User:Cplakidas/Sandbox/Byzantine-Arab3

Byzantine-Arab Wars, 867–1050s(? split in 976?)
Part of the Byzantine-Arab Wars
Depiction of a clash between Byzantine and Arabs, from the Madrid Skylitzes manuscript
Date 867–1050s Location Asia Minor, Syria, Transcaucasia, Sicily and southern Italy, Crete, Aegean Sea Result Byzantine reconquest of southern Italy, Crete, Cyprus, Cilicia, northern Syria, Armenia; final loss of Sicily
Belligerents
Abbasid Caliphate (until ca. 945) Border emirates (Thughur) Tulunids Ikhshidids Emirate of Aleppo (from 945) Emirate of Mosul Fatimid Caliphate Emirate of Crete	Byzantine Empire

Since the abating of the Muslim conquests in the early 8th century, the Arab–Byzantine wars had featured constant raids and counter-raids along a relatively static border roughly defined by the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus Mountains. Until the 860s, superior Muslim armies had placed the Byzantines on the defensive. Only after 863, with the victory in the Battle of Lalakaon, did the Byzantines gradually regain some lost ground against the Muslims, launching ever-deeper raids into Syria and Upper Mesopotamia and annexing the Paulician state around Tephrike (now Divriği). Furthermore, according to historian Mark Whittow, "by 912 the Arabs had been pinned back behind the Taurus and Anti-Taurus", encouraging the Armenians to switch their allegiance from the Abbasid Caliphate to the Empire, in whose service they entered in increasing numbers. The revival of Byzantine power was further facilitated by the progressive decline of the Abbasid Caliphate itself, particularly under al-Muqtadir (r. 908–932), when the central government faced several revolts. In the periphery of the Caliphate, the weakening of central control allowed the emergence of semi-autonomous local dynasties. In addition, after the death of the Bulgarian Tsar Simeon in 927, a peace treaty with the Bulgarians allowed the Empire to shift attention and resources to the East.

On wars in the East after 960, see Honigmann (1935), pp.91-118, after that w. the Turks Maniakes against Edessa &c, Honigmann (1935), pp. 134-139 Armenia, Honigmann (1935), pp. 147-177

Since the introduction of the "Turkish" corps by caliph al-MU'tasimIn fact, experience was to prove that, having the sovereign in their power,they were to be far less tolerable and far more devoted to their own generals than to the Caliph (who, after al-Muctasim, never again commanded them directly). Nevertheless, because of theirtechnical qualifications, because of the care bestowed by the Turkish chieftains on maintaining recruitment,and even because the acquisition of new slaves was the easiest remedy against the lack of discipline ofthe old ones (although in the long run, of course, it merely perpetuated the evil), it seemed no longer possible, right up to modern times, for oriental Muslim states to do without a Turkish army, and all of them, one after another, were to adopt one. At best, in the orient, they were counter-balanced by the calling in of other elements, rough, indigenous mountain people, skilled in fighting on foot in the mountains, such as the Daylamls, or horsemen like the Kurds, or locally negroes (in Arabia) or Hindus (army of the Ghaznavids). In Egypt, the Fatimids,who conquered it with Berber contingents, reinforced as in Ifrikiya with negroes, Slavs and Rumis, themselves later tried to neutralize these by introducing Turks, whom in turn they sought to replace by Armenians under chiefs who could hardly be claimed as Muslims, and finally gave back some part in army affairs to the Arabs. The breaking up of the cAbbasid empire also gave the opportunity of a military career to the Arabs of Mesopotamia and Syria, who gave support to the Hamdanid [q.v.], Mirdasid [q.v.~], cUkaylid [q.v.] and other principalities. The Buyids in western Iran owed their specific strength to the Daylamls, but the need for cavalry compelled them never- theless to reinforce them from the start with Turks. But the racial differences of the contingents, which language and technical differences hindered from mixing easily together, were the cause of disorders, because they were jealous of each other, quarrelled over their share of the state revenues, and espoused the disagreements of their leaders; they made the streets of Baghdad and Cairo run with blood when they were not occupied in promoting their respective generals to power

This entailed a sharp rise in costs: in the 10th century, a professional soldier in the Abbasid army earned two to three times as much as a common labourer, and the amount paid for army salaries, armament production and the other costs associated with military requirements accounted for more than half the budget of the Caliphate.

At the turn of the 10th century, the Byzantines continued to regard the Arabs as their principal foes. When Emperor Leo VI the Wise wrote his Tactica, he says that he did so on account of the peril represented by the Arab raids. The emperor is careful to emphasize the resilience and discipline of the Arabs in battle, but also highlights the differences between them and the Byzantine army: the Arabs are motivated by faith and raid chiefly to win loot; unlike the Byzantine levies, they are not obliged to military service but largely volunteers. The respect towards their eastern adversary is evidenced in the protocols for imperial receptions: the "Eastern Muslims" are accorded the first place immediately after any ecclesiastical officials, enjoying precedence over the Bulgarians or the Franks. Relations were also civilized in the matter of prisoners of war. Arab prisoners were usually paraded in a triumphal procession but otherwise generally well treated. Senior figures were treated as honoured guests and kept at one of the prisons of the Great Palace of Constantinople, from where they were regularly invited to attend races at the Hippodrome of Constantinople or imperial banquets on Easter and Christmas—which, as they were assured on oath, contained no pork—and given gifts as part of imperial ceremonies. An effort was made to induce the ordinary prisoners to convert to Christianity, in which case they were given lands to settle, but otherwise they enjoyed the freedom to worship at mosques in Constantinople. According to Muqaddasi, many were enslaved and forced to work in manufactures, but were still well treated by the Byzantines, who "do not force any of them to eat pork, and they do not slit their noses or their tongues". Ibn Hawqal reports that there were also provincial prisons, in the Thracesian, Opsician and Bucellarian themes, in addition to those in Constantinople, and judged the first two to be the mildest, as the prisoners were not even kept in chains. On the other hand, he comments on the dreaded Noumera prison in Constantinople that it is "harsh, depressing and dark".

Indeed, it was in the interest of the Byzantine government to be solicitous for the welfare of its Muslim prisoners, as reports of mistreatment would bring repercussions on Byzantine prisoners in Arab hands, as well as the Christian populations of Syria and Palestine living under Muslim rule. Both sides also engaged in regular exchanges of prisoners (ἀλλάγια, allagia, in Greek), which took place on the river Lamos in Cilicia, on the border between Byzantium and the Caliphate. A truce was arranged, and both sides met on the river. The exchange was made man for man, as illustrated by al-Tabari in his report of the 845 exchange: Two bridges were built over the river, one for the prisoners of each side. Each side released one prisoner, who walked across the bridge simultaneously with his counterpart. After the exchange was complete, the surplus prisoners were either ransomed for money or exchanged for slaves.

Border warfare

The murder of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil in 861 began a period of internal turmoil, known as the "Anarchy at Samarra" from the site of the Caliphate's capital, which ended in 870 with the rise to the throne of al-Mu'tamid (r. 870–892). The turmoil severely undermined the foundations of the Abbasid regime: successive caliphs were deposed and raised by the Turkish slave-soldiers (ghilman), who emerged as the major power factor in the state. Al-Mu'tamid's brother al-Muwaffaq, who enjoyed the support of the Turks, was thus able to become the de facto regent of the Caliphate for most of his brother's reign. Furthermore, caliphal authority in the provinces collapsed during the Anarchy, with the result that by the 870s the central government had lost effective control over most of the Caliphate outside the metropolitan region of Iraq. In the west, Egypt had fallen under the control of Ahmad ibn Tulun, who also disputed control of Syria with al-Muwaffaq, while Khurasan and most of the Islamic East had been taken over by the Saffarids, who replaced the Abbasids' loyal client state, the Tahirids. Most of the Arabian peninsula was likewise lost to local potentates, while in Tabaristan a radical Zaydi Shi'a dynasty took power. Even in Iraq, the rebellion of the Zanj slaves threatened Baghdad itself, and further south the Qarmatians were a nascent threat. As a result, al-Muwaffaq's regency was thus a continuous struggle to save the tottering Caliphate from collapse. His attempts to recover control of Egypt and Syria from Ibn Tulun failed, with the latter even able to expand his territory and obtain recognition as a hereditary ruler, but he succeeded in preserving the core of the Caliphate in Iraq by repelling a Saffarid invasion aimed at capturing Baghdad, and by subduing the Zanj after a long struggle.

The weakened Abbasid central government had ceased to provide effective aid to the rulers of the frontier provinces of the Thughur. The void was increasingly filled by the local emirs, most notably of Tarsus in Cilicia and Malatya on the Upper Euphrates. To these were added, following Byzantine persecution in 843, the Paulician principality of Tephrike, north of Malatya and allied to it. It was not until the 870s that the Byzantines were able to defeat the Paulicians and capture Tephrike.

As Alexander Vasiliev remarked, unlike his father, Leo VI the Wise (r. 886–912) not only appears to have lacked a coherent strategy, but to have been hesitant to confront the Arabs: for the first half of his reign, Byzantine forces were content to hold a mostly defensive stance, and no major offensive operations are mentioned. In addition, Byzantine attentions were diverted to the Balkans for much of the period 894–924, engaged in mostly disastrous wars with the ambitious Bulgarian Tsar Symeon. At the same time, of course, the Abbasids themselves, al-Muwaffaq and his son, Caliph al-Mu'tadid (r. 892–902), were still preoccupied with restoring a measure of control over their breakaway provinces, and were in no condition to launch offensive operations against Byzantium either.

As soon as the conflict with Bulgaria was concluded with a peace settlement in 927, the Byzantines undertook a full-scale offensive against the border emirates. Within a few years, the Domestic of the Schools John Kourkouas secured the submission of Malatya, Amid and Mayyafariqin. Malatya rebelled in 931, and was finally conquered and annexed to the Empire in 934.

Operations

In 882, the populace of Tarsus rebelled against their Tulunid governor. They chose Yazaman al-Khadim as their leader, and returned to Abbasid allegiance. Ibn Tulun then marched on Tarsus, but the inhabitants opened the sluice gates and flooded the plain around the city, forcing Ibn Tulun to return to Damascus without achieving anything. In 883, the Byzantines under the Domestic of the Schools, Kesta Stypeiotes, approached Tarsus. Yazaman attacked the Byzantine camp at Bab Qalamyah, some 12 km from Tarsus, during the night of 11 September, catching the Byzantines by surprise. The Byzantine forces scattered, Stypeiotes and the strategoi of Anatolikon and Cappadocia were killed, and much booty was captured. Yazaman led a major naval raid soon thereafter against the fortress of Euripos (Chalkis), comprising 30 large ships (of the type called koumbaria in Greek), but it was beaten off with great loss by the local governor of Hellas, Oineiates.

In January/February 888, Yazaman led a raid into Byzantine territory, up to al-Maskanin (unidentified), and returned to Tarsus with no casualties but with much booty and captives. Probably in the summer of the same year, he also led a naval raid that captured four Byzantine ships. At about the same time, the Arabs succeeded in capturing the fortress of Hypsele, located northeast of Sebasteia, hauling off its inhabitants into captivity.

In 890, Tarsus returned to Tulunid control, when Yazaman swore allegiance to Ibn Tulun's son Khumarawayh. In October 891, Ahmad ibn Tughan al-Ujayfi and Yazaman launched a raid against Byzantine territories. The Arabs laid siege to the Byzantine fortress of Salandu, but on 21 October, Yazaman was wounded by a stone thrown by a catapult. This caused the Arabs to break off the siege, and he died on the next day. He was buried at Tarsus' Gate of Jihad, and was succeeded by al-Ujayfi. His loss was an important blow to the Arabs, who considered him one of their greatest champions along with Umar al-Aqta and Ali al-Armani.

In September 893, Ahmad al-Ujayfi along with Ahmad ibn Abba and Badr al-Hammami led an expedition against the Byzantines, reaching as far as al-Balaqsun (unidentified, possibly Carian or Lycian Telmessos). On 16 September 896, a prisoner exchange began on the Lamos River and lasted for twelve days, leading to the ransoming of 2,504 Muslim men, women and children according to al-Tabari, while al-Mas'udi variously numbers the exchanged prisoners as 2,495 or 3,000. In October, after the exchange was concluded, Ahmad left Tarsus by sea, leaving the Byzantine renegade Damian of Tarsus (a former servant of Yazaman) in his place as governor of Tarsus. Later, in March/April 897, he sent Yusuf ibn al-Baghimardi to Tarsus, either to replace or to reinforce Damian.

Tarsus remained under Tulunid control until 897, when it was recovered by the Abbasids.

On Rajab 5, 280 (September 20, 893), Muhammad b. Abbas entered Tarsus for the summer campaign on behalf of Khumarawayh. He was followed there by Badr al-Hammami,62 and together with al-`Ujayfi, the amir of Tarsus,63 they raided as far as al-Balaqsun (possibly Telmessos)

On Thursday, Jumada II 15, 281' (Thursday, August 22, 894), Tughj b. Juff77 reportedly entered Tarsus for the summer campaign on behalf of Khumarawayh. On this campaign, he reached Tarayun (prob. Tyriaeon in Pisidia) and conquered Maluriyah (perhaps Malakopeia or the border fortress of Balboura)

On Sha`ban 3, 285 (August 25, 898), word reached Baghdad that the eunuch Raghib, the mawla of al-Muwaffaq, had undertaken a sea raid (against the Byzantines). God gave him victory over many ships and all the Byzantines aboard. He decapitated three thousand of the Byzantines who had been in the ships, [and burned the ships]. He conquered many Byzantine fortresses. The raiders returned safely.379

In this year (901), Nizar b. Muhammad,490 the agent of al-Hasan b. `Ali Kurah, went on the summer campaign, conquering many Byzantine fortresses. He brought into Tarsus some one hundred and sixty non-Muslims, 491 abbots,492 and deacons as well as many of their crosses and banners. Kurah sent them on to Baghdad

In Sha`ban, 291 (June 18-July 16, 904), word arrived in Baghdad that the Byzantine ruler had sent ten crosses712 with one hundred thousand men against the border towns and that a number of them had moved on al-Hadath. They had raided and burned, and they had captured every Muslim they had been able to. n. 712: Ibn al-Athir interprets this to mean that each army unit of ten thousand men hadone cross. Vasiliev, II, 163, apparently following Ibn al-Athir, speaks of ten legions.On another occasion, `Arib, 34, 11. 12f., mentions Byzantine banners decorated with crosses of gold and silver.

On Shawwal 7, 293 (August 1, 906), word arrived at Madinat al-Salam that the Byzantines had raided Qurus.833 Its inhabitants fought them, but the Byzantines routed and killed most of them as well as the chieftains of the Banu Tamim. They entered the city, burned down its mosque, and drove away the remaining inhabitants.

In this year, Ibn Kayghalagh undertook a raid from Tarsus. He made four thousand enemy captives and seized many horses and cattle as well as goods. One of the Patrikioi came to him to seek a guarantee of safe-conduct and became a Muslim. Ibn Kayghalagh left Tarsus for this raid on al-Muharram 1, 294 (October 22, 906).877 In this year, the Patrikios Andronikos,878 who was the Byzantine ruler's military commander of those living in the border regions, wrote to the central authorities in Baghdad seeking a guarantee ofsafe-conduct. .... In Jumada I, 294 (February 17-March 18, 907), Rustum had left with the people of the border regions to rescue Andronikos and had reached Quniyah soon after the incident.880 The Patrikioi learned that the Muslims were marching against them and turned back. Andronikos sent his son to Rustum, while Rustum sent his secretary and a number of sailors881 (to Andronikos). ...The Muslims laid Quniyah waste, and then returned to Tarsus together with Andronikos, the Muslim captives, and the Christians who were with Andronikos

Melias first appears in historical sources as a vassal of Ashot the Long-armed, an Armenian prince (possibly a Bagratid from Taron) who entered Byzantine imperial service in circa 890. As part of Ashot's Armenian contingent, he fought on the Byzantine side at the disastrous Battle of Bulgarophygon against the Bulgarians. Ashot himself perished in this battle, along with the larger part of the Byzantine force.

Map of the Arab–Byzantine frontier zone, where Melias spent most of his life

Melias escaped death and returned to his service at the Byzantine eastern frontier, where, according to Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, he led a group of fellow Armenians in the Byzantine border wars with the Arabs as akritai, sharing their time between raids against the Arabs and outright brigandage. After participating in the failed aristocratic rebellion of Andronikos Doukas against Emperor Leo VI the Wise (r. 886–912) in 905, however, Melias and many other Armenian nobles were forced to flee to the Arab border emirate of Melitene to escape retribution.

In 907 or 908, however, through the intervention of the strategos Eustathios Argyros, the Armenian refugees were pardoned by Emperor Leo and granted the border provinces as quasi-fiefs: the three brothers Vasak, Grigorik and Pazunes settled in the fortress of Larissa, which formed a border tourma of the theme of Sebasteia and now became a kleisoura (a fortified frontier district), Ismael (possibly an Arab-Armenian) took over the deserted area of Symposion, and Melias was appointed "tourmarches of Euphrateia, the Passes (Trypia, from Arabic al-Durub) and the wasteland", covering the mountainous frontier zone around the Pass of Hadath. Of these petty border-lords, Melias alone would hold his position for long: Ismael died in a Melitenian offensive in 909, while Vasak was accused of treason in 913, possibly due to his association with the failed usurpation of Constantine Doukas, and banished.

Melias soon occupied the old and deserted fortress of Lykandos, refortified it and made it his seat. Emperor Leo soon raised it and its surrounding region to a kleisoura. Settled by Armenian immigrants, for the next decades, it would be one of the main Byzantine bases of attack against the Arabs. In a similar manner, Melias proceeded to occupy the mountainous regions of Tzamandos and Symposion, which became a kleisoura and a tourma respectively. The threat that this new province and Melias's activities posed on the Arab emirates of the frontier zone (Thughur) is recognized in Arab sources, where Melias is mentioned as sahib al-Durub ("Lord of the Passes"). In 909 or 912, a major assault led by Rustam ibn Baradu was launched against him, but was repulsed. In 914/5, the Arabs of Tarsus launched an attack on Tzamandos, which they took and razed, but in retaliation Melias and his men raided Arab territory as far as Marash (Germanikeia, modern Kahramanmaraş), reportedly bringing back 50,000 captives.

In recognition for his success against Marash, in 916 the kleisoura of Lykandos was raised to the status of a full theme, with Melias as its strategos with the rank of patrikios and later magistros.

Conquests of John Kourkouas (922–944)

Following the disastrous Battle of Acheloos in 917, the Byzantines were mostly occupied in the Balkans, in a protracted war against the highly capable and ambitious Bulgarian Tsar Symeon I. In 920, an Armenian, the admiral Romanos I Lekapenos, came to the throne, as guardian and senior emperor to Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos. One of the men who had aided Lekapenos in his rise was a fellow Armenian, John Kourkouas, whom Lekapenos promoted to the post of Domestic of the Schools, in effect commander-in-chief of all the imperial armies, in ca. 923. According to the chronicle of Theophanes Continuatus, Kourkouas held this post for an unparalleled continuous term of 22 years and seven months. His tenure would define an era.

Despite the still ongoing conflict with Symeon, by 925, Romanos Lekapenos felt himself strong enough to demand the payment of tribute from the Muslim cities on the western side of the Euphrates. When they refused, in 926, Kourkouas led the army across the border. Aided by his brother Theophilos Kourkouas and an Armenian contingent under Melias, Kourkouas targeted Melitene (modern Malatya), the center of an emirate which had long been a thorn in Byzantium's side. The Byzantine army successfully stormed the lower city, and although the citadel held out, Kourkouas concluded a treaty by which the emir accepted tributary status.

Map of Armenia and the Caucasian states in the mid-10th century.

In 927–928, Kourkouas launched a large raid into Arab-controlled Armenia. After taking Samosata (modern Samsat), an important stronghold on the Euphrates, the Byzantines advanced as far as the Armenian capital of Dvin. An Arab counter-offensive forced them out of Samosata after only a few days, and Dvin, which was defended by the Sajid general Nasr al-Subuki, successfully withstood the Byzantine siege, until the mounting losses forced the Byzantines to abandon it. At the same time, Thamal, the emir of Tarsus, conducted successful raids into southern Anatolia and neutralized Ibn al-Dahhak, a local Kurdish leader who supported the Byzantines. The Byzantines then turned toward the Kaysite emirate in the region of Lake Van in southern Armenia. Kourkouas's troops plundered the region and took the towns of Khliat and Bitlis, where they are said to have replaced the mosque's minbar with a cross. The local Arabs appealed to the Caliph for aid in vain, prompting an exodus of Muslims from the region. This incursion, more than 500 kilometres (310 mi) from the nearest imperial territory, was a far cry from the defensive-minded strategy Byzantium had followed during the previous centuries and highlighted the new capabilities of the imperial army. Nevertheless, famine in Anatolia and the exigencies of parallel campaigns in southern Italy weakened Kourkouas's forces. His army was defeated and driven back by Muflih, a former Sajid ghulam and governor of Adharbayjan.

In 930, Melias's attack on Samosata was heavily defeated; among other prominent officers, one of his sons was captured and sent to Baghdad. Later in the same year, John and his brother Theophilos besieged Theodosiopolis (modern Erzurum), the capital of the emirate of Qaliqala. The campaign was complicated by the machinations of their ostensible allies, the Iberian rulers of Tao-Klarjeti. Resenting the extension of direct Byzantine control adjacent to their own borders, the Iberians had already provided supplies to the besieged city. Once the city was invested, they vociferously demanded that the Byzantines hand over several captured towns, but when one of them, the fort of Mastaton, was surrendered, the Iberians promptly returned it to the Arabs. As Kourkouas needed to keep the Iberians placated and was aware that his conduct was being carefully observed by the Armenian princes, he did not react to this affront. After seven months of siege, Theodosiopolis fell in spring 931 and was transformed into a tributary vassal, while, according to Constantine VII's De Administrando Imperio, all territory north of the river Araxes was given to the Iberian king David II. As in Melitene, the maintenance of Byzantine control over Theodosiopolis proved difficult and the population remained restive. In 939, it revolted and drove out the Byzantines, and Theophilos Kourkouas could not finally subdue the city until 949. It was then fully incorporated into the Empire and its Muslim population was expelled and replaced by Greek and Armenian settlers.

Final capture of Melitene

Following the death of Emir Abu Hafs, Melitene renounced its Byzantine allegiance. After attempts to take the city by storm or subterfuge failed, the Byzantines established a ring of fortresses on the hills around the plain of Melitene, and methodically ravaged the area. By early 931, the inhabitants of Melitene were forced to come to terms: they agreed to tributary status and even undertook to provide a military contingent to campaign alongside the Byzantines.

The other Muslim states were not idle, however: in March, the Byzantines were hit by three successive raids in Anatolia, organized by the Abbasid commander Mu'nis al-Muzaffar, while in August, a large raid led by Thamal of Tarsus penetrated as far as Ancyra and Amorium and returned with prisoners worth 136,000 gold dinars. During this time, the Byzantines were engaged in southern Armenia, aiding the ruler of Vaspurakan, Gagik I, who had rallied the local Armenian princes and allied himself with the Byzantines against the emir of Adharbayjan. There they raided the Kaysite emirate and razed Khliat and Berkri to the ground, before marching into Mesopotamia and capturing Samosata again. Gagik was unable to take advantage of this and capture Kaysite territory, however, as Muflih immediately raided his domains in retaliation. At this point, the Melitenians called upon the Hamdanid rulers of Mosul for help. In response, the Hamdanid prince Sa'id ibn Hamdan attacked the Byzantines and drove them back: Samosata was abandoned, and in November 931, the Byzantine garrison withdrew from Melitene as well. Sa'id was, however, unable to remain in the area or to leave a sufficient garrison; once he left for Mosul, the Byzantines returned and resumed both the blockade of Melitene and their scorched-earth tactics.

The fall of Melitene, miniature from the Skylitzes Chronicle.

The sources record no major Byzantine external campaigns for 932, as the Empire was preoccupied with two revolts in the Opsician Theme. In 933, Kourkouas renewed the attack against Melitene. Mu'nis al-Muzaffar sent forces to assist the beleaguered city, but in the resulting skirmishes, the Byzantines prevailed and took many prisoners and the Arab army returned home without relieving the city. In early 934, at the head of 50,000 men, Kourkouas again crossed the frontier and marched toward Melitene. The other Muslim states offered no help, preoccupied as they were with the turmoil following Caliph al-Qahir's deposition. Kourkouas again took Samosata and besieged Melitene. Many of the city's inhabitants had abandoned it at the news of Kourkouas's approach and hunger eventually compelled the rest to surrender on 19 May 934. Wary of the city's previous rebellions, Kourkouas only allowed those inhabitants to remain who were Christians or agreed to convert to Christianity. Most did so, and he ordered the remainder expelled. Melitene was fully incorporated into the empire, and most of its fertile land was transformed into an imperial estate (kouratoreia). This was an unusual move, implemented by Romanos I to prevent the powerful Anatolian landed aristocracy from taking control of the province. It also served to increase direct imperial presence and control on the crucial new borderlands.

Rise of the Hamdanids

The fall of Melitene profoundly shocked the Muslim world: for the first time, a major Muslim city had fallen and been incorporated into the Byzantine Empire. Kourkouas followed this success by subduing parts of the district of Samosata in 936 and razing the city to the ground. Until 938, the East remained relatively calm. Historians suggest that the Byzantines were likely preoccupied with the full pacification of Melitene, and the Arab emirates, deprived of any potential support from the Caliphate, were reluctant to provoke them.

With the decline of the Caliphate and its obvious inability to defend its border provinces, a new local dynasty, the Hamdanids, emerged as the principal antagonists of Byzantium in northern Mesopotamia and Syria. They were led by al-Hasan, called Nasir al-Dawla ("Defender of the State"), and by his younger brother Ali, best known by his epithet, Sayf al-Dawla ("Sword of the State"). In ca. 935, the Arab tribe of Banu Habib, defeated by the rising Hamdanids, defected in its entirety to the Byzantines, converted to Christianity, and placed its 12,000 horsemen at the disposal of the Empire. They were settled along the western bank of the Euphrates and assigned to guard five new themes created there: Melitene, Charpezikion, Asmosaton (Arsamosata), Derzene, and Chozanon.

The first Byzantine encounter with Sayf al-Dawla took place in 936, when he tried to relieve Samosata, but a revolt at home forced him to turn back. In another invasion in 938, however, he captured the fort of Charpete and defeated Kourkouas's advance guard, seizing a great amount of booty and forcing Kourkouas to withdraw. In the same year, a peace agreement was signed between Constantinople and the Caliphate. The negotiations were facilitated by the rising power of the Hamdanids, which caused anxiety to both sides. Despite the official peace with the Caliphate, ad hoc warfare continued between the Byzantines and the local Muslim rulers, now aided by the Hamdanids. The Byzantines attempted to besiege Theodosiopolis in 939, but the siege was abandoned at the news of the approach of Sayf al-Dawla's relief army.

By that time, the Byzantines had captured Arsamosata and additional strategically important locations in the mountains of southwest Armenia, posing a direct threat to the Muslim emirates around Lake Van. To reverse the situation, in 940 Sayf al-Dawla initiated a remarkable campaign: starting from Mayyafiriqin (Byzantine Martyropolis), he crossed the Bitlis pass into Armenia, where he seized several fortresses and accepted the submission of the local lords, both Muslim and Christian. He ravaged the Byzantine holdings around Theodosiopolis and raided as far as Koloneia, which he besieged until Kourkouas arrived with a relief army and forced him to withdraw. Sayf al-Dawla was not able to follow up on this effort: until 945, the Hamdanids were preoccupied with internal developments in the Caliphate and with fighting against their rivals in southern Iraq and the Ikhshidids in Syria.

Rus' raid of 941

Main article: Rus'–Byzantine War (941)

The distraction by the Hamdanids proved fortunate for Byzantium. In early summer 941, as Kourkouas prepared to resume campaigning in the East, his attention was diverted by an unexpected event: the appearance of a Rus' fleet that raided the area around Constantinople itself. The Byzantine army and navy were absent from the capital, and the appearance of the Rus' fleet caused panic among the populace of Constantinople. While the navy and Kourkouas's army were recalled, a hastily assembled squadron of old ships armed with Greek Fire and placed under the protovestiarios Theophanes defeated the Rus' fleet on June 11, forcing it to abandon its course toward the city. The surviving Rus' landed on the shores of Bithynia and ravaged the defenseless countryside. The patrikios Bardas Phokas hastened to the area with whatever troops he could gather, contained the raiders, and awaited the arrival of Kourkouas's army. Finally, Kourkouas and his army appeared and fell upon the Rus', who had dispersed to plunder the countryside, killing many of them. The survivors retreated to their ships and tried to cross to Thrace under the cover of night. During the crossing, the entire Byzantine navy attacked and annihilated the Rus'.

Campaigns in Mesopotamia and recovery of the Mandylion

The surrender of the Mandylion to the Byzantine parakoimomenos Theophanes by the Edessenes, from the Madrid Skylitzes.

Following this distraction, in January 942 Kourkouas launched a new campaign in the East, which lasted for three years. The first assault fell on the territory of Aleppo, which was thoroughly plundered: at the fall of the town of Hamus, near Aleppo, even Arab sources record the capture of 10–15,000 prisoners by the Byzantines. Despite a minor counter-raid by Thamal or one of his retainers (ghilman) from Tarsus in the summer, in autumn Kourkouas launched another major invasion. At the head of an exceptionally large army, some 80,000 men according to Arab sources, he crossed from allied Taron into northern Mesopotamia. Mayyafiriqin, Amida, Nisibis, Dara—places where no Byzantine army had trod since the days of Heraclius 300 years earlier—were stormed and ravaged. The real aim of these campaigns, however, was Edessa, the repository of the "Holy Mandylion". This was a cloth believed to have been used by Christ to wipe his face, leaving an imprint of his features, and subsequently given to King Abgar V of Edessa. To the Byzantines, especially after the end of the Iconoclasm period and the restoration of image veneration, it was a relic of profound religious significance. As a result, its capture would provide the Lekapenos regime with an enormous boost in popularity and legitimacy.

Kourkouas assailed Edessa every year from 942 onward and devastated its countryside, as he had done at Melitene. Finally, its emir agreed to a peace, swearing not to raise arms against Byzantium and to hand over the Mandylion in exchange for the return of 200 prisoners. The Mandylion was conveyed to Constantinople, where it arrived on August 15, 944, on the feast of the Dormition of the Theotokos. A triumphal entry was staged for the venerated relic, which was then deposited in the Theotokos of the Pharos church, the palatine chapel of the Great Palace. As for Kourkouas, he concluded his campaign by sacking Bithra (modern Birecik) and Germanikeia (modern Kahramanmaraş).

Dismissal and rehabilitation

Despite this triumph, the downfall of Kourkouas, as well as of his friend and protector, Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos, was imminent. The two eldest surviving sons of Romanos I, co-emperors Stephen and Constantine, were jealous of Kourkouas and had in the past tried to undermine him, albeit without success. Following the success of Kourkouas in the East, Romanos I considered marrying his trusted general into the imperial family. Kourkouas's daughter Euphrosyne was to be wedded with the emperor's grandson, the future Romanos II (r. 959–963), the son of his son-in-law and junior emperor Constantine VII. Although such a union would effectively cement the loyalty of the army, it would also strengthen the position of the legitimate Macedonian line, represented by Constantine VII, over the imperial claims of Romanos's own sons. Predictably, Stephen and Constantine opposed this decision and prevailed upon their father, who was by this time old and ill, to dismiss Kourkouas in the autumn of 944.

Kourkouas was replaced by a certain Pantherios, who was almost immediately defeated by Sayf al-Dawla in December while raiding near Aleppo. On 16 December, Romanos I himself was deposed by Stephen and Constantine and banished to a monastery on the island of Prote. A few weeks later, on 26 January, another coup removed the two young Lekapenoi from power and restored the sole imperial authority to Constantine VII. Kourkouas himself appears to have soon returned to imperial favour: Constantine provided the money for the repair of Kourkouas's palace after it was damaged by an earthquake, and in early 946, he is recorded as having been sent with the magistros Kosmas to negotiate a prisoner exchange with the Arabs of Tarsus. Nothing further is known about him.

Conflicts in Sicily and southern Italy

Strategy and organization

The early Fatimid conflicts with Byzantium took place in the region of southern Italy, and were shaped by geography: Sicily was close to the Fatimids' metropolitan province of Ifriqiya, while conversely for the Byzantines, southern Italy was a remote theatre of operations, where they maintained a minimal presence. This gave the Fatimids an advantage in the waging of prolonged naval campaigns, and effectively left the initiative in their hands. Operations on both sides, being mainly seaborne, were limited in scope by the weather and available naval technology.

Despite their relative advantage, the Fatimids were interested more in raiding than outright conquest, and the expeditionary forces involved were small, rarely exceeding ten to twenty ships. The Byzantines, on the other hand, preferred to deal with the Fatimids through diplomacy. On occasion they allied with the Umayyads of Spain, but mostly they sought to avoid conflict by negotiating truces, even including the occasional dispatch of tribute. This approach allowed the Byzantines to concentrate on affairs much closer to home; thus, when the Emirate of Crete came under Byzantine attack in 960 and fell in the next year, the Fatimids limited themselves to verbal support toward the Cretan emissaries.

Chronology

Although a peace agreement in exchange for annual tribute had been concluded in 917, in 918, the Fatimids conducted their first attack on the Byzantines, capturing Rhegion on the southern tip of Calabria. The main focus of their activities for some time thereafter, however, remained in the east and their attempts to supplant the Abbasids. In 914–91 and again in 919–921, Abu'l-Qasim, the future caliph al-Qa'im bi-Amr Allah (r. 934–946), led attempts to conquer invasions of Egypt. Thwarted in Egypt, the Fatimids remained active in the Western Mediterranean. In 922/3, an expedition of 20 ships under Mas'ud al-Fati took the fortress of St. Agatha near Rhegion, while in April 924 a large army under Ja'far ibn Ubayd, which had been ferried over to Sicily the previous year, landed near Taranto and raided its environs. Ja'far and his army returned with 1,100 captives to Mahdiya in September 925. In 924, the Fatimids also entered into contact with envoys of the Bulgarian Tsar Simeon. Simeon, who was considering attacking Constantinople itself, sought Fatimid naval assistance. Informed of the negotiations, the Byzantines hastened to renew the 917 peace agreement, including the payment of tribute.

Warfare resumed in 927/8, when 44 ships under Sabir, operating from Sicily, raided Calabria. In the summer of 928, Sabir led 30 ships from Mahdiya, once more raiding Calabria before going on to sack Taranto. In 929, Sabir led his fleet up the Tyrrhenian Sea, forcing terms on Salerno and Naples. In the same year, with four ships, he defeated the local Byzantine stratēgos, although the latter had seven ships under his command. Another truce followed, which was adhered to for several years, despite the Byzantines' intervention on the side of an anti-Fatimid uprising in Sicily in 936/7. In 934–935, Ya'qub ibn Ishaq al-Tamimi led another raid, reportedly of 30 vessels, into Italian waters. Genoa was sacked, while Sardinia and Corsica were raided. In 943–947, Fatimid rule was threatened by the revolt of Abu Yazid, which at times came close to overthrowing the dynasty, and another uprising against Fatimid rule erupted in Sicily, again with Byzantine support. Following the end of Abu Yazid's revolt, the Fatimid governor al-Hasan al-Kalbi suppressed it, and possibly in retaliation, attacked Rhegion in 950/1. Considerable land and naval forces were assembled in Sicily in 951, but although the Fatimids raided Calabria and captured the local Byzantine naval commander and his flagship, the expedition returned to Sicily to winter, much to the fury of caliph al-Mansur Billah (r. 946–953). In the next year, after a Fatimid victory at Gerace, the Byzantines sent another embassy, and hostilities ceased once more.

In 955, relations between the Fatimids and the Umayyads, long tense and hostile, boiled over over the capture of a Fatimid vessel, with the Fatimids raiding the Umayyad port of Almeria, and the Umayyads attacking the port of al-Kharaz and the environs of Susa and Tabarqa. Fatimid sources report that the Umayyads proposed joint action with Byzantium, but although an expeditionary force under Marianos Argyros was sent to Italy, it occupied itself with suppressing local revolts rather than engaging the Fatimids, and the Byzantine envoys offered to renew and extend the existing truce. Al-Mu'izz however, determined to expose the Umayyads' collaboration with the infidel enemy and emulate the achievements of his father, refused. The Caliph dispatched more forces to Sicily under al-Hasan al-Kalbi and his brother, Ammar ibn Ali al-Kalbi. The Fatimid official Qadi al-Nu'man reports that initially, the Byzantine fleet was heavily defeated in the Straits of Messina, and that the Fatimids plundered Calabria, whereupon Marianos Argyros visited the caliphal court and arranged for a renewal of the truce. In 957 however the Byzantines under their admiral Basil raided Termini near Palermo, and al-Hasan suffered heavy losses in a storm off Mazara, which dispersed his fleet and killed many of the crews. The survivors were then attacked by the Byzantines, who destroyed 12 ships. Another effort by Argyros to renew the truce in autumn 957 failed, but after the Fatimid fleet was again wrecked in a storm, in which Ammar perished, al-Mu'izz accepted the Byzantine proposals for a renewed five-year truce in 958.

The truce with the Byzantine Empire held despite the massive seaborne expedition launched by Byzantium in 960 to recover the island of Crete. The Cretan Arabs appealed for help to both the Fatimids and to the Ikhshidids of Egypt. Al-Mu'izz wrote to the Byzantine emperor, Romanos II, threatening to retaliate if the expedition was not recalled, and urged the ruler of Egypt, Abu al-Misk Kafur, to combine their navies at Barqa in May 961 and initiate joint action. If Kafur refused, the Fatimids claimed they would sail alone. Kafur, suspicious of Fatimid intentions, refused to co-operate with the Fatimid designs, and indeed it is very likely that al-Mu'izz's proposal was from the beginning a calculated gesture mostly intended for public consumption in the propaganda war with the Sunni Abbasids, with al-Mu'izz trying to present himself as the champion of the jihād against the infidels. In the event the Cretans received no aid from the rest of the Muslim world, and their capital, Chandax, fell after a ten-month siege in March 961. The Fatimids then turned their attention to Sicily, where they decided to reduce the remaining Byzantine outposts, starting with Taormina, which was recaptured in 962. In response, the Byzantines sent another expeditionary force with the object of recovering Sicily in 964. The Byzantine attempt to relieve Rometta was heavily defeated, however, and the Fatimid governor Ahmad ibn al-Hasan al-Kalbi destroyed the invasion fleet at the Battle of the Straits early in 965, using divers equipped with incendiary devices filled with Greek fire. This led the Byzantines to once more request a truce in 966/7. The armistice was granted, as the Fatimids were in the midst of their greatest project: the final conquest of Egypt.

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