User:CJSC/PMC Draft
Lead
Terminology
[edit]Addressing article scope; distinguishing PMC versus PSC versus Mercenary, and the debate to which there is any distinction to be made
Singer pp 43-7 - mercenaries versus PXCs - PXCs are corporate entities, commercial enterprises organized as a business - business profit rather than individual profit the motivator - open global market of legal public entities - a wide range of services - not just tactical combat - links with other industries and businesses
Avant pp 23 - definition of "mercenary" is normative; avoids entirely
This article will use the term... PMC? PSC?
Typology
[edit]PXCs take a diverse array of forms, making systemic classification challenging. While some companies may have a clear corporate structure with a permanent staff of executives, employees and operators, others may be start-up organizations drafted from a network of individual contacts whose membership waxes or wanes with the company's contract needs. Many firms prefer to distinguish between "active", or offensive military providers, and "passive", or defensive security providers.[1][2] This distinction is not always clear in practice, however; even unarmed contractors may still serve a military function, and companies who engage in front-line combat may not be officially employed in that capacity.[3] Nor is "active" or "passive" status necessarily consistent over the whole of a company's operating history, as the nature of services provided by a company may vary from contract to contract or employer to employer.[4]
One alternative classification system popularized by Brookings Institution author Peter W. Singer uses a "tip of the spear" model to distinguish between companies who predominantly operate in three battlespace zones: front-line command and combat operations; training and advisory programs; and logistical support services.[5] These services may be targeted towards external military threats or internal security tasks, depending on the nature of the contract and the conflict. In a counterinsurgency or counterterrorist environment, the classification of a service as offensive or defensive in nature is rarely clear-cut, making generalization about the role of a PXC difficult. Since many companies operate in overlapping zones and provide a variety of services depending on the needs of their clients, these classifications may be applied on a contract-by-contract basis for a more precise description of a particular firm's activities. [6]
Military providers operate at the tactical level and engage directly in combat, either alongside or in lieu of the client's own military forces. These organizations are among the highest-profile PXCs and the subject of some of the greatest controversy for their active participation in their employers' conflicts. ex) Executive Outcomes, Sandline, Blackwater
Military consultants ex) MPRI, DynCorp
Military support firms ex) KBR, Parsons
History and Origins
[edit]Prior to the system of sovereign states established at the end of the Thirty Years' War by the Peace of Westphalia, the contracting of private military companies by European rulers was the norm.[7] Extended periods of intermittent conflict like the Hundred Years' War resulted in a constant need for soldiers, who were then discharged from service when a particular conflict came to an end. The term "company" derives from "con pane", the bread that many of these displaced soldiers shared amongst each other as they formed professional organizations to seek employment through the sale of their military skills.[8] The market for "Free Companies" was particularly active in the wealthy Italian city-states, where local enterprises were known as condottieri for the contracts they signed.[9]
At the end of the Thirty Years' War, the Westphalian peace introduced a new state-centered model of international affairs; and one of the defining characteristics of states was their claim to a monopoly on use of force. Napoleonic warfare, in which large armies of citizens armed with new firearms were conscripted to serve in the nation's wars, was a move away from the small, professionally trained companies that had previously dominated European warfare. As state governments gained a greater capacity to administer and marshal the resources of their sovereign territories, the use of private companies greatly declined.[10]
Even after the introduction of the state system, however, national governments continued to turn to non-state actors to supply or supplement their military forces. 1700-1800s - Colonial charter companies
1960s Decolonization - "Les Affreux"
The post-Cold War era
[edit]The modern PXC market developed with the end of the Cold War era, when a number of factors coincided to facilitate its rapid growth. With the end of the fifty-year standoff between the US and the USSR, conflict became more diffuse and disordered. Many postcolonial client states of the two superpowers collapsed into internal conflict with the absence of their former backers.[11] The collapse of state institutions weakened their powers relative to non-state actors, "pav[ing] the way for ethnic mobilization, transnational criminal activity, warlords, rebels, and paramilitaries".[12] Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) who sought to operate in these areas could not rely on the weakened state apparatus to protect their operations, encouraging them to look to other sources for localized protection and order.[13]
Limited intervention by superpowers / UN; "As the clamor for a western response grew just as western militaries were shrinking, nascent PXCs provided a stop-gap tool for meeting greater demands with smaller forces" - Avant 36
The large-scale decommissioning of forces at the end of the Cold War, as was the case in past conflicts, produced a global pool of newly unemployed individuals whose careers during the Cold War left them with a predominantly military-oriented skillset. One estimate puts this worldwide number at approximately seven million soldiers; in the former Soviet bloc and South Africa, entire units were dismissed from duty, including elite special forces, and the US military shrank by a third from its wartime peak.[14] This new pool of military human capital was complemented by the large-scale post-Cold War sale of surplus arms and materiel, particularly in Russia and Eastern Europe. The growth in the global arms trade drove down prices on small arms — and even heavy weaponry — and made the instruments of warfare readily accessible to non-state actors.[15]
Privatization drives; Thatcher, Reagan
Globalization; a new corporate business structure distinguishes these players from their historical predecessors
The Present
[edit]Africa - Sandline/EO
1990s - MPRI in Balkans, DynCorps in S. America
Afghanistan and Iraq ([PXCs in Iraq] will probably be spun off to a sub-article at some point considering the massive amount of activity going on there)
Market composition
[edit]See also [List of private military companies]
US, UK, S.Africa firms and operators predominate
Capabilities
[edit]Who employs PXCs and why?
Surge capacity for states
Professionalization norms for developing militaries
Private funding of PXCs — security details, NGOs
PXCs in humanitarian ops
Controversial Aspects
[edit]Cost benefits?
Contract Oversight
Unity of Command
Drawing away skilled operators
State control of instruments of force
Shifting warmaking powers towards the exec
Legal status
[edit]Contractors and the laws of war
See Also
[edit]External Links
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ Pelton, Robert Young. (2006). Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror. Crown Publishers, pp 109. IBSN 1400097819.
- ^ Singer, Peter W. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press, pp 89-90. ISBN 0801441145.
- ^ Singer, Peter W. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press, pp 89-90. ISBN 0801441145.
- ^ Avant, Deborah D. (2005). The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge University Press, pp 17. ISBN 0521615356.
- ^ Singer, Peter W. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press, pp 93. ISBN 0801441145.
- ^ Avant, Deborah D. (2005). The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge University Press, pp 17-22. ISBN 0521615356.
- ^ Avant, 27
- ^ Singer, 23-4
- ^ Singer, 25-6
- ^ Singer 28-30
- ^ Singer, pp 50-1
- ^ Avant, pp 36
- ^ Avant, pp 37
- ^ Singer, pp 53
- ^ Singer, 54