User:Cerejota/OpCastLead

Place stuff here under headings etc

Each day the IDF publishes a summary of the day's events ("events" --> nice clean word for "fighting"). You might find it helpful.[1]. Also, if you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask, I'll be happy to share my knowledge (the parts that I'm allowed to share, of course).--Omrim (talk) 01:33, 13 January 2009 (UTC)

Re request. Just in Haaretz I notice Garlasco interviewed on types or possible types of weaponbry, munitions used. Not exactly boffin stuff, which will take some more weeks before full reports in technical journals of warfare and strategy. Still something's bettr than naught. Nishidani (talk) 16:01, 16 January 2009 (UTC)

IDF

These are all the IDF units involved that I`ve seen so far. Just army units and the naval commandos right now. I have not identified the engineering or artillery units and also the reserve parachute brigade that supposedly fired the artillery rounds which hit the school. --JGGardiner (talk) 01:04, 28 January 2009 (UTC)

Southern Command (GOC Yoav Gallant)[2]
-Gaza Division[3] (GOC Brg. Gen Eyal Eisenberg)

from the Infantry Corps:
--Givati Brigade [4] (Col. Ilan Malka[5])
---424th "Shaked" Battalion[6]
---435th "Rotem" Battalion[7] (Lt. Col. Yehuda Cohen)
--(independent) Desert Patrol Battalion (soldier killed after cease fire)[8]
--Golani Brigade[9] (Col. Avi Peled[10])
---51st "HaBoki`m HaRishonim" Battalion [11] (Lt. Col. Shuki Ribak[12])
---13th "Gideon" Battalion[13] (Lt. Col. Oren Cohen)
--Kfir Brigade[14]
---93rd "Haruv" Battalion[15]
--Paratroopers Brigade[16] (Col. Herzi Halevy)
---101st "Cobra" Battalion [17] (Lt. Colonel Avi[18])
---202nd "Viper" Battalion[19]

--5th Reserve Infantry Brigade[20]

--401st Armoured Brigade[21] (Col. Yigal Slovik)

Shayetet 13 (Naval Commandos)[22]
Oketz (K-9) units [23]
Duvdevan unit (undercover)[24]

As for that reserve parachute brigade, looking at an IDF chart, Israel seems to have four of them, the 226th, 551st, 623rd and 646th. But I can't find a specific mention of which of them was in Gaza. --JGGardiner (talk) 01:58, 31 January 2009 (UTC)

from talk

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057962.html

From no less than the commander of Battalion 101 of the Paratrooper Brigade, Lt. Colonel Avi G.: Lt. Col. Avi also describes the Hamas fighting abilities as professional. "They prepared for defense and sabotage. We found groups of booby-trapped homes, with the explosives facing the direction from which they believed we would approach. They have people who understand sabotage a lot better than the average platoon commander in the IDF. In one mosque there were booby traps with sensors that would set the explosive off the minute we entered. In the northern Gaza Strip they retreated as we approached. But the further we moved to the center of the city, Hamas resistance became more serious."

In the area where his unit fought, rocket attacks against Israel ceased. "It is just like the marines say: 'Boots on the ground.' There are things that only a ground force can deal with. It may be that a few ranks above us they call this an operation, but at the battalion level, there is no doubt that this is war. We did not use terms like 'routine security operation.' We talked about 'occupying, assault, attack' - war terminology."

Avi is keen to stress that his soldiers did not consciously target civilians. "At Atatra, a neighborhood in northern Gaza, we saw a light in a house and heard screams, and we let the families walk out with a white flag. I was very concerned about harming civilians. When we went into the Strip I told the soldiers: 'We are not like the Russians in Chechnya.' I was glad to see that the guys knew how to hold their fire."

The only problem is Lt. Avi G. makes the admission in a comment posted on an article, not in an article itself. He wrote (in response to a reservist major arguing the IDF could have gone all the way): ""Up front, we were getting shot at. The IDF advance went well until we got into the heavily populated areas of Gaza. Our tanks couldn’t maneuver properly. The streets were too narrow and the anti-tank fire became so heavy that we were ordered to pull-back to prevent casualties. We could have destroyed Hamas, but not without losing hundreds of soldiers. Hamas of today is not the Hamas of ten-years ago. They are a well-trained force, second only to Hezbollah." 84.65.47.55 (talk) 09:35, 29 January 2009 (UTC)

Equipment

This Haaretz article[25] says that Israel is using the Rafael CARPET minefield clearing system. Some info on that here.[26] I'm not really sure if that's notable enough to be in our article but Haaretz was interested. --JGGardiner (talk) 08:31, 5 February 2009 (UTC)

I happened upon this article from Aviation Week the other day. It has some interesting specifics about the military aspect of the conflict.[27] It mentions a fair bit about the operations. It also has some mention of equipment used including: Spike (missile) (modified for antistructure use), Mark 83 bomb, IAI Heron, Elbit Hermes 450, VIPeR, MATADOR (weapon), SIMON breach grenade --JGGardiner (talk) 22:59, 19 March 2009 (UTC)

Jot of info re Milhist. Can't find your subpage, so I've put it here.

Pfeffer,Defense sources: IAF can't repeat Gaza successes in bigger war, Haaretz 09/02/2009

"Hezbollah and the Syrian army are not Hamas," a senior IAF officer said. "We cannot assume that things will be the same in a bigger war." During Operation Cast Lead the IAF implemented a number of changes that it learned from the Second Lebanon War in 2006. For instance, an air force liaison officer was assigned to every battalion and brigade. Liaisons coordinated evacuation of soldiers and strikes on targets on the ground. Also, every brigade was given an attack helicopter squadron capable of striking targets identified by troops on the ground.

Over 1,000 Hellfire and Orev missiles were fired by Israeli helicopters during the operation. An order to use only laser-guided weapons was given to minimize collateral damage. IAF sources stated that as a result, most incidents of friendly fire were not caused by their own force, but rather by tank or other fire.

Still, IAF officers insisted there was a shortage of helicopters. Cobras that had been grounded for six months due to an accident in which two airmen were killed were rushed back into action.Nishidani (talk) 10:41, 9 February 2009 (UTC)