ^ Cf. the Map of Agricultural land by Israel's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2022; retrieved 2024-05-31).
  182. ^ Ghazi-Walid Falah: How Israel Controls the Bedouin in Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies 14 (2). p. 42.
  183. ^ Don Peretz (1958): Israel and the Palestine Arabs. With a Foreword by Roger Baldwin. The Middle East Institute. p. 143.
  184. ^ Ariel Nesher: Beer Sheba: A Town with Non-agricultural and Sparsely Populated "Hinterland", in: Gerald J. Karaska et al. (ed.): Rural-Urban Dynamics in Developing Rural Regions. Proceedings of the First SARSA/SSC Seminar, 18–22 April, 1984. Regional Cities Project et al, 1985. p. 122–125.
  185. ^ Ravit Hananel: Distributive Justice and Regional Planning: The Politics of Regional Revenue-Generating Land Uses in Israel. International Planning Studies 14 (2), 2009. p. 185 f.
  186. ^ On Yeroham as an underdeveloped camp and town, cf. Irit Katz (2015): Spreading and concentrating. The camp as the space of the frontier. City 19 (5). p. 727–740.
  187. ^ On Dimona, cf. Maina Chawla Singh (2013): "Where have you brought us, Sir?" Gender, Displacement, and the Challenges of "Homecoming" for Indian Jews in Dimona, 1950s–60s. Shofar 32 (1). p. 2 f.
  188. ^ Ismael Abu-Saad (2014): State-Directed "Development" as a Tool for Dispossessing the Indigenous Palestinian Bedouin–Arabs in the Naqab, in: Mandy Turner / Omar Shweiki (ed.): Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy. De-development and Beyond. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 141 f.
  189. ^ On the desolate state of the Siyag Bedouin in the 50s, cf. Chanina Porat (2000): The Strategy of the Israeli Government and the Left Parties' Alternative Plans Towards Solving the Beduin Issue in the Negev, 1953–1960. Iyunim 10. p. 430 f. [Heb.], who reconstructs the situation of the Bedouins in the early 1950s based on Knesset debates. Some translated excerpts: "A complaint by Member of Knesset Moshe Aram (Mapam), addressed at the end of February 1953 to the Minister of Trade and Industry Yosef Sarlin, reveals that indeed the Bedouins' economic situation that spring was difficult. Aram stated that an average Bedouin family consumes 15 kilograms of flour per person in three months, while the government allocated only 5 kilograms per family. Moreover, it was clarified that there was a delay in distributing the rations and the flour reached the tribes only after seven months. The Member of Knesset further established that the Bedouin's dependence on government-distributed rations became unreasonable to the extent that a Bedouin caught buying bread in the free market was arrested and fined. [...] It also emerged from the inquiry that the government forced the Bedouins to sell the seeds and left them only with 'reduced rations' [...].
    [... A] Member of Knesset addressed the discrimination practiced against the Bedouins in the economic and health sectors, and their severe condition as a result. He accused the state of expelling tribes that had been loyal to it during the War of Independence. These tribes – Al-Rawajin, Tarabin, Abu Rukayek, Abu Kaff, Azazima, Al-Tsana, and others, who had shown friendship to isolated settlements like Revivim, Halutza, Hatzerim, and Tze'elim – were transferred to the designated area against their will. According to the Member of Knesset's data, only four schools were established in the tribal area, where only about 100 children were educated. Regarding the medical service, the Member of Knesset reported that only one government doctor served all the Bedouin population in the Negev. A patient needed a special movement permit to the doctor's clinic, and often, due to the time required to arrange the permit, their health condition severely worsened. [...] It turns out that four types of taxes were imposed on the Bedouins: an 'identity card holder' tax; an education tax, imposed on the Bedouins without receiving educational services; a sowing tax, which is unfair to a nomadic farmer in the desert, because whether a Bedouin sows a dunam or 250 dunams, the payment per dunam (as a poll tax) was 5,500 Israeli pounds; and a property tax, imposed on the yield of the seeds and on the animals. According to the Member of Knesset, the government maintained a regime of severe austerity among the tribes. Food supply was delayed and arrived reduced. Unlike the Jewish sector, no special supply was provided for babies. The amount of flour provided was half the accepted minimum, it was supplied once every five to seven months, and the result was famine among the tribes.
    During the discussion, the Knesset member highlighted discrimination in terms of freedom of movement, trade, and association, and criticized the harsh treatment the military government meted out to the Bedouins. According to him, the military government restricted the Bedouins in all matters related to land cultivation and product marketing, and did not provide security for the Bedouins who suffered from infiltrator attacks, unlike the Jewish settlement. He believed that the hidden intent of the regime was to push the Bedouins into desolate areas and to induce despair and disappointment until they would 'voluntarily' want to leave the country."
  190. ^ Gary Fields: Enclosure. Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror. University of California Press, 2017. p. 271.
  191. ^ Amit Tubi, Eran Feitelson: Drought and cooperation in a conflict prone area: Bedouin herders and Jewish farmers in Israel's northern Negev, 1957–1963. Political Geography 51, 2016. p. 33.
  192. ^ Cf. Kurt Goering (1979): Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev. Journal of Palestine Studies 9 (1). p. 10.
  193. ^ Ghazi-Walid Falah: How Israel Controls the Bedouin in Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies 14 (2), 1985. p. 46.
  194. ^ Emanuel Marx (1967): Bedouin of the Negev. Frederick A. Praeger. p. 47–49.
  195. ^ Kurt Goering (1979): Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev. Journal of Palestine Studies 9 (1). p. 10.
  196. ^ Steven C. Dinero (2019): Settling for Less. The Planned Resettlement of Israel's Negev Bedouin. Berghahn Books. p. 5.
  197. ^ Cf. Emanuel Marx (2000): Land and Work. Negev Bedouin Struggle with Israeli Bureaucracies. Nomadic Peoples 4 (2). p. 117, 113: "While they [the recognized towns] have given the Bedouin a chance to acquire land and to build comfortable homes, there are few jobs available in the towns and most men commute to work. Services, like roads, telephones, mail, bus services and commercial services are inefficient, both because of the spread of the towns and the apathy of the authorities. Waste and sewage disposal is minimal. In short, they are not really towns but suburbs. [...]
    The physical layout turns the town [Rahat] into a dormitory suburb. The discriminatory practices of various state agencies – such as the small grants-in-aid by the Ministry of the Interior, the lack of funding for improvements in schools, the long delays in the provision of roads, water and electricity – all these further reduce the opportunities for local employment. [...] Most men are compelled to commute to work places in and around Beersheva."
  198. ^ Ismael Abu-Saad et al. (2004): A Preliminary Evaluation of the Negev Bedouin Experience of Urbanization: Findings of the Urban Household Survey. Negev Center for Regional Development / The Center for Bedouin Studies & Development. p. 19: "With no local industry, local employment was non-existent beyond small grocery shops and work for the local government councils, so the planned Bedouin towns never became more than dormitory communities. [...].
    It has been observed that the neighboring Jewish towns Omer, Lehavim and Metar also have no economic infrastructure, so the Bedouin towns are not uniquely disadvantaged. That is, like the Bedouin towns, they are purely bedroom communities. However, the population of Omer, Lehavim and Metar are generally well educated and economically upwardly mobile, so that they have access to a wide variety of jobs in the broader region. [...] And with a higher tax base due to higher incomes, as well as more generous government grants, their towns have virtually all of the amenities that make living in a bedroom communities attractive. Without such advantages, the Bedouin towns are simply not in the same category, and can hardly be compared."
  199. ^ Ewa Górska: Construction of Imagined Geographies through Law: The Case of Judaization of the Negev Desert. Folia Iuridica 94, 2021. p. 39: "Restricting access to land and freedom of movement was a serious blow to the nomadic Bedouin identity, and, combined with lack of work opportunities in the 'planned' townships, resulted in the conversion of Bedouins into a cheap labour force for developing Israeli settlements (Rangwala 2004)."
  200. ^ Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 148.
  201. ^ Cf. Ronen Shamir (1996): Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the Law of Israel. Law & Society Review 30 (2). p. 246.
  202. ^ Cf. Steven C. Dinero (2019): Settling for Less. The Planned Resettlement of Israel's Negev Bedouin. Berghahn Books. p. 10.
  203. ^ Cf. Longina Jakubowska (2000): Finding Ways to Make a Living: Employment among the Negev Bedouin. Nomadic Peoples 4 (2). p. 95 f.
  204. ^ Emanuel Marx (2000): Land and Work. Negev Bedouin Struggle with Israeli Bureaucracies. Nomadic Peoples 4 (2). p. 110 f.
  205. ^ Shlomo Swirski, Yael Hasson: Invisible Citizens. Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin. Adva Center, 2006. p. 46–49.
  206. ^ Regavim (2023): The Vanishing Negev. Land Use Policy and Practice in the Negev 2005– 2021 [sic]. Past, Present and Future. Almog Printering and Offset. p. 36.
  207. ^ 1990s: 52% of all bedouin able-bodied men. Cf. Steven C. Dinero (2004): New Identity/Identities Formulation in a Post-Nomadic Commmunity: The Case of the Bedouin of the Negev. National Identities 6 (3). p. 262: "While many cease pastoral activities upon relocation to town, the ability to acquire wage labour positions remains problematic. The bedouin experience high levels of wage labour unemployment. Moreover, when employed, very few bedouin men are found in professional positions (women rarely work outside the home, although this too is changing). In a survey I conducted in the mid-1990s, for example, 20 per cent of able-bodied bedouin men aged between 18 and 55 were unemployed, and 9 per cent were retired. A total of 52 per cent were working in the areas of construction, as cab/bus drivers, as agricultural workers on kibbutzim or moshavim, or as factory workers. About 7 per cent worked in business, and another 7 per cent worked in 'other areas'. Thus, only slightly over 5 per cent of those surveyed worked in 'professional' occupations requiring higher-level skills or education."
  208. ^ 1997: 64% of the 66% of employed Bedouins in Rahat. Cf. Ismael Abu-Saad et al. (2004): A Preliminary Evaluation of the Negev Bedouin Experience of Urbanization: Findings of the Urban Household Survey. Negev Center for Regional Development / The Center for Bedouin Studies & Development. p. 19: "A survey commissioned by the Rahat Municipality in 1997 found that of the 66% of men over 18 who were employed, fully 64% worked outside Rahat in construction, trucking, industry, agriculture and services [...]."
  209. ^ Tawfiq S. Rangwala (2004): Inadequate Housing, Israel, and the Bedouin of the Negev. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 42 (3). p. 420 f.
  210. ^ Afif Abu Much (2021-09-30). "Report finds Negev Bedouins remain poorest population in Israel". Retrieved 2024-06-03.
  211. ^ Cf. Rhoda A. Kanaaneh (2008): Surrounded. Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military. Stanford University Press. p. 13.
  212. ^ Alex Weinreb (2021): A Sociodemographic Profile of the South. Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. p. 68: 0% for IT-research, 2% for both Manufacturing and Managerial for Men, 0, 0 and 1% for Women.
  213. ^ Ben-Gurion University. "Life Characteristics of the Bedouin Population in the Negev / Employment and Income". Retrieved 2024-06-20. [Heb.]
  214. ^ Cf. Negev Coexistence Forum For Civil Equality (2023): Home Demolitions in Bedouin Communities. Negev–Naqab, Israel. 2021 – 2022. p. 7.
  215. ^ Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 153: "Israeli authorities have enforced home demolitions, forced evictions and other punitive measures disproportionately against Bedouins as compared with Jewish Israelis not conforming to planning laws in the Negev/Naqab. Most unlicensed Jewish buildings and farms built without outlined plans and building permits are retroactively approved or never face a demolition order. Israeli courts have helped entrench this discrimination through retroactively approving dozens of Jewish Israeli communities and farms, contrary to the same planning laws that result in the demolition of Bedouin homes."
  216. ^ Adalah (2011-12-30). "Cancel the Yatir Forest Plan in the Naqab". Retrieved 2024-06-18.
  217. ^ Amjad Iraqi (2015-06-16). "Bedouin village of Atir to be replaced with forest of "Yatir"". Retrieved 2024-06-18.
  218. ^ Arvind Dilawar (2024-03-15). "How Israel Weaponizes Tree Planting to Displace Palestinians". Retrieved 2024-06-18.
  219. ^ Alon Margalit: The Israeli Supreme Court and Bedouin Land Claims in the Negev: A Missed Opportunity to Uphold Human and Indigenous Rights. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 24 (1), 2017. p. 59.
  220. ^ Cf. Irit Katz: Spreading and concentrating. The camp as the space of the frontier. City 19 (5), 2015. pp. 734–736.
  221. ^ "House Demolitions". Retrieved 2024-06-18.
  222. ^ Cf. Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 200 f.
  223. ^ Cf. "Israel Demolishes Al-Arakib For The 225th Time". 2024-05-16. Retrieved 2024-06-02.
  224. ^ Patricia Golan (2007-12-24). "Beduin in Limbo". Retrieved 2024-06-02.
  225. ^ Cf. Steven C. Dinero (2019): Settling for Less. The Planned Resettlement of Israel's Negev Bedouin. Berghahn Books. p. 27 f.
  226. ^ "Israel: recognition of Bedouin villages will be blocked by right-wing conditions". 2021-11-03. Retrieved 2024-06-02.
  227. ^ International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (2024-03-20). "The cIndigenous World 2024: Bedouin in the Negev/Naqab". Retrieved 2024-06-02.
  228. ^ Two important Bedouin NGOs, however, stated in 2019: "As of 1999 the state of Israel, in various government resolutions, decided to recognize 11 Arab Bedouin unrecognized villages in the Negev/Naqab. This was allegedly a fundamental change, after years in which the only settlement option for the Arab Bedouin community was forced urbanization. Yet, nearly 20 years later, there is no significant difference between these villages and the villages which remained unrecognized. In most of the recognized villages there is no approved urban planning scheme, so their residents cannot attain building permits; the policy of house demolition continues; and infrastructure of water, electricity, sewage disposal and roads are still, in most cases, are [sic] unavailable to the residents."
    Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality / The Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages in the Negev – RCUV. "The Arab Bedouin indigenous people of the Negev/Nagab [sic] – A Short Background" (PDF). Retrieved 2024-08-05.
  229. ^ Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 151 f.: "The state's deliberate neglect of the seven townships has resulted in the highest poverty and unemployment rates in the country, high crime rates and other socio-economic problems that make them undesirable to the residents of the rural Bedouin villages. [...]
    Israeli authorities repeatedly insist that Bedouins in the 35 unrecognized villages can relocate to the recognized villages in the Negev/Naqab. Most residents refuse this 'voluntary' displacement and relocation, especially as it would mean giving up their claim to their land."
  230. ^ Cf. Negev Coexistence Forum For Civil Equality (2023): Home Demolitions in Bedouin Communities. Negev–Naqab, Israel. 2021 – 2022. p. 6.
  231. ^ After Arik Rudnitzky (2012): The Bedouin Population in the Negev. Social, Demographic and Economic Factors. The Abraham Fund Initiatives. p. 31 f.
  232. ^ Shlomo Swirski (2007): Current Plans for Developing the Negev: A Critical Perspective. Adva Center. p. 4.
  233. ^ After Amit Efrati (2017): The Demographic Threat: Israelis Abandon the Negev and the Galilee. Strategic Assessment 20 (3); CBS: Statistical Abstract of Israel 2023.
  234. ^ Alex Weinreb (2021): A Sociodemographic Profile of the South. Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. p. 28, 35.
  235. ^ Shlomo Swirski (2007): Current Plans for Developing the Negev: A Critical Perspective. Adva Center. p. 9.
  236. ^ Alex Weinreb (2021): A Sociodemographic Profile of the South. Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. p. 32.
  237. ^ Amnesty International: Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians. Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity. 2022. p. 68.
  238. ^ Jerusalem Post Editorial (2010-01-21). "Haredim in the Negev". Retrieved 2024-06-06.
  239. ^ Zafrir Rinat (2011-11-07). "Government Approves Construction of 10 New Negev Towns". Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  240. ^ Middle East Eye Staff (2022-03-11). "Israel plans to build two towns in Negev for ultra-orthodox Jews and secularists". Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  241. ^ a b Cf. "Bedouin Communities Under Threat in the Naqab". Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  242. ^ Shahar Ilan (2010-01-18). "A Poverty Trap in the Galilee". Retrieved 2024-06-07.
  243. ^ Ranit Nahum-Halevy (2011-07-04). "Planners Split on Where to Build Haredi Enclaves". Retrieved 2024-06-07.
  244. ^ "New haredi city will be a "poverty trap" says political commentator". 2022-03-20. Retrieved 2024-06-07.
  245. ^ a b c Tarek Ibrahim. "On the Margins. Annual Review of Human Rights Violations of the Arab Palestinian Minority in Israel 2006" (PDF). pp. 73 f. Retrieved 2024-06-19.
  246. ^ Daniel Orenstein et al.: The Ecological Impacts of Homestead Settlements in the Negev: Final Report. 2009. p. 24 f.
  247. ^ Victor N. Rego: Recognizing the Assemblage: Palestinian Bedouin of the Naqab in Dialectic with Israeli Law. Dissertation, 2019. p. 151 f.
  248. ^ "Negev wine farmers claim battle over land is sour grapes". 2010-08-02. Retrieved 2024-06-07.
  249. ^ Emily McKee: Dwelling in Conflict. Negev Landscapes and the Boundaries of Belonging. Stanford University Press, 2016. p. 72 f.
  250. ^ a b Human Rights Watch: Off the Map. Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel's Unrecognized Bedouin Villages. 2008. p. 33–35.
  251. ^ Emily McKee: Demolitions and Amendments: Coping with Cultural Recognition and Its Denial in Southern Israel. Nomadic Peoples 19 (1), 2015. pp. 108–111.
  252. ^ Cf. the map: "Negev Wine Route". Retrieved 2024-06-18.
  253. ^ Daniel Orenstein et al.: The Ecological Impacts of Homestead Settlements in the Negev: Final Report. 2009. p. 26, 28.
  254. ^ Ashok Gulati et al.: From Food Scarcity to Surplus. Innovations in Indian, Chinese and Israeli Agriculture. Springer, 2021. p. 300.
  255. ^ Emily McKee: Dwelling in Conflict. Negev Landscapes and the Boundaries of Belonging. Stanford University Press, 2016. p. 34.
  256. ^ Gadi Rosenthal, Hadas Eiges: Agricultural Cooperatives in Israel. Journal of Rural Cooperation 42 (1), 2014. p. 11 f.
  257. ^ Izhak Schnell et al.: Entrepreneurship in the periphery and local growth: the case of northern Israel. GeoJournal 82, 2017. p. 220.
  258. ^ Alon Tal: To Make a Desert Bloom: The Israeli Agricultural Adventure and the Quest for Sustainability. Agricultural History 81 (2), 2007. p. 243.
  259. ^ Izhak Schnell et al.: Entrepreneurship in the periphery and local growth: the case of northern Israel. GeoJournal 82, 2017. p. 226.
  260. ^ Anat Tchetchik et al.: Rural Tourism: Development, Public Intervention And Lessons from the Israeli Experience. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem et al., 2006. p. 14 f., 20.
  261. ^ Yoav Gal et al.: Coupling tourism development and agricultural processes in a dynamic environment. Current Issues in Tourism 13 (3), 2010. p. 279, 284.
  262. ^ a b Christian Bittner, Michael Sofer: Land use changes in the rural–urban fringe: An Israeli case study. Land Use Policy 33, 2012. p. 13.
  263. ^ Emily McKee: Demolitions and Amendments: Coping with Cultural Recognition and Its Denial in Southern Israel. Nomadic Peoples 19 (1), 2015. p. 99: "They hoped that, although small-scale agriculture alone had not proven profitable in the Negev's arid climate, the flow of tourists travelling this road would supplement farmers' earnings and allow agriculture to succeed (Moskowitz 2007)."
  264. ^ Cf. e.g. Magdalena Pfaffl: Remote villages as heterotopias and places of utopics: analogue case studies in Sweden and Israel in preparation for future Mars settlement. Dissertation, 2019 for a case study of the newer localities Be'er Milka, Ein Tamar, and Kibbutz Yahel.
  265. ^ Cf. Johanna Adolfsson: Settler Suburbia in the Negev/Naqab: The Start-Up Pioneer in the Desert. Geographical Review 114 (2), 2024, on Sansana, Merhav Am, Be'er Milka, Giv'ot Bar, Carmit, Eliav, and Hiran, which as of 2024 is planned on the territory of the unrecognized village Umm al-Hiran.
  266. ^ Ravit Hananel: Distributive Justice and Regional Planning: The Politics of Regional Revenue-Generating Land Uses in Israel. International Planning Studies 14 (2), 2009. p. 188–190.
  267. ^ Ravit Hananel: The Land Narrative: Rethinking Israel's National Land Policy. Land Use Policy 45, 2015. p. 131.
  268. ^ Fredrik Lilijedahl: Agritech Report 2017. 2017. p. 5.
  269. ^ Ashok Gulati et al.: From Food Scarcity to Surplus. Innovations in Indian, Chinese and Israeli Agriculture. Springer, 2021. p. 343.
  270. ^ Danielle Abraham et al.: How Israel became a world leader in agriculture and water. Insights for today's developing countries. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2019. p. 29 f.
  271. ^ Ashok Gulati et al.: From Food Scarcity to Surplus. Innovations in Indian, Chinese and Israeli Agriculture. Springer, 2021. p. 300 f., 302–307.
  272. ^ Cf. the map in Daniel Orenstein et al.: The Ecological Impacts of Homestead Settlements in the Negev: Final Report. 2009. p. 18.
  273. ^ Patricia Golan (2023-03-10). "How did the Arava become the "Silicon Valley" of Israeli agriculture?". Retrieved 2024-06-15.
  274. ^ Cf. State of Israel, Israeli Authority for the Development and Settlement of the Bedouins in the Negev. "Strategic Plan for the Regulation of the Negev: In the Coming Year, a Quarter of the Negev's Scattered Bedouin Population will be Evacuated for the Benefit of National Projects" (PDF). Retrieved 2024-06-15. (inofficial translation by Adalah).
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